

LABAR:
JOURNAL OF MILITARY HISTORY &
PEACE STUDIES (LJMHPS)
www.ljmhps.com

Vol. 3. No. 3, DECEMBER. 2023

A Publication of the Department of History, Nigerian Army University
Biu, Borno State, Nigeria

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Nigerian Army University Biu,
Borno State, Nigeria, 2023

Email: naubhistoryjournal@gmail.com
Website: ljmhps.com

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ISSN: 2705-439X (Print)
ISSN: e-2992-5851 (Online)

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Intelligence Community And Security Challenges In Nigeria: A Review Essay

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Abstract

It is factual that no State can exist without formidable and active intelligence community (IC). Intelligence community is the bedrock of a State in terms of prevention, detection and safe guide against hostile intelligence service (HIS). The Nigeria intelligence community are Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department of State Services (DSS) and National Intelligence Agency (NIA). The intelligence community are saddled primarily to procure timely and adequate intelligence for the government to formulates foreign policies and protect her State against clandestine operations from hostile intelligence service (H.I.S). This paper will focus on the Global North intelligence community citing United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) as reference point and Global South intelligence community adopting Egypt, Kenya and Nigeria as case in point respectively. The security challenges confronting the Global North intelligence community are terrorism, cybercrime, economic intelligence, espionage, subversive activities, hostile State actors and so on. While the Global South intelligence community are facing different security challenges such as, corruption, lack of funds, political instability, failed State, unhealthy rivalry amongst intelligence agency, leakages of sensitive materials (top-secret) to the public, activities of mole (double agents), and so on. It is pertinent to bridge the gaps between the Global North and Global South intelligence community and proffer lasting solution to the security challenges confronting the Nigeria intelligence community. This paper will suggest the way forward and advice the Nigerian government how to combat the contemporary threats impeding the intelligence community in actualizing their potentials in discharging their statutory roles and safeguarding the State against any external coercions.

Keywords: Crime, Early Warning Signals, Global North, Global South, Intelligence community, Intelligence sharing, Security challenges.

Introduction

It is factual that no States can survive without an intelligence community (IC). Intelligence agencies are the bedrock in any warfare, and safeguarding its States against espionage, terrorism and insurgency activities from both internal (terrorist/insurgent) and external (Hostile Intelligence Service) enemies of the State. All State across the globe must have a well-equipped and well-trained intelligence agents to combat the prevailing threats (Mosindi, 2019).

This paper will discuss various intelligence communities from the Global North and Global South States. The United States intelligence community comprises of office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGIA), Department of State (DoS), and Department of Defence (DoD) and so on, Ratcliffe (2020). The United Kingdom intelligence community are Military Intelligence Section 6 (MI6), Military Intelligence Section 5 (MI5), Defence Intelligence (DI) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Ratcliffe (2020).

While the Global South intelligence communities of Egypt, Kenya and Nigeria will be discussed. The Egyptian state intelligence community includes General Intelligence Service (GIS), National Security Agencies (NSA), State Security Investigations Service (SSIS), and General Intelligence Service (GIS). The following are the Kenyan State intelligence community, Special Branch (SB), Directorate of Security Intelligence (DSI) and National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) (Mohochi, 2017).

The intelligence community in the Nigerian State are Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department of State Services (DSS) and National Intelligence Agency (NIA). All the three intelligence agencies are saddled with different functions in order to protect and safeguard the State against basic and contemporary threats. Despite their functions and roles provided by the constitution of the state, these intelligence agencies encountered various security challenges either internal or external (Bodunde, Balogun and Ayefa, 2019). According to Onuoha (2017), the Department of State Services (DSS) has some statutory roles as spelt out in the National Security Agencies (NSA) Decree no 19 of 1986. These roles are prevention and detection of any crime against the internal security of Nigeria, the preservation and protect of all non-military confidential matters and such other responsibilities upsetting the internal security within the State. The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) have their roles as spelt out the in NSA Decree no 19 of 1986 as follows; determination of external threat to Nigeria, this involve an analysis of the immediate border, regional or global threat to the security of Nigeria. Also, intelligence procurement to deter any form of threats against the state and provision of environmental intelligence. The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), are saddled with roles as spelt out in the NSA Decree no 19 of 1986 as follows, Coordinating of all intelligence activities of the armed forces, detection and prevention of crimes of military nature against security of the state and preservation and protection of all military confidential matters regarding the security of state both within and outside the shores of Nigeria (Bodunde, et.al., 2019).

Functions of the Global North Intelligence Community: United States and United Kingdom

The Intelligence community of the United States are saddled with different core responsibilities such as gathering, evaluating and dissemination of information relevant to decision-making, this include prediction based on such information, as well as planning for future contingencies. They also provide assistance to the State through investigations, analyses and monitoring of foreign counterinsurgency threats, conducting operations against hostile intelligence services (HIS) operating within the state. It is pertinent to note that the Intelligence community also works autonomously to conduct intelligence activities to aids the foreign policy and national security of the state (Barnett, 2018).

The Intelligence community of the United Kingdom are responsible for accurate collection of secret foreign intelligence regards the State's interests in the security issues, economic policies, defence and crime. They are saddled to investigates any matter or issue of national security, counter-terrorism, counter intelligence effort in a bid to secure public trust and safeguard the Britain's against internal and external aggression (Schweitzer and Fienberg, 2016).

Functions of the Global South Intelligence Community: Egypt, Kenya and Nigeria

The Egyptian intelligence community are responsible for accurate and timely of intelligence both domestically and transnationality with the aim of counter-terrorism. Also, they are concern and effective in the use of covert operations and exploring foreign intelligence's role in shaping domestic action. Their involvement in the State's politics, national security, instrument intelligence, are in Arab States 'Mukhabarat' which means Intelligence Service are very crucial in the operations (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake, 2016).

The Kenyan State intelligence community are saddled with gathering, collating, interpreting and analysing information and share with government, relevance security intelligence agencies and counter-intelligence. They also identify, detect and collates any potential threats to national security which includes any crime against the State such as sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism and so on. They are also saddled with the responsibilities to prevent and detect any activities of hostile intelligence service directed to the legitimate government in power in a bid to overthrow by unlawful means. The Kenyan State intelligence community are in charge of safeguarding her state both domestically and internationally (Mwangi, 2019).

The Nigerian State intelligence community are responsible for defensive and offensive measures to safe guide the State against espionage and subversive elements. The defensive security must include all measures taking by the Intelligence community to protect the Nigerian State and her citizens against any forms of threats either caused natural or man-made. While the offensive measures are the exploitation and application of existing laws been legislative, judiciary and executive orders which go to improve the national security. The enforcement of security drills and procedures which give protection to classified material and information (Bodunde, et. al., 2019).

Adegoke (2017) posits that the Intelligence community are responsible for the provision of combined intelligence appreciation and threat perception relating to conflict as well as in peace time. Through the Defence Intelligence Service the IC provides intelligence to determine either direct or indirect military threats that occur in the Nigerian State and decisive what counter measures are avail to combat the potential threats. More so, they are saddled with an analysis of immediate border, regional or global threats to the State. They engaged in intelligence

forecast, threats assessment and projection through adequate and timely information that will be proceed to intelligence. They equally assist the Nigerian government through intelligence opportunities, such as providing intelligence on the golden opportunities to informed the governments on how and when to pursue the improvement of the State's economic, political and even military position amongst the committee of nations.

Security Challenges of the Global North Intelligence Community: United States and United Kingdom

The United States Intelligence Community are confronted with various security challenges such as economic intelligence, terrorism, cybercrime, technology and so on. The facts that the State is developed is disadvantage to some extent. The Hostile Intelligence Service (HIS) are readily avail to explore all their tentacles to perpetrate and spy the US government based on the developed and high skill of technology available in the state. The HIS make us of all resources to penetrate and recruits' sources and agencies into the US economic to gathered intelligence that could be used against them in the nearest future. So, the US intelligence community needs to be proactive and adopt more efficient way of gathering intelligence that could frustrate the activities of the hostile intelligence service (Ackerman, 2018).

Terrorism is another security challenge opposing the US intelligence community, the reason is that the hostile intelligence service views the US world power and influencer to other developing and under-developed States. The enemies (H.I.S) may wish to attack the State to show their grievances or avenge as the case may be. This issue subject the US IC into serious threat of terrorism cum insurgency. The case of crime is another concern to be worried by the intelligence community. There are various types of crime committed against the US intelligence community such as fraud, impersonation, cybercrime, hacking, and so on. The hostile intelligence service adopts different methods to commit the crime such as breaking the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility to gain access to the server with the intend of hacking and manipulates their data for their selfish consumption (Pham, 2016).

The issue of technology placed the US intelligence community on high risk regards the attack and penetration by the hostile intelligence service (H.I.S). It is factual that the US intelligence community are highly trained and adopt sophisticated gadgets in discharging their core responsibility. Although, they use human intelligence most in gathering their information that will be proceed to intelligence. But the gadgets they use is also disadvantage for the Intelligence community, which gives the hostile intelligence service to intercept the gadgets and hack or manipulate the communication (Olofinbiyi and Steyn, 2019).

The United Kingdom intelligence community are faced with numerous security challenges some of which are the propagandist State broadcast that have been established to have disseminated false and should be prevented from airing such in the State. Basically, the hostile intelligence service is the sponsor of such propagandist and subversion elements in order to penetrate the government through the IC. The issue of cyber and technological are another serious threat to the UK intelligence community. The enemy of the State take undue advantage of highly technological advancements to attack the intelligence community in bid to undermine and discredit the government. Another issue is the penetration of the physical infrastructure and the exclusion of hostile State-actor which must be curtailed by the intelligence community (Adegoke, 2017).

Security Challenges of the Global South Intelligence Community: Egypt, Kenya and Nigeria.

The Egyptian intelligence community encountered various security challenges such as insecurity, endemic conflict, mass migration which leads to breeding grounds for terrorist's, insurgent's and organized crime. The IC are overwhelmed with all these types of crimes which make their statutory role more difficult to discharge. The outcomes of all these menaces led to a failed State which have negative consequence in the operations and enforcement by the intelligence community (Knell, 2011).

There are no correlation and good working relationship between the governments and private organizations these drastically affects the outcome of international negotiations which the IC can not embark on intelligence assessment cum projection. The security forces are not under effective State control, rogue military and intelligence units. The non-governmental security forces such as private military firms, paramilitary are not properly controlled by the state. All these issues are seriously affecting the intelligence community in terms of collating, sharing of accurate information which could be processed to intelligence (Oghi and Unumen, 2014).

The Kenya intelligence community is confronted with different security challenges that affects their core responsibilities which is gathering of adequate and timely information that can be processed to intelligence to curtail any form of criminality against the State. Corruption is the main hindrance against the Kenyan IC especially the rank and file of the various intelligence agencies are corrupt which affects the operations and common goal of the intelligence community (Mukoya, 2013). It is worthy to note Mwanzia (Retired Maj.Gen.) stated that "Irrespective of how much resources you put into intelligence; the corruption will still undermine your objective". He stressed further that "It is a better lesson and a wake-up call for future improvement of security in this country in terms of intelligence collection management". It is obvious that corruption is one of the greatest issues affecting the Kenya intelligence community to achieved their statutory goals.

Also, there is inter agency rivalry amongst the intelligence agency which basically affects the intelligence community. For instance, the military intelligence feels superior than the plain cloth security intelligence agency, these affects the information sharing and collaboration amongst the intelligence community. The political elite (politicians) in the country have drawn the IC to domestic politics instead of allow them to do their core responsibilities which is intelligence gathering. There is poor inter-agency poor coordination amongst the intelligence agencies, this is a real set back for the Kenya intelligence community. Most of the intelligence agencies are working in silos which does not give room for smooth and well coordination amongst them (Mosindi, 2019).

The Kenyan intelligence community are overwhelmed with the issue of porous borders. Especially, the border boundary between the Somalian State. This porosity enables the enemies of the State such as Al – Shabaab and other terrorist's group to take undue advantage to launch attacks and cause tragic to the State. The intelligence community are taking by surprise and they found it difficult to gathered timely and accurate intelligence. Most of the border's community have been brainwashed and inculcated to their cause and ideology thereby insurgent's group. This made them to operates freely and not apprehended by the security forces within the buffer zones (Faluyi, Khan and Akinola, 2019).

The Nigerian intelligence community is faced by various security challenges such as lack of funds, unhealthy rivalry cum lack of intelligence sharing, ignoring of early warning signals, leakages of sensitive materials/documents, activities of mole (double agents) amongst the intelligence personnel, misconduct of vetting of intelligence personnel, inadequate training and competency skills (Adegoke, 2017). No doubt, the Nigerian intelligence community is basically challenged with lack of funds. This issue has drastically affected their mode of operations. In discharging their core responsibilities in all the levels of gathering and sharing intelligence from strategic, operational and tactical ways respectively. The inadequate funding affects the IC in acquiring the modern gadgets to assist in intelligence gathering such as tracker vehicle, drone, jammer machine, and so on. Even though the Nigerian government purchased it they are not enough for the intelligence personnel to use all because it is just few that are available for usage (Ashaolu, 2017). The issues of unhealthy rivalry cum lack of intelligence sharing can not be overlooked, it really affecting the Nigerian intelligence community. Most of the intelligence agency exhibits some negative attributes such as mistrust amongst the agencies, ego boosting syndrome, politicization of intelligence, overlapping functions between the intelligence agencies, uncooperative attitude and so on (Bodunde, et. al., 2019).

Another security challenge the Nigerian intelligence community encountered is the ignoring of early warning signals. Most of the information of attacks by the insurgent's group in the Nigerian State are heard by the intelligence community prior before the menace but the ability to process the information to intelligence through collation, evaluation and interpretation and timely shared is the issue. They ignore early warning signals due to ego boosting and lack of working synergy amongst themselves which lead to the perpetration of the insurgent's and terrorist's group (Onuoha, 2017).

The intelligence community are confronted with the issue of leakages of sensitive materials cum documents. As we know that security documents should be classified accordingly base on the importance of the contents. Some of these documents are leaks to the public and hostile intelligence service (HIS) which they used against the intelligence community and government. (Adegoke, 2017). More so, the activities of mole (double agents) amongst the intelligence community is alarming and seriously affecting the core responsibilities. When a joint operation is planned against the enemy of the State, some of the mole within the intelligence community will divulge the operational strategies to the sponsor or collaborators of the insurgent's cum terrorist's group. This unprofessional act is causing backdrop to the State and the entire intelligence community (Bodunde et. al., 2019).

The way forwards to curtail the security challenges confronting the Global North intelligence community United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK):

It is not new-fangled that the Global North intelligence community such as United States and United Kingdom are faced with different security challenges. Here is to provide the way forwards to combat the menace of challenges impeding the growth and successful operations of intelligence community in the Global North (Phenson, Ojie, Esin and Atai, 2014).

The intelligence community must be proactive in their dealings rather than reactive, no doubt, this setting will assist to project long time intelligence planning against the hostile intelligence service. The issue of working in silos should be avoided amongst the others intelligence

community in the Global North. This intelligence liaison will assist them in curtailing and having prior information about the enemy of the State.

The intelligence community should be upright in terms of gathering reliable and accurate information on the pursuance of active foreign policy this will assist the states against the backdrop of economic intelligence. The IC through the national security applications will be able to safe guide the States against any forms of menace and nefarious activities against them (Farouk, 2015).

The issue of global war on terrorism is another challenge that threatening the peaceful coexistence and operations of the intelligence community. Intelligence sharing and joint profiling of insurgents cum terrorists should be sustained amongst the Global North intelligence community. No doubt, this will curtail and combat the nefarious activities of the enemy of the State (Akinfala, Akinbode and Kemmer, 2014).

The Global North governments and the intelligence community must advocate against the subversive elements, the media and communication should be properly monitored, activities of propagandist should curtail, arrest and prosecution should be made on them to serve as deterrence to others not to emulate. Doing all these counter measures will drastically reduce the menace of the insurgent's group (Mosindi, 2019).

The way forwards to curtail the security challenges opposing the Global South intelligence community Egypt, Kenya and Nigeria:

Basically, the major challenge facing the Global South intelligence community is corruption. All the States should collaborate to fight against corruption in any individual State. The issue of corruption has deepened into the economic which have negative effects on all the sectors. It is between the governments and the masses. All the sectors in the Global South States are highly corrupt which some of their leaders treat with light-heartedness. No doubt, the issue of corruption has really tremendously affected the intelligence community in terms of gathering adequate and timely intelligence (Faluyi, et. al., 2019).

The issue of inter-agency rivalry amongst the intelligence agencies should be curtail. The governments should encourage synergy amongst them and create enabling environments that will conducive for them to work hand in hand. Joint courses and conference should be organized for all the intelligence community to coagulate their *modus operandi* in terms of intelligence sharing and avoid unhealthy rivalry amongst themselves (Adegoke, 2017).

Another challenge is the lack of harmony amongst the intelligence community. There must be harmonization of inter-agency coordination. This will assist them in gathering of timely and accurate intelligence against enemy of the State. More so, in terms of intelligence assessment, monthly intelligence report, threat analysis, situation report, and so on. Harmonization of inter-agency coordination will play vital role to achieved the core responsibilities of intelligence community which is timely and accurate intelligence (Olofinbiyi and Steyn, 2019).

In addition, the Global South intelligence community are faced with the issue of porosity of border posts. Basically, most of the border posts are very porous without adequate and physical security checks of travelers and alien control (TAC). Kenya-Somalia border, Nigeria-Niger border, Egypt-Sudan borders are very porous which gives room for the insurgent's and

terrorist's group to smuggling arms and ammunition, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and so on. The border posts need to be fortified with both personnel and physical security gadgets. They must strict to the application of five (5) D's of physical security which goes thus; Delay, Deter, Demarcate, Deny and Detain. Applying the five (5) D's of physical security will assist to curtail and combat the excesses of intruders into the State, reduced the crime rate and improve intelligence collection within the radii of the border towns and communities (Mosindi, 2019).

The formation of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has assisted in combating the insurgency activities in the Global South States to some extent. But they failed to established formidable and active intelligence collaboration. It is factual that the MNJTF comprises of military personnel especially in the west coast of Africa such as Benin Republic, Cameroun, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The Egypt and Kenya suppose to form joint international intelligence that will engaged in intelligence sharing, harmonization and liaison amongst them. This will aids the intelligence community to improve in the intelligence collection and combat the threats of insurgency cum terrorism (Okonkwo, 2019).

Bridging the gaps between the Global North intelligence community United States/ United Kingdom and Global South intelligence community Egypt, Kenya and Nigeria:

Adegoke (2017) opined that there are wide gaps between the intelligence gathering and collection between the Global North and Global South intelligence community respectively. The Global North are agitating to combat delinquency against economic, intelligence crime, curtail terrorism and improve technological effects to improve their intelligence collection and gathering against the terrorists. The Global South are still facing with the contemporary threats like corruption, lack of synergy amongst the intelligence agencies, unhealthy rivalry, porous borders, and so on. There are urgent needs for the Global North and Global South intelligence community to come together to share intelligence and educate the Global South intelligence on the need to use modern intelligence gadgets. No doubt, exchange of information cum ideas like security seminars, conferences, symposia and many more will bridge the widen gaps between the intelligence community. The result will assist all the intelligence community to improve in terms of intelligence gathering and increase their professionalism in the course of the statutory responsibilities.

Conclusion and Recommendations:

Onuoha (2017) posits that the applications of both intelligence gathering and intelligence circle must be treated with utmost care and professionalism. It is sacrosanct that intelligence gathering and intelligence circle are the hall mark of intelligence agencies. If they fail in the gathering of information that is accurate, definitely the intelligence will not be apt to curtail any form of impediments or menace. It is factual that the Global North are confronted with terrorism, intelligence crime, technology and so on. They should try to establish kind of data sharing within their embassies and high commissions outside their state on the profile and full photograph of any suspected terrorists, insurgents, cyber fraudsters, hackers, and so on. This act will assist the intelligence community to place them on watch lists and pre informed about their nefarious activities.

While the Global South governments and the intelligence community should be advice and educate on the need to reduced corrupt practices. They should call for war against corruption

and increase the budget for the security votes. Doing these will assist the intelligence community to improve geometrically in terms of intelligence gathering. More so, the intelligence personnel must be train and retrain on how to use the modern intelligence gadgets to ease their intelligence collection (Adegoke, 2017).

The following are the recommendations proffered by the paper

Timely and continuous funding of intelligence to ensure proper, adequate appraised and analyzed information reliable and suitable enough to tackle current situation of insecurity. Training and retraining of personnel of intelligence community in order to meet up with current trend and deviations in the contemporary Nigerian environments for efficient gathering of intelligence and ability to use it for productive law enforcement and policy formulations by the government. For effective and efficiency to be achieved in security operations, government should harness raw information from both the members of the public and the national intelligence communities and confirm timely, adequate, accurate and reliable sharing of intelligence amongst the security forces.

Government should support cordial relationship between her security forces and intelligence agencies of the international communities to ensure counter intelligence cum counterinsurgency for against external aggression such as hostile intelligence service (HIS) and internal collaborators such as subversive elements. It is a known fact that public security agencies that personnel welfare is a motivation of effective and accurate intelligence gathering, therefore, government should ensure that the remuneration of intelligence personnel are moderately and timely taken care of.

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UNITED NATIONS PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: AN APPRAISAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS STABILISATION MISSION IN HAITI (MINUSTAH)

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Abstract

Peace support operations (PSOs) are one of the most crucial tools for conflict prevention and stabilising peace and security in conflict-affected states. History shows that Haiti projects the image of a country where life is not just nasty and brutish but also short and full of uncertainties. This gives context to why the international community today classifies Haiti as a fragile state that has functioned to fulfill the needs of its elite class while offering little or no benefits to the citizenry. An understanding of Haiti's turbulent history is critical to identifying the political realities which shaped the United Nation's peace-building efforts in Haiti. Using the liberal theory of international organisations as the framework of analysis, this paper examines the UN's PSOs through the Instrumentality of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, (MINUSTAH). Secondary data using the content analysis method was used. The paper revealed that UN PSOs like MINUSTAH are crucial for establishing and sustaining peace during and after conflict. Though MINUSTAH restored a largely secure and stable environment in Haiti, difficulties nonetheless persisted as MINUSTAH's presence in Haiti was marked by several internal and external shocks, affecting its stabilisation agenda. The paper recommends among other things that evolving UN missions should ensure a coherent, coordinated, and integrated approach to reform in the areas of Demobilisation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration (DDR), police, justice, corrections, and human rights, by utilizing and formalising the rule of law group.

Keywords: United Nations, Peace Support Operation (PSO), Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, MINUSTAH

Introduction

While not always clearly expressed, human nature *is the immediate basis of all human actions, including conflicts and wars*. Conflict is a universal phenomenon that has directly or indirectly affected all states. Conflicts occur in diverse forms, sometimes between individuals, and groups in a state, states, or between non-state actors, and it can be attributed to internal and external causal factors. These causal factors of conflict are associated with bad governance, ethnic intolerance, massive human rights abuses, poverty, and failure of the state (Best, 2006). From the colonial period till contemporary times, Haiti has primarily functioned to fulfil the needs of its elite class while offering little or no benefits to the masses. From a historical standpoint, Haiti reflects the Hobbesian state of nature where life is not uncertain but also short, brutish, and nasty. This perception of the image of the Haitian state provides the necessary contextualization of Haiti as a fragile state, classified by the inability or unwillingness of the government to provide essential fundamental services to its people, particularly the economically disadvantaged class. Haiti's tumultuous played a critical role in determining the approach and dimension of the UN's peacebuilding effort in the country. Being a product of colonial expansionism, the Haitian state has been ruled by different colonial powers. From the Spanish colonial powers from 1492- 1697 to the French colonialists from 1697-1804. these colonial powers acquired and sustained power through pitted military battles. Slaves from Africa were brought to Haiti during the colonial period to augment the loss of members of the local population during the slave revolt. This brutal colonial administration was characterised by near-continuous cycles of slave revolt and resistance l which resulted in the French colonial administrations governing through acts of "atrocities". Haiti recorded the first successful slave revolt and gained independence in 1804. Post-independence Haiti was characterised by political instability coupled with the economic repercussions of forced reparation payments placed on the Haitian government by the former French Colonialists, further worsening Haiti's economic predicament, ultimately preventing the economic development of Haiti (Leininger, 2006)

Haiti's turbulent history shows that it has experienced several violent conflicts and the premature departure of the international mission from Haiti in early 2000 led to extensive political unrest, violence, and socioeconomic difficulties, with the security sector being the main issue (Mobekk, 2008:113). Despite this array of conflicts and violence in the Haitian state, general elections finally took place in May 2000 after being postponed several times. However, the democratic process of the election was challenged and widely rejected by the local population as a result of the flawed method of calculating the election results. The election resulted in the removal of the three-time president of Haiti Jean-Bertrand Aristide from office on February 28, 2004. Following Aristide's removal from office, paramilitary agencies perpetrated massacres in the streets with near impunity, this resulted in widespread armed rebellions and violent protests in Port-au-Prince, and the Haitian government was unable to prevent the escalation of the crisis because of weak governance. Haiti continued to experience widespread political violence following Aristide's departure, necessitating the inauguration of a 20-year UN peacekeeping presence in Haiti, mandated to establish the rule of law in Haiti (Leininger, 2006). UNSCR 1542 established MINUSTAH on June 1, 2004, and endowed the mission with a strong mandate in three principal areas: provision of a secure and stable environment, particularly through disarmament; supporting the political process and good governance in preparation for upcoming elections; and monitoring and reporting on human

rights. Based on the above preamble, this research intends to conduct an appraisal of the UN's peace support operations in Haiti through the instrumentality of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), particularly the challenges, achievements, and criticisms.

Theoretical Framework

This research adopts the liberal theory of international organisations as the framework of analysis. Liberal institutionalism is traceable to the writings of Adam Smith, John Locke, Voltaire, and the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Liberalism offers a distinct viewpoint on international organisations, which diverges from that of realism. Liberal institutionalism is guided by three interconnected principles; it opposes the idea that power politics is the only result of interactions between actors in the global system, challenges the security and warfare principles espoused by realist scholars and promotes mutual benefits in inter-state relations, and supports international cooperation through the instrumentality of international organisations and non-state actors to influence policy preferences and decisions of states (Shirayev, 2004).

Scholars of the liberalist theory of international organisations argue that international organizations are crucial for facilitating international cooperation. They provide a tangible platform that enables cooperation among states in the international system. Proponents of this theory argue that international organizations are not created only to serve the strategic objectives of one state but are mandated to prevent conflicts and carry out post-conflict peacebuilding.

Pease asserts that international organizations such as the UN are conduits for diplomacy, cooperation, and the safeguarding of global peace and security. To showcase the advantageous impact of international organizations in global matters, proponents of liberal institutionalism emphasize the myriad achievements of these organizations in areas such as human rights, environmental policies, economic cooperation, and interdependence. (Pease 2012). Proponents of liberalism contend that international organizations such as the United Nations play a vital role in maintaining peace, security, and stability in a global system that lacks a global governing body to regulate interactions among its players. The UN has over the years contributed significantly to maintaining global peace and security through various peace support operations inaugurated in conflicted affected areas like Haiti by establishing missions like MINUSTAH. This framework provides an avenue for appraisal of the UN's peacebuilding efforts in Haiti using the instrumentality of MINUSMAH.

The United Nations Stabilization Mission In Haiti (Minustah): A Critical Analysis

Overview of the Mission

MINUSTAH has been actively present in Haiti from 2014-2017, the military component of the mission was spearheaded by the Brazilian Army, and a Brazilian served as the Force Commander. The mission was composed of 2,366 military personnel and 2,533 police officers, assisted by international and civilian personnel, local civilian staff, and UN Volunteers (MINUSTAH, 2016). MINUSTAH's mandates as captured in UNSCR 1542 encompass aiding the constitutional and political process in Haiti, ensuring a secure and stable environment, and contributing to the re-establishment and upkeep of the rule of law, public safety, and public order. The Mission's primary objectives included supporting the Transitional Government in

overseeing and improving the Haitian National Police through democratic policing norms, implementing a thorough and lasting Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Programme (DDR) for all armed groups, aiding the transitional government in expanding state control, facilitating national reconciliation and dialogue, and providing assistance for the organisation of transparent and equitable elections (MINUSTAH 2004). MINUSTAH's mandate varies from previous UN deployments in Haiti in two distinct aspects. The mission emphasized security, as reflected in the ongoing commitment of CIMIC components from participating states. Furthermore, it prioritizes human rights as a central focus of the UN's involvement in Haiti (Freedman & Wills (2021)). MINUSTAH's operation in Haiti was captured in three phases. The initial phase lasted from 2004-2006 and focused on establishing stability in Haiti after the violence that erupted following Aristide's exile and was also ardent to election security in 2006. Phase two which lasted from 2006 to 2010 focused on security in Port-au-Prince's difficult neighbourhoods as well as Security Sector Reform (SSR). As part of the preparation for the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2010, there was also political discourse and reconciliation during this time. Following the 2010 earthquake, the third phase began, with support for recovery and reconstruction programs as well as the prioritization of the security agenda. The third phase was nearing its conclusion by the end of 2013, sparking discussions on how to facilitate a successful shift towards a post-MINUSTAH Haiti (International Crisis Group, 2012).

Security Sector Reform (SSR), MINUSTAH's original objective was overshadowed by the stabilization agenda in the early years of deployment of the mission, as re-establishing state authority and preparations for the 2006 election was prioritized by MINUSTAH because Haiti was still experiencing a boisterous period of change and has not reached the post-conflict state. Before the establishment of MINUSTAH, the US, Canada, and France spearheaded a 3,600-strong Multinational Interim Force (MIF), mandated to restore some degree of stability in Haiti's unstable environment that ensued from Aristide's forceful exile in 2004. Efforts to stabilize the precarious security situation in Haiti's Port-au-Prince remained futile despite the establishment of the UN's presence throughout Haiti for a year. The securitization policy of MINUSTAH was conducted through three specific mechanisms; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former personnel of the Haitian armed forces; neutralization of armed groups and their incorporation into DDR programs; restructuring of the Haitian Nation Police. Nonetheless, the mission could not adequately actualize its objectives. Another key facet of MINUSTAH's mandate was election. The presence of MINUSTAH personnel facilitated the February 2006 election that resulted in the election of René Préval as president of Haiti. However, the election was criticized for electoral fraud (International Crisis Group, 2006). MINUSTAH's mandate was extended in 2006 to include strengthening its SSR agenda. Consequently, the mission assisted in police, judicial, and prison reforms in collaboration with the Haitian government. Despite the security situation in Haiti, MINUSTAH played a crucial role in preventing a resurgence of armed gang violence, political turmoil, civil unrest, and drug trafficking. (International Crisis Group, 2011).

Minustah's post-earthquake mission mandate prioritised the safety of internally displaced persons, facilitating national elections, and establishing an efficient government to expedite the restoration process. To integrate the objectives of stabilizing the situation and promoting economic growth, MINUSTAH also assisted in establishing a rule of law agreement, with the

Haitian government, the business sector, and other international entities. However, this initiative was plagued by political disputes between the presidency and the parliament. Inadequate coordination between various donor nations impeded the SSR initiative of MINUSTAH as aptly noted by the International Crisis Group in 2011. The former Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) of the UN asserted that the inability of the international community to collaborate effectively is reflected in the Haiti National Police (International Crisis Group, 2011). Since 2004, efforts to improve the police system have focused on a specific and technical plan that prioritized training and screening. However, this strategy faced difficulties due to the limitations and practical circumstances in place, and as a result, despite numerous successes, MINUSTAH lacked a comprehensive SSR vision that would have combined state-building and security sector reform. This led the UN in a direction that strengthened the forces that had initially sparked civil unrest.

Challenges of MINUSTAH

MINUSTAH faced challenges in achieving stability and reducing human rights violations, despite its comprehensive mandate, integrated approach, and focus on human security and peacebuilding. The relative efficacy of the military aspect of the MINUSTAH mandate sets the foundation for heightened expectations. MINUSTAH effectively ensured a basic level of security in various cities in Haiti, particularly in Port-au-Prince. MINUSTAH, in addition to its multifaceted mission, deployed police officers in Haiti, as specified in the other two pillars of its mandate. The evaluation and measurement of MINUSTAH's overall success should not be reduced to its military aspect alone, as a multidimensional PSO like MINUSTAH encompasses various other components that also contribute to its performance.

Delayed Implementation of MINUSTAH

The deployment of MINUSTAH was characterised by a lethargic pace, with the mission only being able to fully deploy across the country in November 2004. By mid-August 2004, fewer than 50% of the authorised troops and only 25% of the police had been deployed. The prolonged deployment was taken advantage of by the former Haitian military, who seized control of deserted police stations in the latter part of 2004 and contributed to instances of violence and criminal behaviour (CIC, 2006). MINUSTAH faced challenges in recruiting individuals with the necessary expertise and French language proficiency to effectively carry out police, justice, and prison reform. As a result, it took them some time to assemble the required workforce and develop the essential capabilities. In December 2006, UNPOL had a staffing shortage of 56% and only half of the crucial positions in the justice section were functioning. (Mobekk, 2009).

Mission Composition - Challenges with language, inexperienced troops, and absence of cultural training

MINUSTAH was under the leadership of and primarily comprised of Latin American nations. In 2004, Brazil assumed control of the operation, deploying 1,200 troops along with the force commander. Significant groups from Argentina, Uruguay, Sri Lanka, Jordan, and Nepal were joined by smaller groups from Peru, Spain, Morocco, the Philippines, Ecuador, and Guatemala. Police units were additionally provided by Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Senegal. Moreover, numerous police officers were sourced from more than thirty countries

(CIC, 2006). Considering the limited experience of certain peacekeeping nations, such as the Brazilian command whose lack of expertise and limited decision-making capabilities limited their initial credibility, an important lesson to be learned is the necessity of assembling UN troops from countries with a diverse range of peacekeeping experience (UNAC, 2006).

The reputation of MINUSTAH and the perception of the mission by local people were influenced by language barriers. Only a small number of peacekeeping personnel possessed proficiency in both French and English. By mid-2006, less than 40% of the United Nations Police (UNPOL) deployed with the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) were proficient in French, even though they were often involved in confrontations with armed gangs. A smaller number of peacekeepers possessed the ability to communicate in Creole, the predominant language spoken by the Haitian population. There were only three translators at the disposal of a contingent of 500 police officers. The United Nations Association of Canada suggested that MINUSTAH should establish joint patrols, consisting of both foreign troops and Haitian soldiers of Haitian descent, as a means to foster trust. Canada, which has a significant number of reserve soldiers with Haitian heritage, opted to form mixed patrols during their recent deployments. These initiatives have yielded numerous favourable outcomes, as members of the local community identify with the uniforms worn by individuals similar to them, leading to a rapid establishment of trust. Integrating cultural training would have facilitated peacekeepers' comprehension of Haitian culture and fostered the establishment of trust between MINUSTAH forces and the indigenous community (UNAC, 2006)

Disagreements in UNSC and within the Mission itself

The Security Council's divergent viewpoints and the nature of the mission itself resulted in a mandate that was ambiguous and created uncertainties regarding MINUSTAH's security responsibilities. The interpretation of MINUSTAH's mandate varied among troops contributing countries, especially on issues concerning the protection of civilians and the exercise of authority (Faubert, 2006). Resolutions 1542 and 1608 provide a comprehensive framework, but they also blur the distinction between assigning MINUSTAH a purely supportive role and authorising a more assertive, interventionist approach (CIC, 2006). At the initial phase, there were strident differences of opinion as to how robustly MINUSTAH should act and several countries refused to allow their troops to take part in offensive missions. According to a report from Harvard Law School in 2005, the failures of MINUSTAH can be attributed mainly to the cautious interpretation of its mandates by its officials. Despite being fully staffed, the peacekeeping force persistently interpreted its mandate with complacency and a limited perspective that is unsuitable for the constant security situation in Haiti. The transition period within the Security Council itself gave rise to intricate dynamics that led to uncertainty regarding the mandate of MINUSTAH. In February 2006, the Security Council Report observed that France and the US had become uninterested in resolving the Haitian conflict. Brazil, which was leading the mission, was also no longer a member of the UNSC. China was hesitant to support MINUSTAH's mandate due to disagreements over Haiti's increasing relations with Taiwan. Argentina was unwilling to accept a UN involvement that was interventionist. In mid-2005, MINUSTAH implemented a more assertive and vigorous strategy in certain slum areas of Port-au-Prince. While the security situation eventually got better and

peacekeepers successfully disbanded some criminal gangs, how operations were carried out raised concerns about the mission's legitimacy and caused a breakdown of trust between MINUSTAH and the Haitian population. A significant number of military operations were conducted by troops who lacked sufficient training in urban warfare tactics and strategies to minimise unintended harm.

Implementation Issues

MINUSTAH employed a comprehensive strategy that encompasses five crucial areas of activity: disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR); justice; electoral assistance; national dialogue; and child protection. A significant innovation in management was the establishment of an integrated management structure between UNDP and MINUSTAH. This involved appointing the Resident Representative of UNDP as Deputy SRSH to ensure continuity, given that he had already been in the country for two years (Faubert, 2006). Nevertheless, initial attempts to integrate were hindered by institutional distrust and adverse stereotyping among the organisations. According to the report, UNDP believed that they possessed a superior understanding of the local context and described the mission as dominant and intimidating. Conversely, the mission perceived UNDP as being completely disconnected from reality (Mobekk, 2008). The reluctance to merge is partially rooted in divergent perspectives regarding the immediate goals of the mission versus the long-term developmental objectives of the UNDP, as well as the perceived intrusive nature of the mission compared to the perceived more lenient approach of the UNDP towards the government. Muggah's (2007) analysis of the DDR section, which is the most comprehensive and integrated part of the mission, determined that the integrated DDR mission was indeed undergoing disintegration. The effectiveness of integration was hindered by deficiencies in political leadership both within and outside the UN, the lack of explicit guidance from headquarters, conflicting interpretations of DDR among managers and practitioners, and uncertainty regarding financing mechanisms. In 2006, the operational work of DDR UNDP and DDR MINUSTAH, although integrated in vision, was divided into two distinct programmes. UNDP focused on community violence prevention, while DPKO focused on DDR. The level of collaboration among important stakeholders rose in 2007, specifically within the United Nations organisation and concerning specific matters, such as the reform of the security sector (Mobekk, 2008). Nevertheless, there is still a deficiency in donor coordination, even though formal coordination mechanisms have been established. The UN Secretary-General, MINUSTAH, and numerous donors have recognised that enhancing coordination is a crucial priority, especially as new stakeholders increase their involvement (CIGI, 2010:4).

Inability to adapt to the evolving political and economic landscape in Haiti.

MINUSTAH encountered a progressively intricate and swiftly worsening security scenario right from the beginning - a volatile combination of politically driven violence and criminal behaviour. Cockayne (2009) contends that MINUSTAH's ability to address the persistent violence and instability was initially hindered by their reliance on conventional military methods. MINUSTAH faced criticism for its inability to foresee and address unconventional challenges to stability arising from the intricate (frequently involving criminal activities) political system. This includes the misdirection of DDR initiatives towards rebel armed factions

instead of local gangs and organised criminal activities. However, MINUSTAH achieved success in 2006-2007 by engaging in intelligence-led military-police-civil operations to combat the gangs, although it required some time to comprehend the nature of the threat and devise an efficient strategy. The Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) is a collaborative unit consisting of military officers, police personnel, and international civilians. Its primary function is to collect information on the operations of urban gangs using a network of informants who are compensated for their services, as well as through discreet surveillance methods. MINUSTAH's intelligence was instrumental in enabling them to proactively seize control of the battlefield and successfully eliminate gang presence in the slums of Port-au-Prince (Dorn, 2009).

Human Security: Guardians or Agitators?

UNSCR 1542 mandated MINUSTAH to establish and maintain a safe and stable environment, reinstate and uphold the principles of law, safeguard public safety and order in Haiti, and provide protection to civilians facing immediate danger of physical harm. However, there were regular protests against MINUSTAH's use of excessive military force particularly in urban slum areas and to suppress demonstrations. The mission's significant loss of local support and credibility can be attributed to its failure to ensure sufficient security for residents of internal displacement camps, particularly women and communities experiencing violence and forced evictions. MINUSTAH faced persistent public accusations of human rights violations and sexual assault committed by its members (Henry and Highgate, 2009) noted that peacekeeping enclaves in Haiti exhibit gendered characteristics, including the interactions that occur within them. Despite having a substantial gender unit compared to other UN missions, the effectiveness of MINUSTAH in addressing gender-related issues remained uncertain. Despite the repatriation of over 100 Sri Lankan MINUSTAH troops in 2007 due to allegations of sexual misconduct and abuse of underage girls, there is no substantiated evidence of any subsequent prosecution of Sri Lankan troops. The Security Council Report from March 2012 raised doubts about MINUSTAH's capacity to establish its legitimacy and effectiveness due to allegations of sexual misconduct involving police personnel from the mission (Beetham, 2011).

Criticism

Since its inception, MINUSTAH has been squeezed between the traditional conservative sectors, which wanted greater action, and the leftist parties, primarily those connected to former President Aristide, which regularly call for its removal and condemn its operations. Among these criticisms were the following:

Political Overtones

MINUSTAH had challenges in recruiting a significant number of foreign police personnel though it was predominantly composed of the military. The mission was sent to a nation experiencing widespread violence resulting from political instability and ordinary criminals. The mission was assigned to support and strengthen the efforts of the Haitian Police in the slums of Port-au-Prince. On 6 July 2005, The MINUSTAH mission, under the leadership of Brazilian general Augusto Heleno, conducted a military operation in the Cité Soleil area of Port-au-Prince. The operation was aimed at a stronghold of unlawfully armed insurgents under the leadership of the notorious criminal Dread Wilme (Gabriel, 2018). According to reports from sources supporting Lavalas and writer Kevin Pina, the attack was aimed at civilians and

intended to eliminate the widespread backing for Haiti's exiled former leader, Aristide, before the planned 2018 elections (Klein, 2015).

The casualty estimates ranged from 5 to 80, with the higher numbers being reported by those alleging that the operation deliberately focused on civilians. Contrary to the reports from many sources, there were no casualties among the MINUSTAH personnel. The consensus among all sources confirms that Dread Wilme, also known as Emmanuel Wilmer, was fatally attacked during the raid. Wilma was referred to as a "gangster" by MINUSTAH officials. The Haitian Lawyers Leadership Network, which supports Aristide, refers to Wilme as a community leader and martyr (HLN, 2007). The occurrence was celebrated by factions who are against the presence of MINUSTAH in Haiti and who advocate the reinstatement of deposed President Aristide (International Red Cross, 2007). Advocates of Fanmi Lavalas further alleged that MINUSTAH facilitated the Haitian National Police in perpetrating heinous acts and mass killings against Lavalas supporters and innocent Haitian individuals. On January 6th, 2006, Juan Gabriel Valdés, the leader of the UN mission, said that MINUSTAH soldiers would carry out an additional operation in Cité Soleil. Haitian traditional organizations strongly criticised MINUSTAH for its failure to intervene and stop the ongoing violence in slums such as Cité Soleil. Meanwhile, human rights organisations were prepared to hold MINUSTAH responsible for any unexpected negative outcomes resulting from its actions. According to reports, Valdés said, "We plan to intervene in the upcoming days." The author expresses the belief that there will be unintended harm caused, yet it is necessary to assert our power since there are no other methods available. (IJDH, 2007).

Rape Scandal

Multiple incidents of sexual assault reportedly involved troops from MINUSTAH. In 2011, four Uruguayan UN marines faced allegations of engaging in a collective sexual assault on a 19-year-old Haitian boy in Port-Salut. According to reports, the purported sexual assault was documented using a mobile device by the peacekeepers themselves and then made public on the Internet (Weisbrot, 2011). Following the video's widespread circulation, the adolescent and his family were compelled to move their residence (Klarreich, 2012). In March 2012, three Pakistani policemen serving in the MINUSTAH were convicted of sexually assaulting a 14-year-old kid with mental disabilities in the town of Gonaïves. According to Human Rights Watch (2013), Pakistani authorities imposed a one-year jail term on each officer.

In November 2007, a total of 114 individuals from the Sri Lanka peacekeeping mission in Haiti, which consisted of 950 personnel, were alleged to have engaged in sexual misconduct and abuse (Williams, 2007; BBC News, 2007). A total of 108 individuals, consisting of 3 officers, were repatriated due to their involvement in suspected misbehaviour and sexual assault, as reported by Reddy in 2007. Michele Montas, a spokesperson for the United Nations, expressed remorse on behalf of the organisation and the Sri Lankan government for any instances of sexual exploitation and abuse that have taken place. According to the Sri Lankan Officials, there is little concrete proof about this instance (UN, 2007). The inquiry conducted by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) concluded that incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse (specifically against minors) were pervasive and mostly took place at nighttime, occurring at almost every location where the contingent troops were stationed. The OIOS provided support in the ongoing legal processes undertaken by the Sri Lankan Government and recommended

that charges should include statutory rape "due to the involvement of individuals under the age of 18" (Sunday Times, 2008). In 2015, a further inquiry was published, alleging that MINUSTAH forces had perpetrated widespread mistreatment against several Haitians (Times of India, 2015).

Human Rights Cases

In 2010, Gérard Jean-Gilles, a 16-year-old Haitian boy who ran miscellaneous errands for the Nepalese soldiers in Cap-Haitien, was found dead hanging inside of MINUSTAH's Formed Police Unit base. UN personnel denied responsibility, claiming that the teen committed suicide. The troops released the body for autopsy seventy-two hours after the death; the examination ruled out suicide as a potential cause of death (Harvard University Press, 2013). Nepalese UN troops were also accused of other misdeeds. Several days before the Jean-Gilles incident, the local press charged a Nepalese soldier with torturing a minor in a public area in Cap-Haitien. The soldier was said to have forced "his hands into the youth's mouth in an attempt to separate his lower jaw from his upper jaw, tearing the skin of his mouth" (CPER, 2013).

People affiliated with Fanmi Lavalas, the major socialist party in Haiti, have frequently complained about MINUSTAH's handling of political public dissent. On November 15, 2010, Demonstrations in Cap-Haitien and other areas of the country led to several casualties, including numerous wounded and a minimum of two civilian deaths. It was alleged that the demonstrations seemed to be politically driven, to foster a sense of instability just before the elections. The report indicated that a UN peacekeeper was fatally shot in an act of self-defence (CPER, 2013). The party of former President Aristide, Fanmi Lavalas, participated in the funeral of Catholic priest Gerard Jean-Juste on June 18, 2009. Subsequently, it was stated that the parade was abruptly disrupted by gunshots. According to witnesses from Fanmi Lavalas, the Brazilian troops from Minustah fired their weapons after trying to apprehend one of the people attending the funeral. However, the UN has refuted this claim and said that the deceased was either killed by a rock thrown by the crowd or a blunt object.

Conclusion

United Nations peace operations continue to serve as a significant mechanism for establishing and sustaining peace following conflicts. The existence of United Nations peace efforts is crucial for facilitating dialogue between states, providing a platform for former enemies to resolve their differences, and coordinating international cooperation to promote peace and security. It symbolises the combined endeavour and dedication of the global community to guarantee a safe and steady atmosphere worldwide. With a strong and authoritative mandate, MINUSTAH could put an end to the recurring patterns of violence in Haiti, establish equitable and democratic institutions, and foster a societal environment that upholds and advances human rights. While the United Nations, through the implementation of the MINUSTAH peacebuilding operation, successfully achieved a relatively secure and stable environment in Haiti, there are still existing challenges that need to be addressed. MINUSTAH, despite being a robust human rights mandate in the realm of U.N. peacekeeping operations, failed to adequately investigate or document instances of human rights violations and also did not

provide sufficient protection for human rights defenders. MINUSTAH's primary focus was on disarmament as part of its security and stabilisation responsibilities. However, the disarmament efforts of MINUSTAH were limited to discussions held in conference rooms. Therefore, Haiti is governed by firearms and intimidation, rather than a legal system. These deficiencies arise not due to a feeble authorization, but due to a feeble determination in the political realm. The fragility of Haiti will persist until there is a parallel improvement in both the security situation and the socioeconomic conditions of the country and its entire population. The U.N.'s primary goal now is to assist in attaining and maintaining these advancements. Therefore, evolving UN Missions in Haiti should focus on creating a solid foundation for long-term peace, to avoid the need for repeated interventions.

Recommendations

If the Transitional Government does not immediately put its DDR plan into action, it is all too easy to anticipate that unlawfully armed groups, particularly ex-military and urban gangs, will undermine the democratic process and the UN peace operations' efforts. U.N. personnel must be trained in Creole and/or French, or, if that is not possible, additional professional translators must be hired to accompany UN personnel in the field, to bridge the linguistic gap between U.N. personnel and the Haitian people. This will help to overcome the challenge of language difficulty and a lack of cultural training.

Human rights abuse issues provide a dilemma that evolving UN engagements in Haiti must inevitably confront. Provide safety and security for all Haitians exercising their right to freedom of expression and peaceful public assembly, free from interference and repression from the government and/or police forces. Cooperate with all human rights organizations in Haiti regularly and share information and intelligence with them. Use whatever means necessary to ensure the safety and security of human rights organizations.

Evolving UN operations in Haiti must implement a strategy for disarming any armed groups—including gangs of various political affiliations and the former military—at the earliest possible date and, relatedly, ensure that the government provides no compensation to any illegally armed actors unless payment is linked to their disarmament.

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EFFECTS OF BOUNDARY DEMARCATION BETWEEN ITUMBAUZO AND HER NEIGHBOURS, 1940 – 2020

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Abstract

This paper examines the effects of boundary demarcation between Itumbauzo and her neighbours. The study explores the implications of boundary disputes on inter-group relations in Nigeria, using the people of Akwa Ibom and their Igbo neighbours situated in Abia state as a case study. This study becomes imperative since such disputes have shown to have dire consequences on long standing inter-group relations which goes back to pre-colonial times, as the case of Akwa Ibom and Igbo is one among the numerous examples scattered across Nigeria. Findings from the study reveal that the boundary conflict between both groups took root in the state creation and Boundary Adjustment exercises conducted by the then Federal Military Government which led to the carving out of Akwa Ibom state from Cross Rivers in 1987, and Abia from Imo state in 1991. Both have long before the coming of the European lived side-by-side peacefully as they had had a very robust inter-group relation which is presently being threatened by recent boundary disputes between them. However, it is intrusive to note that should these boundary disputes persist unresolved, the implication is that both groups will make no meaningful socio-economic advancement as wherever there is conflict, growth and development could be difficult to achieve. Hence, the study concludes thus: policy makers as well as traditional leaders must endeavour to avert further complication through proper investigation, consultations and reconciliation exercises. The method adopt in the study is both primary and secondary sources. While the primary source focuses on oral interview and use of archival document, the

secondary source focuses on use of written documents such as gazettes, textbooks, journals and other relevant documents.

Introduction

In reality, boundaries are as old as man himself and therefore not a new phenomenon in the relationship between man, his environment and his fellow human beings. On a broader spectrum, Africa as a whole has continuously been ravaged by land boundary disputes due to her colonial and post-colonial experiences. From Southern Africa, to North, East, West and Central Africa, there exist numerous protracted conflicts relating to boundaries forcefully separating two or more ethnic groups that either have shared cultural values or have lived side-by-side for countless number of years. Among these disputes, key instances would include, but not limited to; the Ogaden boundary conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Bakassi Peninsula between Nigeria and Cameroon, Orange River border line between Namibia and South Africa, KaNgwane between South Africa and Swaziland, to mention but a few.

It should be noted that all the aforementioned land-border disputes have their root in the partition exercise conducted by European nations. In Nigeria, there exist a plethora of boundary disputes ravaging so many communities which are struggling over land, boundary, forest reserve, ancestral land, among other valuables, as the case may be. The boundary dispute between the Annang people (Itumbauzo) of Akwa Ibom state and their Igbo neighbours, particularly in Abia state, has been one of the numerous protracted boundary disputes in Nigeria which necessitated this academic venture.

It is interesting to note that both groups, over many centuries, had enjoyed a very robust inter-group relationship irrespective of some slight variances that could be spotted in their cultural exchanges. In spite of these variances, both ethnic groups have for centuries conducted intermarriages, engaged in joint economic activities, exchanged cultural values as well as amicably settled conflict between themselves with any third party being involved.¹ Therefore, the genesis of this boundary conflict is to be traced to the various boundary demarcation and adjustment exercises which inadvertently neglected the importance of conducting appropriate field assessment of affected regions prior to the creation of new boundaries or adjustment.

Itumbauzo people and her Neighbours from 1940 to 1960

The nature of Annang-Igbo relations in the pre-colonial time was without doubt multifaceted. The groups had interacted with one another for over a long period of time which cuts across various aspects. The people of Annang, prior to the coming of the Europeans, interacted with their Igbo neighbours in numerous ways which cut across aspects such as inter-marriages, trade and commerce, cultural festivities, and even in the aspect of warfare and diplomacy.

The implication of the foregoing is this was that, Africans all over the continent were never in absolute isolation as against the erroneous view of Eurocentric scholars. Accordingly, Adiaka, posits strongly that “the people of Igbo have been in very close contact with our Annang people.” Commenting on the intergroup relations that existed between the Igbo and their

Annang neighbours, Afigbo points to the fact that, these groups enjoyed a very robust interaction in many aspects of their co-existence. Afigbo espouses that the two groups ensured that in spite of the disputes that emerged, it was not enough to create long-lasting enmity among them.

Further, trade and commerce were other factors upon which the intergroup relations between the Annang and the Igbo neighbours thrived in pre-colonial times. The nature and scope of their trade relations was basically hinged upon agriculture, which was the bases of their economies. In addition, trade as a factor of contact between the Annang and Igbo people arose from the fact that different communities under our scope of study were differently endowed with resources. Therefore, this compelled some of them to engage in local and long range exchange by the need to transcend their limitations and maximize their comparative advantages.

Outside agricultural produce, the Annang communities were noted for craftsmanship. Most Annang communities exchanged crafted items which they must have manufactured from the use of raffia, such as bags, hats, carpets, among others. The Annang people were also involved in wood carving which was one of their major traditional occupation that has been passed down from one generation to another by their ancestors.³

In another direction, the marriage factor was another decisive instrument in their relations. It was reported that marriage was mostly used as a diplomatic tool in amending their relations mostly after conflictual periods. Marriages were often conducted as means to an end. While on other occasions, inter-marriages occurred not for diplomatic purposes but for the fact that intending couples might have developed interests. Afigbo succinctly puts it thus: *...and Ika-na-Annang asserted that since they lived so close, the two ethnic groups inter-married. The Ndoki in particular were said to have been fond of marrying from amongst the Ika-na-Annang, whose women they claimed made excellent wives.*

Afigbo's position was further consolidated by the statements of Okuku who asserts thus:

Marriage between the Annang people and their Igbo neighbours, particularly those along the Ariam and Ikot Umoh Essien boundary lines of Obot Akara and Ikwuano is an age-long practices right from our forefathers through whom this practice have been passed down to the present generation. The place of marriage in our relationship with our Igbo neighbours is undeniable as both group have for long been inextricably intertwined as a result of the off springs from these marriages.⁴

Therefore, giving the foregoing analysis, the fact that marriage constituted a major factor in the Annang-Igbo relations has been established. Like have been stated earlier, marriage was both for amending their relationship sequel to any loggerhead, or trade purposes, as well as for the purpose of expanding their frontiers for the purpose of generations yet unborn as is the case in contemporary times.

Furthermore, both ethnic groups had in time past expressed their pre-colonial relations via the art of warfare. The motive of these wars were not to annihilate one another, but to resolve their misunderstanding through other channels, as war itself is a form of diplomacy upon the application of certain coercive measures. Put differently, conflict by its very nature is a critical ingredient for human societal progress. However, when not properly ordered, can become destructive. For instance, the Igbo, according to Basden, remarked that:

War was an integral part of the Ibo life-style and form a basis of their inter-group relation with their neighbours... it was “a rare thing for towns to remain at peace for a very long, and when quietness did happen to prevail for a time, the spell was broken on the slightest pretext and hostilities began again forthwith. During the dry season, fighting was a sort of pastime, either between different quarters of the same town or between neighboring towns.”⁵

Basden’s remarks as given above goes to show that the intent behind pre-colonial warring communities was not necessarily to neither destruct nor annihilate their contending oppositions, but to resolve their misunderstanding in the battle field. The most interesting part is that warfare were also conducted in the most suitable period so as not to create famine across the land after the war must have come to an end. This is in contradiction to what is obtainable in most African societies today. As in contemporary times, certain groups engage in conflict, either to annihilate their opponents or cause devastating consequences even after the war must have come to an end.

Language factor was also a very strong indices when considering the dynamics of inter-group relations between the Annang people and their Igbo neighbours.⁶ However, it must be pointed out that when analyzing this factor of contact between the groups under discourse, attention must be paid only to those group of Igbo communities sharing immediate boundaries with the Annang people, as they were so close than other group of Igbo who are far from the immediate reach of the Annang people. Put differently, an Igbo community situated in faraway Nsukka, Okigwe, Owerri, Orlu, or even Onitsha cannot be said to have interacted with the Annang people in terms of language, as distance posed a barrier to this possibility. However, only the Igbo communities such as the Ariam, Ngwa, among others, sharing immediate boundaries with the Annang people that must have related in term of language. As language interaction, the Igbo and their Annang neighbours must have found themselves speaking in each other’s language in the pre-colonial times, as it is without surprise the case in contemporary times.⁷

Pointedly, the Paramount Ruler of Obot Akara Local Government Area of Akwa Ibon State showed a high level of understanding the Igbo language as he indicated that his name “Uwa” means earth or world in both the Annang and Igbo languages, further strengthening the position that both groups interrelated in the aspect of language during pre-colonial, colonial and even up to post-colonial times. Also supportive of the position that language was indeed a medium of interaction for both the Annang and their Igbo neighbours from pre-colonial to post-colonial times, David Northrup, while critically conducting a research he entitled , *Igbo and Igbo Myth: Culture and Ethnicity in the Atlantic World, 1600-1850*, espouses the views that:

It has been established by many scholars who, through the employment of ethno linguistic study, surmised that the Igbo and their neighbours, of which the Annang people are a part of, have shown to relate through language. Northrup puts it succinctly thus: ...in the eighteenth century, the Anang lived along an unstable frontier with the Ngwa Igbo, whose traditions are quite explicit about their penetration and incorporation with the Anang peoples. The Anang and Ngwa Igbo laid along important trade routes from Arochukwu to Bonny. Thus, an Ngwa Igbo might well speak Moko and look like a Moko. Similarly, there

would be nothing odd about an Anang (Moko) who could speak Igbo as a second language.⁸

Given the above background, the fact that Africans existed in isolation have been further debunked through the robust relations both groups under our discourse had in pre-colonial era. The Annang people, along with their Igbo neighbours, had a very cordial intercourse that has spanned countless number of years and that was multifaceted.⁸ Thus, it must be noted that, in spite of the cordiality and thoughtfulness, war was not totally devoid of their interactions.

Cases of Boundary Disputes

Strictly, most of the boundary disputes existing between the Annang and their Igbo neighbours earlier took roots in the various old provincial and divisional boundaries backed by the statutes of government. That is to say that across the various boundaries demarcating Abia and Akwa Ibom states, majority of the communities, right from colonial, to post-colonial era, have been entangled in disputes over boundary disagreements owing to numerous government policies and boundary demarcations and adjustments exercises. However, it is intrusive to note that these boundary disputes are only an outgrowth of a framework for inter-state boundaries which were aimed at bringing about quality governance, maintenance of law and order, and the utmost desire to bring government closer to the people in most practical terms. Take for instance, Essien puts this more succinctly thus: ...

Thirty-six states now exist out of four regions in place immediately after independence. Eight states now exist out of the former Eastern Region. Of these, it would appear that in these parts, the boundary with emotions rooted deepest in distrust was between the former South Eastern State and East Central State; and then it became Cross River/ Imo, then Akwa Ibom and Abia states. There exist till date various instances of boundary disputes among numerous communities spread across some Local Government Areas on both sides.

Regrettably, these disputes have lingered for so long that it has left cracks in their inter-group relations. Almost all communities along the boundary demarcating Abia State from Akwa Ibom State have at one time or the other involved in very serious clash that had brought about terrible consequences for all concerned, even going further to threatening whatever peace that had existed among them in time past.⁹

State Creation, National Boundary Commission and Boundary Disputes in Nigeria

Beyond doubt, it has been noted that all boundaries created on the bases of political or economic factors are artificial, since they are not natural but were created by man. Hence, the accidents of history, the vagaries of geography and the exigencies of economics have all given impetus in determining even European boundaries which often more than not becomes a flash point for future disputes.¹⁰ Prior to the establishment of Boundary Adjustment Commissions and subsequently, various states creation exercises, the various peopling that made up what is today known as Nigeria had their own traditional form of boundaries marked by various natural factors. Pre-colonial communities across Nigeria noted their territorial integrities by agreeing on certain landmarks such as trees of very distinct nature, particularly the *Iroko* and Mahogany,

a lasting feature example, ant-hills, or other natural landmarks such as rivers, valleys, mountains, among others.

Moreover, it is to be noted that while traditional boundaries had the potential for conflict, their cooperative features were far more prominent as these boundaries were not regarded as sacrosanct. Rather, such boundaries further enabled geographical definition of kin-ship group and remarkably gave a boost to human organization and promoted inter-group harmony in pre-colonial times. Unfortunately, during colonial rule, the British colonial government imposed imaginary boundaries alien to the traditional notion of boundaries among the people. The consequence of this was that it separated related ethnic groups in all aspects of their very existence. M.O. Bonchuk puts it thus:

...the boundaries have separated related ethnic groups...the boundaries were meant to separate these groups for purposes of administrative and jurisdictional competence. However, neither the colonial nor post-colonial boundaries have functioned as they were expected to. These divided groups continue to interact and yearn for closer relationship across boundaries.¹¹

In another dimension, Adejuyigbe, while discussing on the issues surrounding boundary disputes in western Nigeria, highlights colonial government's policy as a root cause of boundary tussle in colonial times which have regrettably lingered up till present day Nigeria. Though he attributed boundary disputes during colonial era to disagreement over resource(s) control, he stated such conflicts arose when colonial agents decided to pay royalty over certain natural resources situated in a frontier to one group and ignoring the other group which also shared same frontier as well. Hence, Adejuyigbe advocates thus:

After colonial administration had been established, British citizens started to take interest in the extraction of timber and wild rubber from the forests. Such forest produce was more abundant in areas not under agriculture and these were usually in the frontiers between the communities...before exploitation started it was necessary to get clearance from the landowners, that is one of the communities separated by the frontier and which was believed to exercise jurisdiction over the area...one effect of the situation was that any community which was first approached first felt it within its power to give the concession and hence collect timber royalties from the timber merchant. Knowledge of royalty agreements and payments usually made the other community challenge the rights of the grantor over the affected area. The second community would claim that it owned part of the territory or all of it and should therefore collect part or all the timber royalty from the area.¹²

Thus, from these perceptive, both Bonchuk and Adejuyigbe are of the views that one major cause of boundary disputes among the various peopling of present day Nigeria was the policies of the defunct colonial administration. Through their works, both authors illustrated how colonial administration sparked off boundary disputes which have lingered up till day. Although it is to be noted that by exactly 1917, a request was put forth to the colonial government of Lord Frederick Lugard by some people from Ilorin and Kabba Provinces for a boundary adjustment which would enable them to rejoin their kith and kin in the western portion of Nigeria which they were separated from during the 1914 Amalgamation. Both Commissions set up by Lugard in 1917, and the one set up by Macpherson, gave a verdict of no adjustment.

And the Willink Commission set up to look into the Cross River, Ogoja and Rivers agitation only recommended adjustment based on a plebiscite.¹³

Further, after Nigeria gained independence from British colonial rule, the country, barely six years into her independence, found herself grappling with so much internal issues ranging from loyalty, ethnic politics, riots, coup and mutiny, among others, which eventually culminated into a Civil War lasting from 1967 to 1970. Prior to the Civil war, the then military government of Gen. Yakubu Gowon was to break the formidable geo-ethnic fronts presented by the regions.³³ Although, a source claimed that Gowon broke the regions into twelve to further destabilize the southeast under Ojukwu's control prior to the Civil War to ensure that those regions which had earlier agitated for their separate states (which led to the establishment of the Willink Commission in 1957) disassociated themselves from Ojukwu's rebellious act. Hence, once states were created, ethnic groups began to glamour for their own states so as to be able to promote their individual identity and participate actively in the acquisition and appropriation of the nation's resources.¹⁴

After this, the creation process began with Gen. Yakubu Gowon who, around 1967-1976, transformed the Northern, Western, Eastern and Mid-Western Regions into twelve states. And by 1976, Murtala/Obasanjo increased them to nineteenth; Gen. Ibrahim Babangida by 1991 topped the number of states in Nigeria to thirty, whereas, it was Gen. Sani Abacha who climaxed it with addition six bringing the total number of states to thirty six. What these numerous states creation brought was separation of ethnic groups into two, leaving one in another state, and the other half in a different state altogether. This had led to increased agitations by various groups which long to be reunited with their kith and kin. In view of this, Bonchuk remarked thus:

Ethnic groups that were not large enough to constitute a state of their own invariably found themselves on the "wrong side" of the boundary "dominated" by groups with larger population in their own states. Some of these groups also found out that they have been split and dump in two different states...some of the boundaries were replicated on the map without adequate care being taken to ensure that the position on the map was precisely reflected on the ground before such states were created.

What the quotation holds is exactly the case with the Annang and their Igbo neighbours. In which, during the various boundary adjustment and states creations, the various constituted Commissions and Panels (such as Akilu, Nasir, Irikefe, Oduwaiye, Ali, among others) failed to conduct a thorough on the filed assessment before given their final reports. Hence, communities which had earlier lived as one single unit, found themselves separated from their kith and kin. And in areas where there exist mineral resources, the issues became more intense.

Notably, the boundary disputes that have continued to strain the Annang-Igbo inter-group relations could be traced to the state creation of 1967 when Gen. Yakubu Gowon created Cross River from the former Eastern Region.¹⁵ However, its name was changed to Cross River State in the 1976 state creation exercise by the then Gen. Murtala / Obasanjo regime from South Eastern State; and the present Akwa Ibom State was excised from it in the state creation exercise of 1987 by the then regime of Gen. Ibrahim Babaginda. The creation of Akwa Ibom, and the subsequent creation of Abia state led to many communities along the borderline to be split into various factions with one half into Akwa Ibom and the other in Abia state. Owing to the multiple

boundary conflicts scattered across Nigeria, the then Murtala/Obasanjo regime constituted the Justice Nasir Boundary Adjustment Commission in 1976 to look into how the issues, among other things, could be resolved. In order to work out a solution, the Mamman Nasir Commission, based on the recommendations made by Justice Irefeke's panel on the creation of states set up earlier in 1975, traced the origin of boundary dispute to the 1914 Amalgamation Exercise. However, the Nasir Commission has on many grounds, been accused of being the root cause of what both ethnic groups under discourse are going through till date. Many have termed the Nasir Commission as the handmaiden used by Olusegun Obasanjo to further punish, deprive, humiliate and also marginalize the Igbo who were still in the process of recovering from the Nigerian Civil War.¹⁶ Concisely, while reacting to the boundary dispute between Ukwa East (in Abia) and Oyigbo (in Rivers state) Don Ubani stated thus:

For no other reason than economic punishment, deprivation, humiliation and marginalization, the Obasanjo Military Government set up the Justice Mamman Nasir Boundary Commission. General Obasanjo's targets were the Igbo areas prolific with hydro-carbon and Mamman Nasir boundary Commission, ironically, ignorantly and, of-course, unjustifiably used the Imo River as boundary between the present Abia State and Rivers State. It has to be stated that both sides of the Imo River, that is Ukwa-west in Abia State and Oyigbo in Rivers State contain many oil-wells. But more oil wells are in Oyigbo area. Let it be said here that the commercial town of Obigbo, which was renamed Oyigbo after the Nasir boundary adjustment, is an Asa town. During the colonial era, Obigbo town and komkom Village, which are now in Rivers State, were integral parts of Asa county council, with headquarters at Obehie-Asa. After the Nigerian/Biafran War, Oyigbo and Komkom were in Ukwa Division, with the headquarters still at Obehie-Asa. They were in Ukwa Division until 1976 when Mamman Nasir did his supposedly magic. The same fate befell Ndoki communities of Afam and Egberu. Although, the quotation above portrays what actually transpired between the people of Ukwa-West and Oyigbo, it can imaginarily be substituted in the case of the various local government areas under study. Recounting the words of Okuku, Paramount Ruler of Obot Akara LGA, he was of the view that what bedevils the Annang people of Usaka Annang, and their closest Igbo neighbours, Usaka Oku and Ariam was as a result of boundary demarcation carelessly carried out by the Justice Mamman Nasir Commission which ended up splitting brother communities into two or more units. Whereas one is presently in Abia state, and the other in Akwa Ibom state.¹⁷

In addition to the views above, a community leader attributed the various communal clashes to the "biased federal government boundary adjustment of 1985," which, he explained, unjustly ceded some Imo communities to Cross Rivers. Since then and upon creation of Akwa Ibom state in 1987, and Abia state in 1991, Abia border communities have been under attack by their neighbours.¹⁹ In 2014, when the then Governor of Abia state, Theodore Orji, was addressing journalist on the skirmishes that have continued to plague the border communities of Abia and Akwa Ibom states, the Governor lamented that the Mamman Nasir Boundary Commission created a whole lot of problem for the people of Abia and their Akwa Ibom neighbours.

Thus, from the foregone analysis, we have seen that what is presently going on between the Annang and their Igbo neighbours in terms of boundary disputes took roots in colonial policies, as well as boundary adjustments and states creations which have been conducted haphazardly as a result of lack of adequate investigations to ascertain the crux of the matters before giving verdicts. Thus, if this boundary dispute must be brought to an end, government, as well as other stakeholders, must take a historical voyage to understand what conflict resolution mechanisms must be employed to resolving this intermittent skirmishes that have continuously strained the Annang-Igbo inter-group relations.²⁰

Implications of Boundary Disputes for among and their Igbo neighbours

It is common knowledge that every actions or inactions come with many consequences, either for good or bad. In likewise manner, the boundary disputes that have engulfed the Annang people and their Igbo neighbours over time is in itself not without grave implications for both groups, as it should be noted that growth and development are hardly recorded wherever there is conflict. The disputes have the following implications.

- i. First, the boundary dispute between both groups have greatly affected negatively their trade and commercial life. In pre-colonial times, both groups, as historical studies and oral traditions have shown, interacted so much in economic terms as no group is self-sufficient, hence the need to trade with the other group for vital basics needed for continuous survival. However, the nature and scope of the groups' involvement with one another in the aspect of trade and commerce have to a large extent reduced owing to these protracted conflicts that have characterized their relations in the post-colonial time. This is regrettably so, since it has become common for movement at some point within the various territories of both groups under discourse to be a source of worry. When tension is high, someone from one side could be slaughtered on the other side, on the assumption that the victim is an enemy. In most cases, the victim of such act might not even be aware that he has crossed into the "enemies" zone because of how inter-woven the Annang and their Igbo neighbours had long lived side-by-side. For example, Annang groups within Ika Local Government Area, which has boundary with Ndoki-Azumini, often more than not cross Igboland before getting to another part of the same Ika LGA and vice versa or going to trade in local markets. But with the onslaught between both groups as a result of the various boundary skirmishes, this movement has been cautiously reduced for fear of losing their lives. The implication being that trade across local markets in both communities has been terminated.²¹
- ii. Another implication is that inter-marriage, an age-long practice between both groups, has greatly reduced. As, presumably, no son or daughter from either side of the groups would want to marry from a region termed "enemy" by his or her own people. This development is in sharp contrast to what Afigbo told us concerning inter-group marriage among these groups when he remarked that both groups were found of marrying amongst themselves, particularly, the Ndoki men who were fond of taking wives from the Ika-na-Annang whose ladies they said made excellent wives. This regrettable situation is not just peculiar to the Annang-

Igbo case, but cuts across virtually every area across the length and breadth of Post-colonial Nigeria where there is presently some sort of boundary disputes.²²

- iii. Furthermore, the boundary skirmishes across the two territories have brought about pain and anguish to both groups as countless number of lives and property worth millions of naira had been lost. Also, it has left both groups going after the jugular of each other at every slightest provocations without recourse to proper investigation. This has totally destroyed the peace and harmony that had existed among them in the pre-colonial times.
- iv. Moreso, the boundary disputes between the Annang and their Igbo neighbours have some resultant adverse effects among the youths across the various communities affected. As a result of this, there have been hunger and starvation, since most people are scared of going to farms close to the boundary for fear of being attacked. Similarly, the disputes among these groups have brought about loss of moral and cultural values. It would be noted that in the pre-colonial times, these groups had shared so many traditional practices in common such as the *Ekpe* society. Evidences show that the Igbo people of Nkpor, Abam, Ohafia, among others, have interacted with the Annang people through this medium; during festivals both groups also interacted.²³ Unfortunately, the boundary dispute between them have discouraged further interactions in those dimensions.
- v. Politically, boundary disputes have been greatly exploited by numerous politicians from both ends to the detriment of both groups. This is much more obvious during period of elections as most aspirants vying for either Local Government Chairmanship or Councillorship positions use to promise the affected communities to attract the state and federal government attention towards their plights, only for them to abandon all such promises the moment they are elected into office due, mostly, for prevalence of disputes in the communities. This has further worsening the plight of the people within the regions where these boundary disputes have lingered.²⁴
- vi. Another dimension is that grassroots development hardly gets to these areas, as policy decision makers at the LGAs level always assume that since the region(s) is or are under contention, it would be a waste of resources to take any massive project to such areas.
Thus, having stated this much, it is right to assert that boundary disputes among the Annang and their Igbo neighbours have brought certain unfavourable consequences on their inter-group relations.²⁵

Conclusion

In conclusion, the paper beyond doubt, has proven from the foregoing that the people of Itumbauzo and their Akwa Ibom neighbours interacted before the coming of the Europeans in the area as one entity. However, the advent of the Europeans which subsequently led to colonialism, and later to independence, created boundary disputes among the people. This was

as a result of the Willink Commission boundary adjustments in the area which disrupted the unity in the area and turned the once peaceful people into disagreement over the new boundary demarcation in the area, which was formerly not an issue in the area.

Therefore, the paper is of the view that both communities should, with the relevant authorities and restrain, as well as mutual understanding, go back to the drawing board and bring back those virtues that united them as one in the area in order to design a better ground for peaceful coexistence for development in the area. When this is achieved, it will return the people to successful economic, social and political healthy relationship the way it was before the arrival of the Europeans whose interest in the area became the beginning of boundary rancour in the area.

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GLOBALIZATION AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA: THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN PLATEAU STATE

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Abstract

Globalization after the end of the cold war dashed the hope for international peace and security as it gives wide range of opportunities for trans-border movement, transnational crimes and proliferation of small arms and light weapons across national boundaries and within national territories. Plateau State is a victim of the proliferation of SALWs within and from without its territories. *One of the major threats bedeviling Plateau State's peace and security in the 21st century is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The State since 2001 has passed through several faces of conflicts and criminal activities, which have persisted till date. This paper examines the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Plateau State since 2001. It also examines the connection and implications of these small arms and light weapons on violent conflicts and crimes in the state.* The study adopted a qualitative research design, with a historical methodology, which is based on the use of primary and secondary data. The primary data emanates from field work and oral interviews while the secondary data were collected from textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers, electronic media and the internet. *Readily available and easy to use, small arms and light weapons have been the sole tool of violence in almost all conflicts and criminal operations in Plateau State. These weapons, have taken a heavy toll on human lives, women and children accounting for more of the casualties.* The findings of the study reveal that the proliferation of SALWs is an enabler for insurgency, banditry, kidnapping and other crimes in Plateau State, Nigeria. The study recommends that there should be strict monitoring and surveillance of all borders by the security in Plateau State and at the larger extend Nigeria's illegal access routes should be block. *The paper concluded that the supply and demand factors of SALWs are interwoven, addressing one without the other will disproportionately exacerbate the fight on security challenges; thus stringent national arms control strategy is very important to regulate SALW proliferation.*

Keywords: Globalization; Nigeria, Plateau State; Proliferation; SALWs

Introduction

Nigeria as a country has undergone diverse violent conflicts; these are ethnic conflicts, religious clashes, political tensions, communal conflicts etc. The nexus between small arms and security has been established among scholars. Literature abounds on the national security challenge caused by the proliferation of small arms in Nigeria. Studying security threats and having knowledge on the proliferation of small arms and light weapon is just a bid to consider its effect on human security, especially in Plateau State, Nigeria. This stems from the fact that Plateau State has become a large market and destination accommodating trans-border arms merchants and dealers. The ineffectiveness of government policies to curtail the illicit distribution of arms and light weapons in Nigeria presents a threat to the livelihood of citizens in the country. SALW is not just a threat to the citizens' fundamental right, it also undermines human development. The escalation of violent conflict is a show of the availability of small arms and light weapons in the hands of the perpetrators of crimes and conflict merchants. The threat to human security in Plateau State owes to the fact that Nigeria shares the three stages of the organised trafficking of small arms and light weapons in West Africa region: origin, transit and destination.¹

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) remain the most desirable out of all categories of weapons known to man. This is as a result of the cost and handling as they are cheap, easily assessable, and easy to use as compared with heavy weapons.² Additionally, SALWs present its users with the opportunity of variation of use. Put differently, Small Arms and Light Weapons provide users with a wide range of users including defense, etc. This is the reason behind the large number of SALWs in circulation in most parts of Nigeria including Plateau State.

According to Flesham and Jacqmin, Nigeria has over ten million SALWs in circulation, in which a fraction of these weapons in circulation are found in Plateau State.³ This however creates an opportunity for individuals with criminal intentions to employ such weapons to fulfill their intents.⁴ This in turn creates room for the transference of SALWs through unprotected and porous borders. The security risks posed by the wide availability of SALWs are evident in the number of people killed in the state since 2001, when conflict broke out between Christians and Muslims. According to Malam SALWs kill between 500,000 and 700,000 people annually;⁵ in Plateau State it kills over 1,000 yearly following the end of the violent conflict, these killings are attributable to farmer-herder conflicts, criminal invasion of villages by militia groups known as bandits and reprisal attacks.

Ayuba and Okafor opine that conflicts are invigorated due to the abundance of SALWs procured by individuals, religious groups, criminal non-actors and national governments, with state-owned financial resources.⁶ This is the experience of Plateau State as it has witnessed different dimensions of ethnic and religious conflicts since 2001. Some of the conflicts that have occurred in the State include the 2001 Jos conflict which spiral to other parts of the state, the Yelwa Shendam conflict, Wase, Kanam, Langtang North and Namu conflicts between 2004 and 2015 and a host of others issues such as the Dogo Nahawa genocide of 2011, the Yelwa Zangam invasion in 2021, the incessant Irigwe killings and so on. These conflicts are fueled by the constant demand, availability and circulation of SALWs in the hands of non state actors, individuals and criminals in Plateau State. This study therefore, examines the proliferation of these arms and weapons in the state since 2001 and how it has affected lives and property.

Conceptual Clarifications

Globalization

Anthony McGrew states that globalization constitutes a multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that transcend the nation states (and by implication the societies) which make up the modern world system. It defines a process through which events, decisions and activities in one part of the world can come to have a significant consequence for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the

globe.⁷ Philip Cerny furthermore suggests that globalization redefines the relationship between territoriality and authority, shifting authority from the level of the state to supranational and sub-national units, perhaps offering more to grasp onto in operational terms but precious little in causal terms.⁸

Robert Z. Lawrence is emphatic in stating that globalization shifts authority—to specifically the local and the regional level.⁹ Cerny adds elsewhere that: Globalization is defined here as a set of economic and political structures and processes deriving from the changing character of the goods and assets that comprise the base of the international political economy—in particular, the increasing structural differentiation of those goods and assets.¹⁰

Alternatively, globalization might be characterized functionally by an intrinsically related series of economic phenomena. These include the liberalization and deregulation of markets, privatization of assets, retreat of state functions (particularly welfare ones), diffusion of technology, cross-national distribution of manufacturing production (foreign direct investment), and the integration of capital markets. In its narrowest formulation, the term refers to the worldwide spread of sales, production facilities, and manufacturing processes, all of which reconstitute the international division of labor. Globalization involves the compression of space such that distance is less of a factor than it used to be in terms of knowledge, communication and movement. Geography and territory is undermined and things start to develop at a level which is global and more than and above inter-national relations.

Roland Robertson, a professor of sociology at the University of Aberden, was the first person who defined globalization as "the understanding of the world and the increased perception of the world as a whole."¹¹ Albrow Martin and Elizabeth King define globalization as "all those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society."¹² In his paper "The Consequences of Modernity", Giddens Anthony define the concept thus: "the globalization can be defined as the intensification of social relations throughout the world, linking distant localities in such a way that local happenings are formed as a result of events that occur many miles away and vice versa."¹³ Globalization can be linked to the local, the national and the regional. On the one hand, a connection is made between social and economic relationships and networks, organized on a local and / or national, on the other hand, it connects social and economic relationships and networks crystallized on wider scale the regional and global interactions.

Conflict

Conflict is difficult to define, because it occurs in many different settings and facets of life. The essence of conflict seems to be disagreement, contradiction, or incompatibility. Thus, conflict refers to any situation in which there are incompatible Goals, Cognitions, or Emotions within or between individuals or groups that lead to opposition or antagonistic interaction.¹⁴

Conflict refers to more than just overt behaviour. Concentrating only upon its behavioural manifestation is an extremely limiting exercise.¹⁵ The three-dimensional conception of conflict emphasizes the need to consider the situation in which parties (individuals, groups, organisations or nations) come to possess incompatible goals, their structure of interaction and the nature of their goals.¹⁶

As per the traditional definition of conflict, it is the result of opposing interests involving scarce resources, goal divergence and frustration. Conflict is not defined simply in terms of violence (behaviour) or hostility (attitudes), but also includes incompatibility or differences in issue position. Such a definition is designed to include conflicts outside the traditional military sphere and is based on behavioural dimensions.¹⁷

Small Arms and Light Weapons

Small Arms and Light Weapons: for the purpose of this paper it is referred to as SALW. Although there is no universally acceptable definition of SALW, the report of the United Nations Panel of Government Experts on small arms in 1997 sees SALW as: weapons ranging from knife and machete to those weapons that are less potent than the UN register of conventional arms like mortars below the caliber of 100mm. they are designed for use by one person and manufactured with military specifications. Light weapons in the order hand can be used by several persons working as a team.¹⁸

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention defines 'Small arms' as arms used by one person, and which include firearms and other destructive arms or devices such as exploding bombs, incendiary bombs or gas bombs, grenades, rocket launchers, missiles, missile systems or landmines; revolvers and pistols with automatic loading; rifles and carbines; machine guns; assault rifles; and light machine guns.¹⁹ The convention considers 'Light weapons' as portable arms designed to be used by several persons working together in a team, and which include heavy machine guns, portable grenade launchers, mobile or mounted portable anti-aircraft cannons; portable anti-tank cannons, non-recoil guns; portable anti-tank missile launchers or rocket launchers; portable anti-aircraft missile launchers; and mortars with a calibre of less than 100 millimeters.²⁰

In examining the proliferations of SALWS in Plateau, it is pertinent to state that the challenge to security of lives and property fall under the freedom from fear and want dimension of the human security concept. This is because arms and light weapons are the basic requirement to secure and/or disrupt the daily activities of citizens. Security threats from inceptions of states in the world traditionally came from other states, whereas today security is challenged by domestic factors within states and it is codified by the era of globalization that renders states borders useless. Traditional studies on security usually focus on the state and/or nation. It is majorly concerned with defending the territorial integrity of nation's states and the resource controlled at their disposal without cognizance for the people they represent. The states focus mainly on protecting the lives and properties of the political elites while the poor are neglected to suffer security problems. It is displayed in their nonchalant attitude to the violence, conflict, disaster and disease which common average person struggle to overcome in his daily activities.

SALWs Categorizations: Article 1 of ECOWAS Convention on SALW, Ammunition and other Related Materials, classified light weapons as portable arms designed to be used by several persons working together in a team and which includes: heavy machine guns; Portable grenade launchers, mobile or mounted; Portable anti-aircraft cannons; Portable anti-tank cannons, non-recoil guns; Portable anti-tank missiles launchers or rocket launchers; Portable anti-aircraft missile launchers; Mortars with a caliber of less than 100 millimeters.²¹

1.3 The Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Plateau State

Over the last two decades, Nigeria records communal conflict, ethno-religious violence, political crisis, civil unrest, these events made Nigeria a huge destination market for illegal sale and use of SALWs. The demand for SALW in Plateau State has increased thereby stimulating the proliferation and easy availability of these weapons. The failure of government at the national level to ensure adequate security for individual in a particular region of the country and the need to protect their lives and property is tantamount to the proliferations of these kinds of weapons (SALWs). The legal SALW for authorised usage have been transferred to illegal hands for illicit usage, especially in terms of crisis just like the ethno-religious conflict in Jos, Wase, Langtang North and others.

The unsecured stockpile of arms by security agencies give rise to leakages of SALWs in to the country;²² in 2002, Nigeria records 1 and 3 million SALWs including lawful chattels of arms with the members of armed forces and the police and majority in the custody of civilians. The 80% of SALWs with civilians were illegal acquisition defying strict regulations.²³ It is worth mentioning that SALWs do not just spread all around, but where demand is placed. Therefore, from 2001, the covert popular demand of arms in Plateau State by Christians and Muslims resulted in the proliferation of SALW. While some scholars centre on the supply chain of SALW like ready sellers, profitability and border porosity others focus on demand reasons like crises, crime, violent conflict, armed robbery, riots and civil unrests.²⁴ Estimated 640 million SALWs are in circulation world-wide. 100 million are revealed to be in Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is home to 30 million SALWs while 8 million have their nest in West Africa alone and more than 70% of about eight to ten million illicit weapons in West Africa sub region are in Nigeria, while 5% of these weapons are in private and wrong hands in Plateau State.²⁵ Investigation into the cause of increase in the proliferation of SALWs in the State reveals that the contestation for ownership of Jos by the Jasawa community from 1994 and counter action by the indigenous groups the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom led

to stockpile of arms across the two decades of the 21st century.²⁶ This act unveiled the upsurge of SALWs and local production, making the arms readily available and affordable.

The presidential committee on small arms and light weapons revealed that 60% of the illegal arms in the south East Zone are made locally. Professor Aloysius Okolie the PRESCOM south east coordinator also said some communities are known for their natural fabrication of arms.²⁷ He added that politicians are art of arms proliferation in the area of importation and fabrication. In his survey, political leaders import 40% of arms. Maritime border is a conduit for the escalation of SALWs proliferation from the Sahel region of Africa taking advantage of the porosity of northern borders and southwest borders of Nigeria.²⁸ The recurrent seizure of illegal arms and weapons across Nigerian borders by security agencies reveal the troubling rate of weapon proliferation in Nigeria. Today, the media is replete with alarming reports of modern small arms and light weapon seized by security operatives at ports, borders or highways.²⁹ In 2017, the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) claimed that a syndicate based in Turkey has been discovered to be behind illegal arm imports into the country. Since the beginning of 2022, Nigeria Custom Service disclosed that four batches of arms illegally imported into the country were from Turkey. These include the interception of 661 in February, 440 arms in June; 1,100 in September and 470 arms in September making 2671 arms.³⁰

In August, 2010, a commercial driver carrying 25AK-47 riffles allegedly smuggled into the country from Cameroon was arrested by security forces in Maiduguri. Jos, Plateau state where ethno-religious conflicts has caused unprecedented damage to human security was the destination of these arms.³¹ Governor Simon Bako Lalong of Plateau State highlighted the enormity that led to serious threats to security in the country, which he believes was the proliferation of small arms and light weapons by farmers and Fulani herders. Governor Lalong in a press briefing avers that “today, we are now seeing the hazard of allowing people do open grazing here and there. But they (herders) also want solution; by the time you explain to them, they also want to stay in one place, they would also want to keep away from carrying AK-47. I’m not justifying anybody to carry AK-47 but don’t forget that in the course of our deliberations and investigations, it was not only Fulani herdsmen that were carrying AK-47, even farmers were carrying AK-47.”³²

Similarly, the police high command, on Wednesday June 2011, paraded suspects who specialized in manufacturing locally fabricated AK-47 rifles in Jos South Local Government Area of Plateau State.³³ The rifles were equivalent to foreign AK47 rifles in lethal value and sophistication. The two suspects connected with the illegal local production of the AK-47 rifles, Joe Michael and Iliya Bulus, were arrested for alleged fabrication of the weapons.³⁴ These arm fabricators must have clients/buyers across the state, who might be criminal gangs, arm robbers and even kidnappers.

In 2021, James Ibrahim of the Punch Newspaper reported that an arm smuggler, Likita Abubakar, 35 years old, was apprehended in Nasarawa State on his way to Jos.³⁵ Abubakar was caught with 53 magazines, over 260 live ammunition, one motorcycle and N38,500. A joint team of the Police and the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) apprehended him at Alushi junction in Akwanga, while he confessed his colleagues were on their way on motorcycles to Jos in Plateau State.³⁶

Nasir Ayitogo on 28th April, 2022 reported in the Premium Times that Operatives of the Force Intelligence Bureau Intelligence Response Team (FIB-IRT), in a sting operation arrested four notorious arm dealers and recovered 57 AK47 rifles and a large catchment of ammunition in Jos, Plateau State.³⁷ The suspects, Hamza Zakari (aka Hamzo) aged 20 years, Abubakar Muhammed (aka Fancy) aged 22 years, Umar Ibrahim aged 25 years and Muhammed Abdulkarim (aka Dan-Asabe) aged 37 years, all males and residents of Jos, were arrested following a credible intelligence on their nefarious activities in Jos and its environs. The suspects were identified as one of the major links for the supply of arms and ammunition to criminal elements terrorizing the state and some other parts of the country.³⁸

In Nigeria, the use of small arms and light weapons dominate most conflicts. A good number of terrorist attacks in Nigeria, is traced to the delimitation of small arms resulting in the escalation and intensification of these conflicts, the series of bomb blast recorded in Jos, the Plateau State capital were massive, for example, the first act of using Improvised Explosive Device (IED) by the Boko Haram sect to attack innocent civilian population in Jos North was on Christmas Eve of 2011, which killed about 50 people in Angwan Rukuba and Kabong of Jos North LGA while over 80 people were terribly injured.³⁹ Subsequent attacks went on without prevention; for example, in January 2012, a suicide-bomber suspected to be sponsored by the Boko Haram attempted to enter the COCIN Headquarters Church Compound in Jos with a car, which exploded at the gate and killed 3 persons.⁴⁰ On Sunday 11th March, 2012, another suicide-bomber attacked St. Finbarr's Catholic Church, Rayfield, Jos, on a similar mission. About five (5) people were reportedly killed,⁴¹ On Sunday 10 June, 2012, a suicide bomber drove his bomb laden car into the Christ Chosen Church along Rukuba Road, Jos, where four people were confirmed dead and several others injured.⁴² The Boko Haram insurgents planted two bombs in Jos metropolis, which exploded and killed at least 118 people and injuring more than 56 others in 2013. The first bomb explosion occurred in a busy market place called Terminus market, and the second near a bus station close to the old Jos University Teaching Hospital Campus.⁴³ Two separate bomb blasts on the 28th February, 2015, rocked the Bauchi road axis of Jos North Local Government in Plateau State, leaving behind many deaths and casualties.⁴⁴ There are many unseen, un-track and unknown arms dealers or smugglers in Plateau State today, these cartels are found across different ethnic groups, religions and criminal gangs who are into criminal acts of kidnapping, arm robbery and cattle rustling.

Several private investigations carried out on international arms dealers' network confirms that terrorist groups cooperate faster with these dealers in acquiring arms and ammunitions than states. Unlike the earlier situation where arms trade was the exclusive preserve of states, contemporary arms traffickers across national boundaries have successfully taken advantage of border porosity, trade liberalization and free movement protocol caused by globalization, which permeate arms in sovereign states, and further perpetuating terrorist related activities in many countries.

The use of SALW in ethnic and religious crisis in Plateau State, inter and intra communal clashes, herder-farmer conflict, banditry and mid-night invasion of Irigwe, Anaguta and Berom communities and banditry have exterminated more than 10,000 lives in Plateau State, an average of 1250 people yearly from 2010.⁴⁵ The majority of casualties of about 76% Plateau people were SALW victims, incurring irredeemable disabilities. Countable people in the state have been harmed due to increase in the proliferation rate of SALWs. The inability of the police to curb violent crimes, guarantee law and order and protect lives and property aggravate the teething troubles of armed violence and proliferation of SALW. Security operatives at present are bereft of the training, resources that could equip them for effective performance in the area of prevention and detecting proliferated SALWs in Plateau State. The proliferations of SALWs have caused untold damage to human security in Plateau State.

1.4 Security Implications of Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation in Plateau State

The security implications arising from small arms and light weapons proliferation in Plateau State are numerous. First of all, SALWs posed severe challenge to human rights everywhere in the world;⁴⁶ small arms and light weapons proliferation is adjudged as the most immediate security problem to individuals, societies, and states worldwide, fueling civil wars, organized criminal violence, insurgency and terrorist activities posing great obstacles to sustainable security and development. Since 2001, Plateau State has been bedeviled by a plethora of violent conflicts because of small arms and light weapons proliferation. These problems include ethno-religious crises, indigene-settler conflicts, herder-farmer feud, armed robbery, kidnapping and Boko Haram terrorism.⁴⁷

The presence of small arms and light weapons in the hands of non-states actors has led Nigeria and Plateau State in particular into multiple security problems: insecurity and threat to lives and property as a result of armed robbery, kidnappings, ethno-religious violent conflicts to herder-farmer conflict and

terrorism. Small arms and light weapons proliferations have given rise to banditry and kidnapping in the state. It has manifested in increasing rates of kidnappings in Jos metropolis, especially around State and Federal Low, Rayfield, Haske quarters around Lamingo, ECWA Staff School around Farin Gada and the University of Jos Senior Staff quarters. Act of kidnapping has move into rural communities and villages. This has taken a new dimension, because kidnappers are feasting on the rich and poor in the state; traditional rulers, religious and political leaders are all victims of these kidnappers with series of example in 2022: the Sum Pyem of Gindiri the traditional ruler of the Pyem people of Gindiri was their victim; the District head of Pushit and Panyam districts were kidnapped between April and June 2022. Also, the wife and family members of the Commissioner for Industry Plateau State Idi Bamaïyi picked in at home by the kidnappers in May, 2022. Lecturers from the University of Jos and Bokkos were victims of these criminal elements.⁴⁸ The insecurity has led to lose of hundreds of millions by the victims' families, friends and relations to secure their release; all these criminal and civil unrest are linked to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Plateau State.

The security implications of SALWs in Plateau State have resulted to serious humanitarian tragedy in terms of loss of lives and property in series of violent conflicts. For instance the violent conflict in Plateau State has taken a worrisome and disturbing dimension as more than ten thousand (10,000) persons have been killed since September 2001 following the outbreak of Jos conflict and its escalation to other parts of Plateau State.⁴⁹ Small arms and light weapons have led to killing of thousands of people and destruction of property. Large population of Plateau State citizens and residents alike were exposed to risks of different nature.⁵⁰ The security implications of these small arms and light weapons proliferation has led to mass killing and destruction of property in places like Angwan Rogo, Angwan Rukuba, Congo Russia, Nassarawa, Dogon Dutse, Rukuba road, Wase, Yelwa Shendam, Dengi, and Namu among others. The International Crisis Group in 2018 reported that from September 2017 through June 2018, farmer-herder violence left at least 1,500 people dead, many more wounded and about 70,000 displaced in Northern Plateau and 100,000 in the entire state.⁵¹ Farmer-herders violent conflict has become a reoccurring phenomenon without end; this is pinned to small arms and light weapons proliferation in places like Wase, Bassa, Jos South, Riyom, Barkin Ladi and Bokkos.⁵² Without these small arms and light weapons proliferation, these killer entrepreneurs would not muster the audacity of killing people at night and sacking them in their ancestral home. It created the phenomenon of internally Displaced persons (IDPs) in Riyom, Bassa and Jos North LGAs between 2018 and 2022. It has rendered agricultural communities of Irigwe, Rukuba, Berom and Anaguta desolate with farmers living in IDP camps and host communities. This has hampered serious economic and social development in Plateau State.

Anytime there are sad events in Plateau State, the Federal government responds to these issues only by feeble clichéd statements about how it was committed to securing lives and property of Nigerians. The concerned state governors from 1999 to 2022 (Chief Joshua Chibi Darriye, Da Jonah David Jang and Hon. Simon Bako Lalong) sometimes visit victims and shed tears making promises to arrest perpetrators of the heinous crime and give the victims justice. Political elites would pay a powerful condolence visit and use the opportunity to make political statements with little or no aid.⁵³ The police on their part will make promises of ransom for people that volunteer information concerning the criminals, without diligent investigation or having a proactive policing skills to nib all these criminal acts in the bud. We may portend that, the proliferation of different classes of SALWs in Plateau State is responsible for fueling ethnic conflicts, insurgencies, violent crimes such as rape and robbery, kidnapping and banditry.

1.5 Conclusion and Recommendations

The number of SALWs in the hands of individuals, non-state actors and criminals in Plateau state is alarming. Small arms and light weapons proliferation remain one of the biggest challenges in the state. Since 2001 to 2021, these situations have compelled the government to channel resources that would have been used to provide social services and amenities in rural areas to contain this menace. Small arms and light weapons proliferation have led to aggravated armed violence among Christians and Muslims

in Jos North and South, farmers and herders feud in Riyom, Bassa, Wase, Barkin Ladi, Jos South and Bokkos LGAs; this has increased the proportional level of poverty, thereby inhibiting access to social services from the government in the state. In an atmosphere of insecurity, business investments that would have provided jobs to the citizens remain become major targets. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons can be reduced if legal frameworks are kept in place. To achieve this:

- i. Strong institutions must be built and supported with strong legal framework that would criminalize every violation and punish offenders.
- ii. A holistic approach has to be adopted to curtail widespread socio-economic and political insecurity arising from unemployment, poverty and corruption among other things that produce and promote the culture of violence.
- iii. Stricter levels of monitoring and surveillance should be instituted at the country's borders to discourage the illicit transfer of weapons into Nigeria.
- iv. There should be regulations on the manufacture and production of SALWs in the Plateau State.
- v. Also, acts of kidnapping, banditry, conflict, cultism and crimes must be decisively dealt with through state legislation and proper punishments to reduce their prevalence in the state.

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POLITICS OF ETHNICITY AND POWER SHARING: IMPLICATION ON THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA FEDERATION

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Abstract

Nigeria is made up of a heterogeneous multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies forcibly merged together. The country practices federal system of government imposed on her by her colonial master. The relationship has been more of conflict and less of cooperation due to divergent objectives and missions of the different ethnic groups. Ethnicity also plays vital role in power sharing and distribution of national resources. The paper qualitatively examines the politics of ethnicity and power sharing and its implication on the political development of the federation of Nigeria. The study revealed the attendant effects of ethnic politics to include but not limited to marginalisation, emergency of incompetent leader(s), soft-landing of the corrupt leaders, promotion of mediocrity and breeding of civil unrest. The study recommended decentralization of authority by making power reside in States and Regions, enthronement of nationalistic consciousness, fairness and equity in national appointment and allocation of resources, and principle of proportional representation in the national election among others. Merit and excellence in implementing the principle of federal character is also apt.

Keywords: Ethnicity, Federalism, Multi-cultural, Multi-ethnic, Political Development, Power Sharing

Introduction

Historically, the formation of Nigeria can be linked to the imperialist strategy of Britain. Long before to British colonialist's arrival, the region that is now known as Nigeria, was inhabited by people from different empires, kingdoms, and cultures that were customarily ruled. Culture and politics were integrated in most parts of the kingdoms. The relationships among the various ethnic groups were characterised by both harmony and hostility.¹ Under Britain earlier rule, she organized various African areas into colonies, protectorates, or dominions to identify the most effective administrative structure for the regions, which included federal systems², which was generally thought to be more appropriate for federations like Nigeria with complex diversity in racial, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and other cleavages that are territorially defined.

The 1914 amalgamation popularized by Lord Frederick Lugard, marked a landmark in the journey of federalism in Nigeria. This was invariably achieved in 1954 as the north, the east and the west became the participating regions. Not minding the issue of suitability, the British willfully forced the federal system upon Nigeria in an effort to retain neocolonial control over the nation. Since federalism is more or less evidence of some form of disunity, political weakness, and uneven economic development, the British wanted to keep the federating units as separate as possible in order to interfere in the internal affairs of Nigeria to their own economic and political advantage, even after independence. With minor modifications, the federal system created by the colonialist was still in place under the present Nigerian constitution. The objective of the paper is to evaluate the politics of ethnicity and power sharing and its negative impact on the sustainable development of the country.

Conceptual Analysis

Lucidly, federalism is a political arrangement in which power is shared between central government and constituent unit of the federation. Federalism according to Wheare is a situation in which the central and constituent units constitutionally 'are coordinate with one another.'³ He explained that "the powers of government are divided between the levels of governments in a federal constitution in such a way that each government is legally independent within its own sphere". The definition of Wheare has come under severe criticism for rigidly making American fashion of federalism a true resemblance of federalism.

In the above development, Bagudu (2005) cited in ⁴ defined federalism as an essential and functional arrangement, which allows for limited union and preserves a measure of separate identity within diverse states. He probed further that the centre unifies power with the constituent parts that make up the federation and at the same time decentralizes power within the unified state. In essence, federalism indicate a form of government in which powers and resources are fairly distributed between the centre and the component units.

Ethnicity is a phenomenon found both in developing and developed nations. Its presence across the globe is the fact that many villages, bands and communities who come together to form a

¹ Onor, Sandy: Intercourse and Crosscurrents among Nigeria People in Colonial Times (Department of History and International Studies, University of Calabar: 2021)

² Obiozor, George A: The Politics of Precarious Balancing. An Analysis of Contending Issues in Nigeria Domestic and Foreign Policy (Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, Lagos: 1994).

nation/state maintain their historical and cultural practices and later grew up in their new States. Conceptually, ethnicity refers to a group of individuals who believe they have the same history, origin, kinship, links, customs, cultural distinctiveness, fate, and language.⁵ Comprehensively, ethnicity refers to a sense of loyalty to and identification with a particular ethnic group that is defined by shared cultural traditions, a common tongue, and cultural identity.

Ethnicity as ethnic consciousness expressed in interpersonal interactions with others (individuals and groups) to maximize gains in contexts involving competing interests and claims over limited resources⁶. The process of national integration in a nation-state is not negatively impacted by ethnic consciousness. In fact, it could be argued that it only becomes an issue for the country when rival elites and politicians use it for their own personal advantage. Three ingredients must reflect in definition of ethnicity namely;

- ❖ A group must be perceived by others in the society to be different in language, religion, race, culture and ancestral homeland;
- ❖ The group must perceived themselves to be different from others in number of ways; and
- ❖ The group participate in shared activities built around their mythical common origin and culture⁷.

Power sharing concept in literature emerged in 1960s as a political normative aimed at stabilising political or democratic tenets in divided societies. The concept can be seen in both broad and narrow sense. Broad is when sharing of power is associated with power in Montesquieu concept that manifest among the three organs of government i.e. legislature, executive and judiciary. It also manifests in the division of power in federalism between the centre and the component units. In the narrow sense, it is limited to the political sharing of power in a divided society like Nigeria. Conceptually, the phrase, power sharing, is defined as a government cartel of political elites.⁸

An agreement known as "power sharing" designates a group of individuals who have the authority to make political decisions in a particular community.⁹ The authors also see power sharing as a political conflict resolution mechanism. Effective power sharing is sustained by providing a level ground for each party in collective decision, and through provisions that protect group autonomy in sensitive policy areas.¹⁰ It therefore focuses on political systems that

³ Wheare, Kenneth Clinton: Federal Government (Oxford University Press, New York: 1963).

⁴ Adedeji, Amos Ojo: The Concept and Practice of Federalism in Nigeria: The Prospects and the Challenges. Master of Public Administration Dissertation, Ladoke Akintola University of Technology, Ogbomoso, Nigeria (2013).

⁵ Thomson, Alex: An Introduction to African Politics (Routledge, London: 2000)

⁶ Eliagwu, Isawa Jonah: Federalism, Governance and Security in Nigeria. International Conference (Evangelische Akademie Loccum, Nigeria: 2007).

a set of principles that, when carried out through practices and institutions, provide every significant group or segment in a society representation and decision-making abilities on common issues and a degree of autonomy over issues of importance to the group.¹¹

Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism and Nigeria Federalism

The federation of Nigeria was a conglomeration of different ethnic societies with over three hundred (300) ethnic groups, over four hundred and fifty (450) languages, over one thousand (1,000) dialects and various religions brought together by the British colonial master without adequate consultation of the different groups, for easy administration and their selfish interests.¹²

Lord Lugard, in 1914 invariably laid the slippery and crack foundation of amalgamation which has significantly hindered the pace of development in the federation of Nigeria. To worsen the situation, another slippery foundation of defective federalism was laid between 1914 and 1954. Cultural differences manifested among the foremost political leaders who were ethnically conscious, hence the birth of ethnic based political parties which was aided by the division of the country into three ethnically based regions by the Richards constitution of 1946. The Action Group (AG) from Western region, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons which later became the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) from East and the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) predominantly populated by Northerners.¹³

The ethnic cleavage of parties' formation metamorphosed into the Second Republic with the formation Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) from Southwest; National Party of Nigeria (NPN) majorly from North; and Nigeria Peoples' Party (NPP) from Southeast. Other parties that were later formed were Great Nigeria Peoples' Party (GNPP), Peoples' Redemption Party (PRP) and National Advance Party (NAP) also tolled ethnic line¹⁴. Ethnic colouration can still be noticed

⁷ Yinger, Milton J: *Ethnicity: Source of Strength? Source of Conflict?* Albany/N.Y. (State University of New York Press: 1994).

⁸ Lijphart, Arend: *Democracy in Plural Societies*, New Haven, Connecticut (Yale University Press: 1977).

⁹ Scott, Gates and Kaare, S. Strøm: *Power-sharing, Agency and Civil Conflict - Power-sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes*. Policy Brief © Center for the Study of Civil War, (CSCW), ISBN 978-82-7288-288-3 (Oslo: 2007).

¹⁰ Scott, Gates and Kaare, S. Strøm: *Power-sharing, Agency and Civil Conflict - Power-sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes*. Policy Brief © Center for the Study of Civil War, (CSCW), ISBN 978-82-7288-288-3 (Oslo: 2007).

¹¹ Sisk, Timothy: *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*. United States Institute of Peace / Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (Washington D.C. / New York: 1996).

¹² Okotoni, Olu: *Governance, taxation and fiscal policy in Nigeria*. *European Journal of Social Sciences*, 2(2), 80-94 (2006).

in the present crops of political parties in the federation which laid emphasis of forceful housing of different ethnic groups in one country with different objectives and aspirations.

Ethnic group in Nigeria can be grouped into ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities with ethnic minority groups experiencing perceived dominance in the affairs of the nation.¹⁵ The ethnic majorities are the Hausa-Fulani of the North, Yoruba of the Southwest and Igbo of the Southeast.¹⁶ In each location, the concept of majority and minority has essentially evolved into a genuine source of instability. The numerical and hegemonic strength of the trios gave Nigeria tripodal ethnic structure that constitute basis of struggle for political and economic power.

At the time of independence, the Nigerian federation's structure was a recipe for instability among the ethnic groups, and the demise of a long-lasting democracy. The view of Professor Wheare's theory is that, one of the constituent units of any federation should not be so large that it threatens the federation if it does not submit to its will, or two constituent units should not be so large that, if they are united, they could dominate the others or impose their will on the federation.¹⁷

The Northern region of the Nigerian federation was larger than both the Eastern and Western regions, and therefore was allowed to have her way on having 50% of the seats in the proposed federal legislature to avoid a breakup of the country in the preparatory stages leading to a participatory government in Nigeria. Similar to this, it was easy to undermine the West in 1965 when the North and the East combined, declare a state of emergency, and install an Administrator to manage the Western region¹⁸.

The unholy alliances among the ethnic groups against one another to get to the corridor of power over other ethnic groups has become a factor in the political landscape of Nigeria. The ethnic minorities are numerous in fraction but smaller in number, and at-times forming alliances with any of the majority groups to wrestle power in order to have share of the national cake.

¹³ Adeleke, Adegbamigbo and Charles, Uche: Ethnicity and Ethnic Politics: An Impediment to Political Development in Nigeria. Canadian Centre of Science and Education; Public Administration Research, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2015).

¹⁴ Adeleke, Adegbamigbo and Charles, Uche: Ethnicity and Ethnic Politics: An Impediment to Political Development in Nigeria. Canadian Centre of Science and Education; Public Administration Research, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2015).

¹⁵ Adeleke, Adegbamigbo and Charles, Uche: Ethnicity and Ethnic Politics: An Impediment to Political Development in Nigeria. Canadian Centre of Science and Education; Public Administration Research, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2015).

¹⁶ Adeleke, Adegbamigbo and Charles, Uche: Ethnicity and Ethnic Politics: An Impediment to Political Development in Nigeria. Canadian Centre of Science and Education; Public Administration Research, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2015).

¹⁷ Wheare, Kenneth Clinton: Federal Government (Oxford University Press, New York: 1963).

Ethnic sentiment has submerged merit and skills such that round peg are no longer fix in a round hole¹⁹. Sadly, this ethnic cleavage was a product of British colonial master bequeathed to Nigeria as heritage.

The fact remained that Nigeria is blessed with both human and material resources. The irony of the matter is that the blessed country has become the stronghold of inequality, injustice, unstrained corruption, social decay, violence based and poverty ridden to mention a few. Ethnicity has pervaded every facet of Nigeria life and has become a threat to the survival of the federation. The unequal distribution of power in Nigeria has caused her to change from a political community to an administered State due to its movement from its absolute subjugation to an absolute centralized authority and its complete disregard for consolidating political relationships.

In the contemporary world, very few nations if there is any, are without internal divisions along cultural, religious, racial and ethnic lines. The majority of nation states are heterogeneous but this is not always resulted in deep political cleavages and conflict. Sadly, in Nigeria, ethnicity has been coloured negatively as it mostly exists in competition with others.

Possible Ways of Addressing Politics of Power Sharing in Nigeria Federation

Power sharing has been identified as a major challenge in any heterogeneous federation. Some measures taken to correct the uneven distribution of power in Nigeria amongst:

1. Rotation of Political Offices: The principle of zoning was introduced in Nigeria in a bit to ensure that important elective political offices are rotated around different ethnic divisions as a recipe for national integration. One of the ideas put in place in the 1995 National Constitutional Conference was the rotation of political offices, which states that the position of President and other important political positions shall alternate between the North and the South.²⁰

2. Federal Character Principle: It originated in Nigeria in attempt to practice politics of accommodation which has been the secret of the success of other complex societies in the world.

¹⁸ Adeniji, Adeyinka S and Ofiwe, Micheal E: The Impact of Ethnicity on Nigeria's Political Development: An Assessment, 1999-2011. Int. Journal of Research and Development Organisation; Vol. 2 Issue 12, 6 (2015).

¹⁹ Asaju, Kayode: Democratic Governance, Federal Character Principles and National Development in Nigeria. Review of Public Administration and Management. Vol. 4, No. 8, ISSN: 2315-7844 (Department of Public Administration Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria and Zainab Arabian Research Society for Multidisciplinary Issues Dubai, UAE: 2015)

²⁰ Oshodi, Gbenga Adio and Raji, Olarenwaju Solomon: Rotational Presidency and Power Shift as an Instrument of National Integration in Nigeria. Veritas Journal of Humanities Vol 4, Number 1 & 2 (2022).

Operationally, federal character connotes political arrangement for equity and fairness for all-inclusiveness in participating in the affairs of the nation.²¹ This principle is applicable in federal appointments and promotions; admissions and scholarships; and development project. By emphasizing the necessity of ethnic balancing, the federal character principle always elevates ethnicity and downplays nationhood, strengthening Nigerians' parochial, particularistic attitudes and irrational ethnic attachments.²² This principle has nevertheless promoted mediocrity and incompetence against merit and excellence as ethnicity play a negative role in its institutionalisation. However, there seems a general acceptance of the principle as a normative expression of the equal right of all section of the country to participate in the administration of the federation.²³

3. State Creation: Another strategy used by successive Nigerian governments to appease the neglected regions of the nation is State creation. Nigeria progressively transitioned from its original pre-1966 structure of four (4) regions to a thirty-six (36) States structure.²⁴ Minority agitation has been a significant problem since 1954, a reason the colonial government established the Willinks Commission to investigate the fear of the minority communities.²⁵ The government's response to complaints of neglect from various parts of the nation has been States creation. Gowon administration started the State-creation process in 1967, prior to the civil war, and ended with the Abacha administration, which increased the total number of States to the present thirty-six (36). The opinion holds that majority of States in Nigeria, notably the northern States, are not economically viable thereby contributing to the country's development problems.

4. Revenue Allocation: Agreed and acceptable formula is usually devised in any federation that is at logger head with revenue distribution formula among the three levels of government that make up the federation. One of the major features of federalism is constitutional division of powers, functions and resources between the centre and constituent units. Sadly, the inadequacy in sharing formula has become subject of controversy and degenerated to conflict most especially from oil producing region. Hence successive governments have set up series of commission to proffer solution to the imminent problem.²⁶ The outcomes of some the commissions' report have not really be implemented to the latter by successive government in the spirit of true federalism.

²¹ Asaju, Kayode: Democratic Governance, Federal Character Principles and National Development in Nigeria. Review of Public Administration and Management. Vol. 4, No. 8, ISSN: 2315-7844 (Department of Public Administration Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria and Zainab Arabian Research Society for Multidisciplinary Issues Dubai, UAE: 2015)

²² Asaju, Kayode: Democratic Governance, Federal Character Principles and National Development in Nigeria. Review of Public Administration and Management. Vol. 4, No. 8, ISSN: 2315-7844 (Department of Public Administration Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria and Zainab Arabian Research Society for Multidisciplinary Issues Dubai, UAE: 2015)

²³ Ammani Aliyu A: The Federal Character Principle as a Necessary Evil. www.gamji.com/article/800/news8603.htm (2004).

²⁴ Ajagun, Samuel Olusola: Federalism: Problems of Power Distribution in Nigeria Being A Seminar Paper Presented at the Department of Public Administration, Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma (2004).

²⁵ Umukoro Nathaniel and Okon Joseph: Citizenship Education for Nigerians (Mindex Publishing Company Limited, Benin City: 2008).

²⁶ Akinde, Adebayo: Security Intelligence System: Principles, Policies, Plans and Practices. Institute of Security, Nigeria (Makugamu and Brothers Enterprises, Nigeria: 2011).

5. Acceptable Constitution: The search for acceptable constitution dated back from 1914 and has been a task for successive government. Most of Nigeria constitution that have surfaced were packed together in an undemocratic manner by military junta. There are series of sections that are in conflict with one another in the military imposed constitution.²⁷ Successive democratic governments from 1999 to date has made attempt to amend some of the defaulted parts to better reflect people's opinion. Sadly, all the attempts have also failed to meet the democratic procedure of making constitution. At this period in the life of Nigeria State, we need grassroots participated drafted constitution that will give hope to common man and return the country into the path of true federalism among the committee of all federal States.

6. True Federalism: It is clear with all sense of sincerity and objectivity that federalism is the most viable form of political union for the Nigeria.²⁸ In the constitution of 1999, all the provisions enshrine into federalism in power sharing in the exclusive, concurrent and residual legislative lists violate the principles and doctrines of true federalism. There is concentration of powers at the centre thereby making constituent units an appendage of the centre. To right the wrong, several national conferences have been organised with the purpose of making recommendations for constitutional review that will reassess and redefine Nigeria political future and strengthens the bond of unity in Nigeria federation.²⁹ Many reports has therefore been submitted for implementation. One of the suggested solutions was the view of Professor Wheare, that all federating units should be independent within their own sphere without excessive control at the centre.³⁰

7. Resource Control: Ownership and control of mineral resources is the most worrisome situation in Nigeria federation since the discovery of oil in Oloibiri, present day Bayelsa State. Decree No. 51 of 1969 and Land Use Decree of 1978 vested the ownership and total control of petroleum products and land ownership respectively in the country to the Federal government of Nigeria. Consequent to this, item 39 of exclusive legislative list of 1999 constitution also vested federal government the sole and exclusive power over all categories of minerals fall within the territory of Nigeria. This has led to agitation from some States of the federation most especially the oil producing region demand for resources control find in their regions and thereby pay some percentage of revenue accrue from sales of such minerals to the federation account. This imbalance and violation of federalism principle has only been partially addressed.

8. Creation of Specialized Commission/ Ministry: The perceived marginalization carried out against oil producing region of Niger Delta by the Federal government since the discovery of oil resulted to militant activities across the region. The militant specialize in kidnapping, destruction of oil pipeline, killing and other vices. In an attempt to address the socio-political

²⁷ Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) (1999). Constitution (Promulgation Decree), no. 24 of 1999 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.

²⁸ Akinde, Adebayo: Security Intelligence System: Principles, Policies, Plans and Practices. Institute of Security, Nigeria (Makugamu and Brothers Enterprises, Nigeria: 2011).

²⁹ International Crisis Group: Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty (ICG, Dakar/Brussels: 2006).

³⁰ Wheare, Kenneth Clinton: Federal Government (Oxford University Press, New York: 1963).

conflict, the federal government of Nigeria made impressionistic efforts through creation of some specialised commission as conflict management mechanisms as highlighted by³¹ and³², thus:

- 1961: Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB)
- 1970: River Basin Development Authority
- 1993: Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC)
- 2000: Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)
- 2008: Ministry of the Niger Delta

As commendable as these initiatives, it can be inferred that the agencies were not really established to bring succour or development to the Niger-Delta Region, but mere cosmetic efforts. The programme was also alleged to be politicized by the ruling party.

Consequences and Effects of Ethnicity on Nigeria Political Development

Ethnicity which supposed be an avenue of healthy competition for the growth and development of the nation has focus more on sentiments of origin and descent and thereby widen the gap among various ethnic groups in the federation. Cultural pluralisation that supposed to be a plus to the nation widen the fractionalisation. Sadly, ethnicity has therefore become millstone and a cog in the wheel of Nigeria progress. Few of the salient effects of ethnicity in Nigeria are highlighted below:

1. **Marginalisation:** Ethnicity leads to political manipulation, calculation and permutation which has largely affected the development of the nation. It involves the display of favour most especially to the ethnic group occupied the centre while other ethnic groups are restricted. The government of President Mohamadu Buhari has displayed high level of marginalisation by appointing Fulani of northern origin into key and sensitive posts without minding the principle of federal character. Beyond this, marginalisation also manifested in allocation of national resources as widely perpetrated by the ethnic group who controls the centre. The Hausa-Fulani at the helms of affairs in the First Republic allocated the highest percentage of national resources to the northern region at the expense of other two regions of West and East.³³

2. **Emergency of Incompetent Leader:** Ethnicity has made it impossible for the country to produce patriotic and competent leaders. National interest has been submerged for ethnic interest, as emphasis has been more on ethnic group than the qualification of the candidate at the presidential and national assembly elections. Attention has also been shifted to the candidate who can favour his respective ethnic group. Ethnic sentiment has therefore become a channel for

³¹ Oviasuyi, Patrick Osatohanmwon and Uwadiae, Jim: The Dilemma of Niger-Delta Region as Oil Producing States of Nigeria Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development - Issue 16, Nov., No 122 (2010).

³² Adeyemo, David and Olu-Adeyemi, Lanre: Amnesty in a Vacuum: The Unending Insurgency in the Niger Delta of Nigeria in Ojokorotu, V & Gilbert, L (Eds.) Checkmating the Resurgence of Oil Violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria (2010).

³³ Ekannade, Victor O and Ekanade, Tinuola: "The First Republic and the Interface of Ethnicity and Resource Allocation in Nigeria's First Republic" in Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences Volume 2, No.22 (2011)

for politicians to get to political limelight.

3. Soft-Landing of the Corrupt Leaders: Due to ethnic bias, corrupt leaders are not call to question or give account of their stewardship. Any attempt to probe such leaders, their respective ethnic groups take arms against government to restrict them being probed.³⁴ This ethnic cleavage has made Nigerian leaders to strive in the business of corruption with impunity. Corruption has undermining the political development of the federation as well as becoming a stumbling block to the social-economic development of the nation.

4. Promotion of Mediocrity: The main purpose of federal character is equity and fairness among all ethnic groups in Nigeria with a view to include all and sundry in the administration of their fatherland. Sadly, the underlying ethnic politics has promoted the reign of mediocrity in the governmental activities through the program. Attempt to include merit and excellence in the principle of federal character in the constitution by the 1989 constituent assembly were defeated by educationally lagging behind ethnic groups for the fear of being placed at disadvantage.³⁵ The tragic development of ethnicity is that incompetent officials cannot formulate policy talk less of implement progressive programme.

5. Breeding of Civil Unrest and War: Ethnicity has been linked to many civil unrest in Nigeria political journey. Series of ethnic militias have emerged in the country therefore causing mayhem, with ethnic marginalisation as an excuse. The January 1966 military coup which brought Major General Aguiyi Ironsi into power was believed to be Igbo ethnic inspired coup and consequently, the July 1966 countercoup was also interpreted to be Hausa-Fulani coup carried out against Igbo ethnic group.³⁶ The fact remained that ethnicity has plunged Nigeria into two and half years of indiscriminate shedding of blood in Nigeria Civil War of 1967 to 1970. The psychological impact of the civil war is still rampaging the entire nation. The course of Biafra nation has not died, in fact it has become a torn in the flesh of Nigeria federation. The possibility of whether the torn will be able to successfully healed or be separated from the flesh has become a matter of time and political calculation.

6. Emergency of Ethnically Political Parties: The negative trend of ethnicity also manifests in formation of political parties. Parties that are supposed to have ideology and national outlook

for effective and efficiency were formed along ethnic lines with absolute ethnic interest. Ethnic politics on party formation were experienced in the First Republic, Second Republic, aborted Third Republic and even in this Fourth Republic. Ethnic fractionalisation has weakened Nigeria political parties to form a formidable opposition against the party in power.

³⁴ Umezina, Cletus: Ethnicity and Nigeria's Underdevelopment. *A New Journal of African Studies*, vol. 9, 215-229 (Ogiri: 2012).

³⁵ Aniagolu, Anthony Nnaemezie: *The Making of the 1989 Constitution of Nigeria* (Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan: (1993).

³⁶ Adeniji, Adeyinka S and Ofiwe, Micheal E: *The Impact of Ethnicity on Nigeria's Political Development: An Assessment, 1999-2011*. *Int. Journal of Research and Development Organisation*; Vol. 2 Issue 12, 6 (2015).

7. Divisive and Ethnically Based Association: Ethnicity has inspired the formation of ethnic based association with different motives and objectives. Ethnic associations like Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), Afenifere, Ohaneze Ndi Igbo were formed mostly to gain political advantage over others.³⁷ Ethnic associations have bred ethnic militant groups across the nation. While the former remain civil, the latter become militant. Ethnic militias seek to cater for the interest of their respective ethnic groups and as well retard the operation of other ethnic groups against their interests. Few among them are Oodua People Congress, Arewa People's Congress, Movement for Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra, Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, Tiv Militia and Junkun Militia.³⁸ The negative effects of ethnicity are alarming amongst large-scale human and material resource waste, threat to the protection of life and property; deterioration of the already precarious political and economic systems; and deepening social divides across the nation.

8. Electoral Violence: Ethnicity has been used to heighten political contest. Politicians have severally used the vehicle of ethnicity to seek power and win election by all means for the perceived interest of ethnic group. This type of political game always creates tension in election time by splitting the country or region into hostile blocks³⁹. The incessant struggle for power among the various ethnic groups has negatively impacted the unity and corporate of the nation. It will be highly deceptive to conclude that ethnicity has not done harm to Nigeria's unity and her quest for development. Ethnicity can therefore be said to be a blood sucking demon and agent of anti-peace.

9. Creation and Emergency of Ethnic-Based States: Ethnicity has led to desperate creation of States and Local governments in Nigeria. All the States created from 1967 to 1991 from original four regions manifested ethnic marginalisation. Critical evaluation of this revealed that the creation of States favoured the north. In a cleverly concealed ethnically marginalisation by northerners under different regimes, only seventeen States were created from three existing regions of East, West and Mid-West before 1967, while one region of the North became nineteen States. This was also obvious in creation of local governments where Kano from North has Forty-Four Local governments while Lagos from West the most populous city in Nigeria

has only Twenty local governments. The number of state and local governments from each ethnic group is a factor in distribution of political offices and allocation of resources. Hence ethnic induced States and Local governments' creation is a strong weapon of political hegemony and marginalisation. The mathematics of power-sharing has therefore become weapons of ruling ethnic group.

10. Census and Election Manipulation: Rigging of election and manipulation of census figure can as well be traced to ethnic dimension in Nigeria. Almost all census exercise was marred with

³⁷ Umezina, Cletus: Ethnicity and Nigeria's Underdevelopment. *A New Journal of African Studies*, vol. 9, 215-229 (Ogiri: 2012).

³⁸ Isiaka, Alani Badmus: Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*. Working Paper No. 4 December (2009).

³⁹ Hembe, Godwin Nyor: *The Dilemma of Ethnic Minority Politics in Nigeria* (Makurdi; Aboki Publishers: 2003).

manipulation of figures orchestrated by all ethnic groups against one another for political reasons. This has not allow the country to have accurate census figure, as planning therefore based on wrong assumption. The annulment of 1993 historic presidential election by Gen Ibrahim Babangida from North believed to have been won by a southerner Chief M. K. O. Abiola was interpreted to be a pre-programmed attempt to sideline the southerner from holding power at the centre by the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy.

Conclusion

Federalism form of government was in colonial masters' interest. It was established in an effort to preserve the region's ethnic diversity after it was politically and forcefully assimilated into a Federal State. Nigeria was more of a 'hold together federation' of different ethnic groups with different objectives drive. The study shown that Nigeria has been plagued by conflicts arise from unhealthy competition among the diverse ethnic groups. The permutation of one ethnic group dominating the political affairs of the country which is the road to control economic remain the main source of hostility that has been threaten the stability and unity of Nigeria as a nation. Another persistent problem impeding Nigerian federalism's progress has been power sharing. Electioneering has shifted from emphasizing the abilities of a leader to emphasizing the region that produced that leader. Ethnicity has therefore place at the centre stage of either election or appointment to public offices. The development has not been in the best interest of the federation.

Recommendations

In recognition of the negative effect of ethnicity in Nigeria development drive, the following are suggested panacea to the identified problems.

1. As federalism is the best system of government for a heterogeneous societies like Nigeria, then the sovereignty should be co-owned by both the federal and the constituent units. The mad rush for the occupation of the presidency will be greatly reduced when the power is co-divided. There is therefore need to decentralize authority in Nigeria. Authority to generate funds for the execution of projects should be relinquish to states in collaboration with respective regions, as tax are paid to the region and the region in that respect pay tax to the Federal government.
2. It is also important to uphold the oneness principle, according to which nationalism can be enthroned without any adverse effect on ethnic allegiance and vice versa. Absolute unity and political advancement would only occur when every Nigerian becomes a nationalism and stops engaging in tribalism.
3. The spirit of marginalisation should be abolished among the various ethnic groups by imbibe the spirit of fairness and equity in national appointment and allocation of resources. Fairness and equity are essential ingredients in governance for heterogeneous Nigeria's development, stability and national integration.
4. While applying principle of federal character for equity, fairness and unity of all-purpose in recruitment and appointment into federal offices, the merit principle ought to be taken into consideration as a criterion for efficiency and effectiveness in all governance-related activities.
5. There is also need to specify the relevant parameters for inter-group representation in the national election and appointment. Such representation can be linked to the true spirit of proportionality. This will give all ethnic groups fair representation rather than winner take all mentality operated in Nigeria. As federalism is best option for heterogeneous societies like Nigeria, so also proportional representation.
6. Appropriate compensation for the resentful and persecuted ethnic nationalities, particularly the Niger Delta ethnic groups. This is the correct step in the right direction of ethnic conflict resolution. The federal government must acknowledge the rights of and give the Niger Delta's ethnic minority more influence in the administration of the oil companies that operate in the region.

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NEIGHBOURS AT PEACE: INTER-GROUP RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DERA AND NUNGURABA PEOPLES OF ADAMAWA UP TO 1960

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Abstract

The Dera are regarded as one of the most peaceful ethnic groups in Adamawa. This research examines the political, economic and social relations that existed between the Dera and their earliest and closest neighbours- the Nunguraba from. The research aimed at analysing the forms of relations the Dera have had with the Nunguraba in pre-colonial and colonial Nigeria. Historical approach was adopted as a methodology to which primary and secondary sources were used including archival materials and oral interviews. Intergroup relations between the Dera and Nunguraba can be traced to the 19th century, when the two ethnic groups came into contact at the upper Benue and lower Gongola-Hawul River basin area of present-day Adamawa State. The findings of the research postulate that the Gongola-Hawul River played a vital role as a push and pull factor of the migration of these ethnicities to the area of research. As age-long neighbours, the Dera and Nunguraba had unique differences in their political organisations and system of inheritance. Colonialism and mission activities were two essential factors that led to a fundamental shift in the relations of the groups. The Nunguraba through colonialism became subjects of the Dera. As time evolved, they borrowed the Dera political system and system of inheritance. On the other hand, the once powerful Dera people through failure of leadership lost the enormous power they once wield on the Nunguraba at the dawn of Nigeria's independence to the Nunguraba.

Keywords: Intergroup relations, migration, peace, interdependence, interactions

Introduction

Inter-group relations is an essential ingredient for survival among humans. Man has always been in close relationship with his environment in different forms. Intergroup relations, recently alternatively used with “interethnic” and “international relations” refers to the manner people belonging to similar social groups perceive, feel, think and behave towards and interact with people of other groups (Hogg, 2013). These relations are often characterized by competition, conflict and exploitation, hostility, intolerance and prejudice which have become major challenges towards intergroup co-operation, compromise, tolerance and social harmony (Hogg, 2013). No man lives in absolute independence. Man is always compelled by many factors to be in constant contact and interaction with other beings as well as his environment for the need of

food, shelter, clothing, marriage, war, trade, leadership etc. Co-operation has proved to be vital in inter-group relations among peoples of the world. All races and people throughout history have had reasons to interact with other groups. These relations have brought about both co-operation and alienation, the issues of Christian crusades and missions, Islamic Jihads, colonialism, racism, genocide, apartheid and Xenophobia as is the case in South Africa are all products of intergroup relations.

Intergroup relations through the epochs of Pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Nigeria have been influenced by different factors. First, is the level of autonomy with which ethnicities interacted with each other in pre-colonial Nigeria through trade, intermarriages, conflicts, peace accords, religious practices etc. Second was the subjection and forceful amalgamation of independent and diverse ethnicities into the Nigerian state by the British. Third, the imposed domination of one independent local ethnic authority over the other through indirect-rule, through which many communities lost their sovereignty to foreign local chiefs for “administrative convenience” of the British. The Post-Colonial Nigerian State through different administrations, battles with the challenges of ethnic politics, ethnic stereotype, enmity, strife, mutual suspicion, indigene settler phenomenon, ethnic intolerance, ethnic conflicts and some level of grass-root co-operation which have shaped inter-group relations of Nigeria since 1960.

The Dera ethnic group predominantly occupies Shani and Shelleng Local Government Areas (LGA) of Borno and Adamawa States, respectively. There are as well a fraction of them in Guyuk Local Government Area of Adamawa State as well as Balanga and Yamaltu/Deba Local Government Areas of Gombe State. The people speak the Dera Language and are popularly known by their neighbours as *Kanakuru*. Kanakuru is derived from their salutation “*ku annaku ru?*”, which means “hope you rested well?” The Dera people of Shelleng are neighbours to the Bachama, Mbula, Bare and Fulani people to the South, Nunguraba, Tangale and Waja to the West, Bura and Dera people of Shani to the North and, Ga’anda, Yungur, Libbo and Lala to the East.

Dera land from Buma to Kiri, was established by the *Anakidan* (the masses) who came along with their spears and horses led by Bilewati. They migrated from the Chad Basin through the Mandara Hills and moved with their kith and kin from the Boti clan. The Dera arrived Buma around 1600. It was from Buma that they began to disperse and establish different Dera settlements such as Shani, Kombo, Walama, Gasi, Mada, Betembere, Purokayo, Dukkul, Dandang, Bodeno, Labau, Kwaba, Gwaskara, Borgu, Talum and Kiri (Adamu, 2012). The Dera have three political divisions of Shani, Shelleng and the Kiri. Each has a centralized political system headed by the *Amna*-King.

On the other hand, the Nunguraba also known as Longuda predominantly occupy Guyuk Local Government and a fraction of them inhabit Lamurde Local Government of Adamawa State. They also have their kinsmen in Balanga Local Government Area of Gombe State as well. They have notable towns such as Guyuk, Boshkiri, Purokayo, Gugu, Banjiram, Bobini and a host of others. The Nunguraba people have a central leader whose palace is in Guyuk, he is known as the *Kwandi Nunguraya*. The Nunguraba are neighbours with the Dera of Shani, Waja and Nunguraba of Balanga to the North bordering Borno State. They share Eastern boundaries with

the Dera of Shelleng, the Yungur and Lala. The Bachama, Waja, Tangale and Dera of Kiri are their neighbours to the West and South.

The Nunguraba trace their migration from Gimai-the east. It is from this place they continue to trace their migration to wherever the sun sets, through Sudan to Kukawa in Borno State from where they journeyed to Katagum and then Ningi in Bauchi State. They moved in groups of clans led by their maternal clan heads from Ningi through the Tangale and Waja Highlands in Gombe State before arriving at Wangda (Wanda) where they lived for a long time before further migration (Jamthi, 2013) Oral history, as gathered by Jamthi Michael, recounts that the push factors of migration from Wangda included famine and overpopulation. Some of the clans moved West from Wangda to Jiu, Sili Dangir, Kerau and Dumna. Others migrated North East to Waja, Arah and Bobini while others moved westward to Kurnyi, Falu and Waala. It is the Nunguraba clans who moved East of Wangda that eventually settled in the Guyuk hills after displacing the Dera in series of clashes from the area, pushing them to a new settlement in Mada and later across the Gongola River to Shelleng.

Dera-Nunguraba Relations in the Pre-colonial period, 1844-1900

The pre-colonial period in Dera-Nunguraba relations as with many other groups, symbolized an era of contacts and interactions (migrations, settlements, early contacts with neighbours as well as conflict, peace and resettlement) among the peoples of the area. In what is now known as the Upper Benue and Gongola valley, The Dera and Nunguraba also arrived in their area around this time. The Dera arrived in this area first around the early 17th century from Buma in Borno State. While the Nunguraba came around the mid-18th century, the Dera were at Dukkul. It should be noted that it was the arrival of the Nunguraba and the competition for arable land and water resources that made the Dera leave Dukkul and continued further to Mada, Purokayo, Lakumna and finally Shelleng in 1844 (Adamu, 2012). The Dera of Kiri on the other hand were already in Kiri by 1800, having left their brethren in Kombo and Shani in present day Borno State.

Socio-Religious Relations

To begin with, the first point of contact between the Dera and the Nunguraba peoples happened during the migration of the latter from Wanda to the Guyuk valley. By the 18th century, the Nunguraba were established in the hills to the west of the Gongola-Hawul River. Some groups of the Nunguraba had arrived from the Guyuk hills to occupy the plane lands beneath the hills. Some of the communities they occupied had been inhabited by the Dera who had to leave in order to occupy the portions of land by the banks of the river (Thomas, 2020). From Shani to Kiri, all the predominant settlements of the Dera are by the Gongola-Hawul river bank. The arrival of the Nunguraba groups to Mada led to a competition for scarce resources (arable land and access to the Gongola-Hawul River), land was a prized possession for the Nunguraba. Consequently, the Nunguraba began to harass the Dera mostly by killing the Dera children left at home while their parents were at farm (Amalai, 2021). This crisis led to the assertion that the Nunguraba were cannibals, by both the Dera (Thomas, 2020) and colonial ethnographers (Kirk-Greene, 1969).

Amalai (2021) buttressed that indeed their forefathers lived in a time of barbarism and did kill the children of the Dera and left with their heads while leaving the body. What they did with the head, he could not say. This instilled fear among the Dera and as such they moved to Lakumna, leaving Mada- which was on the western front of the Gongola-Hawul River for the Nunguraba. Soon, the Nunguraba were back in business with the harassments and killings thus pushing the Shelleng Dera across the Gongola-Hawul River to the east (Amalai, 2021). This was a period of conflict between the two groups. Although there are no evidences of violent conflict or battle between the two groups, the King of the Dera at the time did try to use force on the Nunguraba but his supposed alliance with the Waja was compromised and as such his enemies surprise attack caught up with him. He is said to have used magical powers to turn to a stone (Thomas, 2020).

A striking similarity in the socio-cultural practices of the Nunguraba and the Dera lies in the traditional African religion centered on the rain-cult. The spiritual town of the Nunguraba was at Dukkul which the Dera referred to as Duuku. The Dera were here in the 1700s. Eli Chumaro (2021) posits that the Dera while migrating from Dukkul left some of their kinsmen behind. Those left behind were part of the raincult worship before the arrival of the Nunguraba.

Festivals like *Menjauli* of Shelleng and *Mendamo* of Kiri (similar to North America's Thanksgiving) created another means of interaction between the Dera and Nunguraba. Mantau (2021), asserts that the Nunguraba of Southern Guyuk have enjoyed a very cordial relationship with the Dera of Kiri. He further posits that the Nunguraba from Kola often went in groups to Kiri to attend the annual Mendamo festival. He states further that during the festival there was a lot of feasting and drinking of *men* (local beer) which brought all these people together. In addition, some of the Nunguraba spent some days in Kiri with their Dera friends. Even though the Nunguraba lived in many small groups scattered on the Guyuk plains, there hardly was a major festival that brought the Dera to the area. But the Dera did occasionally visit their Nunguraba friends and spent some time in their village (Mantau, 2021).

Games' hunting was another means of relations between the Dera and Nunguraba. Mantau, explained that the Dera of Kiri met with the Nunguraba of Kola in the area of what is now the fields of the Dangote Sugar Refinery from where they moved through the forests to the mountain areas in Kiri. They hunted wild pigs, squirrels, grass cutters and other game and this increased the bond between the Southern Guyuk Nunguraba and the Kiri Dera (Mantau, 2021).

There were also a good number of intermarriages, particularly between the Dera and Nunguraba of Mada, Purokayo, Lakumna, Guyuk and Shelleng. The contrasting patrilineal and matrilineal inheritance practices between the Dera and Nunguraba, respectively did not hinder intermarriages (Bom, 2008). The Nunguraba are the only known matrilineal ethnicity in Nigeria. Unlike their Dera neighbours, the Nunguraba inherited children and estate on the side of the mother. Amalai (2021) narrates that there were quite a number of intermarriages between the Dera and Nunguraba and *vice versa*. He added that the Nungura man had to amass a lot of wealth to be able to pay up the bride price of the Dera woman which was paid at once unlike that of the Nunguraba which was paid in installments. This did not deter the Nunguraba, but rather motivated some of them based on the fact that they would inherit their children and not

the reverse if their wife was of Nunguraba stock. When a Dera man married a Nungura woman inheritance followed the patrilineal lineage (Amalai, 2021).

Political Relations

By the 16th century, the Dera had developed a centralized system of government. The *Anagaan* (leaders) were the early leaders of the Dera people. The office of the *Amna* as the paramount ruler with the *Wullan* as the King's council became operational in the 17th century. Other offices include the *Na-bo-golmi* (chief priest), *Jarama* (War Lord), The *Nagulak* and *Gulak* (Chief Kingmaker and council of Kingmakers), *Amna-Palda* (Chief of Staff), *Na-Bulo* (in-charge of information and communications), *Kwarak lo denga* (in-charge of water resources and fishing), *Bilama* (In-charge of agriculture and rain-cult) and *Amna Jombrom* (in-charge of youth initiation rites, festivities, musical instruments and dance troupe) (Geoffrey, 2017).

The Nunguraba in contrast to the Dera had a non-centralized political system (Harold, 2021). They were republican and operated leadership at the village and clan levels. They had no paramount leader. Leadership was conferred on the oldest, strongest or wealthiest member of the village and as such there was no central authority over the people (Harold, 2021). They had a loose confederation. Although villages were independent of the other, they could call on one another against a common enemy, at a time of war (Harold, 2021). As their name Nunguraba implied interconnection, they were connected to each other despite the absence of a central authority. It should be noted that in pre-colonial Dera-Nunguraba relations, none exerted political authority over the other, but this would later change

Dera-Nunguraba Relations in the Colonial Times, 1900-1960

British occupation of the Adamawa area was firmly established in 1900 when the British took over from the Royal Niger Company (Nissen, 1993). Before this time, Mr. Charles McIntosh of the Royal Niger Company had embarked on an expedition on the Gongola-Hawul River in the 1890s. It was on this expedition that the British met with the Dera in 1898 and set up trade relations with them (NAK. Yola Prof. 275p/1919). The expedition party followed the direction of the Benue River from Numan and took the path that flowed west at the Benue-Gongola confluence, this led them to Kiri, the first Dera community on that route before they arrived Shelleng. Both Kiri and Shelleng were well established communities with centralized political systems in place, at the time (Thomas, 2020).

Political Relations

The British on arrival at the Dera area offered Amna Keri (King of Kiri) a staff of office which he refused. The staff of office was both a symbol of recognition and assertion of colonialism. The British left and moved up the Gongola-Hawul River to Shelleng. Amna Shelleng received the British warmly and accepted the staff of office given to him as a third-class chief (Harold, 2021). Thus, Kanakuru District was formed in 1910. The British had on their arrival to the Nunguraba area, realized that the Nunguraba had no central authority and lived in groups of many villages. For administrative convenience, the Nunguraba and the Shani, Kiri Dera as well as Libbo, Lala, Ga'anda

were placed under the Shelleng district as subjects of the Amna Shelleng. The district was made up of a Native Treasury, Court, market and a Native Administration Prison (NAK. Yola Prof. 275p/1919).

Unlike the Shelleng Dera, the Nunguraba did not submit so easily to foreign rule of both the Dera and the British. In 1901, Mr. W.P. Hewby the Resident of Bornu Province set off on an expedition on the Benue to get to Nafada (Gombe) via the Gongola-Hawul River, while on this voyage, the expedition party set resting posts by the river bank in Mada, Gwarmi and Banjiram. When the Banjiram Nungura saw the white man penetrating into their territory with their post by the river, they informed their kinsmen from Guyuk and other villages and prepared to attack the strange men. They were repelled by the superior weapons of the British (NAK. Yola Prof. 275p/1919). This event in Nungura history is known as the 1901 battle of Zarra (Harold, 2021). Penetrating the Nunguraba area became a tough feat for the British as the people refused every form of oppression.

Against their will, the Nunguraba were subjugated by the Dera. This was a British invention that had a serious negative impact on the two groups' relationship. Two groups of Nunguraba were formed. Amna Shelleng ruled over the Northern Nunguraba, from Dukkul to Guyuk and Mada, with the headquarters located in Guyuk. Meanwhile, the Amna of Kiri ruled over their Southern kinsmen, from Silli to Kola. The aggressive Southern Nunguraba did not appreciate this (Mantau, 2021). As a result, there was hostility between the parties, making governance challenging for both the British and the Dera.

Despite their placement as subjects to the Dera, they refused the payment of taxes and constantly attacked the tax collectors of the Amna Shelleng as well as British parties that tried to penetrate the area. It was until 1912 when Guyuk was burnt by the colonial administration that a level of peace and compliance to foreign rule was achieved. After this, a Dera Prince, the heir apparent to Shelleng was appointed village head over Guyuk. Kanakuru District was renamed Shelleng District in 1918 and reorganized in 1945 with four sub-districts of Dukul, Guyuk, Kiri and Lala. The district was constituted to have an advisory council comprising of the headmen from the four sub-districts and 3 others, two Nunguraba from Guyuk and Dukul, one Lala and one Dera from Kiri, two Dera from Shelleng and a scribe with the Amna Shelleng as the head of the committee and the sole Native Authority for the District (NAK, Yola Prof C.599/3).

The Nunguraba people's refusal to submit to foreign rule made district management even more challenging. Some of the challenges include; a dislike of Shelleng rule by the Nunguraba and their persistent demands for autonomy, and on the other hand the carefree nature of the Amna Halilu (1941-1950), his haughtiness, his fear of losing dignity and significance as a result of the growing number of Nunguraba, who made up nearly half of the district's population and his inability to effectively oversee the Guyuk sub-district. These prompted the administration of the Numan Division to consider separating the Nunguraba from the Dera.

In 1928, the divisional authority considered removing the Dera village head and installing a Nunguraba instead. The decision was later put aside with the reason that the Nunguraba were

not ripe for autonomy for they did not demonstrate cohesion and were administratively backward when compared to the Dera (NAK, Yola Prof C.599/36). But in 1936, the Nunguraba were permitted to have their village chief to represent them at the District council in Shelleng. The Nunguraba proved to be capable of leading themselves as their population exceeded the Dera and they showed a potential to be productive in the Division. As such, a court was established in 1936 in Guyuk.

When it dawned on the Nunguraba that if they cooperated with the British they would be granted autonomy from the Dera, the villages decided to unite and submit to one Nungura paramount leader. This led to jealousy and rivalry between the Dukkul and Guyuk village heads for leadership of the whole Nunguraba. But by 1947, the unhealthy rivalry was ended when the Nunguraba set up a committee to appoint a leadership by consensus from Wanda. This led to the acceptance of the Guyuk clan for overall leadership of the Nunguraba (NAK, Yola Prof C.599/3), resulting to a two-district solution for the British Administration. In 1948, the Nunguraba were granted autonomy and a district known as the Longuda District was formed.

The part Alhaji Grema Parku played in is another important factor to consider in understanding the political autonomy of the Nunguraba. Grema was of Dera descent, but once his mother remarried a Nunguraba, he grew close to the Nunguraba. Before he was appointed chief of Guyuk, Grema worked for the Numan District Officer as a messenger, mail man, and translator, thus the two had friendly connections. He ascended to the Guyuk throne through his stepfather's lineage. Grema, as Guyuk's chief (1942-1953), grew audacious and compared himself to Shelleng's Amna Halilu. Halilu was already well-known for his ruthless use of force against the Nunguraba and his looting of the Native treasury. Due to Grema's rivalry with Amna Halilu, Grema was forced to report to the Numan District Officer (D.O.). It was this report that finally hit the nail on the coffin. Amna Halilu was tried in a Yola court, deposed and exiled to Jos, while the Nunguraba on the other hand, gained autonomy (Harold, 2021).

Socio-Religious Relations

Religion played a vital role in the relations between the Dera and Nunguraba during the colonial period. Christianity came into the Adamawa area through the Danish Sudan Mission (DSM), an arm of the Danish Lutheran Mission in Copenhagen, Denmark. The Sudan United Mission (SUM) which was in charge of Christian missions in Northern Nigeria, allotted what was to be later known as Adamawa province to the DSM (Nissen, 1993). Dr. Neils H Bronnum of the DSM was the first missionary to arrive in the area in 1913 – 13 years after the consolidation of British rule in Yola. In 1913, the mission secured permission from the then Colonial Governor of Northern Nigeria, Sir Frederick Lugard to begin its missionary activities in mission Numan. Dr. Bronnum had provided medical services to a lot of people in the Numan area. This led to the warm reception of the mission and Christianity among the Bachama including their kings. This gave DSM a firm footing in Numan, making Numan the first mission station in the area. The mission was formally established in Numan in 1914 (Nissen, 1993).

In 1917, Dr. Mogens Uhrenholt and his wife Eline arrived to take over from Dr. Bronnum. Through the permission of the D.O, they made their first visit to Shelleng, where they were well received by the king, Amna Mujibauna who understood Hausa very well and conversed with the missionaries greatly. During this visit, they provided medical services to some of the

Dera, Nunguraba, Lala and Waja that had come to seek medical care. It was not until June 1918, that the DSM received permission to establish a second mission station in the Adamawa province of Shelleng, four years after that of Numan. At the time, Amna Mujibauna was not particularly enthusiastic about the missionaries even though he did not stop them from setting up the mission. This, according to Dr Uhrenholt was due to the influence the Mohammedans (Muslims) had on Shelleng. They tried to prejudice the Amna against the missionaries. By November of that year, a hospital and a school were established in Shelleng (Nissen, 1993). These establishments provided the gospel and medical services to the people of Shelleng. The school was attended by the Dera, Nunguraba, Lala and Yungur people. To ease the burden of most of the students, who had to trek long kilometers to attend the school daily, the school was converted to a boarding school in 1926. Christianity did not receive a favorable response in Shelleng. Many were already Muslims, while others were African Traditional worshippers. Many of the people did not show a readiness to forsake their polygamous marriage to accept a Protestant Christianity that preaches monogamy. There was also preaching against the brewing and consumption of *men* (beer). All these, compounded to the unwillingness of the Dera of Shelleng, to accept Christianity. On the other hand, other Dera communities such as Talum and Kiri, received Christianity with open arms and sent students to the school in Shelleng. The Lala had an enthusiasm for Christianity too but not as much as the Nunguraba (Nissen, 1993).

It was in 1932 that the DSM received permission to go into Nunguraba land to set up a mission station and school in Guyuk, 14 years after Shelleng. The delay was due to the frequent murder and resistance to foreign rule by the Nunguraba. It must be noted though, that by now, a sizeable number of the Nunguraba, who were already Christians, had received and were receiving western education in Shelleng (Nissen, 1993). The DSM's personnel was impacted by the First World War's (1914–1918) social and economic effects. As a result, there was a shortage of mission workers from Denmark to Nigeria. Despite their fervent desire for education, the Nunguraba grew weary of the lengthy journey to the mission school in Shelleng. Conversely, the Dera in Shelleng demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm for Western education. These factors played a role in the DSM's 1941 decision to relocate their station from Shelleng to Banjeram in Nunguraba territory. A Nunguraba convert named Taddawus Jemeta, who had by then became an evangelist and nurse. He catered for the few members and the school in Shelleng (Nissen, 1993). The Mission work in Nunguraba land, progressed faster than in any other station even though it was the 8th mission station to be established in Adamawa province

From the foregoing, it is clear that the coming of Christianity to Shelleng district fostered interactions between the Dera and Nunguraba. While for some factors, the DSM had difficulties in Shelleng, it was a less bumpy ride once they had access to Nunguraba land for the religion was well received by both the chiefs and masses in the various villages. Their early traditional leaders such as Mallam Yoila the first Kwandi Nunguraya was already a teacher and a Boys' Brigade organizer with the Lutheran Church of the DSM in the province (Nissen, 1993). His installation as the leader of the Nunguraba further rooted Christianity among the people. This was in contrast with Shelleng whose king, Amna Mujibauna (1909-1924), was the first Dera king to convert to Islam.

Dera-Nunguraba relations in the 18th century through the dawn of the 19th century witnessed conflicts caused by the migration of the Nunguraba from the hills to the plains already occupied

by the Dera. The Dera were accused by the Nunguraba of conniving with the British to launch wars of conquest on them. The Shelleng chief Shombayina (1879-1909) was said to have betrayed the Nunguraba to this effect in retaliation for the dislodgement of the Dera, from Mada, Lakumna and Purokayo across the Hawul-Gongola River to Shelleng. The attacks set against the Nunguraba by the British both faced strong resistance leading to the death of two British Officers. This event caused a strain in the Guyuk- Shelleng relations between the Longuda and the Dera. On the other hand, the Kiri and Talum Dera have enjoyed friendly relations with the Nunguraba (Jamthi, 2013).

Even though the Dera people have been the Nunguraba's neighbors for a long time, they have lived to appreciate each other's culture with regard to inheritance, common historical experiences, lexical borrowing and cultural traits. However, a striking difference between the Dera and Nunguraba nation is the fact that while the former operates a patrilineal inheritance system the latter is the only known ethnic group to practice the matrilineal system of inheritance in Nigeria. Through intermarriage they have cooperated with each other by respecting each inheritance system in the event of the demise of a parent. As Eli Bom (2008) explains, when a Nunguraba man married to a Dera woman, passes on, part of his inheritance are given to his children and his relatives take responsibility for the children's welfare and upkeep. But in the event that the Nunguraba man is married to a Nunguraba woman, the children have no share in his inheritance and the inheritance and responsibility of the children goes to the widow's family.

Margareth opines that the Longuda and Dera have a sense of acculturation where one nation learns from the other. She posits that the Nunguraba who had lived in rock shelters learned to build mud huts, weave straw mats and string the bow from the Dera while the Dera learned to use the sling and short sword from the Nunguraba (Nissen, 1993). She also explains that the Nunguraba were strong and warlike and had forced the less belligerent Dera across the Gongola during their period of conflict. Consequently, they claimed possession of about four hundred square miles of the choicest agricultural land in the area.

Marriage between the Dera and Nunguraba increased with the coming of Christianity and increased colonial relations with the Dera. The Shelleng, Purokayo, Mada and Talum Dera have the most marriages with the Nunguraba than the Dera of Kiri who seldom marry from the Nunguraba even though they have enjoyed the most peaceful relations with each other. An enquiry as to why revealed that the Kiri Dera just had no interest in inter-marriage with the Nunguraba while the others have had prolonged contact with the Nunguraba through settlements in Dera land and close land proximity with the Nunguraba

Conclusion

As observed from the foregoing, inter-group relations are dynamic. It changes patterns and leads to eras of conflict, cooperation, competition, mutual suspicion and alliance. Within the period of study, it was evident that once upon a time by the doing of the British, the Dera were heads over the Nunguraba politically but by independence the Nunguraba had gone far ahead of the Dera politically. They had used their population to affirm the saying that democracy is a game of numbers where the minorities have their say and the majorities have their way.

In conclusion, the Dera and Nunguraba have enjoyed a great deal of relations from religious, to social and political interactions. While they are good neighbours socially, such cannot be said in terms of their political relations. There is still the competition of dominance as introduced to them by the British. The Dera would always want to prove to the Nunguraba that they were once their subjects and the Nunguraba would in turn want to prove to them that they were more powerful, which was why they dislodged them and have now gained political autonomy.

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CONCEPTUAL ILLUMINATION OF INDIGENIZATION POLICY IN NIGERIA.

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Abstract

Indigenization policy in Nigeria has failed to deliver the objectives associated with its promulgation. Especially in the area of continuity of businesses, using knowledge gained and technology transfer. In middle of 2023, GSK, a pharmaceutical company, relocated from Nigeria, today the products of the company are available at exponential prices. P & G is exiting Nigeria, Dunlop tyre, Michelins tyre, and several others have relocated from Nigeria and there are no indigenous replacement for them, so the problems of job loss, importing the products and selling at practically throat-cutting prices has continued. Indigenization policy has almost become a history piece in Nigeria. As such, optimal exploration of the benefits associated with it has remained elusive. The policy needs conceptual illumination in order to rescue it from being restricted to mere history, and thereby enhance persistent and articulate reappraisal and healthy implementation of the policy. The passion to bridge the identified gap constitute the driving force to embark on this work titled 'conceptual illumination of indigenization policy in Nigeria.' Methodology adopted for this study is conceptual method. Findings from conceptual analysis indicated that the benefits associated with indigenization policy is enormous. The study concludes that indigenization policy requires dedicated implementation. The study recommends conscious efforts by the appropriate policy organs to ensure that citizens retain the knowledge and technology transferred to Nigeria, and use same to move economy forward, even when foreign organizations relocated.

Keywords: Conceptual; Illumination; Indigenization; Policy; Nigeria

Introduction

Extant authors have provided general knowledge on indigenization policy in Nigeria, and the historical context that led to the formulation of the indigenization policy. However, major provisions of the indigenization policy, and how it affects ownership and management of businesses in Nigeria still require much clarifications. The foregoing constitutes a gap, which this study intends to close. Therefore, this study captioned 'conceptual illumination of indigenization policy in Nigeria' came with the objective of addressing the gap identified. The study adopted qualitative method, and harnessed data via secondary sources. Using deductive approach, relevant information emerged. Findings indicated that indigenization policy influences the Nigerian economy and society. Government policies come with both positive and negative consequences. Indigenization contributes to the empowerment of Nigerian citizens, particularly in terms of job creation and wealth distribution. Indigenization policy attracts criticisms from the opponents. On the premises of findings, the study concluded that, indigenization policy in Nigeria is worthy, and meritorious. There are recommendation emanating from the study, namely, increase of efforts towards implementation of indigenization policy to strengthen the economy; government should consolidate on the gains associated with proper implementation, such as job creation and wealth creation.

Literature Review

Indigenization policy in Nigeria

The indigenization policy in Nigeria refers to a series of government measures and regulations aimed at promoting the economic participation and ownership of businesses and assets by Nigerian citizens and entities, particularly in the context of foreign-owned businesses operating in the country (Ogbuagu, 1983). The policy has evolved over the years, but primarily implemented during the 1970s and 1980s. According to existing authors, below are the key aspects and objectives of the indigenization policy in Nigeria:

- i. ***Historical Context:*** The indigenization policy emerged in the aftermath of Nigeria's independence in 1960. It was part of a broader effort to address economic imbalances and reduce the dominance of foreign-owned businesses, particularly in strategic sectors of the economy (Balabkins, 1980; AkinolaArikawe, 1992).

Early Policy Developments and Challenges (1960s-1970s)

The initial indigenization decrees focused on specific industries like banking, insurance, and retail trade. These early attempts faced challenges, including lack of funding, limited entrepreneurial skills among Nigerians, and resistance from foreign companies. The 1972 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act marked a significant turning point, mandating majority ownership by Nigerians in a wider range of businesses. This ambitious move aimed to accelerate economic transformation and empower indigenous entrepreneurs.

Policy Evolution and Shifting Priorities (1980s-2000s)

Critics argue that the policy has hampered economic growth, discouraged foreign investment, and led to inefficient resource allocation. Others contend that it has empowered indigenous entrepreneurs and promoted economic diversification. The Nigerian government has undertaken various policy reviews and reforms to address these concerns, seeking to strike a balance between promoting indigenous participation and attracting foreign investment.

Social and Political Dimensions of the Policy

The indigenization policy in Nigeria remains a work in progress, shaped by its historical context and constantly evolving economic and social realities. While its initial goal of empowering indigenous entrepreneurs and fostering economic independence remains valid, the policy requires continuous evaluation and adaptation to ensure its effectiveness in achieving its intended goals. The lessons learned from the past offer valuable insights for navigating the complex challenges and opportunities of indigenization in the 21st century.

- ii. ***Objective of Economic Empowerment:*** The primary objective of the indigenization policy was to empower Nigerians economically by promoting their active participation in various sectors of the economy. It aimed to give Nigerians a significant stake in businesses and industries operating within the country (Biersteker, 1983; Etuk, 2005).

The indigenization policy in Nigeria should constitute a cornerstone of the country's economic development strategies. Its primary objective has been to empower indigenous entrepreneurs, aiming to create a vibrant and self-sustaining local economy. This write-up will delve into the policy's historical context, analyze its impact on economic empowerment, and explore current challenges and future directions for maximizing its effectiveness.

At the heart of the indigenization, policy lies the desire to empower indigenous entrepreneurs and foster a thriving local business community. This empowerment manifests in several ways:

- **Increased Ownership and Control:** The policy mandates majority ownership of businesses by Nigerians, shifting economic power and decision-making from foreign hands to local entrepreneurs.
- **Access to Resources and Opportunities:** The policy incentivizes and facilitates access to finance, training, and other resources critical for entrepreneurs to start and grow their businesses.
- **Protection and Promotion of Local Businesses:** The policy aims to create a level playing field for indigenous entrepreneurs by providing them with a competitive advantage over foreign companies in designated sectors.

To maximize the effectiveness of the indigenization policy in empowering indigenous entrepreneurs, several key considerations are crucial:

- **Strengthening Access to Finance:** Implementing policies to facilitate access to funding options like loans, grants, and venture capital is essential.
- **Investing in Capacity Building:** Extensive training programs and mentorship initiatives aimed at developing business skills and entrepreneurial acumen are vital.
- **Promoting a Business-Enabling Environment:** Streamlining bureaucratic procedures, reducing regulatory burdens, and addressing corruption can significantly enhance the business environment.
- **Enhancing Transparency and Good Governance:** Implementing transparent and accountable governance practices fosters trust and encourages greater participation from both domestic and foreign investors.
- **Fostering Innovation and Technology Adoption:** Supporting research and development initiatives and promoting technology adoption can enhance competitiveness and drive long-term economic growth.

- iii. ***Ownership and Control:*** Under the policy, certain sectors of the economy got highlighted for indigenization. Foreign-owned companies operating in these sectors were required to cede a percentage of their ownership to Nigerian citizens or entities. This meant that Nigerians had the opportunity to acquire shares and take control of these businesses (Balabkins, 1980; Onuegbua, & Aniefiok, 2016).

The primary objective of the indigenization policy was to transfer ownership and control of the Nigerian economy from foreign companies to indigenous Nigerians. This objective is associated with factors like:

- Economic Nationalism: The desire to reclaim control of the country's resources and wealth, ensuring that economic benefits accrue primarily to Nigerians.
 - Entrepreneurship Development: Promoting the growth and development of a strong local business class capable of driving economic diversification and innovation.
 - Technology Transfer: Facilitating the acquisition of technological expertise and knowledge from foreign companies to enhance Nigerian technological capabilities.
 - Social Justice: Addressing historical imbalances in economic power and creating a more equitable distribution of wealth and resources.
- iv. ***Legislation:*** The key legislative framework for the indigenization policy included the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972, which mandated the indigenization of certain industries, and subsequent amendments and regulations that provided details on the sectors covered and the specific requirements (AkinolaArikawe, 1992; Inanga, 2008).

The indigenization policy has undergone numerous legislative revisions throughout its history:

- 1972: The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act (NEPA) marked the turning point, mandating majority ownership by Nigerians in specific industries.
- 1977: The revised NEPA expanded the list of scheduled industries and introduced quotas for Nigerian participation in various economic sectors.
- 1989: The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act was established to attract foreign investments while prioritizing specific industries for indigenization.
- 1995: The NEPA was further revised, liberalizing some sectors and increasing the minimum capital requirement for foreign companies.
- 2004: The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act was amended to create a more conducive environment for foreign investors.

Key Features of the Indigenization Legislation

The legislative framework of the indigenization policy revolves around several key features:

- Scheduled Enterprises: The NEPA lists specific industries where majority ownership is reserved for Nigerians.
- Indigenization Quotas: Certain industries require minimum levels of Nigerian participation, including shareholding and employee composition.
- Incentives and Restrictions: The legislation offers incentives like tax breaks and grants to encourage indigenous businesses, while imposing restrictions on foreign companies operating in scheduled sectors.

- Regulatory Bodies: The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission and other regulatory bodies oversee the implementation of the indigenization laws and facilitate foreign investment in non-scheduled sectors.
- v. **Sectors Affected:** The indigenization policy typically targeted sectors such as banking and finance, manufacturing, telecommunications, oil and gas, and mining. The specific requirements and limits on foreign ownership varied by sector (Balabkins, 1980; Ogbuagu, 1983).

Following independence, the Nigerian government identified specific sectors crucial for national development and progress, including:

- Banking and Finance: Dominated by foreign banks, this sector was deemed essential for controlling the financial system and directing resources towards national priorities.
- Insurance: Similar to banking, foreign control of insurance limited Nigerians' access to financial services and hindered the development of local expertise.
- Retail and Wholesale Trade: This sector, characterized by small businesses, was seen as an opportunity for indigenous entrepreneurs to thrive and contribute to economic dynamism.
- Manufacturing: The government aimed to promote local production and reduce dependence on imported goods, making manufacturing a key target for indigenization.
- Extractive Industries: Recognizing the wealth generated by oil and other natural resources, the policy sought to ensure that Nigerians benefit directly from their exploitation.

The indigenization policy adopted various strategies to achieve its objectives in targeted sectors:

- Ownership Quotas: The government mandated minimum levels of Nigerian ownership in specific industries, ranging from 40% to 100%.
- Investment Incentives: Tax breaks, grants, and other financial instruments were offered to encourage indigenous businesses to invest and expand their operations in targeted sectors.
- Joint Ventures: Partnerships with foreign companies were encouraged, allowing technology transfer and knowledge sharing while ensuring a degree of local control and participation.
- Nigerianization of Management: Policies aimed at promoting the employment and advancement of Nigerians within targeted companies, leading to increased local control and decision-making.

- vi. **Ownership Percentages:** The policy mandated that foreign-owned companies in designated sectors reduce their ownership stake to a specified percentage. For example, in banking, foreign banks were required to reduce their ownership to no more than 40% of the total share capital, with the remaining 60% available for Nigerian ownership (Onuegbua, & Aniefiok, 2016).

The roots of ownership percentages in the indigenization policy lie in the desire to reclaim control of the economy from foreign companies that dominated key sectors during the colonial

era. Following independence in 1960, implementation of series of indigenization decrees, account for gradually increasing the required percentage of Nigerian ownership in various industries.

- 1972 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act (NEPA): This landmark legislation introduced the concept of ownership percentages, mandating majority (40% to 60%) Nigerian ownership in designated industries like banking, insurance, and retail trade.
- Subsequent Revisions: Over the years, NEPA underwent numerous revisions, adjusting ownership percentages based on sector performance and economic realities. The 1977 revision raised the minimum requirement to 60% in several industries, while the 1995 revision liberalized some sectors and reduced the required percentage.

The government employed various strategies to enforce ownership percentages:

- Direct Ownership Transfer: Foreign companies were required to sell shares to Nigerian individuals or institutions, ensuring compliance with the mandated percentages.
- Joint Ventures: Partnerships between foreign and Nigerian companies were encouraged, allowing gradual transfer of ownership and knowledge while maintaining access to foreign expertise.
- Incentives and Restrictions: The government offered tax breaks and other incentives to encourage indigenous businesses and limit foreign investment in sectors with high ownership requirements.
- Regulatory Oversight: Regulatory bodies like the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission monitored compliance and implemented measures to address violations and loopholes.

- vii. ***Transition Periods:*** The policy allowed for transition periods during which foreign companies had to comply with the ownership requirements. This gave businesses time to adjust their ownership structures to align with the policy's provisions.

This policy, enacted through a series of legislative measures, employed diverse strategies, including the implementation of transition periods.

Transition periods were employed for several reasons:

- Gradualism and Minimizing Disruption: Implementing the policy abruptly could have caused significant economic disruptions and led to business closures. Transition periods provided a planned and controlled approach, allowing time for adjustments and ensuring minimal negative impact on the economy.
- Capacity Building and Skills Development: The policy recognized the need for indigenous entrepreneurs to develop the necessary skills and knowledge to manage and operate businesses effectively. Transition periods allowed for the creation and implementation of training programs and capacity-building initiatives.
- Negotiation and Facilitation of Ownership Transfer: Transitions provided a window for negotiation between foreign companies and prospective indigenous owners, facilitating a smooth and transparent process of ownership transfer.
- Protection of Foreign Investment: Transition periods offered foreign companies an assured timeframe to divest their holdings in a controlled manner, mitigating potential losses and protecting their interests to a certain extent.

- viii. ***Encouragement of Indigenous Enterprises:*** In addition to ownership requirements, the indigenization policy also encouraged the establishment of indigenous businesses and the growth of Nigerian-owned enterprises in various sectors (Balabkins, 1980; Onuegbua, & Aniefiok, 2016).

The indigenization policy employed various strategies to achieve its objectives:

- **Financial Incentives:** Tax breaks, grants, and loan guarantees provided financial support to indigenous businesses, helping them overcome capital constraints and compete effectively.
- **Infrastructure and Support Services:** The government invested in infrastructure development, including industrial parks and research facilities, creating a conducive environment for businesses to thrive.
- **Training and Development Programs:** Skill-building initiatives aimed at equipping indigenous entrepreneurs with essential business management skills and technical knowledge were implemented.
- **Market Preferences and Set-asides:** Government procurement policies prioritized indigenous businesses, providing them with a competitive edge and access to new markets.
- **Technology Transfer Programs:** Partnerships and collaborations with foreign companies facilitated the transfer of technology and expertise, enhancing the capabilities of indigenous enterprises.
- **Promotional Campaigns and Public Awareness:** Initiatives aimed at raising awareness about the importance of supporting indigenous businesses and encouraging a culture of entrepreneurship.

- ix. ***Impact:*** The indigenization policy had mixed effects. While it promoted the ownership and control of certain industries by Nigerians, it also faced criticism for potentially discouraging foreign investment, reducing economic efficiency, and leading to a decline in the competitiveness of some sectors (Onuegbua, & Aniefiok, 2016; Umana-Abasi, 2021).

The roots of the Indigenization Policy lie in the colonial era, where foreign companies dominated key sectors of the Nigerian economy. This dominance fostered resentment and a yearning for economic independence, which became a driving force for change following independence in 1960. The Indigenization Policy, enacted through a series of legislative measures, aimed to:

- Transfer ownership and control of businesses from foreign to indigenous hands
- Promote the growth and development of a strong local private sector
- Empower indigenous entrepreneurs and create a more equitable distribution of wealth
- Foster technological advancement and knowledge transfer
- Reduce dependence on foreign economies and diversify the economic landscape

One of the most significant impacts of the Indigenization Policy has been the transfer of ownership and control of businesses from foreign to indigenous hands, achieved through various means, including:

- Direct ownership transfer: Foreign companies were required to sell shares to Nigerian individuals or institutions.
 - Joint ventures: Partnerships between foreign and Nigerian companies facilitated knowledge sharing and technology transfer while contributing to increased local ownership.
 - Indigenization quotas: Specific sectors required minimum levels of Nigerian ownership, leading to a gradual shift in ownership structures over time.
- x. ***Policy Revisions:*** Over time, Nigeria has revisited and revised the indigenization policy to align with changing economic realities and global trends. The policy has been relaxed in some sectors, and the government has sought to attract foreign investment while promoting local entrepreneurship (Balabkins, 1980; AkinolaArikawe, 1992).

The initial Indigenization Decrees of 1972 marked the first significant revision, introducing the concept of ownership percentages and mandating majority Nigerian ownership in specific industries. This aimed to achieve rapid transfer of ownership and control to Nigerians.

Subsequent revisions in the 1970s and 1980s further refined the policy:

- 1977 Revision: Expanded the list of scheduled industries and introduced quotas for Nigerian participation in various economic sectors.
- 1989 Revision: Established the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission to attract foreign investments while prioritizing specific industries for indigenization.

Liberalization and Market-Oriented Reforms (1995-2004)

Recognizing the need for greater flexibility and market-oriented reforms, the policy underwent further revisions:

- 1995 Revision: Liberalized some sectors, reducing the minimum required percentage for Nigerian ownership and encouraging foreign investment.
- 2004 Revision: Further liberalized the economy, streamlining regulations and focusing on attracting foreign direct investment for specific sectors while maintaining indigenization in others.

- xi. ***Economic Reforms:*** In recent years, Nigeria has shifted its focus toward broader economic reforms, including privatization, liberalization, and efforts to improve the business environment. These reforms aim to create a more investor-friendly climate while encouraging domestic and foreign investment in key sectors (Yakubu, 1991; Onuegbua, & Aniefiok, 2016).

This policy has served as a catalyst for broader economic reforms, shaping the country's economic landscape through its direct and indirect impacts.

The Indigenization Policy has directly influenced economic reforms by:

- Transferring Ownership and Control: Mandated ownership quotas in key sectors resulted in a significant shift in ownership from foreign to indigenous hands, diversifying the economic landscape and fostering greater local control.
- Encouraging Entrepreneurship: The policy's emphasis on indigenous participation spurred entrepreneurial activity, leading to the emergence of numerous local businesses and contributing to economic dynamism.

- **Promoting Competition and Market Efficiency:** By opening doors for new entrants, the policy increased competition in certain sectors, driving efficiency and innovation.
- **Diversifying the Economy:** Indigenization fostered the development of new industries and sectors previously dominated by foreign companies, leading to a more diverse and resilient economy.

Methodology

This is a conceptual work, and it adopted quantitative approach; accordingly, exploration of secondary sources took place. Given that the study was qualitative, more so, conceptual, no form of mathematical workings or computation was involved. The study explores secondary data via desk research. As such, extant publication by scholar were accessed in various libraries (online and offline).

Analysis

Impact of Indigenization on the Nigeria Economy and Society

The impact of indigenization on the Nigerian economy and society has been a subject of debate and discussion over the years. The policy, which aimed to promote economic empowerment and ownership by Nigerians in certain sectors, had both positive and negative effects on the economy and society:

Social Impact: Shifting Power Dynamics and Empowering Entrepreneurs

The Indigenization Policy has also significantly impacted the social landscape:

- **Empowerment and Social Mobility:** The policy has empowered indigenous entrepreneurs, creating opportunities for wealth creation and social mobility.
- **National Identity and Economic Pride:** The increased control over the economy has fostered a sense of national identity and economic pride among Nigerians.
- **Inequitable Access and Marginalization:** However, the policy has not always benefited all segments of society equally, with marginalized groups facing limited access to resources and opportunities.
- **Corruption and Abuse:** Instances of corruption and manipulation during the policy's implementation have undermined public trust and led to social injustices.

The supposed Positive Impact on the Economy:

- i. ***Economic Empowerment:*** Indigenization policies are to help empower Nigerian citizens by giving them the opportunity to own and control businesses in key sectors. This increased economic participation and wealth distribution among the Nigerian population.

The Indigenization Policy should lead to economic empowerment in several ways:

- **Increase in Indigenous Participation:** The policy should lead to a significant increase in the participation of Nigerians in the formal economy, particularly in sectors previously dominated by foreign companies. T
- **Wealth Creation and Improve Living Standards:** The transfer of ownership and control of businesses should facilitate wealth creation for Nigerians, and improve living standards of many families.

- **Increase Control over Resources:** The Indigenization Policy should give Nigerians greater control over their own resources and economic destiny.
- **Skills Development and Knowledge Transfer:** The policy should promote the development of skills and knowledge among Nigerians through partnerships with foreign companies.

Challenges and Constraints

Indigenization Policy is facing challenges that limit its impact on economic empowerment:

- **Market Distortions and Inefficiencies:** Rigid ownership quotas in certain sectors have discouraged competition and limited market efficiency. This has led to higher prices, lower quality goods and services, and reduced consumer choice.
- **Unequal Distribution of Benefits:** The policy has not always benefited all segments of society equally. The concentration of wealth in the hands of a select few has exacerbated existing inequalities and limited the trickle-down effect of economic growth.
- **Limited Capacity and Skill Gaps:** The lack of adequate skills and experience among some indigenous entrepreneurs has hampered their ability to manage businesses effectively and compete with established foreign companies.
- **Corruption and Abuse:** Instances of corruption and manipulation during the policy's implementation have undermined its effectiveness and led to unfair advantages for certain individuals or groups.

- ii. ***Local Business Development:*** The policy encouraged the development of indigenous businesses in various sectors. Nigerian entrepreneurs and investors emerged and expanded their businesses, leading to increased economic diversification.

Promoting Local Business Development:

- **Increased Indigenous Ownership and Participation:** The policy has facilitated the emergence of numerous indigenous businesses across various sectors, shifting the economic landscape and diversifying the business landscape.
- **Access to Resources and Opportunities:** Previously limited access to capital, technology, and markets has reduced for indigenous businesses due to the policy's support and incentives.
- **Entrepreneurial Spirit and Innovation:** The policy has fostered a spirit of entrepreneurship and innovation, leading to the development of new business models, products, and services.
- **Job Creation and Economic Growth:** The growth of indigenous businesses has contributed to increased employment opportunities, boosting economic activity and promoting income generation within communities.
- **Sectoral Diversification:** The policy has encouraged indigenous participation in sectors previously dominated by foreign companies, leading to a more diversified and resilient economy.

Challenges and Constraints: Hindering Local Business Growth:

- **Market Distortions and Inefficiencies:** Rigid ownership quotas in certain sectors have stifled competition, hindering innovation and leading to higher prices and lower quality goods and services.
 - **Limited Access to Finance:** Many indigenous businesses still struggle to access adequate financing, impeding their growth and expansion plans.
 - **Lack of Capacity and Skill Gaps:** The lack of essential business management skills, technical expertise, and market knowledge among some entrepreneurs limits their ability to manage complex businesses effectively.
 - **Bureaucratic Obstacles and Regulatory Burdens:** Excessive bureaucratic procedures and regulations create unnecessary hurdles for business registration, operation, and growth.
 - **Corruption and Unfair Competition:** Instances of corruption and unfair business practices create a disadvantageous environment for many indigenous businesses, hindering their competitiveness.
- iii. **Job Creation:** The growth of indigenous businesses resulted in the creation of jobs across different sectors of the economy. This helped reduce unemployment and underemployment rates.

Promoting Job Creation

The Indigenization Policy has undoubtedly contributed to job creation in several ways:

- **Increased Indigenous Businesses:** The policy has facilitated the emergence of numerous indigenous businesses across various sectors, leading to the creation of new jobs and increased demand for labor.
- **Diversification of Employment Opportunities:** The policy has diversified the employment landscape, offering Nigerians opportunities in sectors previously dominated by foreign companies.
- **Entrepreneurship and Self-Employment:** The policy has fostered a spirit of entrepreneurship, leading individuals to start their own businesses and create jobs for themselves and others.
- **Increased Investment and Economic Growth:** The growth of indigenous businesses has attracted investments and boosted economic activity, creating a ripple effect on job creation across various industries.
- **Skills Development and Knowledge Transfer:** The policy has encouraged partnerships with foreign companies, leading to skills development and knowledge transfer among Nigerians, enhancing their employability.

Challenges and Constraints:

Indigenization Policy faces challenges that limit its effectiveness in promoting job creation:

- **Market Distortions and Inefficiencies:** Rigid ownership quotas in certain sectors have hindered competition and discouraged investment, impacting the overall creation of jobs.
- **Limited Capacity and Skill Gaps:** The lack of essential skills and expertise among some indigenous entrepreneurs has limited their ability to grow their businesses and create more jobs.

- **Bureaucratic Obstacles and Regulatory Burdens:** Excessive bureaucratic procedures and regulations create unnecessary hurdles for business registration and operation, affecting job creation.
 - **Informal Sector Growth:** The policy's focus on formal sector businesses has neglected the large informal sector, where a significant portion of the workforce is employed.
 - **Inequitable Distribution of Benefits:** The concentration of wealth in the hands of a select few has limited the trickle-down effect of job creation, particularly for marginalized groups.
- iv. **Technological Transfer:** As Nigerians took ownership and control of businesses, they gained access to technology, expertise, and management skills that were previously the domain of foreign-owned companies. This contributed to knowledge transfer and the development of local expertise.

Promoting Technological Transfer:

- **Joint Ventures and Partnerships:** Collaborations between foreign and indigenous companies facilitated the transfer of technology, knowledge, and expertise to Nigerians, enhancing their technical skills and capabilities.
- **Training and Development Programs:** The policy encouraged the development of training programs and knowledge transfer initiatives, equipping Nigerians with the necessary skills to operate and maintain technology acquired from foreign companies.
- **Research and Development Partnerships:** Partnerships with foreign companies and research institutions promoted technological innovation and the development of locally relevant technologies.
- **Reverse Engineering and Local Adaptation:** The policy encouraged indigenous companies to adopt and adapt foreign technologies to suit local needs and conditions, fostering innovation and technological self-reliance.
- **Increased Access to Technology:** The transfer of ownership and control of businesses provided Nigerians with greater access to advanced technology and equipment, boosting their ability to innovate and compete globally.

Challenges and Constraints

- **Limited Capacity and Skill Gaps:** The lack of essential technical skills and expertise among some indigenous entrepreneurs has hampered their ability to effectively manage and utilize acquired technology.
- **Inadequate Research and Development Infrastructure:** Limited investments in research and development infrastructure, including laboratories, testing facilities, and technical resources, hinder the development and adaptation of technology.
- **Intellectual Property Rights Concerns:** Lack of awareness and enforcement of intellectual property rights can discourage foreign companies from sharing their technology with indigenous partners.
- **Brain Drain and Talent Acquisition:** The migration of skilled professionals to other countries limits the available talent pool and hinders the transfer of knowledge within Nigeria.
- **Limited Access to Funding:** Insufficient funding for technology acquisition, adaptation, and development projects restricts the ability of indigenous companies to leverage available technology effectively.

- v. ***Promotion of Local Content:*** In sectors like oil and gas, indigenization policies encouraged the participation of Nigerian companies in the value chain, leading to the development of local content and capabilities.

Promoting Local Content

- **Increased Participation of Local Businesses:** The policy has facilitated the growth and participation of local businesses in various sectors, leading to greater reliance on local goods and services.
- **Development of Local Production Capabilities:** The transfer of ownership and control of businesses has encouraged indigenous companies to invest in local production capacity, reducing dependence on imported goods.
- **Job Creation and Skill Development:** The growth of local businesses has created new employment opportunities and stimulated the development of skills and expertise relevant to local production processes.
- **Boost to Local Innovation:** The policy has fostered a spirit of innovation among indigenous entrepreneurs, leading to the development of new products and services tailored to local needs and preferences.
- **Increased Value Addition and Economic Growth:** The emphasis on local content has encouraged the processing and refining of raw materials within the country, leading to increased value addition and economic growth.

Challenges and Constraints

- **Market Distortions and Inefficiencies:** Rigid ownership quotas in certain sectors have discouraged competition and stifled innovation, hindering the development of efficient and high-quality local production.
- **Limited Capacity and Skill Gaps:** The lack of essential skills and expertise among some indigenous businesses has limited their ability to produce goods and services that meet international standards and compete effectively.
- **Lack of Access to Finance and Technology:** Difficulty in accessing adequate financing and advanced technology has hampered the ability of local businesses to scale up production and compete with established foreign companies.
- **Infrastructure Deficiencies:** Inadequate infrastructure, including reliable power supply, efficient transportation networks, and communication technology, creates significant hurdles for local production and distribution.
- **Bureaucracy and Regulatory Burdens:** Excessive bureaucratic procedures and regulations can create unnecessary delays and increase the cost of doing business, making it difficult for local businesses to thrive.

Negative Impact on the Economy:

- i. ***Reduced Foreign Investment:*** The indigenization policy, by limiting foreign ownership in certain sectors, may have deterred foreign investment. Some foreign investors were reluctant to invest in Nigeria due to uncertainty regarding future policy changes.

Potential Causes of Reduced Foreign Investment

- **Rigid Ownership Quotas:** Mandated ownership percentages in specific sectors have restricted foreign investors' potential stake in businesses, discouraging their participation and limiting access to capital and technology.
- **Concerns about Policy Uncertainty:** Frequent revisions to the policy, coupled with inconsistent implementation, have created an environment of uncertainty for foreign investors, making long-term planning and investment decisions challenging.
- **Market Distortions and Inefficiencies:** Rigid quotas and limited competition in some sectors have reduced the attractiveness of the Nigerian market for foreign investors seeking efficient and competitive environments.
- **Bureaucratic Obstacles and Regulatory Burdens:** Excessive bureaucracy, complex regulations, and lengthy administrative procedures can add unnecessary delays and costs, discouraging foreign investors from venturing into the Nigerian market.
- **Corruption and Lack of Transparency:** Instances of corruption and lack of transparency in business dealings can undermine investor confidence and deter them from committing capital to Nigeria.

Consequences of Reduced Foreign Investment

- **Hindered Economic Growth and Job Creation:** Foreign investment plays a crucial role in boosting economic activity, creating jobs, and diversifying the economy. Reduced investment can hinder these positive outcomes.
- **Limited Transfer of Skills and Knowledge:** Foreign investors often bring with them valuable skills, knowledge, and best practices. Reduced investment can limit the transfer of such expertise and hinder the development of local capabilities.
- **Increased Reliance on Foreign Aid:** Dependence on foreign aid for development projects can increase the national debt burden and limit economic self-reliance.
- **Reduced Global Competitiveness:** Limited foreign investment can hinder the development of internationally competitive businesses and products, impacting Nigeria's position in the global market.
- **Limited Access to Capital and Technology:** Reduced foreign investment can limit access to much-needed capital for infrastructure development, business expansion, and technological advancements.

ii. ***Lower Economic Growth***

Critics argue that the policy slowed down economic growth in some sectors due to a lack of foreign investment and reduced competitiveness.

Potential Causes of Lower Economic Growth

- **Market Distortions and Inefficiencies:** Rigid ownership quotas in certain sectors can limit competition, stifle innovation, and lead to higher prices, lower quality goods and services, and reduced consumer choice. This can discourage investment and hinder overall economic activity.
- **Limited Capacity and Skill Gaps:** The lack of essential skills and expertise among some indigenous entrepreneurs can lead to poor business management, inefficient production processes, and suboptimal decision-making, affecting productivity and slowing economic growth.

- **Bureaucratic Obstacles and Regulatory Burdens:** Excessive bureaucracy and complex regulations can create unnecessary delays, increase costs, and discourage business registration, operation, and growth, hindering economic activity and investment.
- **Reduced Foreign Investment:** Concerns about policy uncertainty, market distortions, and limited opportunities can discourage foreign investors from entering the Nigerian market, depriving the economy of essential capital and technology.
- **Limited Access to Finance:** Indigenous businesses often face challenges in accessing adequate financing, restricting their ability to invest in expansion, technology adoption, and innovation, potentially slowing economic growth.

Consequences of Lower Economic Growth

- **Increased Poverty and Inequality:** Slow economic growth can lead to higher unemployment rates, lower wages, and increased poverty, exacerbating existing inequalities and hindering social development.
- **Limited Infrastructure Development:** Reduced government revenue and private sector investment can hinder the development of critical infrastructure, such as power, transportation, and communication networks, affecting economic activity and productivity.
- **Reduced Social Spending:** Lower economic growth can limit the government's ability to invest in essential social services like healthcare and education, negatively impacting the well-being of citizens.
- **Political Instability and Social Unrest:** Economic stagnation can contribute to political instability, social unrest, and increased crime, undermining national security and hindering development efforts.
- **Reduced Global Competitiveness:** A sluggish economy can limit Nigeria's ability to compete effectively in the global market, hindering export opportunities and economic diversification.

Findings

Nigerians industrial policies from 1990 to date

Nigeria's industrial policies from 1990 to the present have witnessed shifts, reforms, and evolving strategies aimed at addressing economic challenges, promoting industrialization, and attracting investment. These policies have undergone changes in response to changing economic realities, global trends, and domestic imperatives. Here is an assessment of Nigeria's industrial policies during this period:

Economic Reforms in the 1990s

Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs): In the early 1990s, Nigeria embarked on Structural Adjustment Programs under the guidance of international financial institutions. These programs emphasized market liberalization, privatization, and trade liberalization.

Impact

While SAPs brought about some macroeconomic stability, they also faced criticism for their social impact, including job losses and reduced public services. They marked a shift away from previous import substitution and indigenization policies.

Industrial Policy Revisions in the 2000s

- i. ***National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS):***
Introduced in the early 2000s, NEEDS emphasized poverty reduction, job creation, and investment promotion. It included sectoral reforms and initiatives aimed at fostering economic growth and development.

Industrial Policy Revisions in the 2000s: National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS)

Introduction:

In the 2000s, Nigeria embarked on a significant revision of its industrial policy, culminating in the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). This strategy aimed to address the shortcomings of past policies and promote a more vibrant and diversified industrial sector.

Background:

Prior to the NEEDS document, Nigeria's industrial policy was largely characterized by:

- Import substitution: This approach focused on replacing imported goods with domestically produced alternatives, often leading to inefficient industries.
- State intervention: The government played a dominant role in the economy, owning and managing many businesses, which often resulted in inefficiency and corruption.
- Lack of focus on competitiveness: Little attention was paid to enhancing the competitiveness of Nigerian businesses in the global market.

Key Objectives of NEEDS:

NEEDS aimed to address these issues by focusing on the following key objectives:

- Private sector-led growth: The government shifted its focus from directly driving industrial development to creating an enabling environment for private sector businesses to thrive.
- Trade liberalization: NEEDS promoted the opening up of the Nigerian economy to international trade, exposing businesses to competition and encouraging them to improve their efficiency and competitiveness.
- Investment in infrastructure: The government committed to investing in vital infrastructure such as power, transportation, and communication networks to create a conducive environment for businesses to operate.
- Small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) development: Recognizing the importance of SMEs, NEEDS emphasized the need to support their growth and development through access to finance, training, and technology.
- Human capital development: The strategy focused on improving the quality of education and training to provide businesses with a skilled workforce.

Key Revisions and Reforms:

NEEDS led to several significant revisions and reforms in Nigeria's industrial policy, including:

- Privatization: Many state-owned enterprises were privatized, fostering efficiency and reducing the government's burden on the economy.
- Trade liberalization: Tariffs were reduced, and import restrictions were eased, opening up the economy to international trade and competition.
- Financial sector reforms: The banking sector was reformed to increase access to finance for businesses, particularly SMEs.
- Education and training reforms: Efforts were made to improve the quality of education and training programs to provide businesses with the skilled workforce they need.

- ii. ***Nigerian Industrial Revolution Plan (NIRP)***: The launching of NIRP occurred in 2014, as a comprehensive industrialization strategy. It aimed to diversify the economy by promoting key sectors, such as agriculture, manufacturing, and services.

The NIRP built upon the successes of NEEDS by:

- Emphasizing value addition: Moving beyond import substitution, the NIRP focused on adding value to raw materials and promoting local production of finished goods.
- Prioritizing specific sectors: The plan identified four key sectors for development: agro-processing, petrochemicals, light manufacturing, and metals and solid minerals.
- Promoting industrial clusters: The NIRP emphasized the creation of industrial clusters to facilitate collaboration, knowledge sharing, and resource optimization among businesses.
- Focusing on resource-based industrialization: Leveraging Nigeria's abundant natural resources, the plan aimed to develop industries that utilize these resources efficiently.
- Enhancing institutional framework: The NIRP aimed to create a stronger and more efficient institutional framework to support industrial development.

Features of the NIRP:

The NIRP included several key features, such as:

- Tax incentives: Tax holidays and other incentives were offered to attract investors and encourage the development of priority industries.
- Access to finance: The government established various financing schemes to facilitate access to capital for businesses, particularly SMEs.
- Infrastructure development: The plan emphasized the need for continued investment in infrastructure to improve transportation, power, and energy supply.
- Skills development: The NIRP recognized the importance of a skilled workforce and included initiatives to address skill gaps in key sectors.
- Trade facilitation: Measures were introduced to streamline trade procedures and reduce barriers to exports.

Challenges and limitations:

- Slow implementation of some aspects of the plan due to bureaucratic hurdles.
- Inadequate infrastructure and unreliable power supply continue to hinder industrial growth.
- Security challenges and political instability in certain regions deter investment.
- Concerns about the effectiveness of some tax incentives and their impact on government revenue.

Trade Agreements and Foreign Investment

Nigeria signed various trade agreements and investment treaties during this period, such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Trade Liberalization Scheme. These agreements aimed to enhance trade and attract foreign investment.

Privatization and Commercialization

Nigeria pursued the privatization and commercialization of state-owned enterprises, including power generation and distribution companies, telecommunications, and the Nigerian Ports Authority.

The goal was to improve efficiency, attract private sector investment, and reduce the government's fiscal burden.

Local Content Policies

Nigeria introduced local content policies in sectors like oil and gas to promote indigenous participation. These policies mandated the local sourcing of certain percentage of goods, services, and labour.

The establishment of Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB) came with the objective to oversee the implementation of local content policies.

Infrastructure Development

Initiation of Investments in infrastructure development, including road construction, airport upgrades, and the expansion of seaports.

These efforts aimed to improve transportation and logistics, which are critical for industrial growth.

Challenges and Persisting Issues

- i. ***Infrastructure Deficits:*** Inadequate infrastructure, including power supply, remains a significant challenge for industries. Frequent power outages, poor roads, and limited access to modern ports continue to impact productivity.

Funding:

- **Limited Public Investment:** Many governments lack the resources necessary to invest adequately in infrastructure development.
- **Inefficient Public Expenditure:** Corruption and mismanagement often lead to inefficient use of public funds allocated for infrastructure projects.
- **Limited Private Sector Participation:** Difficulty attracting private sector investment due to perceived risks, complex regulations, and unclear returns on investment.

Planning and Implementation:

- **Lack of Long-Term Planning:** Inadequate planning and coordination can lead to shortsighted projects and inefficient resource allocation.
- **Bureaucratic delays and inefficiencies:** Cumbersome regulatory frameworks and administrative hurdles can significantly slow down project implementation.
- **Corruption and lack of transparency:** Corruption in the planning and construction phases can lead to poor-quality infrastructure and inflated costs.

Social and Environmental Impact:

- **Displacement and resettlement:** Infrastructure projects can lead to involuntary displacement of communities, requiring proper resettlement and compensation plans.

- Environmental degradation: Construction activities can have significant negative impacts on the environment, including deforestation, pollution, and loss of biodiversity.
 - Inequitable access to services: The benefits of infrastructure development may not be evenly distributed, potentially exacerbating existing inequalities and marginalizing certain communities.
- Maintenance and Sustainability:
- Lack of dedicated resources: Inadequate funding for infrastructure maintenance often leads to deterioration and decreased service quality.
 - Technology adoption and innovation: Difficulty integrating new technologies and innovative solutions into existing infrastructure systems.
 - Climate change and natural disasters: Infrastructure needs to be resilient to the increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The Indigenization Policy in Nigeria has the goal of promoting economic empowerment and ownership by Nigerians in specific sectors of the economy. While it had some success in achieving this objective, it also faced criticism for potential negative impacts on foreign investment and economic efficiency. Therefore, the paper concludes that Nigeria has moved toward more market-oriented economic policies, reflecting a shift away from strict indigenization measures. The Indigenization Policy has played a significant role in empowering indigenous entrepreneurs and fostering economic self-reliance in Nigeria. However, concerns remain regarding its potential impact on economic growth. In middle of 2023, GSK, a pharmaceutical company, relocated from Nigeria, today the products of the company are available at exponential prices. P &G is exiting Nigeria, Dunlop tyre, Michelins tyre, and several others have relocated from Nigeria and there are no indigenous replacement for them, so the problems of job loss, importing the products and selling at practically throat-cutting prices has continued. The study concludes that indigenization policy requires dedicated implementation. The study recommends that Nigerian government continue to ensure economic empowerment and the development of indigenous businesses. In addition, considering the existing criticism and steady migration of companies from Nigeria, government needs to review her approach to economic policies, strike a balance between promoting local ownership and attracting foreign investment to drive economic growth and development. More so, the study recommends conscious efforts by the appropriate policy organs to ensure that citizens retain the knowledge and technology transferred to Nigeria, and use same to move economy forward, even when foreign organizations relocated. This will facilitate indigenous replacement when foreign companies relocate from Nigeria.

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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA, 1960-2020.

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Abstract

This study examines the dynamic nexus between civilian-military relations (CMR) in Nigeria's sixty years after independence. Civil-military relations are key features in the political life of all nation-states that maintain permanent military institutions. The intimate interaction between the civil and military authorities in Nigeria are Siamese twins to nation-building and development. This work posits that this relationship has not been fully explored as seen in the military disregard for civil orders and the civilians often support military interventions into politics for personal gains. The Agency and historical methods adopted in this study found that, civil-military relation in Nigeria has not benefitted the civil society given the enormous human and material resource endowments. The civil-military rivalry has fueled religious, ethnic, and political antagonisms to the detriment of the Nigerian state. The work opines that a robust and strategic civil-military relations devoid of any form of parochial interest, where military institutions professionally are subordinate to the civil leadership, strengthened by the right constitutional and institutional bonds, will create the desired equilibrium that will engender national growth, cohesion and development.

KEYWORDS: Nigeria, Civil-Military Relations, Nation-building, Development.

Introduction

The historiography of civil-military relations could be traced from the works of Sun Tzu¹ and Carl Von Clausewitz². Both writers agree that the military institutions are primarily servants of the state and society with the monopoly of the means of violence in the interest of its citizens.

¹ Sun Tzu (1988). *The Art of War* by Thomas Cleary. Boston. Shambhala Publications.

² Carl Von Clausewitz. (1989). *On War*. By Micheal, H and Peter, P. New Jersey. Princeton University Press

In the exercise of its unique expertise, the military must therefore do so with high moral and ethical responsibility in the interest of the society. Nigeria is no exception.

The evolution of civil-military relations in Nigeria is rooted in history. A prominent legacy of the British Colonial Government in West Africa is the Nigerian army³, which set the pace for civil-military relations.. Ukpabi⁴ contends that after the Royal Niger Company was granted a Charter in 1886 and assumed administration of Southern Nigeria, the charter authorized the company to raise the Royal Niger Constabulary for 'effective occupation. This quasi-military power was used to enforce the authority and interests of the British colonial administration which expanded its influence into the hinterlands and coming in conflict with the inhabitants. The British deemed it appropriate to increase the size and improve the training of these forces, dividing them into the police and the regiment forces. While the police force handled civil matters and the maintenance of law and order, the regiments were deployed to deal with military matters, such as the protection of the territorial boundaries of the protectorates. In 1900 the Charter was revoked and in 1901, the various regiments and dependencies of Great Britain along the West African coast (Nigeria, Gold Coast - now Ghana, Sierra Leone, and The Gambia) were merged to form the West African Frontier Forces (WAFF). In Nigeria, the WAFF had two regiments - one in the north and the other in the south. On January 1, 1914, on the day that the north and south were amalgamated to form Nigeria, the two WAFF regiments emerged. WAFF was changed to Royal West African Frontier Forces (RWAFF) in 1928. RWAFF became the Nigerian Army in 1960.

During colonial rule, civil-military relations in Nigeria, was one of enmity, because the 'Colonial Constabularies' as agents of administration and governance, habitually maltreated the civil society by carrying out the orders of the colonizer with brute force and intimidation, resulting in conflicts. After independence in 1960, with power in the hands of the civilian authorities, the army, though subordinate to civil rule, remained uncivil, undemocratic in nature and character, not ready to be truly under the civil authorities. The people of Nigeria did not see the role of the military during the colonial period as promoting civilization and humanitarianism, but believed it was an instrument fashioned by an alien authority to destroy the political independence of the various ethnic groups and their cherished ways of life.⁵ In the military in 1960, emerged too powerful an institution in what was still a very young and relatively poor democracy with fault lines of ethnic divisions among the politicians. Though at independence, there was a clear division of labor between the civilian and military institutions

The Nigerian military has been differently described as a dictatorship, a body of nation-builders, an all-powerful "national watchdog", ineffective administrators, change agents, politicians in

³ Robert, Aziakpono Dibia. (1997). *The Military-Bureaucracy Relationship in Nigeria: A Study of Public Policy Making and Implementation*. Dissertations Graduate College. Western Michigan University.

⁴ Ukpabi, S. C. (1972). *Military Involvement in Nigerian Politics*. Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press.

⁵ Ahmadu, Bello. (1962). *My Life*. London: Cambridge University Press, p.23.

uniform, and arbitrators. While some others like Oyediran⁶, Mazurui⁷, and Diamond⁸, have branded the Nigerian military as corrupt, arrogant, ethnic oriented, and responsible for the political decay and underdevelopment of the country. Dent,⁹ has also noted the helplessness of the military regime to contribute meaningfully to the political and economic development of Nigeria. They contend that the expansion of the role of the military into governance, has seriously impaired its professionalism. It has been opined that military officers can indulge in politics only at the cost of their fighting skills.¹⁰ This is true of Nigeria, as the military interventions in Politics have destroyed the civil foundations of national development and patriotism.

One may argue that the low pace of modernization and political development in a new nation is what produces military takeovers, but such interventions eventually have no beneficial consequences for the country.¹¹ Doubt has often been expressed by some Nigerians on the ability of the military to develop effective political institutions, especially those institutions like political parties that organize broader citizen participation, strong institutions, rule of law, patriotic citizenry and other institutions needed for political and national development.

The Nigerian military has not demonstrated the political expertise and will, for developing a viable and self-sustaining political system among others ideological virtues. They have not also demonstrated the capacity to respond to new challenges, and the arts of administration, negotiation, representation, and bargaining, needed in a developing country like Nigeria. Hence the need for a deepened relationship with the civil authority, devoid of corruption and ethnicity for the good of society.

The military as a professional institution is charged with the responsibilities of maintaining national security in the nascent democratic state, protecting lives and properties, and defending political independence and territorial integrity from external aggression, to ensure a peaceful civil society devoid of insecurity and ready for growth and development. The civil authorities made up of politicians and civil society on the other hand, provide the enabling environment, strong institutions, and the necessary motivations and incentives to the military to perform its statutory professional responsibilities effectively as enshrined in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The civil-military relationship and responsibilities are expected to converge at an equilibrium, to serve the purposes of nation-building, peace, and development. Therefore, a civil-military relationship is to act as a balancer, not as equals but to check and moderate the excesses of the other, for national development, not for personal gains. The

⁶ Oyediran, Oyeleye. (1979). *Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule 1966-79*. New York: St. Martins Press.

⁷ Mazrui, A. (1986). *The Africans: A Triple Heritage*. Boston: Little Brown.

⁸ Diamond, L. (1988). *Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press

⁹ Dent, M. (1978). "Corrective Government: Military Rule in Perspective" in Keith Panter-Brick ed. *Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria*. London: Frank Cass, pp. 101-137.

¹⁰ Bienen, H. and Waterbury, J. (1989). "The Political Economy of Privatization in Developing Countries." *World Development*. Vol. 17, No.5, p.622.

¹¹ Huntington, S. P. (1965). "Political Development and Political Decay." *World Politics*. Vol. 7, (3), pp. 386-430.

military had often argued that they have always ruled Nigeria in concert with the civilians, as it has not been only the military all through. The relationship has always been one of 'functional anarchy.'¹² It has been alleged that some of the coups in Nigeria were instigated and sponsored by civilians. When the June 1, 1992 election was annulled by General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida (IBB), the reason was that it was supported by some prominent civilians¹³. When the Sani Abacha junta, killed Ken Saro Wiwa and the Ogoni Nine, in 1996, the military in some quarters said the whole idea was supported by some Ogoni sons who gave false testimonies to the tribunal¹⁴. However, in all these, the military had greater decision-making and executing powers ruling by decrees. The civilians had little or no say in their decisions. The 1999 Odi Massacre and the 2001 Zaki-Biam killings in Bayelsa and Benue states respectively, ordered by President Obasanjo, a military man turned democrat, was seen as a 'military dictatorship' in a democratic dispensation with the legislature 'rubber-stamped'. Justice Lambo Akanbi's judgment, in 2013, condemned the Federal Government (FG) 'brazen violation of the fundamental rights of victims to movement, life and to own property and live peacefully in their ancestral homes.'¹⁵ Subsequently, the FG was to pay 37.6 billion Naira compensation to the people of Odi. The FG led by a career military president is still to comply with this judgment. This civilianization of the military and the militarization of politics and society is the pivot of the problem of Nigeria's civil-military relations. This begs the question of whether a soldier who has spent his entire life in the military can become a civilian by mere election in a democratic dispensation and expect him to act like a democrat. Even Obasanjo opined that... politics and the military are strange bedfellows.¹⁶ He further opines that, the military sees it as an affront to take orders from civilians. The question has always been whose interest this is supposed to serve if not the society?. History has certainly shown that, it is not in the interest of Nigeria's nation-building and development journey abinitio.. The civil-military relations and synergy expected, should translate into an organizational structure in consensus for effective coordination between them, to democratize, build and develop Nigeria, with the civil authorities at the helms, having preponderant powers. This however has not been the case.

This work will now look at the theoretical approaches to civil-military relations, the history of civil-military relations, challenges, and the way forward for Nigeria, in a democratic setting.

Theoretical Approaches to Civil-Military Relations.

The Agency theory and the qualitative historical methods were used to gather, evaluate, analyze and reconstruct civil-military relations and experiences in Nigeria within the period under review to ascertain how it has enhanced national development. The Agency theory was

¹² John, K. G. (1958). *Rivals Economic Theories in India*. Foreign Affairs, Vol.36, No. 4 July, p.590.

¹³ Enemaku Idachaba. (2018). *Chronology of Major Political Event in the Abacha Er, a(1993-1998)* in Nigeria during the Abacha Years (1993-1998) by Daniel BachYann Lebeau and Kunle Amuwo.

¹⁴ Project Underground 'The life and death of Ken Saro- Wiwa: Ah history of the struggle for justice in the Niger Delta. www.life_dearth_ksw.pdf.

Nicholas Ibekwe. (2013)¹⁵ 'Odi Massacre: Court orders Nigeria Government to pay 36.7 Billion damages to residents, (Premium Times, February 2013).

¹⁶ Olusegun, O.(2012).My Watch. Prestige, p.125.

propounded in the 1970s by scholars like Mitnick¹⁷, Ross¹⁸ and others. This theory was propounded in Financial and Corporate Governance, adopted and utilized in the civil-military relationship by Peter Feaver¹⁹. At the core of this theory is the argument that civil-military relation is seen as a principal-agent relationship in which the civilian authority is the principal and the military, the armed servant of the nation-state. That the relationship of the civil masters (principals) and the military servants (agents) is a form of strategic interaction in which the civil authority monitors the actions of the military, making sure they are effective in their duties and not shirk in their responsibilities.. That civil-military relation should create and preserve a military that is subordinate to political control, but is also efficient and effective. This theory holds the following assumptions:

- i. The military will shirk as long as they are not monitored in the polity by the principal.
- ii. The military will work better if its aims converge with that of the civilian (principal).
- iii. The military will work better despite not being monitored if they think they will be punished if they get caught shirking.

This theory is relevant to this study in that, the world over, there has always been a relationship between the civil and military authorities in all nation-states. None can be completely isolated from the politics in the state, as both have to interact to meet the developmental needs of society. While the military protects lives and properties, defending against external aggression and other responsibilities to the principal, this creates a peaceful environment for development. The civil authority must provide the resources, opportunities, and direction for development to take place, that will build the nation. These relationships are expected to be cordial and amicable for the greater good of society. In Nigeria, this relationship has been to the contrary as seen in military coups that overthrew constitutional democracies, infighting for power amongst military officers for personal gains, and military men who got to be elected under democratic dispensations, but still act as military dictators in disregard for the constitution and civil authorities. According to Feaver, the civil-military problem is a paradox as the very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity and coups are the traditional focus of civil-military relations because they so dramatically symbolize the central problem of the military exploiting their coercive strength to displace civilian rulers.²⁰.

This is the nature of civil-military relations in Nigeria today, plagued by corruption, very weak men, and institutions, nepotism, ethnicity, lack of patriotism, power hungry, rascality, and a general lack of purpose as it concerns nation building. In Nigeria, the military is not completely subordinate to civil institutions and has not always worked in the interest of society, because in some cases the military will say they do not take orders from 'bloody civilians'; this is really

¹⁷Mitnick, j. (1973). *Fiduciary Rationality and Public Policy: The Theory of Agency and some Consequences*. Paper presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA.

¹⁸ Ross, S. (1973). *The economic Theory of Agency: The Principal Problem, in the American Economic Review*, Vol.63, No.2, pp.134-139.

¹⁹ Peter, F. (2003). *Armed Servant: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-military relations*. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press

²⁰ Feaver, P.D. (1999). *Civil-military Relations*. Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 2, pp.211-141.

reminiscent of a colonial army that has not decisively transformed itself for actual national development and growth.

In the wake of insurgency in the North –east and Kaduna, the Senate Committee on Ethics, Privileges, and Public Petitions invite the Chief of Army Staff to the Senate to explain their activities to the Committee. The Chief of Army Staff refused to honour the invitation. This violates the civil authorities and the constitution as the lawmakers said Mr. Buratai, the then COAS, was ‘disrespectful’ and ‘insulting’.²¹ One of the legislators said ‘go and tell your Chief of Army Staff that this Committee takes exception to this insult and would not take it’.²² This is contrary to what Jawaharlal Nehru says that the ‘civil authority is and must remain supreme’.²³ To Buratai, the military takes orders only from the President, who himself was a career soldier. Thus, agreeing with Huntington, that when officers retire, they conspire,²⁴ and seek solidarity by *Esprit de corps* and associations to stay in power and not withdraw from the rulership. In all, nation-building, national development, and growth suffer from no objective civilian control as the military fails in its expertise, responsibility, and corporate character. This is the nature and character of civil-military relations in Nigeria unlike in developed democracies.

Strategic Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria

According to Heady,²⁵ the Nigerian civil bureaucracy has played prominent roles during periods of military rule and periods of civilian rule in part, because of the frequency of regime oscillations. Koehn, opines that the civil bureaucrats have played central and often dominant roles in public policy making and processes throughout Nigeria's history,²⁶ However, these policies have not been enduring to translate into concrete development, because of oscillations between military and civilian regimes that has made policy stability practically impossible.

The entire scope and determinant of civil-military relations in Nigeria is governed by the Nigeria Constitution 1999²⁷ as amended. Section 1, Subsection (1-3) says the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed by any person or group of persons in any part of this country if any other law, is inconsistent with this constitution. The military turned civil president often violates this constitutional provision and rules with subtle coercion.

²¹ Kemi, B. (2017). Senators were furious over Nigerian Army Chief Buratai's absence at public hearings. Premium Times, October 5, 2017.

²² Kemi, B. (2017), October, 5.

²³ Srinath, Raghavan (2010), *War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years*. Ranked: Permanent Black.

²⁴ Huntington, S.P. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press.

²⁵ Heady, F. (1991). New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.

²⁶ Koehn, P. (1984). *Public Administration: Comparative Perspective. The Evolution of Public Bureaucracy in Nigeria*. Edited by Tummala. Administrative Systems Abroad: West View, pp. 188-228.

²⁷ Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as Amended.

Section 14-says the FRN shall be a state based on the principle of democracy, and social justice: sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom government through this constitution derives all its powers and authority.

Section 217-218 (PART I), deals with the army defending the nation from internal insurrections and external aggression when called upon by the President and the powers of the President to appoint the heads of all military institutions with the consent of the National Assembly. The National Assembly can also assign duties to the military as deemed by national exigencies.

Fifth Schedule (PART I) says no public officer shall put him/herself in a position where his/personal interest conflicts with her duties and responsibilities: professionalism rule of engagement, Specific Order/Command, even of exposure/Education/Experience/ World view, Situation/Environment/ Contingency/Personal Character/integrity/Humility, the Civil Society itself, Values and Expectations, Political institutions and Ideas and Individuals.

According to Constitutional provisions, these are the powers of the military and civilian (president) as prescribed by the constitution. However, one of the crucial questions arising out of the Nigerian Civil-Military Relations is the extent to which one controls the other. Huntington²⁸ opines that, the Military institutions of states and their functional relations are determined by the security threats to those states or societies and the internal power/authoritative ideologies and forces that dominate the state or society. Meaning that the extent to which the military will use its powers within the state or society will be determined by the level of threat and the assignment given to it by an Act of Civil authority (National Assembly) and never to usurp power.

In Nigeria, the fissures in civil-military relations are being driven by cultural values and attitudes of civilians and military on both sides of the divide, policy preferences between the civilian and military elites in respect to public policies and issues, internal strife, intra-class or inter-class relations and the struggle for supremacy between the civilian and military in a weak constitutional framework. The military rulership for 27 years and bequeathing to Nigerians a constitution that led the country to civil rule in 1999, has further worsened civil-military relations as the constitution is seen as a military constitution that has consolidated the military Establishment. All efforts to amend the constitution have proven abortive.

According to Obasanjo, by 1965, the Nigeria army has become politicized because of tribalism, favoritism, double standards, and general indiscipline²⁹. This was the nature of the military on the eve of the 1966 coup. By 1966, the leadership style of the civilian authorities and political office holders was characterized by corruption and nepotism. The military acted outside their orders to stage a coup that overthrew the civil administration (1960-1966) in a clear violation of the constitution and their professional ethics. The apolitical and nationalistic Military incursion into politics, suspended the constitution and declared martial law thus, pursuing anti-democratic goals. Between, 1966-1979, every military Administration, ruled the country by Decrees, through the Supreme Military Council (SMC) of senior military officers as principal policymakers. They are also governed by the Federal Executive Council (FEC), which was

²⁸ Huntington, S.P. (1957).

²⁹ Olusegun, O. (2012). pp. 168-169.

made up of senior bureaucrats (civilians) of their choice. who implemented the decision of the SMC. From the above, the military and civil authorities have always interacted in the polity, but with different agendas. While the military intends to perpetuate itself, the civilians want the military out, for failing to uphold their 'corrective mantra'. According to Ifesinachi, the "pursuit of incompatible interests and goals by different groups,"³⁰ is no doubt anti-developmental. This was the disastrous rise of misplaced military power and influence characterized by coercion and authoritarian control that has left the civil society lacking patriotism, highly militarized with elevated poverty, corruption, intolerance, selfish pursuits, and rise of violent religious and ethnic extremist groups troubling the polity today. The above has become the legacies of failure of the civil and military authorities, to adhere to their professional duties and come together to build and develop a nation based on justice, peace, equity, and fairness. The blame is neither here nor there because, both authorities must collaborate to lift this nation out of backwardness in all spheres of national life.

In August 1985, General Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) overthrew another military leader, General Mohammadu Buhari in a coup. IBB declared himself president which is a civilian title. This shows that the military has failed in its core roles and was seeking political power and control for power-sake; subverting civil rights and democracy without an iota of purposeful leadership and nation-building. The military incursion into Nigerian political space for 27 years was a disservice to this nation. IBB ruled with some of the best brains in the Nigerian civil society and his regime was adjudged the best after General Murtala Mohammed's regime, but for the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election. General Sani Abacha took over after IBB stepped aside. Abacha was no better, as corruption escalated to an absurd level and human rights violations were worst,, culminating in the expulsion of Nigeria from the Commonwealth of Nations in 1996. During Abacha's regime, military-civil relations were at an all-time low. Abacha silenced civil society groups with the threat or actual killing of its leaders. Civil society groups like NADECO, and PANDEF, fought him from transiting himself into a civilian President, even though civilians were "begging" Abacha with a prepared One Million-man march title' Youths Earnestly ask for Abacha' to be president before his sudden demise. The military and civilians have often interacted in the polity not in the greater national interest, nonetheless for personal gains of the military leaders and their civil cronies. This of course is at the detriment of national development and nation-building.

When Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999, the Military had ruled the country for 27 years, while the civilians had only 12 years. During these 27 odd years, the military controlled the ship of the state and the civil authorities fought for the return to democratic rule because, the military has failed in their messianic mission of ending corruption, politically uniting, integrating, and developing the country. The military according to the civil authorities has polarized the nations along political, economic, ethnic, and religious lines more dangerously disintegrative than they met it. This view of the military was further buttressed by Falola , Ihonvbere and Huntington³¹ They argued that the, puritanical, nationalistic, patriotic, detribalized, dedicated modernizers attributes of the military are either exaggerated or over-

³⁰ Ifesinachi, K. (2009). *Preventive Diplomacy and Peace Making*. In Mark-Clark (Ed), *Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution in Nigeria*: (p.73), A Reader. Spectrum Books Limited.

³¹ Falola, T, Ihonvbere, J. (1985). *The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic, 1979-1983*. London: Zed Books Ltd.

Huntington, S.O. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven. Yale University Press.

generalized, when considering the situation in Africa,. Nigeria is no exception. The military has shown that they can bow to pressure from the civil authority and have endeavored to make their relationship more cordial in the years after 1999 but a lot is still expected.

The military cannot be completely ignored in the political history of Nigeria from their colonial antecedents, haven related with the civil authorities, tasted power and never wanted to quit. This has resulted in different forms of military-civilian engagement in the polity: civilian employment of retired soldiers, the direct participation of retired soldiers in partisan politics, co-option of the military in the civilian-military regimes, and professional association of military officers that make demands on civil authorities. These have resulted in a relationship between the civilianized military and militarized civilians. They both must strategically through healthy relations and partnership, lay the solid foundation for national rebirth and development, and twenty years into 'democratic rule', Nigeria is still to find its rhythm nationally and internationally.

Challenges to the Civil-Military Relations

Like in other climes the world over, there are challenges to civil-military relations. In Nigeria, the challenges are arising basically from the supremacy of control based on the nation's past. While the military thinks it must control the wheels of power, the civilians feel it is a democracy and the military should be subordinate. Nigerian military plays a significant role in internal security provision for the sustenance of Nigeria and democracy. However, the civil authorities feel threatened by the increased involvement of the Nigerian military in curbing internal security challenges like the Boko Haram insurgency, Niger Delta militancy, End-Sars protest, and the rise of nationalist groups. Several operations and code names like Rat-Race; Crocodile Smile; Lafiya Dole; Python Dance; Show of Force, Herdsmen/farmers conflict, Cattle Rustling and Kidnapping, and Thunder Strike, have made the military too powerful and a threat to civilian authority. The effective constitutionality of these operations is not well defined and the Military leadership takes orders only from the President. Further still, the Constitution of Nigeria of 1999 as amended, should institutionalize strict democratic values and or constitutional norms in military training and culture to make the military supporters of democratic principles. Elected civilians in Nigerian still do not enjoy power supremacy as obtained in developed democracies³²This is because of the military superiority mindset to governance in the country. There is little or no punishment or deterrence to erring military officers who violate the constitution, especially during elections.

The influence of each other on civil-military relations is not at equilibrium but subtle rivalry. The military rarely complies with constitutional provisions that guarantee civilian authority over the military, because of the rise of class interests and the need for protection between the Generals serving or retired and the civilian political class 'bloody civilians'. The ordinary Nigerian still nurse the fears of the military brutality, which has not stopped twenty years into a civil rule. There have to be conscientious efforts at rebuilding confidence in the affected civilian populace psyche.

³²Feaver, P. (2003). *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

The military has very unique challenges which make their relational experience with the civilians a problematic one. The military often works in very difficult situations involving, a long time and alienates them from their parents, families, and even themselves. These often cause traumatic stress disorders and paranoid coupled with job stresses of deployment and redeployment, transfers, and relocations. These exert pressures on the individual soldiers that make striking a balance between civil-military life, environment, and engagement a problematic one by nature.

Another, problem with civil-military relations is that of reconciling the military laws vis-à-vis the Constitution. The military rule by decrees and are used to taking and receiving commands and instructions, unlike constitutional orders which are slow and have to pass through the Senate or House of Representatives. These two different natures have to be harmonized for there to be tolerance of each other for the reason of nation-building. The military is often not properly acculturated and reintegrated into the civil society, after long years of military service. This often results in clashes and problems between the military and the civilians in interpersonal relationships.

According to Onimode³³, the Nigerian military is immune from class biases. The military has an inherent class interest to point that the upper stratum of the Nigerian military has had a close alliance with the civilian faction of the ruling class. He said the military interest often coincides with that of the Nigerian dominant class. This military interest is often to consolidate the state and guarantee a conducive atmosphere for primitive accumulation of wealth. Military interest has most times intervened in the democratic process, suspending the constitution, unleashing terror on the citizens through high-handedness and draconian decrees with evidence of monumental corruption under military regimes. The military haven tasted power and wealth and finds it difficult to leave, but try to perpetuate themselves in power to the detriment of the country. This is a major challenge to civil-military relations in Nigeria.

Way Forward for Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria

The relations between the civil and military in Nigeria have dominated the thinking of Nigerians over the years, because Nigerians are still yet to benefit from this relationship that is ordinarily is capable of enhancing their lives. The civil and military must ensure they work hand in hand for development and nation-building. Defense and development must go in tandem. The Civil authority must by legislation, subordinate the military leadership to civilian leadership. The civil authority must not over-empower the military to make them too assertive, to overthrow the civil authority. Adequate punishment should be meted out on erring military authorities for insubordination for deterrence purposes. Democratic ethos must be embedded in the military profession to inculcate respect for civil control over government as power belongs to the people. There must be a systematic dialogue between the military and civil authorities to ensure greater military effectiveness and efficiency in the use of national resources for all Nigerians, because the military is vital in giving power and stability to the democratic process.

The military and civilians must strategically cooperate in terms of respect for the constitution and respect of professionalism because, the Military, has always been a 'Political

³³ Bade, Onimode, (1983). *Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria*. London. MacMillian press.

Integrator³⁴The reason for this is that the Military plays both dominant, strategic, and complementary roles in the establishment of peace and sustenance of democracy. Though civil-military relations remain delicate in Nigeria, both are relevant as the civilian leaders/society look up to and depend on the military for many and varied services and roles of territorial defense, internal stability, national power, and image with Africa and the world. Refocusing the military on increased professionalism, discipline, and better welfare (Death, Retirement Benefits, Accommodation, Medical, etc.) will reduce their appetite for power and interference in politics. There has to be an intensive inculcation of national values- the Nigeria First approach, in everything the military and civilians do. Effective communication, increased openness, adequate information dissemination, and respect for each other among other things, hold the prospects for better civil-military relations aimed at national development in Nigeria.

The Nigerian military already occupies and has an indispensable place in the state and polity and need not gain forcefully political power and relevance, because cordial and diverse civil-military relations will yield more power, relevance, influence, and patriotism for the military. There is vast and wealthy potential (human and material resources) to be fully exploited and harnessed by the Nigerian state for its overall greatness. The civil and military authorities must harness and guide the populace positively for national development which will earn the nation its credibility and a prospective future.

CONCLUSION.

The fate of democratic survival in a delicate and transitional state like Nigeria, depends on the conscious efforts at genuine growth by both the civil and military authorities. Both forces must play their roles bearing in mind their statutory responsibilities, because how well they effectively relate will not only determine how well Nigerians get the dividends of democracy but also its future internationally, amongst the comity of nations. The civil and military authorities must adhere to the constitution, professionalism, and rules of engagement in their different areas of operation and penalties to the contrary to serve as deterrence to others. Nigerians (military or civil) must enjoy good and adequate welfare services to create equity in social and living standards for all, which will douse tensions in military-civil relations. Quality civic education, civil-military relations, and reorientation of Nigerians will go a long way in addressing civil-military misunderstandings which breed conflict. A sound political culture based on the rule of law, equity, fairness, and justice will eradicate all antagonisms in civil-military relations thus paving the way for a united and prosperous Nigeria of our dream.

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³⁴ Adekson, J. B. (1981). *Nigerian Search of a Stable Civil-Military System*. Aldershot: Gower Publishing company

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A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW OF SOME ISSUES AFFECTING COMMUNITY POLICING AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE

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Abstract

This paper reviews some core components of community policing and their effects on national development in Nigeria. The study does this by specifically reviewing the extent of security threat on centralized policing, the willingness of citizens' support, the extent of the collaboration of municipal patrolling with central regulating system, and the relationship between metropolitan supervision and economic improvement in Nigeria. The attitude and disconnect between Nigeria's formal policing structure and the community is perceived to have contributed to the inefficiency of the Nigerian policing system which is highly centralized. This issue seems to have grossly undermined the country's national development and thus the need to be examined. In its final analysis the study establishes the fact that despite its challenges, community policing if properly executed would reduce the prevalence insecurity in Nigeria thereby aiding national development.

Keywords: Community Policing, Insecurity, National Development, Policing, Security

Introduction

Keeping peace and maintaining the safety of citizens and property cannot be over emphasized for the progress and survival of any sovereign nation. It can be viewed as a precondition for good governance leading to secure economic growth, political advancement, national peace building, human capital development, human freedom, and proper functioning of things in a country. Oikhala opined that global security challenges tends to have adverse effects on the world at large as insecurity appears to have compromised desired national development of many countries of the world¹. Incidence of insecurity differs from one continent to another viz-a-viz one country to another as well as their consequences. There is no doubt therefore that, the absence of internal security breeds disorder, increases insecurity, distorts freedom, reduces human value, and impoverishes the citizens, hence, the necessity of community policing for sustaining law and order in communities as an integral component of peace and security policy arises.

Cossyleon explained community policing as a philosophy which promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnership and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues. It is a way of combating crime and criminal act to achieve greater positive outcomes in each society. Nigeria has and is experiencing different forms of unpleasant internal security threats such as banditry, human trafficking, terrorism, kidnapping, killings, militancy, violence, assassinations, armed robbery, thuggery, and communal clashes amongst others². The spate of insecurity has assumed a worrisome trend and it appears that the existing apparatus of government tasked with confronting these threats head on is either over stretched, inefficient, or both. The loss of lives and properties have hindered so many activities among which is the mass exit of investors from the country, discouragement of potential investors, drop in oil revenue, and national development in the long run³. This view admits that national development cannot be attained in the absence of a productive economy, capable administration, and responsive state. In as much as there are concerted efforts at checking insecurity in Nigeria, it is observed that the incidence of insecurity comes with a severe negative impact on her national development.

In the opinion of Ajibola, national development entails the application of a nation's resources to create wealth and advance people's well-being. No doubt, insecurity has affected businesses which are an important segment of the economy, hindered economic progression, industrialization, and sustainable development in Nigeria. Although national development is top priority of the Nigerian government, little has been achieved to secure the state⁴.

Countries around the world such as (United State of America, United Kingdom, Canada and Malaysia) have adopted a combination of policing options to ensure internal security. In this instance, some observers have noted that the Nigerian system of government which promotes centralization of security agencies is the major setback in the fight against insecurity in the land and that is perhaps what has led to persistent calls for grass root security apparatus or neighborhood watch christened 'community policing'⁵. Zumve posits that community policing is an approach of policing which involves people at the grassroots to ameliorate criminal tendencies and organizational transformation. It involves cooperation for preventing and solving crimes through information gathering resident's observance and patrol activities between formal police structure and a given community. This often comes in the form of Police Community Relationship Committees, Civilian Joint Task Force (JTF), Vigilante Groups, and Community Development Associations, among others⁶.

Conceptual Review

There are concepts that underline this discourse which require conceptualization as far as they are useful to this study. These concepts are security threat, citizens willingness, municipal policing, and metropolitan supervision with other indices of national development such as centralized policing, communal watching, central regulating system and economic improvement

Security Threat

Security according to Madaki relates to the safety of lives and properties and absence of threats to lives. It presupposes assurance that all is well and would be well as events unfold. It may be about stability in a relatively expected territory or community where people live, do their

business, or engage in social gathering⁷. Security as a concept evolved from the philosophy that human beings need to be guided in terms of societal peace, human rights, and within political space. Such description covers crime prevention, food security, economic security, social security, internal security, and national security. Of interest in this review is national security, which Arase described as ‘protection of values, human and infrastructural assets, territorial integrity and properties of citizens from threat’⁸. This can be embraced as emancipation against internal threats to lives and properties of people in a defined territory.

To have further insight into the concept, security threat connotes ‘insecurity’ and it includes but not limited to danger, fear, uncertainty, absence of protection and safety. It is as a state of being open or subject to danger or threat of danger, while danger is the condition of being susceptible to harm or injury and state of being exposed to risk or anxiety⁹. Anxiety is a vague unpleasant emotion that is experienced in anticipation of some misfortune. Udeh et al described security threat as a system of being unable to protect lives and properties which make individual vulnerable to damage, injury, or loss from both internal and external causes¹⁰.

Security threat is a condition that exists due to the lack of effective measures put in place to protect individuals, information and property against hostile persons, influences and actions. Obarisiagbon and Akintoye captured security threat as the absence of resistance to or protection from harm, peaceful co-existence, and development at large¹¹. On a general note, Ndubuisi-Okolo and Anigbuogu present security threat as the state of fear, anxiety, restlessness, and uncertainty of human beings’ existence. From these views, there are attempts to have oversimplified the concept ‘security threat’ which limits it to the physical safety of lives and properties¹². However, a comprehensive description of security threat entails social insecurity, food insecurity, job insecurity, financial insecurity, economic insecurity, political insecurity, health insecurity, demographic insecurity, gender insecurity, environmental insecurity, moral insecurity, relationship insecurity, and religious insecurity amongst others. Aminu et al stated that security threats of all forms are manifesting in Nigeria. The state of Nigeria insecurity is overwhelming as this can be seen in poverty, communal clashes, banditry, insurgencies, kidnapping, armed robbery, ritual killings, religious crisis, cattle rustling, destruction of farms, and political crisis, to mention but a few¹³. In context, the lingering security challenges is a serious issue of concern and raises the question of whether Nigeria’s formal security apparatus would be able to change the narrative for the better.

Citizens Willingness

In the modern age, the complexities of interests within nation-states, high crime rates, civilization, terrorism and failed state phenomenon’s, make citizens willingness to the events in his/her environment an imperative. Without any sense of contradiction, citizens need to be involved and be informed about the governing process, the rights they are to demand from the state and the responsibility required of them. Dustin put it clearly while articulating the works of J. J Rousseau on the imperative of citizen willingness in the happenings and events. He affirmed that there can be no patriotism without liberty, no liberty without virtue, and no virtue without citizens¹⁴.

Ozumba and Eteng expounded citizens willingness as the totality of erudition, instruction, equipping, which citizens need to be able to play his/her role, discharge his/her responsibilities, know his/her rights, understand his/her country-the constitution, the politics, the ethics, the

religious, the ethos and the ideals that make the national geo-political entity¹⁵. The citizen willingness or disposition is the kind of tutoring given to the citizens of a country with a view to making them responsible people, capable of contributing meaningfully to the overall development of their country. Citizenship participation is then designed to make the entire citizen identify and exercise their civic and political rights and willingly accept to perform their civic and political responsibilities¹⁶.

Municipal Patrolling and Metropolitan Supervision

Municipal patrol is an intersection among the community, liveliness, and transference. It is the allocation of personnel to patrol the urban transport network¹⁷. Patrolling is as old as the concept of modern policing, despite its long history, little has been done over the years to track these patrols systematically and accurately. Practitioners and police scholars alike are generally unable to tell what measure is, or should be, applied to routine or special police operations, especially when it comes to directed and preventative patrolling¹⁸.

A smart city management assigns several city inspectors to patrol in the street traffic network in order to protect public facilities to solve some problems in the street network such as illegal constructions, unpleasant attitudinal behaviour and road occupancy¹⁹. In real life, there are many distributed services on the street. A well-designed route can substantially reduce the cost of a distributed service. Therefore, routing patrolling is being increasingly studied for both fundamental issues and incidents. Municipal patrolling is a necessary activity neighborhood watchers use to prevent emergencies and act on real-time incidents²⁰. Efficient patrol routes are designed using computerized information systems and more affordable geographic information systems (GISs)²¹.

A community patrol simulation framework is used to determine and evolve a set of routes and find the optimal solution. Route optimization for municipal patrol is essential, and some inquiry has been done on optimizing patrol paths. Public security officers carry out daily community patrols to ensure safety and combat crime²². The optimization target for patrol was to allocate personnel and route. Cheng et al. established an optimized, high-performance road patrol task assignment model for multi-unmanned communities²³. The length of patrol routes communities would therefore be optimized.

National Development

Description of development appears controversial because of expectations and contextual factors. In comparative terms such as standard, benchmark, time or period inform development and otherwise. Economists would prefer to use economic growth indices like per capita income or gross domestic product (GDP) as determinants of development²⁴. The United Nations (2008) describe development as a process of increasing people's opportunity of variety. Applying this to a nation implies efficient deployment of national natural, material, and human resources to create wealth and improve the well-being of people's lives²⁵.

This implies improvement in the social and economic conditions of people. In this regard, the realization of human personality as agents of development is fundamental which include

respecting the diversity of the people and their independence within the environment. Such development cut across all spheres of lives, be it social, political, economic and expression. This line of thoughts encapsulates national development among political scientists, financial analysts, business analysts, economists, sociologists, and psychologists. Today national development is centered on people (human development) and places emphasis on the provision of social goods and reduction if not elimination of unemployment, poverty, malnutrition, disease, hunger, illiteracy, insecurity, crime, and war, to mention few in the world²⁶. Therefore, national development in this study refers to the provision of all necessities of life to make life worth living.

Centralized Policing

The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) remains the only police authority in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, since the first decade of the nation's independence in 1960. For emphasis's sake, this had not always been the case. For example, from 1943 to 1966, there were local police forces in the three regions of the federation, controlled and maintained by respective regional administrations under the Native Authority Ordinance of 1943. The constitutional conference of 1954 paved the way for a quasi-federal system of government in Nigeria. At this conference, it was agreed that the Nigeria Police Force should be the only police authority and that the existing local and native police forces should be dissolved or absorbed, if possible, into the Nigeria Police Force²⁷.

Nevertheless, the dissolution was never carried out despite coming into operation of the 1954 Constitution. It was not until 1966 when the first coup d'état took place that the then government of Aguiyi-Ironsi decreed that all local police forces and native authority police forces should be placed under the overall command of the Inspector-General of Police²⁸. Be that as it may, the complete absorption of the local police forces into the NPF was finally completed between 1967 and 1969²⁹, maybe because of the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970). At this juncture, the long journey into a centralized police system in Nigeria commenced amidst the presence of a federal structure, at least on paper.

One of the Nigeria Police Force' units, the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), was created in 1992 to tackle and prevent criminal-related offences ranging from highway robbery, kidnapping, armed robbery, etc. recently became notorious in her conduct of operations. The SARS unruly behavior to Nigerian citizens reached its crescendo in the year 2020. It was their assault, extrajudicial killings, extortion, unlawful arrest, and detention of innocent citizens that resulted to the ENDSARS protest of October 2020.

SARS has been accused of unlawful arrests, the invasion of youth's privacy by searching phones and laptops, 'kidnapping', rape, humiliation, extortion, and extrajudicial killings of their victims. To validate the above viewpoint, Kelechi Madu, Canada's first black Minister of Justice and Solicitor-General at government of Alberta, recently gave a detailed account on how the Nigerian police allegedly murdered his cousin – Chrisantus Nwabueze Korie – in 2013 (Sahara Reporters, 2018). He went on to reveal how the police did everything to obstruct the investigation into the murder incident. Aside this gut-wrenching incident, so many painful experiences encountered by so many Nigerians in the hands of SARS were shared on various news outlets, particularly the social media platforms thus heightening tension. Nevertheless, the Nigerian government was perceived to be lukewarm towards the issue. This resulted in a

violent protest in Nigeria in October 2020 which led to the banning of SARS on the 11th day of October, hence the citizens quest for decentralization of the policing system across the country

Video streaming platforms (e.g., Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Prime) have been expanding at a fast pace in the past few years. Combining ease of use (affordability and wide accessibility through just about any internet-connected device) and prolific content libraries available on-demand at one's convenience, these services are now part of millions of TV series viewers' daily routines [1–3]. Central to the changes afforded by these technologies is the move away from the traditional week-by-week release of episodes with entire seasons of TV series now being made available at once. As a prime indicator of the cultural shift in watching, binge-watching (i.e., watching multiple episodes of a TV series back-to-back) has rapidly become the new normative mode of viewing TV shows, especially among young adults [1, 4]. Nevertheless, in this unparalleled era where viewers are free to watch literally as many TV series episodes as wanted, and where problematic online behaviors are taken seriously, a new sector of research recently emerged, building on t

Central Regulating System

The International Code of Enforcement Ethics reveals the primary reason for establishing formal police system in any society. The fundamental duty is to serve mankind and property; to safeguard lives and property; to protect the innocent against deception; the weak against oppression or intimidation, and the peaceful against violence and disorder; and to respect constitutional rights of all the men to liberty, equity and justice (<https://www.theiacp.org/resources/law-enforcement-code-of-ethics>). Admittedly, the main role of the police is to enforce law and order, safeguard lives and property, and render other essential services in the society. Put in a different way, fighting crimes and criminals is so difficult that the police and other law enforcement agencies alone cannot perform this task and achieve maximum positive results as centralized law in a polarize state nation cannot encompass the entire society without challenges. Since the most visible part of criminal activities take place at the neighborhood level, policing agencies need public support and co-operation. Intensive partnership and collaborative efforts of both the formal and informal agents of social control remain preconditions for a possible near 'crime-free' society.

Traditional societies, including Nigeria employed the system of 'hue and cry', which literally means angry protests embarked upon by a group of people over something, but contextually refers to a system of community policing whereby members of the community unite with State agents of social control to arrest criminals. Specifically, African societies of old used their various traditional institutions to achieve and maintain maximum level of public safety, orderliness, and conformity. With the passage of time, these institutions recorded wide-ranging progress and success in curtailing antisocial conducts by forming a synergy with the formal policing agencies, particularly the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) through community policing. Across cultures and civilizations, community-policing has always been emphasized, encouraged, and recommended by individuals, State and non-State social control actors as well as crime scholars as a safety valve for effective policing of society.

However, community policing entails a systematic involvement and inclusion of credible local guards, vigilance groups, able-bodied civilian youths, and traditional rulers and chiefs into the conventional police sub-system for the purpose of achieving far-reaching success in crime prevention and control at the grassroots.

Economic Improvement

The concepts ‘improvement’ is ambiguous, and for decades it has been the subject of endless debates and discussions. There is no clear picture or definition of what actually constitutes ‘economic underdevelopment’ or how to achieve it, as it is an evolving concept, and keeps altering over time. Broadly speaking, economic improvement is taken to be the structural transformation of an economy by introducing more mechanized and updated technologies to increase labor productivity, employment, incomes, and standard of living of the population³⁰. Economic improvement should be accompanied by development in infrastructure, as well as social, political, and institutional factors to facilitate transformation of the economy³¹.

Economic improvement has greatly developed living conditions and incomes across the world. However, an alarming and inevitable consequence of modern economic development is the massive negative impact on the natural environment. Modern technology is highly resource dependent, needing enormous inputs of minerals, metals, power, fuel, timber, water, as well as adequate security to protect all the endowed resources from theft and other maligns. At the same time, production and consumption do not ‘use’ up all these materials, they are let off into the environment in the form of pollution and wastes and thus, need to be protected in order to serve as raw materials to other finished goods.

If the natural environment is completely devastated, it threatens the existence of life itself on this Earth. There is an urgent need to review the type of economic improvement that is taking place and to ensure that the process and fruits of economic development are not environmentally destructive. Hence, there is the need for sustainable development – i.e., economic development that does not pose a threat to the living environment or limit future development. Sustainable development is usually defined as “development that meets the needs of the present generation, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” The UN SDG goals are framed as guidelines to help countries achieve sustainable development by focusing on both the economic and environmental dimensions of growth³².

Community Policing in Nigeria: The Way Forward

Existing documentation on modern community policing was traced to United States in the early 1970s³³. By this practice and traces of oral tradition, community policing has been in existence long term ago in the pre-colonial era of a geographical area called Nigeria today. The Nigerian traditional community policing arrangement was before the advent of colonial rule and existed during colonial rule until when Nigeria got independence in 1960. Such policing system was effective in preventing internal criminal tendencies and solving criminality problems such that it prevented and controlled criminal behaviour in towns and villages. Back in those days, the leadership of the towns and villages, elders, and traditional leaders were the ones that

constituted neighbourhood watches³⁴. Modern community policing now comes in form of neighbourhood watch, vigilante groups, and home security. In contemporary Nigeria, community policing is now part of the Nigeria police structure. The recent trend of insecurity pronounced in some States of Nigeria where banditry, kidnapping, communal clashes armed robbery, and other related crimes have made the citizenry lose confidence in formal policing³⁵. The citizens believe that divulging security information to Police Officers is meaningless as they will either not act on it or endanger information providers. Consequently, many Nigerians have become obsessive with putting in place personal security measures or migrating from the country. As a result of all these issues, in 2004 the Federal House of Representative Committee on Police Affairs reviewed the Police Act to accommodate community policing. Unfortunately, till date the country is still unable to properly and fully implement community policing. This study therefore provides the following recommendations below:

Recommendations

The Community should be the primary objective for security agencies; its tacit support, its submission to law and order, its consensus etc. It is therefore necessary to obtain the support of the community not only in the form of sympathy and approval but in active participation in keeping the society safe. However if the community fears retribution from criminal groups, they will not cooperate with security agencies and provide valuable information. Security agencies in general must build confidence in the community by conducting themselves professionally and showing the ability to hold volunteered information in the highest secrecy and protect those they have been entrusted to protect at all cost.

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations were made:

- i. The security architecture of formal policing in Nigeria should be reviewed to meet up with modern policing strategies.
- ii. Stakeholders need to know that security is the business of everyone and must collaborate to tackle the wave of crime in the locality and Nigeria at large.
- iii. To reverse the retrogressive pace of development, government must confront the level insecurity with every sense of urgency.
- iv. It is important for house residents to be actively involved in community policing. In this regard, landlords and tenants must fashion out ways to enlist with the community policing arrangement and be actively involved.

Conclusion

Development would continue to be an illusion where insecurity pervades. This study concludes that the spate of insecurity in Nigeria is alarming, and this can be attributed to a weak formal policing structure and the demand for community policing that would have strengthen the formal policing structure. It is obvious that Nigeria as a whole is yet to fully maximize the potential of community policing in helping to address the security challenges confronting her. This is compounded by the lack of trust in the formal policing structure by the larger Nigerian citizenry. Consequently, security challenges have stalled the pace of development in Nigeria. To halt this retrogression, community policing must be seen to be critical as the present formal policing structure appeared to be overstretched. Therefore, the study considered a community

policy as the bailout option to address the security challenge in Nigeria and restore the trajectory of development in the nation.

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THE RESURGENCE OF COUPS IN AFRICA: A DESIRABILITY FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY

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Abstract

This study examines the limitations of states' principles of self-determination, the causes of the resurgence of military coups in Africa, and the applicability of international law in resolving conflicts emanating from the resurgence of military coups. Therefore, this study explores the functionality of international law in the process of conflict resolution amidst a revived military coup in this era when democracy is said to be promoted globally. This paper made use of archival materials, historical analysis, and a review of related literature and documents to address the issue of military coup resurgence within the purview of international law. Apart from domestic factors and influences that are promoters of these military coups, this study holds that pseudo-democracy and misappropriation, misconception of the position of international law on modern democracy by coup plotters in Africa, the imbalance in the political system of most African states, and concentration of power in the hands of a particular political class could be said to account for the resurgence of military coups in Africa. This study also holds that provisions of international law are not sufficient to restrict the action of military coups in this

contemporary era; hence, a more diplomatic approach should be fine-tuned and applied. The paper recommends that international law should spread to cover the actions of states' military, in keeping with the provisions of democracy, and that stronger deterrence measures should be adopted by the international community aimed at preventing the resurgence of military coups in Africa.

Keywords: Africa, resurgence, military coup, international law, and conflict resolution.

Introduction and historical background

A military coup is a violent or non-violent overthrow of a government by the armed forces, usually with the aim of installing a new regime or restoring a previous one (Thompson, 1973). Military coups have been a common phenomenon in the developing world since the end of World War II, accounting for nearly 200 cases of regime change (David, 1991). Between 1945 and 1976, Nordingler (1977) estimated that more than two-thirds of the countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East had experienced some degree of military intervention.

In Africa, military coups were especially prevalent between the 1960s and 1980s, when the armed forces often seized power from regimes that were seen as dictatorial, corrupt, or incompetent. Between 1956 and 2001, there were 80 successful coups and 108 failed coup attempts on the continent. Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan were among the countries where military officers toppled governments. However, most of these coups did not lead to a transition to democracy or good governance. Instead, they resulted in military dictatorships that violated human rights and suppressed civil society. The era of military rule only faded after a wave of democratisation swept across Africa in the late 1990s (Warah, 2022).

Despite the democratic progress, a series of military coups have erupted across West Africa and the Sahel in a worrying trend of "coup contagion" since 2019 (The Guardian, 2022; The Institute Montaigne, 2022). Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, and most recently, Gabon, have all witnessed coup attempts, many of which have succeeded. While each country has its own specific context, there are some common factors that explain the domestic and international drivers behind this dangerous phenomenon (The Institute Montaigne, 2022; The Organisation for World Peace, 2022). Unlike the earlier coups that were motivated by bad leadership and poor governance, the recent coups have been driven by economic hardship and rising insecurity (The Guardian, 2022; The Council on Foreign Relations, 2022). The pandemic has worsened poverty and unemployment levels, while corrupt or incompetent leaders have failed to address violent extremism and insecurity. These factors have eroded the trust and patience of Africa's largely youthful population (The Council on Foreign Relations, 2022). The history of military coups in Africa has also paved the way for the recent and potential coups in the region, as many African states still suffer from weak or fragile institutions (The Institute Montaigne, 2022).

The resurgence of coups and the increase in military interventions across Africa pose a serious threat to peace, stability, and security on the continent. Most of these coups are occurring in countries that are undergoing democratic transitions after decades of authoritarian rule. It is well known that militaries play a crucial role in democracies. They could either refuse to

suppress mass protests or topple repressive regimes. On the other hand, they can either support or undermine democratic consolidation by respecting or rejecting civilian authority, especially when reforms or efforts to enact changes threaten their entrenched interests (NATO, 1998). The latter is evident from the fact that many African dictators tend to consolidate their power by building ethnic armies. African autocrats recruit soldiers into the military that belong to the same ethnicity as themselves and offer them key leadership posts (Businessday NG, 2019). Such a shared communal identity between the soldiers and the autocrats ensures loyalty. In such circumstances, the growing number of military coups could be attributed to the militaries' desire to protect rather than change the status quo when their entrenched powers and privileges are threatened. The question now is, to what extent have diplomacy and the practice of international law gone a long way towards preventing and resolving these issues of resurgent coups in Africa? That is why this study, through historical analysis and a review of related literature and documents, explores the functionality of international law in the process of conflict resolution amidst a revived military coup in this era when democracy is said to be promoted globally.

The Resurgence of Military Coups in Africa as a Threat to Modern Democracy, World Peace, and Security

During the peak of Africa's democratic struggles in the 1970s and 1980s, scholars and civil society actors claimed that democracy was synonymous with development. They advanced the argument that, once there was democracy, African states would automatically undergo the long-desired process of development. Africans were, therefore, highly hopeful when the "third wave" of democratisation began to manifest in states during the 1990s. They thought security and development had finally arrived on the continent (Bryden, 2007).

Unfortunately, decades into the democratic journey, nothing substantial has changed. There has not been considerable progress from what was obtainable under the military. Corruption cases in West Africa have skyrocketed, while poverty rates have been on the rise. Neither are the states of human rights and civil liberties better than they used to be with the military. Even with democracy in place, the political space is exclusionary. For example, the Ibrahim Index on African Governance in 2022 reported a decline in the areas of participation, rights and inclusion, security, and rule of law over the last decade (Mo Ibrahim, 2022).

The masses, particularly the youth, feel excluded from policy discussions and have become increasingly disenchanted with the idea of democracy itself if this is all that it can offer. Rising conflicts have continued to threaten lives and properties. For a sub-region that has experienced military regimes for many years, it is only natural that people are comparing the current crisis with what was possible before. These sentiments provide an enabling environment for the military to successfully stage coups in West African states, a phenomenon that has become increasingly welcomed by civilians. This reaction reflects the masses' lack of faith in political institutions ruled by corrupt elites who have long ruled their countries.

Another major factor that is often overlooked is the issue of security sector reform. The military was expected to be reformed by democratic principles following the democratic transition programmes of the 1990s (African Union, 2013). However, little was done to restructure the

military and enable it to function properly in a democracy. In some cases, civilian leaders actively maintained a strong military structure that existed during military regimes because politicians aimed to have full control of the political space. Underlying issues, such as ethnic domination and inadequate representation of competing ethnic groups within the military, have further fuelled resentments within and outside of the institution. The military's poor welfare and the failure of reforms have further contributed to the resurgence of military coups in the sub-region.

Amidst various failings in governance and difficulties that African regional governments have had in dealing with security and developmental issues, there is an ever-present concern that militaries in the Sahel and Horn of Africa will continue to take power into their own hands (Akinwotu, 2022). The resurgence of military coups, especially in West Africa, has raised concerns about the state of democracy, peace, and security in the region (Adebanwi & Obadare, 2022). Sanctions have not been able to create the necessary political outcomes that the AU and ECOWAS desire. The sanctions on Mali in August 2020, Guinea in September 2021, and Niger on July 28, 2023, have backfired and driven popular support towards military leadership (Al Jazeera, 2022; Deutsche Welle, 2022; CNN, 2021). Civil society organisations in many African countries continue to urge regional organisations such as ECOWAS not to impose sanctions (Akinwotu, 2022). Even though trade embargoes and border closures have impacted businesses, military leaders continue to remain in positions of power. Any further weakening of regional security architecture in the West African region runs the risk of accelerating the spread of militancy in not only other Sahelian countries but also in coastal West African states as well (Muhammad & Hakeem, 2022). With sanctions put in place against several states, this has disrupted social and economic development and weakened regional and international cooperation (The Guardian, 2022; Fragile States Index, 2022). It has been adjudged that democratic coup necessitate military coups, and both have hurt the tenets of democracy, peace, and security. The military coup in Africa eroded the legitimacy and stability of democratic institutions and even created political uncertainty and violence. Therefore, it is essential to prevent and address the root causes of coups as well as support the restoration of constitutional order and democratic governance in the affected countries.

Causes of the Resurgence of Military Coups in Africa

Coups have been a visible and recurrent characteristic of the African political experience for decades. During the post-colonial period, there was a string of successive military coups in many parts of the African continent, from east to west and north to south. This trend manifested itself in a series of coup d'états, especially between the mid-1960s and the late 1980s. Allegations of poverty, mismanagement, and endemic corruption were the fundamental justifications given for organising coups. By the decade of the 2000s, the wave of democracy and the reintroduction of multiparty politics in some African countries led to the perception that the military was giving up its dominance over the political affairs of Africa (Mishra and Toprak, 2022).

The proliferation of insurgents and extremist violence, coupled with weak, fledgling, and transitional democracies, has provided fertile grounds for military intervention in civilian and political matters in Africa. According to Mishra and Toprak (2022), the recent reappearance of

the military in Guinea, Sudan, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, and Gabon recalled the experience of military intervention in civilian authority in the past. One of the reasons for the revival of this phenomenon is that in some African countries, as a result of deciphering and implementing democracy in different ways according to the wishes of politicians and the ruling elite, significant discontent has arisen among the people.

In addition, the decadence of the socio-political and economic environment is the justification for coups in many cases, while elite power struggles may also be among the explanatory variables. However, the biggest proof that military coups cannot maintain stability and do not address socioeconomic concerns can be cited, since there have been more than 200 successful and unsuccessful coup attempts on the continent since 1950. Although many coups occurred for different reasons, external factors are too important to be ignored (Mishra and Toprak, 2022).

Poorly funded and under-resourced militaries are another reason why coups have been a recurring event in Africa, especially in the Sahelian region. The task of tackling the rising spate of extremist violence without proper combat readiness, i.e., insufficient training, weaponry, resources, and funds, has placed an unsustainable burden on African militaries. This has resulted in militaries intervening against their governments, as demonstrated recently in Mali and Burkina Faso. The occurrence of successive attacks and the subsequent holding of large-scale anti-government protests became the path to coups in most countries. The proliferation of insurgents and extremist violence, coupled with weak, fledgling, and transitional democracies, has provided fertile grounds for military intervention in civilian and political matters across Africa (Mishra and Toprak, 2022). In such circumstances, the growing number of military coups could be attributed to the militaries' desire to protect rather than change the status quo when their entrenched powers and privileges are threatened.

Cases of Military Coups Resurgence in Africa

The recent military coup in Burkina Faso that toppled President Roch Kaboré highlights a disturbing trend in African politics: a resurgence of unconstitutional means to bring about regime change since the start of the pandemic. In the past two years, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, Niger, and Gabon have all seen military takeovers.

In Sudan, a popular, people-driven revolution led to the ouster of military dictator Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. However, the military has undermined the power-sharing agreement between the military and civilians. It dissolved the government and declared a state of emergency in October 2021. The Sudanese protested against the coup and demanded an expedited transition to civilian rule (Warah, 2022).

Plagued by al-Qaeda- and ISIS-linked extremist violence, Mali experienced two military coups in one year. France has sent thousands of troops to Mali to fight jihadists and armed insurgents and condemned the coups as "unacceptable. Likewise, France announced it would withdraw its troops from the country. Meanwhile, foreign private military and security companies are taking advantage of the instability and insecurity in countries such as Mali. This includes the controversial Russia-based Wagner Group. Its alleged links with the Kremlin suggest that

Russia is eager to expand its military presence in Africa. In 2019, the United Nations warned of a "surge in mercenaries" in Western Africa. The UN said these groups are not only fighting wars but also illegally exploiting natural resources in countries where organised crime and violent extremism are prevalent (Warah, 2022).

Mali (August 2020): The Malian military seized control over controversial unrest following the parliamentary election in which former President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was ousted. This left a military-led government in power. The government's mismanagement of insurgencies, alleged government corruption, the impact of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, and a floundering economy were the principal reasons for the coup.

Chad (April 2021): Former President Idriss Deby was assassinated while visiting troops in northern Chad fighting the rebel group Front for Change and Concord in Chad. His son, Army General Mahamat Idriss Deby, was quickly installed in his place, in a blatant power grab that violated the Constitution.

Guinea (September 2021): Mamady Doumbouya, a United States-trained Special Forces commander, leads a coup against former President Alpha Conde. He claimed to have acted in the public interest, following years of poverty, endemic corruption, and a controversial constitutional amendment that allowed Alpha Conde to be elected for a third election term.

Sudan (October 2021): The Sudanese military, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, seized power by tearing up a power-sharing deal with former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok that was meant to lead Sudan to its first free election in decades.

Burkina Faso (January 2022): Led by military leader Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, former President Roch Kabore was detained by soldiers, and his government was overthrown and dissolved. The justification given for the coup d'états was Roch Kabore's failure to contain the growing Islamist insurgency and address citizens' concerns. The mutinous soldiers demanded better means and support to fight the militants and the removal of defence chiefs. A blow to Kabore's legitimacy and leadership came with the attack by armed groups last year in June in Solhan, a remote village in Yagha province, that killed around 130 civilians. After the seizure of power by soldiers in Burkina Faso, people took to the streets in the capital, Ouagadougou, to celebrate the coup and burn French flags. In the aftermath, the ECOWAS and African Union suspended Burkina Faso's membership.

Guinea-Bissau (February 2022): There was a failed putsch in Guinea-Bissau, a coastal state in West Africa. Despite being one of Africa's smallest countries, it has become a giant in the drug and narcotics trade, due to which it suffers from endemic corruption and has been mired in chronic political instability. The country has emerged as a key transit hub for cocaine produced in Latin America, which is then moved onward towards Europe. President Umaro Sissoco Embaló described the coup attempt as an "unsuccessful attack against democracy," with possible links to drug trafficking.

Niger (July 28, 2023): After the failed coup on March 31, 2021, the 2023 coup toppled the elected president Mohamed Bazoum and suspended the constitution. The coup leaders, led by

General Abdourahamane Tchiani, claimed that they acted to save the country from "the gradual and inevitable demise" caused by rising insecurity and a lack of economic growth (Héni, 2023). However, other factors may have also influenced the coup, such as ethnic divisions between the Zarma and Hausa groups, foreign interference from France, the US, Russia, and China, and regional trends of political instability and democratic backsliding in West Africa and the Sahel (Héni, 2023; Al Jazeera, 2023).

Garbon's military coup was the latest episode of political instability in the West Africa sub-region. On August 30, 2023, a group of soldiers in Gabon announced they had seized power and cancelled the presidential election results that gave a narrow victory to incumbent Ali Bongo Ondimba, who is suffering from a stroke. They claimed that they acted to end the "illegitimate and illegal" regime of Bongo, who had been in power since 2009 and was accused of fraud, corruption, and human rights violations. They also called for a national uprising and the formation of a transitional council to restore democracy and social justice in the country (Sulaimon, 2023).

AU's response to military coups in Africa

In response to the rise in military takeovers, particularly in West Africa, the African Union issued a statement expressing "deep concern over the growing trend of military coups across the African continent that undermines the peace and stability of countries in Africa. The AU has adopted a strong stance against military coups and unconstitutional changes of government in Africa. It had legal frameworks and mechanisms to prevent and respond to such situations, such as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (ACDEG), the Peace and Security Council (PSC), and the African Standby Force (ASF). Through the AU's Peace and Security Council, the AU suspended Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Guinea-Bissau from the AU until normal constitutional order is restored in the country. Moreover, it has imposed sanctions, such as travel bans and asset freezes, on the coup leaders and their associates. It has also supported the mediation efforts of regional organisations, such as ECOWAS, to facilitate dialogue and transition in these countries.

Yet, regional blocs like the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been unable to convince military leaders to re-establish civilian rule. Additionally, many citizens in countries with military rule don't appear to be in a hurry to hold democratic elections, with the notable exception of Sudan. In Niger, Burkina Faso, and Gabon, civilians welcome the coup leaders, who promise radical change. Civilians were seen kissing the hands of soldiers loyal to coup leader Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henry Damiba, whom they believed would be more effective than the ousted president in dealing with violent Islamic insurgents in the country. Insurgents have killed more than 2,000 people since 2015. In Guinea, some citizens viewed the military takeover positively. They were frustrated by President Alpha Conde's scrapping of the presidential two-term limit, which allowed him to run for a third term in 2020. While the position of civilians in the spread of coups in Africa is diverse and complex, it reflects the different realities and aspirations of the people who live in different countries and contexts. It also shows the challenges and opportunities for democracy, peace, and security in Africa.

The position of international law on military coups

International law on military coups is a multifaceted issue that has been debated for decades. The historical roots of international law, traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, lay the groundwork for the principle of non-intervention. This principle, enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, stands as a sentinel guarding against external interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. However, the delicate balance it attempts is evident in the provisions of Chapter VII, where the Security Council can advocate intervention in the pursuit of global peace and security (Von Hippel, 1995).

The Westphalian conception of sovereignty, a legal identity in international law, serves as a cornerstone for order, stability, and predictability among states. However, sovereignty comes with the parallel responsibility to respect the sovereignty of others. The principle of non-intervention, embedded in Article 2.7 of the UN Charter, establishes that a state has exclusive jurisdiction within its borders, and others must refrain from interference (UN, 2004). This reciprocal duty, when violated, grants the victim state the right to defend its territorial integrity and political independence. Recognised exceptions to non-intervention emerge in cases of severe human rights abuses, as witnessed in the international opposition to apartheid in South Africa. Additionally, international treaties and UN interventions can weaken the prohibition against intervention. Grey areas persist, especially during conflicts like the Cold War (Funston, 2000), where the lines between intervention and non-intervention were blurred (Stanton, 2000).

The paramount question in understanding the position of international law on military coups is the concept of legitimacy. Does international law recognise the legitimacy of military takeovers under specific circumstances? The historical context reveals a distinguished lineage in legal and moral discourse, suggesting that intervention might be justifiable in response to severe human rights violations, genocide, or other extreme circumstances (Holsti, 1988). However, the legitimacy of military coups is not recognised under normal circumstances. However, the inadequacies within international law become apparent when considering the instances where military coups have occurred without clear-cut consequences. The principle of non-intervention, anchored in respect for national sovereignty, appears to be a double-edged sword. While it provides a clear rule for limiting the armed force and reducing the risk of interstate wars, it has proven imperfect in preventing military interventions under the pretext of protecting nationals or supporting opposition groups (Roberts, 2000).

A crucial aspect of this analysis is the impact of military coups on democratic processes. Imposition under a military coup raises pertinent questions about citizens' rights to elect their leaders. The examination of international legal norms, including the UN Charter, reveals complexities in defining the boundaries of intervention when democratic values are undermined. The deficits within international law become evident when analysing the three dimensions linked with intervention: legality, legitimacy, and political opportunism. Despite Article 2.4 of the UN Charter forbidding the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, the application of this legal norm faces challenges in practice (UN, 2004). The inadequacies are further compounded by the ambiguity surrounding the circumstances that justify intervention (Ortega, 2000).

The history of military coups worldwide, especially in Africa, provides a backdrop to the perception of international laws as toothless bulldogs in the face of such events. Instances where international laws failed to prevent or respond effectively to military takeovers underscore the need for a reevaluation of the existing legal framework. The case studies of past interventions authorised by the UN in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Haiti, Kuwait, Rwanda, and Somalia reveal both the potential and the pitfalls of international law (Roberts, 1993). The stark contrast in responses, such as the failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide, exposes the limitations of existing legal mechanisms. The moral quandaries embedded in the discourse of military intervention surface prominently. The idea that certain extreme circumstances, those that "shock the conscience of mankind," may justify intervention becomes a focal point. The tragic instances of systematic attacks, genocide, and a government's failure to protect its citizens from fundamental atrocities become touchstones for evaluating the moral imperatives guiding international law. However, the haunting echoes of inaction, as witnessed in Rwanda and the hesitancy to intervene in Darfur amid looming genocide, underscore the challenges in translating moral imperatives into effective legal action.

The position of regional law on military coups

While the gaps in international law's ability to prevent or adequately respond to military coups challenge its efficacy as a regulatory framework, the African Union (AU) has taken a strong stance against military coups, and its Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, adopted in 2007, condemns unconstitutional changes of government. Apart from that, it has also developed an array of conflict management instruments and a proactive stance in filling the gaps left by international law in addressing the complexities surrounding its response to military coups in Africa.

Diplomacy

Diplomacy takes precedence in the AU's conflict resolution toolbox, aligning with its core norms of non-use of force and peaceful dispute settlement. The AU employs diplomatic measures through the Peace and Security Council (PSC), utilising the chairperson's authority to deploy observers, fact-finding missions, and special envoys. However, challenges persist in the AU's mediation capacity, revealing a persistent weakness in its diplomatic endeavours (Nathan et al. 2015).

Sanctions as a deterrent

Under Article 23 of its Constitutive Act, the AU possesses the authority to impose sanctions on member states for non-payment of dues and recalcitrant behavior. Notably, the AU has applied sanctions in response to 'unconstitutional changes of government,' primarily suspending regimes deemed illegitimate from participating in formal AU activities. This has been a

common response to the numerous coups that occurred between 2003 and 2014, with sanctions serving as a deterrent against unconstitutional actions. However, the AU's response has rarely involved the threat or use of military force in such cases, highlighting a distinct approach compared to international norms (Nathan 2017).

Peace Operations

Since 2003, the AU has been actively involved in over a dozen peace operations, ranging from observer missions to substantial deployments exceeding 20,000 troops. These operations, mandated for roles such as ceasefire monitoring, electoral observation, and counter-terrorism, underscore the AU's commitment to maintaining peace and security. The complexity and costs of these operations have necessitated external assistance, with key partners including the UN, EU, United States, France, and the United Kingdom (Gelot et al. 2012; Coleman & Williams 2017).

Military Intervention

Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act grants the Union the right to intervene militarily in a member state in 'grave circumstances,' defined as cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. This provision reflects a departure from the principle of non-intervention to one of 'non-indifference' to peace and security challenges. However, the legal standing of Article 4(h) remains controversial, with debates on its conformity to established principles of international law, notably Article 53 of the UN Charter (Kuwali & Viljoen 2014; Hurd 2014).

While all these measures had been put in place by the AU, they could not stop the recent coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, and Gabon. As it is, the inability of both international and regional laws to prevent military coups can be attributed to their lack of a clear definition of what constitutes a coup, the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms, and the reluctance of the international community to intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states. For instance, despite the innovative nature of Article 4(h), its invocation by the AU Assembly has been limited. Notably, the AU chose not to employ Article 4(h) in response to crises in Darfur (2004) and Libya (2011), despite acknowledging the existence of relevant crimes. The legal and political controversies surrounding Article 4(h) are evident in these cases, illustrating the challenges faced by the AU in asserting its authority over state sovereignty (Hurd 2014).

The limited application of Article 4(h) and the challenges faced in its implementation underscore the evolving nature of the AU's role, like the UN Charter, in addressing military coups, necessitating continuous evaluation and potential refinements to its conflict management instruments and world security.

International Law and Diplomacy as Panacea to the Resolution of Military Coups Resurgence in Africa

With all this being said, the persistent threat of military coups in Africa undermines people's rights and underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive strategy to prevent and resolve such crises. The absence of effective enforcement mechanisms and international reluctance to intervene in sovereign states' internal affairs have collectively weakened both international laws and AU mechanisms. To confront these dynamic challenges, a synergistic approach that combines international law and diplomacy becomes crucial in creating a robust framework for prevention and resolution.

International law can still play a pivotal role in preventing military coups; a comprehensive and universally accepted definition of a coup, along with internationally endorsed consequences for violators, can serve as a deterrent. Additionally, strengthening the legal framework around the principle of non-intervention while acknowledging exceptions in cases of grave human rights abuses can provide a more nuanced approach to intervention. Diplomacy, when effectively employed, has the potential to complement international law in preventing and resolving military coups.

The African Union (AU) and other regional bodies can leverage timebound diplomatic channels to mediate conflicts, engage in preventive diplomacy, and foster dialogue between conflicting parties. Since around 2000, when the AU went tough on coup plotters, there has been a noticeable decline in military coups d'état. However, soldiers across the continent took notice when the AU failed to act when General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt overthrew the government of Mohammed Morsi just one year after his election. The exemption given to el-Sisi and his subsequent ascension to the chairmanship of the African Union in 2019 was all the encouragement ambitious soldiers needed to attempt government overthrows. Also, the ECOWAS cases of Mali and Burkina Faso illustrate the limitations of long-time diplomacy in preventing military coups and in returning democratically elected governments, but they also offer insights into potential future improvements.

The root causes of military coups often lie in socio-economic factors such as poverty, injustice, and communication breakdowns. International law can address these issues through mechanisms that promote economic development, social justice, and cross-cultural understanding. People must be able to see evidence of a strong correlation between democracy and development. Practical policies must be introduced and pursued to address growing poverty and unemployment. These could include poverty eradication programmes, infrastructural development programmes, anti-corruption measures, and massive investments in education. Crucially, these changes are only achievable if there is a strong political will to tackle these challenges.

Diplomacy can facilitate dialogues on inclusive governance, poverty alleviation, and cultural exchange, fostering stability and reducing the appeal of military intervention. The manipulation of election processes and heightened political agitation can contribute to the vulnerability of states to military coups. Learning from these instances, diplomatic initiatives could focus on addressing underlying socio-political issues, such as governance, human rights abuses, and

economic disparities. Civilian governments play a pivotal role in preventing military coups by prioritising good governance, human rights protection, and effective electoral processes. The cultivation of transparent and accountable institutions can contribute to political stability, reducing the likelihood of military intervention. International actors, including the United Nations, can support capacity-building initiatives to strengthen democratic institutions and promote good governance practices.

International law can reinforce electoral integrity through monitoring mechanisms, ensuring fair and transparent elections. The AU's Peace and Security Council, with its mandate for conflict prevention and resolution, can act as a diplomatic force to avert the escalation of tensions leading to military coups. Diplomacy can facilitate dialogue between governments and opposition groups, fostering a political environment where disputes are resolved peacefully rather than through coercive means. The convergence of international law and diplomacy emerges as a panacea, offering the potential for lasting solutions to the complex issue of military coups in Africa.

Furthermore, there must also be effective security sector reform that professionalises the military. Civilian authority must be in charge of the military, and the military should likewise be reoriented to abide by democratic values. The military should not be vulnerable to manipulation by the elite, and institutional mechanisms should be put in place to put the institution under adequate checks. Finally, the international community should take steps to seriously address the promotion of democracy and democratic sustainability in Africa. Foreign powers and important organisations must collaborate with Africa and advance effective punitive actions to discourage military coups, especially those going on recently in West Africa and the Sahel. If the problems still being cited to justify coups continue to worsen in today's African democracies, then the temptation to try something else may continue to be dangerously seductive, both for coup plotters and citizens alike.

Conclusion

This study has explored the consequences of military coups in West Africa, with a particular focus on the recent events in 2023. The paper also discussed multifaceted factors that contributed to the coup, ranging from internal dynamics to external influences from global powers. Also, the paper examined the complex realm of international law concerning military coups. It highlighted the historical roots of non-intervention principles while acknowledging the challenges and ambiguities in applying these norms, especially during conflicts like the Cold War. Furthermore, the paper examined the regional perspective, emphasising the African Union's efforts in condemning unconstitutional changes of government. Diplomacy and sanctions emerged as key tools, although challenges persisted in the AU's mediation capacity. The paper highlighted the responses from international bodies, notably the African Union (AU), in dissecting the aftermath of military takeovers in West Africa. It revealed, however, that despite the AU's strong stance against coups and its legal frameworks to prevent and address such situations, challenges persist in convincing military leaders to reinstate civilian rule.

While the paper underscores the complex nature of military coups in West Africa and their implications for democracy, peace, and security, it maintains that a comprehensive approach

that combines international law and diplomacy is crucial for an effective prevention and resolution framework. International law can deter coups by defining them universally and endorsing consequences for violators, while diplomacy complements this by mediating conflicts and fostering dialogue. While there has been a decline in coups since the AU's strong stance in 2000, consistent action is essential. Addressing root causes, such as socio-economic factors, requires practical policies, and effective security sector reform emphasising civilian authority is crucial. The international community must collaborate with Africa to promote democracy, taking punitive actions to discourage coups. Ultimately, addressing the cited problems in African democracies is vital to counter the seductive temptation of resorting to coups

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AN APPRAISAL OF THE CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SELECTED CHURCHES DURING COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN SOUTHWEST, NIGERIA

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Abstract

In a fight against the COVID-19 virus, the government took drastic measures to contain the spread of the virus by, among other measures, shutting down social activities, including public gatherings places of religious worship. The research work assessed the corporate social responsibility of selected churches in South West Nigeria during COVID-19 pandemic. The study employed quantitative approach. The quantitative method approach involves collecting, analyzing, and interpreting quantitative data. Findings revealed that respondents were aware of the churches use of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown. Unfortunately, majority of them could neither participate nor benefit from these initiatives. Therefore, they were unaware of the challenges their churches faced in the distribution of these relief items. The study recommended that church leadership should ensure that congregants benefit from packages meant for them. The church will enjoy full support when congregants benefit from items distributed and meant for them. This will also enable them to keep attending the church and devote their full time to the church activities.

Keywords: Congregants, COVID-19 Pandemic, Corporate Social Responsibility, Selected, Churches

Introduction

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is the ability, especially for organisations, to become socially responsible by giving back to the society that provides the material and human resources. Sessa, Serpe and Malandrino (2020) define CSR as a set of responsibilities that a company has towards its stakeholders to ensure a fair balance between the contribution made to the organisation and the consideration received in economic and social terms. This implies that organisations are expected to be socially responsible to give back to society from where they get the necessary resources – human and material - they work with. As a discourse that has traversed multiple disciplines, corporate social responsibility (CSR) concerns an organisation's relationships with society and its necessity to match its principles with public expectations (Atuguba and Dowuona-Hammond 2006). This implies that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) deals with relationships between organizations and their public and how these organizations fulfill their social responsibility to the public. Coombs and Holladay (2011) further reiterate that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an organization's voluntary act as it pursues its goal and performs its perceived duties to stakeholders, including workers, communities, the environment, and society in general. Thus, organizations implement Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities to achieve some of their goals. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has emerged as a key discussion in business and academic research over the past few years (Sharma, 2018). This is partly because giving back is vital to the survival of organisations in different societies. Rochlin, Bliss, Jordan and Kiser (2015) suggested that when organisations are involved in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) such acts can lead to an increase in their market value, assist in reducing risks, and retaining employees. Business and academic organisations, therefore, often create awareness of the importance of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to the organisation's growth –both profit and non-profit. To this end, religious organisations are also examples of organisations that perform Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities. The Church, for instance, is a religious organisation that is expected to give to the society – including those in need - as instructed by Christ. This is found in some scriptural injunctions which Christ handed down to the church. For instance, Proverbs 19:19 says that —whoever donates (gives) to the impoverished lends to the Lord, and the Lord will reward him.

The Bible also stated that each person must give as he has determined in his heart, not grudgingly or under duress, for God loves a joyful giver (1 Corinthians 9:7). Again, the Bible posits further thus, I have shown you that by working hard in this way, you must help the weak and remember the words of the Lord Jesus, who stated, 'It is more blessed to give than to receive, (Acts 20:35). One of the ways through which Churches give to the society is through material and spiritual needs - evangelism. As a concept, evangelism involves sharing the gospel of Christ with unbelievers. Evangelism is one of the major tasks of Christians, as it involves sharing the good news of Jesus Christ. Christians follow Jesus Christ and are mandated to spread Christ's gospel. Diara and Uroko (2019) stated that evangelism is the Christian practice of persuading others to accept Jesus Christ as their Lord and Saviour through preaching. This portends that Christians are mandated to proselytising the gospel of Christ, especially to those who have not received Christ. As Brodie (2020) asserts, evangelism means communicating the gospel of Christ to unbelievers, as evangelism is meant for them. The word —evangelism" comes from the Greek words *Euaggelion*, which means a good message or gospel, and *Euaggelizo*, which means announcing, declaring, and preaching the good news (Brodie, 2020).

Therefore, evangelizing means preaching and sharing the good news. For Christians, this good news is found in the Bible in John 3:16, which says “For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life”. Likewise, Christians are advised to spread the news that Jesus Christ is the only way to life, as portrayed in John 14:6 thus, I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me. Therefore, Jesus Christ enjoins Christians to spread His word to others, especially the unbelievers. This task is what the Bible refers to as the Great Commission (Matthew 28: 18 – 20), as Christ left this mandate with his disciples – which churches are a part of - to evangelise to the unbelievers. The Church main task is to fulfill Jesus Christ mandate through evangelism. The Church is made up of people called to do the work of the Lord. The church is made up of people called to do the work of God. The Church is a place of nurturing and maturing (Ephesians 4: 11). Charry (2005) opines that the Church consists of people given a particular identity and called by its owner (Jesus Christ), who sets the paths they should follow. One of God’s works, which has become a believer's identity, is teaching the gospel to persuade. Stiles (2014) notes that a healthy church has a culture of evangelism. Therefore, members of the Church are expected to be involved in evangelism drives.

The significance of religion in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized, as studies have found religion to be one of the key determinants of major decisions and policies. Even though the Nigerian constitution professes the country's secularity, Nigeria has been described as a multi-religious society regarding identity. It is no news that the coronavirus pandemic and its resulting lockdown in 2020 took a toll on religious activities in Nigeria. The government took drastic measures to contain the spread of the virus by, among other measures, shutting down social activities, including public gatherings in places of religious worship. For churches and Christians, the pandemic dealt a blow to spiritual, social, and, most importantly, financial activities. Tebitendwa and Ssendege (2020) noted that "Christians could not congregate and bring offerings and other forms of financial contributions". These financial contributions during the lockdown remained a significant challenge to churches as there was a worldwide recession and widespread job loss occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic (Bartik et al., cited in Holleman, Roso and Chaves, 2022). Many people lost their jobs temporarily, while others lost it permanently thereby cutting off their sources of livelihood.

Despite the pandemic's effects and misinformation surrounding it, many churches took responsibility for assisting individuals and communities. This is referred to as a social action. Diara and Uroko (2019) state that social action refers to services that can be rendered by an individual or groups of people who are neither mandated in any way nor working to make a profit. Churches embarked on social action initiatives by organizing and executing several charitable acts that impacted the society during the lockdown. While some churches donated food items, money, clothing, beverages, and drinks to their communities, others donated medical equipment worth millions of Naira to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) to support the government's efforts at curtailing the virus (Adebayo, 2021). However, despite the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives of these churches, there were concerns about what members thought of these initiatives during the trying times. Literature revealed a dearth of empirical evidence on people’s perceptions of the social action initiatives by religious bodies. This is a significant gap as communication is a two-way process with feedback. Other studies examined the gestures from organizations (including religious bodies) during the pandemic, with a dearth of empirical evidence to understand people’s perceptions of these gestures. .

Social action raises questions as to congregants' awareness of evangelism initiatives by their churches, what could happen if churches do not engage in social actions, or the perception of social action initiatives as evangelism. Understanding members' awareness of these initiatives will give the discourse a balanced approach. Also, members' awareness of these initiatives become essential to measure the effectiveness or otherwise of these initiatives. Therefore, this study examined how Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) affected congregants (respondents) perception of evangelism in the selected churches during the coronavirus pandemic. It further explored the effectiveness and challenges encountered in the course of engaging in these Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities by the selected churches during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown. The question, therefore is: to what extent were congregants aware of specific Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives of the Church during the coronavirus pandemic?

Faith-Based Theory

Faith-Based Theory is most frequently used in social studies. Brammer (2007) notes that religion impacts the congregants' knowledge of Corporate Social Responsibility and influences people's perception of an organisation. A faith-based method has emerged as an effective means of shaping people's worldviews on social, economic, cultural and political issues (Tucker and Grimm, 2001). The developmental influences of religion are getting embraced due to the failure of social welfare initiatives and programmes of social agencies to meet the yearnings of the people (Haar and Ellis, 2006). To strengthen CSR initiative compliance among religious individuals, communities, organisations and even nations, the adoption of faith-based model is inevitable. Faith-based model has been deployed as economic model (Raimi and Mobolaji, 2008; Raimi et al., 2010), looking at economic issues from an Islamic angle. It has also been used as an interfaith advocacy tool against sex trafficking and criminal activities (Raimi, 2012). Organisations will be more committed to ethical issues and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), when Interfaith Project is supported by a massive pressure from notable stakeholders (Brammer et al., 2007). The inter-faith project has shared moral, ethical and spiritual values of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, which provide a basis for corporate social responsibility (Interfaith Declaration, 1993:2). In the same vein, research has long established helpful insight into the crucially and unavoidability of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in African religious practices and tenets (Helg, 2007; Omoluwabi, 2012).

Research Method

The study employed the descriptive research method as a design or blueprint for data collection. Descriptive research become appropriate when researchers intend to describe individuals, groups, activities, events, or situations (Leavy, 2017), hence, its justification in this study. Consequently, to deeply explore and understand how churches employed CSR during the COVID-19 pandemic and how Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programmes affected members perception of their churches' evangelism, the study employed the quantitative approach. The quantitative data were gathered through a structured questionnaire from congregants of the selected churches. A structured questionnaire was used to obtain diverse views and opinions from congregants who were beneficiaries of the churches' CSR during the pandemic.

Sample Size and Sampling Techniques

A sample size of 400 respondents was statistically determined for this study using Taro Yamane formula in Emaikwu (2011) for a finite population as follows:

$$1 N(e)$$

n

n

where:

n = the sample size

N = the population size

(e) = the sampling precision – 95% or the acceptable sample error p – 5% (0.05)

1 = unit or a constant

Thus:

$$n = \frac{19,278,000}{1 + 19,278,000 \times 0.052}$$

$$1 + 19,278,000 \times 0.052$$

$$n = 399.99 \text{ (That is 400 approximately)}$$

Therefore, n = 400.

A multiple sampling approach was employed to further determine this study's sampling procedure. Accordingly, the purposive, random, and proportionate sampling techniques were employed. Using the purposive sampling technique, South-West Nigeria was chosen for convenient reasons and the fact that most Orthodox and Pentecostal churches have their Headquarters office in the South-West. Additionally, purposive sampling was further used in the selection of four mega-churches in the South-West. These churches include:

- 1) The Redeemed Christian Church of God;
- 2) Living Faith Church;
- 3) Baptist Church; and
- 4) The Seventh-Day Adventist Church.

The selection of these churches was further anchored on their leaderships' formal approval to embark on the distribution of relief items during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown. Another justification for the selection of these churches is hinged on their provision of palliatives, such as the donation of food items, money, clothing, beverages and drinks, medical equipment, among others, to church members. Lastly, as stated under the scope of the study, the choice of churches comprises a rich blend of orthodox and pentecostal orientations. For instance, the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) and Baptist denominations represented the Orthodox churches,

while the RCCG and Winners Chapel represent Pentecostal denominations. Hence, two categories of the population served as data sources for the study. The proportionate sampling technique was used to further determine the actual selection of the number of respondents from selected churches. This is because the selected churches had uneven numbers of worshippers in the selected area. However, copies of the questionnaire were administered to the respondents drawn from the church members in the selected States –Lagos, Oyo, and Ondo States. To achieve this, research assistants were thoroughly trained in line with the requirements of the study. They were recruited to assist in the administration of the questionnaire on the respondents in their different locations and the questionnaire copies were retrieved on the spot. In some instances, the research assistants attended the church services and waited till the end to retrieve the questionnaire copies.

The analysis of data for this study was carried out using frequency percentage tables, bar charts, mean and standard deviation using the Statistical Product for Service Solutions (SPSS) version 26.

Results

Research Objective: To examine congregants' Knowledge of the Church's CSR Initiatives during the Pandemic

This research objective seeks to understand selected congregants' knowledge and awareness level of specific CSR initiatives embarked upon by their churches during the coronavirus pandemic. To answer this research question, respondents provided opinions on their awareness of their Church's participation in the distribution of relief items, extent of benefitting from the items and further went ahead to list these items. They were further requested to show the extent of participation in these initiatives as well as awareness of challenges faced. It is important to state that the researcher combined the figures under very great extent and great extent to represent a great extent, while figures under very little extent and little extent were collated to represent a little extent of knowledge. The results are presented in Table 1

Table 1: Respondents' knowledge of their Church's CSR-Initiatives during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown

S/N	Statement	V G E F (%)	G E F (%)	L E F (%)	V L E F (%)	N E F (%)	x	SD
1.	Extent of awareness of Church's involvement in distributing palliatives and relief items during the COVID-19 Lockdown	408 (38.4)	318 (29.9)	159 (15)	62 (5.8)	116 (10.9)	3.79	1.3

An Appraisal Of The Corporate Social Responsibility Of Selected Churches During Covid-19 Pandemic In Southwest, Nigeria

2.	Extent which respondents benefitted from relief items during the COVID-19 Pandemic	236 (22.2)	317 (29.8)	186 (17.5)	97 (9.1)	227 (21.4)	3.22	1.4
3.	Respondents' participation in other CSR activities embarked upon by churches during the COVID-19 pandemic	44 (23)	293 (27.6)	193 (18.2)	143 (13.5)	190 (17.9)	3.24	1.4
4.	Extent of awareness of some challenges faced by the Churches in distributing the relief items during the COVID-19 pandemic	23 (21)	242 (22.8)	234 (22)	127 (11.9)	237 (22.3)	3.08	1.4
Average Weighted Mean							3.33	1.7

Source: Author's field survey, February, 2023

Key: VGE- Very Great Extent;

GE – Great Extent;

LE – Little Extent;

VLE – Very Little Extent;

NE – No Extent

Decision Rule: If mean is ≤ 1.49 =Undecided;

1.5 to 2.49=Strongly Disagree;

2.5 to 3.49=Disagree;

3.5 to 4.49=Agree;

4.5 to 5 = Strongly Agree.

If SD value is less than $<+2$ = true values;

If SD value is greater than $>+2$, reject the outcome.

The results from Table 1 reveal that there are more respondents who claimed to be aware of their churches' involvement in the distribution of palliatives during the pandemic than those who were unaware. The results reveal 68.3% respondents are aware to a (very) great extent while 20.8% respondents have (very) little extent of knowledge. In addition, there are 10.9% respondents who claimed to have no knowledge or awareness of their churches' involvement in the distribution of palliatives during the pandemic. With a mean score of 3.79, the data implies that the respondents agree to an awareness of their churches' involvement in the palliatives distribution during the COVID-19 pandemic ($\bar{x} = 3.79$, $SD = 1.3$). The SD value ($SD = 1.3$) also implies an acceptance of the results indicating that respondents agreed to an awareness of their churches' involvement in the palliatives distribution during the COVID-19 pandemic.

To further test respondents' awareness of the Church's distribution of palliatives during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown, the study sought to know the various relief items distributed by the Church. The findings revealed that the majority of the respondents recalled that food items, cash, medical assistance, distribution of hand sanitizers and free nose masks, household items, toiletries were among the relief items distributed by their churches to members.

Since the majority of the respondents were aware of their churches' involvement in the distribution of palliatives during the pandemic, as seen in the selection of these relief items, the study further examined if respondents benefitted from these relief items. The findings reveal that there are more respondents who benefitted from the relief items (palliatives) distributed by their churches during the lockdown occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic. Findings reveal that 553 (52%) respondents benefitted from the relief items while 283 (26.6%) respondents benefitted to a little extent. However, there were 227 (21.4%) respondents who did not benefit from the relief items (palliatives) distributed by their churches during the lockdown occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, a mean score of ($\bar{x} = 3.22$, $SD = 1.4$) indicates that respondents *disagreed* to benefitting from the relief items. The SD value ($SD = 1.4$) also implies an acceptance of the results indicating that respondents disagree to benefitting from the relief items

To further test respondents' awareness of specific Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives embarked upon by their churches during the coronavirus pandemic, the study asked through an open-ended questionnaire item – respondents to list out these initiatives. To the respondents who agreed to benefitting from the churches Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives, the findings revealed that food items, cash gifts, medical assistance, general household items and toiletries as some of the major Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives distributed by the churches during the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the findings revealed other initiatives as (online) prayers, visitation, the donation of facemasks

and hand sanitizers as well as pandemic sensitization (through social media and other online means).

Respondents' opinions showed awareness of some activities embarked upon by their churches during the coronavirus pandemic. Nonetheless, the study further sought to determine if respondents participated in these activities. The results from Table 4.4 reveal that more than half of the entire respondents participated in the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities of their churches during the COVID-19 pandemic. The results reveal that 537 (50.6%) respondents actively participated, while 336 (31.7%) respondents participated passively. However, 190 (17.9%) respondents did not participate. Again, a mean score of ($\bar{x} = 3.24$, $SD = 1.4$) indicates that respondents *disagree* to participating in distributing these palliatives. The SD value ($SD = 1.4$) also implies an acceptance of the results. A likely reason for respondents passive or non-participation could be because they were either recipients of these relief items or as a result of the restriction of movement occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Lastly, the study sought to understand respondents' awareness of some challenges faced by the Church in the distribution of palliatives to members. The quantitative results revealed that there were more respondents who showed awareness of challenges, albeit the difference was not too glaring. For instance, there were 465 (43.8%) respondents who were aware of some challenges faced by these churches while 361 (33.9%) respondents are not very much aware. However, there are 237 (22.3%) respondents who are not aware. With a mean score of ($\bar{x} = 3.08$, $SD = 1.4$), the data implies that respondents *disagree* to an awareness of some challenges faced by the church in the distribution of palliatives to members. The SD value ($SD = 1.4$) also implies an acceptance of the results. A possible explanation could be that since they may have been recipients and did not fully participate in the distribution of the palliatives, they could not have known the likely challenges faced by the church.

Research objective four has revealed that respondents were aware of the churches use of CSR activities during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown. Unfortunately, the majority of them could neither participate nor benefit from these initiatives. Therefore, they were unaware of the challenges their churches faced in the distribution of these relief items

Items Distributed to Members of Select Churches

s/n	Denominations	Items Distributed	Items Distributed	Items Distributed	Items Distributed
1	Redeemed Christian Church of God	Beans	Rice	Vegetable Oil	Semovita
2	Living Faith Church	Garri	Rice	Beans	Palm Oil
3	Baptist Church	Rice	Yam	Vegetable Oil	Noodles
4	Seventh Day Adventist Church	Wheat Flour	Palm Oil	Rice	Beans

The table shows items distributed to members of the four denominations, which include the Redeemed Christian Church of God, Baptist Church, Living Faith Church, and Seventh Day Adventist Church. The relief items were equally distributed to members of the churches. One-hundred members were selected and given relief items in each of the four churches.

Discussion of Findings

Research objective: To examine the extent to which congregants were knowledgeable about specific CSR initiatives embarked upon by their churches during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown in 2020.

The results reveal an overwhelming majority of the respondents had knowledge that their churches distributed relief items as CSR initiatives during the coronavirus pandemic. This was further reflected in the mean score of ($x=3.79$) which implied an agreement that respondents were aware of their churches CSR initiatives. This finding is still in line with the stakeholder theory and those of the social contract theory. More specifically, the social contract theory explains the implicit social contract between an organisation and society. These organisations function by public agreement to aid the needs of society. As the saying goes, —those that come to equity must come with clean hands. Because of the transparency of the churches, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, congregants came together to support the church in providing basic needs to other members. The qualitative interview with one of the Participants revealed that there was an anonymous food bank, where congregants anonymously donated food items, clothes and cash to assist in reducing the burdens of those that did not have among the congregants. This was a Godly social contract entered into by some congregants. Again, this could have only been possible if the church came to equity with clean hands. Therefore, congregants showed a great extent of awareness of specific CSR initiatives embarked upon by their churches during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown in 2020. The findings of the study are similar with those of Prempeh (2021) who found that during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown in Ghana, congregants acted in community-like ways by bringing and sharing relief items among one another.

Furthermore, not only were the congregants aware, some of them also partook and benefitted from the relief items shared by their churches. However, a mean score ($x = 3.22$), implied that respondents disagreed to benefitting from the palliatives. In addition, the findings revealed that some respondents participated in distributing these relief items. However, a mean score of ($x = 3.24$, $SD = 1.4$) indicates that respondents *disagreed* to participating in distributing these palliatives. The likely reasons for not participating may be linked to the restriction of movement during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown. People were restricted from moving out and there was a limit to the number of people in gatherings. All these were efforts aimed at reducing the spread of the virus.

Since more respondents did not participate nor benefit from the CSR initiatives of their churches, it also meant that they were unaware of the challenges faced by their churches in distributing these palliatives. A mean score of ($x = 3.08$) implied that respondents *disagreed* to an awareness of some challenges faced by the church in the distribution of palliatives to members.

Conclusion

Churches have been called to be alive to their corporate social responsibilities. The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the world order and enabled a new wave of new normal. Hence, churches had to move with the new tide. The findings of this study have exposed the roles of churches and their CSR activities. The major objective of this study was to understand the CSR campaign strategies embarked upon by the churches during the COVID19 pandemic lockdown and to examine respondents' perceptions of these initiatives. Understanding congregants perceptions is necessary as a form of feedback to the churches and how well the CSR initiatives were perceived. The selected churches had robust yet similar evangelism

philosophy, which is to seek out the souls of the unbelievers. This is the mandate given by Jesus Christ, who is the Head of the Church. The strategies in achieving the evangelism philosophy involve house-to-house, open air, group and mass evangelism. At other times, the use of CSR, especially to the community, is an effective strategy to evangelise.

Recommendations

- (i) Other strategies beyond the study's findings through which churches can undergo CSR should be employed. Some of these strategies could include prison ministries, video evangelism and through social activities such as football evangelism.
- (ii) More CSR initiatives should be encouraged in churches. CSR is a form of evangelism and can assist churches to achieve their evangelism philosophies. More so, churches should ensure that they conduct CSR activities at all times, and not during pandemic times.

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A DISCOURSE ON IDENTITY CONFLICTS IN MOVIES: HALF OF A YELLOW SUN AND DAFUR

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Abstract

Movies, documentaries, news media and other such sources are beginning to make their mark on bringing to a global audience, description, analysis and contextualization of several conflicts, both old and contemporary. Thus, this study is aimed at examining the capacity of the media, especially movies and documentaries, in creating awareness, education and conflict resolution or management. Using Biyi Bandele's movie adaptation of Chimamanda Adiche's book 'Half of a yellow sun' and Uwe Boll's 'Darfur', the study was able to explore the potential of movies (media) to portray identity, deprivation and grievances in the Nigerian Civil war and Darfuri conflict. The study utilized mainly secondary sources of data from the two movies, a YouTube video, journals, reports, web pages and news media. These sources enabled the authors to arrive at the conclusion that indeed Film (movies, documentaries and other video media) are increasingly becoming useful research, analytical, teaching and conflict analysis tool. Furthermore, they have the potential to expose conflicts – local and regional - to a global audience. Finally, it demonstrates the relevance of theories in explaining conflicts through these movies.

Keywords: Conflict, Identity, Movies, Civil War, Relative Deprivation, Greed vs Grievances

Introduction

Africa has been besieged with several conflicts over the decades that can be tagged as identity conflicts. While these conflicts are often exacerbated by other salient and less obvious factors like poor governance, illegitimate governments, poverty, illiteracy, corruption, resource control, electoral malpractice among others, identity has often remained at the core of most African conflicts. The Rwandan 1994 genocide, the Nigeria Civil War (1967 –1970), the South African Apartheid (1948-1991) and Sudan-South Sudan War (1955-1972, 1983-2005) typify some of these cases, although contextually different still emphatic on identity dynamics nonetheless. Identities as social constructs are often shaped by various traits and experiences. Characteristics like race, skin color and ethnicity are often subjective depending on society. Identities however, are not only based on ascribed traits but on shared values or beliefs as well. Typically, for any intergroup (racial, ethnic or religious) conflict to occur, the conflicting parties have distinct separate collective identities, each side believing the fight to be between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The extent to which these conflicts persists rests largely on the value placed of the identities held.

The media has often played a crucial role of reporting on and even actual coverage of conflicts as they evolve across diverse platforms to an international audience. Several documentaries archived across history also reflect the immerse contribution of the media and film in recording conflicts. While the use of movies as a tool for illustrating conflicts has always provided more in-depth analysis and contextualization of the issues at play, its role in creating awareness on conflicts across borders to a wide audience cannot be overlooked. Popular movies like Randall Wallace’s 2002 ‘We were Soldiers’ depiction of America’s war in Vietnam in 1965, Mel Gibson’s 1995 ‘Braveheart’, a portrayal of the Scottish rebellion against England and Micheal Bay’s 2001 ‘Pearl Harbor’ on the Japanese 1941 attack on the American naval base at Pearl harbor stand out and represent examples of some movie narrations of western conflicts. Similarly, movies like Darrell Roodt’s 1992 ‘Sarafina’ on the South African Apartheid, Terry George’s ‘Hotel Rwanda’ (2004) on the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Ridley Scott’s 2001 ‘Black Hawk Down’ about the 1993 UN-Somalian incident in Mogadishu, and Edward Zwick’s ‘Blood Diamond’ (2006) about the Sierra Leone civil war 1991-2002 also depict African conflicts. Even though these movies are mostly fictional and ranked for their box office ratings, they have been widely criticized for their historical inaccuracies of actual events. Yet despite the global status of film, the use of movies as an analytical tool of research, teaching or even conflict analysis is still relatively new (Engert & Spencer, 2009). Although several arguments have emerged across disciplines over its credibility as a research tool, it is gaining popularity and relevance regardless. This thus informs the content of this paper.

This research seeks to evaluate the discursive identity conflicts of both the Nigerian Civil War and the Darfur War in Biyi Bandele’s 2013 movie adaptation of Chimamanda’s book; ‘Half of the yellow sun’ and Uwe Boll’s 2009 movie ‘Darfur’ respectively. The choice of these movies was motivated by their international appeal as depicting of a global perspective on the conflicts which is relevant for in-depth and holistic analysis. Even though both movies are historical in nature and this analysis cannot influence the outcome of the wars, it can be useful in the analysis of other identity conflicts ravaging Africa, more so as these identity conflicts are still persistent in the countries under scrutiny. There has been a systematic resurgence of the Biafran agitation in Nigeria under a rebranded alias of IPOB (Independent People of Biafra) and the hostilities in Darfur has persisted (Aladekomo, 2021; BBC, 2021).

The research will provide a historical background of both civil wars to provide a clear backdrop for analysis and adequately define the context for the identity dynamics at play in these conflicts. Although the movie *Half of a Yellow Sun* provides a significant background of the Biafran war with actual documentary inserts from historical archives, *Darfur* provides none, as such a robust background is justified to set the premise for analysis. According to Engert and Spencer (2009) theories as scientific constructs and such better understood in synthetically constructed contexts. Hence, these movies provide the structured context for critical analysis of the referred theories from which evaluations are then drawn.

Theoretical Framework

Relative Deprivation

This study has adopted the Relative Deprivation Theory of conflict propounded and advanced by Ted Gurr, Faye Crosby, Garry Runciman & Graham Davis. According to Crosby (1979), relative deprivation is an emotion of deprivation that manifests as some form of anger roughly synonymous with a feeling of resentment or dissatisfaction with a sense of grievance. Deprivation is perceived when an individual thinks it is feasible to obtain the desired outcome (Clayton & Crosby, 1992). Walker and Pettigrew (1984) expounded the postulations of Ted Gurr and Faye Crosby, they emphasized egoistic tendencies rather than fraternity affiliations in relative deprivation. This enunciates value expectations (rightful entitlements) rather than value capabilities (capacity to obtain value). It can also be defined in a broader sense to mean the way in which individuals or groups object or rebel against their current circumstances. They do so not necessarily when they have been deprived in its absolute form, but to protest their present predicaments relatively in contrast to another person or group of persons (Guimond & Dube-Simard, 1993). According to Walker and Smith (2002), it is a construct used to understand the progressions of social identity as well as the reactions to disadvantage, by both disadvantaged minorities and privileged majorities. The Relative deprivation theory typically asserts that social or temporal comparisons are a crucial component in assessing whether one is deprived.

These assertions are not exclusive to deprived (underprivileged/proletarian) portions of the society. They can also explain violent reactions from all segments of society to a perceived deprivation especially, as it relates relatively to another segment of society regardless of if they are haves or have nots, rich or poor, elites or masses. In most societies however, it always seems that the relativity of deprivation seems to justify the burgeoning class gaps between the haves and the have nots. Panning (1983) however argues that the relationship between instability and inequality can be relative but consents that reducing inequality almost always minimizes the level of relative deprivation and undeniably enhances the likelihood for political stability.

Typically, in Africa, these perceptions attached to identity markers and affiliations is regularly used to explain conflicts of identity (ethnic, religious or class). This often creates an “in group” “out group” dynamic with either perceived as the enemy. Such scenarios create a complex perception of competition and an atmosphere of hostility between opposing ends. Options for mutual gain becomes almost impossible depending on the scale of competition and obtainable benefits. As such any individual in power seems to represent his/her ethnic, religious or class affiliations, granting accessibility to privileges, leading to the open dismay and animosity the out groups. This frequently leads to zero sum (do or die) politics, with in-groups securing

advantages and seeking to maintain power by all means and, the out-groups striving to attain that position.

This, as would be seen in the study explain the case of the conflicts in Nigeria between the perceived relatively deprived Igbos (Christian majority) in Eastern Nigeria and their counterparts in the Hausa (Muslim majority) Northern Nigeria ruling elite as well as the Arab Sudanese and African Sudanese of Darfur. This study notes that the power dynamics based on specific identity markers like ethnicity, tribe and race is far-reaching. Beyond geographical divides or religious affiliations, it reveals deeply entrenched feelings of deprivation within diverse groups.

Greed verses grievances

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler's greed and grievance theory is an economic model that predicts the outbreak of civil war (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Supporters of the greed model believe that combatants perform a cost benefit analysis and only take up arms to better their situations. While those who support the grievance model say that combatants are motivated by identity (religious, ethnic) and social class grievances (Shira, 2010). Collier and Hoeffler reject grievance-based explanations of civil war asserting rather that combatants in civil wars fight for economic benefits (Shira, 2010). This would largely be applicable to rentier economies such as the developing countries of Africa who depend largely on natural resources for acquiring wealth.

Since its discovery, Nigeria's economy has mostly been driven by oil and secessionist movements in the country (in the South-East and South-South especially) is largely motivated by access to it. Because Oil has singularly enriched most of Nigeria's elite, it can be argued that grievance factors ignited the Nigerian civil war, and greed considerations to be derivable from oil appear to have motivated the parties to action. This arguably prompted Ojukwu's declaration of independence of the Republic of Biafra on 30 May 1967 to lay exclusive claim of oil royalties after the division of the nation into twelve states on 27 May 1967 as a way of isolating the mainly Igbo extractions of the South Eastern states from the oil rich South-Southern states.

Similarly, in the case of Darfur where the government was in Cahoots with the Janjaweed in oppressing the black Sudanese. Their penchant for power has allowed them to come into partnerships with militia groups that can help foster their agenda. Adversely, this system continues to inspire the aggrieved to seek recourse by the most aggressive means possible (war), especially, in the face of an ethnic and racial genocide,

The Civil War and the Darfur Conflict

The Nigerian Civil War (1966-1970)

Although the Nigerian civil war officially started in July 1966, the causes of the conflicts were long established since the inception of Nigeria. Before the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914, present day Nigeria consisted of diverse societies with distinct identities and cultures. However, Nigeria is dominated by three major tribes; the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbos, while several other minorities collectively constitute a jagged majority. In Jide Olanrewaju's 2009 prolific documentary of Nigeria (Naij: History of Nigeria), he disclosed that although Nigeria was a colonial arrangement created to fulfil a business

requirement for Britain, it proved a reasonable political arrangement that accommodated its diversity (Ade Ade, 2013). Yet, a collective national identity remained elusive, it rather seems to reinforce the existing ethnic, regional, religious and class cleavages in Nigeria.

Furthermore, these cleavages were deepened by the British creation of a conspicuously larger Northern region (both by geography and population) automatically granting it more seats in parliament (Ade Ade, 2013). Olanrewaju maintained that the indirect rule in the North meant that their hierarchical, cultural and power structures remained largely intact unlike their 'southern' counterparts. Even though the political configuration of the First Republic, at face value gave the impression of equity from a coalition government: An Igbo president (Nnamdi Azikwe), a Yoruba opposition leader (Obafemi Awolowo) and a Northern prime minister (Tafawa Balewa). The office of the prime minister however wielded the actual political power and this did not only heighten the political and ethnic rivalries but also granted the North unfair advantage and indicated a Northern hegemony.

As the optimism of de-colonization faded, a system of patronage and rivalry created along ethnic lines, corruption, electoral irregularities, and increasing isolation of the minorities was consolidated (Spalding, 2000). Although a new Mid-western region was created in 1963 to ease the fears of some minorities, it was perceived by the West and East as a calculated attempt to further the North's advantage (Greene, 1975). In a political twist, the Action Group (the Yoruba party) erupted into a crisis and diminished the party's presence in parliament. This gave room for the Northern People's Congress (NPC) access to the Mid-West and a subsequent alliance with the new AG leadership further strengthening the position of the North (now a North-West alliance) against a lone National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in the Eastern region (Ade Ade, 2013).

Amidst the rivalry between the North and East, comments by the Northern Premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello during an interview in 1964 revealed a strategic and institutionalized discrimination against the over ambitious Igbos. This was intended to curb their need to dominate other ethnicities and particularly in the North. In a well curated pro Northern agenda, Northerners (even expatriates) were given preference over other 'Nigerians' within the civil service. The Igbos and other ethnic groups were only considered in the absence of Northerners to fill vacancies. Even though this negated the national principle, it was common practice across all the other regions in Nigeria (Ade Ade, 2013). It was under such tensions that the first post-independence general elections were conducted in 1964 and 1965. The stakes were obviously between the rivaling NPC and the NCNC (North and East respectively), with the North (with its western AG alliance) trying to maintain power and the East desperate for a shot at power. This was evidenced in massive rigging by both sides and an eventual degeneration to anarchy. It was under this atmosphere and arguably one of Nigeria's worst elections with an NPC victory, that the military struck in the infamous bloody coup of January 1966 (Green, 1975; Heerteem & Moses, 2018).

Considering the North/East feud, it came as no surprise that the coup was masterminded by officers of Igbo extraction targeted at some Northern and Western political elites. And political power was handed to a high-ranking Eastern officer 'General Aguiyi Ironsi' as the military head of state and president of Nigeria. However, General Ironsi's failure to execute the coup plotters and his attempt to redress the Nigerian federal arrangement into a unitary state proved to be his greatest undoing. In a counter-coup by Northern officers, General Ironsi was killed

and was replaced as Head of State with Colonel Yakubu Gowon (from a Northern minority tribe) as president. The coup was characterized by a massacre of both eastern soldiers and civilians across the country. This led to a mass exodus of Igbos back to the East. The Eastern Premier Colonel Ojukwu was also aggrieved as he had been deliberately boycotted for president as the highest-ranking officer in the country as opposed to Yakubu Gowon who was only the highest-ranking officer in the North.

Ojukwu declared the massacre a genocide against the Igbos and sought retribution through an Igbo secession (Korieh, 2012). His attempt to ally with the West was thwarted by Awolowo's acceptance of the position of the Finance Minister regarded as highest-ranking civilian office in Gowon's military regime (Ade Ade, 2013). Strategically, Gowon's decree 14 created 12 states out of the existing 4 regions, as a counter-measure to the secession threat. This reduced not only the numerical strength of the Igbos but isolated them to a landlocked, overpopulated enclave which emphasized the East's long contained minorities problems (the Calabar/Ogoja/Rivers separatism and Ibibio/Efik discord) amongst several other issues. This ultimately provoked Ojukwu into declaring the secession of the Eastern Region as the Republic of Biafra. But also exposed oil at the core of the conflict (Greene, 1975).

For Gowon, the action was regarded as an act of treason and the federal government declared war. Heerteem and Moses (2018) argue that both sides had inadequate military power, funds, personnel, discipline and education at the beginning of the war. The Federal government's interpretation of the secession as an insurgency (as opposed to the tagged genocide by the seceding side) made it more of an internal matter that required no external mediation. This as well as the tactical shutdown of all communication lines, seaports, foreign transactions, international businesses and the sudden change of Nigeria's currency in the early 1968 dealt some crippling blows to the Biafran side. Despite the spectacular military offences from both sides, the war remained at a stalemate for the most part. Eventually, in January 1970, after about two and half years of war Biafra surrendered with Ojukwu fleeing to Ivory Coast (Green, 1975; Ade Ade, 2013).

The Darfur Conflict

Even though Sudan's colonial past played a significant role in laying the seeds of discord that fueled identity consciousness, differences and competition. Deprivation, greed and grievance have served to amplify these identity issues.

Colonial rule had created, maintained and deepened economic and social inequalities serving as a major incentive to all who had a feeling of being marginalized (Baas, 2012). Baas (2012) extrapolates the inferior status given to the black (African) Sudanese as compared to their Arab Sudanese counterparts as stemming from the slave trade that was perpetrated on mostly black Sudanese leading to a de-facto stigmatization as second class citizens. Initially, the black Sudanese was to be separated from Sudan at independence to join its East African neighbors, but the plan was thwarted by prominent Sudanese elites. This further entrenched the intricate in-group and out-group dichotomy, deepening the identity tensions that eventually metamorphosed into war (s).

Most of the hostilities that arose pre and post-independence always seems rooted in their ethno-racial differences. The Darfuri impasse became more prominent in 2003 but could easily be

argued to have its roots in conflicts during the late 1980's and spanning through the 90's. Despite several rounds of negotiations, peace talks and agreements, the conflict continued to persist as the government continued to grapple with an array of militia groups making it difficult to align them together to reach negotiated agreements. The contending issues lingered around representation, equality, land (between farmers and nomadic livestock herders), access to water, racism (with connotations of Apartheid) and ethnic cleansing amongst others. The region has witnessed several attacks resulting to mass deaths, destructions, displacements and migrations despite the presence of the African Union and United Nations Mission in Darfur peacekeepers (Agence France Presse, 2014). They adopted a terrible war tactic known as the 'scorched earth' campaign which were visibly carried out on enemy Darfuri villages (Smith, 2011). The AFP publication claimed these attacks were perpetrated by the nomadic Arab tribal allies (known as the Janjaweed), which the government had previously armed and have now lost control of, as they continue to carry out vicious attacks. There have also been allegations of the use of chemical weapons by the Sudanese governments on its citizens, including civilians in the Darfur region. The western media and international organizations have labelled the atrocities in Darfur as a genocide, since Darfuris (Blacks) were increasingly being targeted by the Arab Janjaweed militia.

A Discourse on Half of a Yellow Sun

Half of a Yellow Sun is a historical fiction based on the book by the same title by Nigerian's Chimamanda Adichie. It centers on the Nigerian/Biafran Civil war. The book tells the story of the lives of Odenigbo (a radical idealist), his western raised wife Olanna and their naïve village houseboy Ugwu, and how these characters evolved through events leading to and during the Nigerian civil war.

It offers a glimpse into identity as the potential cause of conflicts through the characters' portrayal divergence and conflicting perspectives. It sets the tone and precedence for major events and the feelings of deprivations (perceived or actual) that heightened the conflict. Although it reflects several other critical themes like humanitarian intervention, hybridization of cultures and corruption amongst several others, it pulls from the experiences of the survivors while imitating actual events as closely as possible to forge these complicated characters and well curated scenes. It highlights how the politics of class, race, gender and culture combine to engender the societies (Iheka, 2021). Set from the timeline of Nigeria's independence in 1960 to the end of the war in 1970, it takes viewers on a journey across Nigeria from Lagos to Kano, Nsukka and Port Harcourt in an attempt to provide a rounded perspective of the different implications on the citizens. Even though the major characters are predominantly Igbo (Odenigbo, Olanna, Kainene, Ugwu and Mama), it features characters of other tribes (Miss Adebayo, Airport Stranger) and even Richard (American) to represent 'the others' and present a somewhat objective perception of the conflict (it is arguably still lopsided and sympathetic to the Biafran narrative). It reflects both the egoistic and fraternal types of deprivation to provide a more holistic view of the postulations of the relative deprivation theory.

The movie introduces to the viewers the twin characters of Olanna and Kainene at their parents' residence hosting the finance minister of Nigeria to a lavish dinner on independence night in the nation's capital; Lagos (00:04:35 - 00:05:10). Although they are Igbos, they are clearly beneficiaries of the existing government with no perception of resentment or grievance towards

the lopsided system of patronage (oblivious of the deprivation of their ethnic kinsmen) but enjoying positions of privilege, affluence, relevance and opportunity.

Nevertheless, as the plot thickens and the characters evolve, we see Olanna (due to Odenigbo's influence, increased interactions with other Igbos as well as exposure in the East) increasingly transforming from the egoistic entitlements to more fraternal affiliations of the Igbos as such being more sensitive to the perceived relative deprivation of the Igbos. While Kainene's perceptions and general disillusion with ethnicity largely remains unaffected with her tagging Odenigbo 'the revolutionary' (00:11:40 - 00:11:42), her marriage to a white man, perception of Biafran agitation, a refugee camp owner and a licensed (Nigerian) army contractor still trading with the Nigerian side would reveal.

The first glimpse of the Igbo's resentment in the movie is captured in Odenigbo's unreserved excitement as he announced the news of the first coup to Olanna as he listened in open admiration to Major Nzebo's speech over the radio, followed with a celebratory hosting of colleagues (lecturers of University of Nsukka) at his residence. They tag the rebelling soldiers as heroes, while Miss Adebayo (a Yoruba) observed it was being branded by the international community (BBC) as an 'Igbo coup', a position she defends by pointing out that the casualties were mostly northerners. To which another colleague confirms 'it was mostly northerners who were in government after all' affirming the collective perception of a Northern hegemony. Odenigbo's response not only supports the claims but blames the British colonial powers for institutionalizing this hegemony by 'putting the northerners in government to dominate everybody', adding that they needed more men like Major Nzebo in Nigeria to facilitate a much-needed change (00:26:21 - 00:27:20).

These accusations not only substantiate Greene's (1975) assertion of a Northern supremacy at the time, but equally validates Olanrewaju's (2009) argument of a British conspiracy in establishing the hegemony as well as the deep-seated anger and resentment held by the other ethnic groups over the arrangement. However, the question 'Isn't he a communist?' posed by the only foreigner amidst them reveals not only the naivety but the perception of the international community to identity dynamics in African conflicts and the overreaching implications of these markers on the entire systems of states.

Soon enough, Odenigbo reaffirms his stance in another of these hangouts, making an argument for tribe as the ultimate identity for Africans whilst dismissing nationality and race as mere colonial social constructs. He surmises, 'I am Nigerian because the white man created Nigeria and gave me that identity. And I am black because the white man constructed it to be as different from white as humanly possible but I was Igbo before the white came...' to which his colleague Okeoma responds 'You became aware you were Igbo because of a white man' and Miss Adebayo resorts 'Odenigbo is just a hopeless tribalist' (00:29:44 - 00:30:10).

The conversation above reveals not only the identity struggles for most Africans but the uncertainty that accompanies the whole colonial legacy as either a curse or a blessing. For our main character even though highly educated, he professes his ethnic superiority over his nationality, thus justifies his (ethnicity) claim for more of the national cake than what he is being apportioned. Emphasizing Bernstein and Crosby's (1986) argument that the Relative deprivation theory centers on the suggestion that negativity related with perceptions of one's status is not simply a function of one's objective status but rather motivated by resentment,

anger, dissatisfaction and other deprivation related emotions of one's subjective assumption. They state that certain preconditions like the presence of a comparison to the 'other' (in this case the Hausas) and entitlement, act collaboratively in affecting perceptions of felt deprivation.

In the documentary insert of the movie, a foreign correspondent reports that although the coup was not successful in Lagos, the politicians stepped aside for the military and General Ironsi an Igbo to take over. He (Gen. Ironsi) concentrated his government in Lagos and cut down the powers of the regions. It looked as if the Igbos were beginning to run the whole country and the North was suspicious (00:27:20 - 00:27:42). Thus, revealing mutual suspicions from both the North and East. For the 'others' perceptions on the Igbos, the random man's conversation with Olanna at the airport provides an overview. Showing his approval with the removal of the Igbo as the Vice chancellor of University of Lagos, he claimed the Igbos wanted to control Nigeria 'they own all the shops, control the civil service, even the police'. If you're arrested for a crime as long as you can say "keda" (Igbo greeting) they will let you go. But now with this coup, they control the army'. Olanna in obvious irritation responds 'We say "Kedu" not "Keda", it means how are you'. Now ashamed he responds 'Are you Igbo? But you have the face of a Fulani' (00:38:59 - 00:39:49). This stranger's comments oddly re-echo Sir Ahmadu Bello's comments about the Igbos attempting to dominate Nigeria and revealed a counter plan to amputate this cause. Confirming a Northern consensus about the Igbos as a threat to their instituted hegemony.

While the claims of genocide by the Igbo remained largely debated, Richard (Kainene's white husband) witnesses the identification and brutal killing of Igbos at the Kano airport (00:54:27 - 00:56:57) and Olanna witnessed the slaughter of her favorite Auntie Ifeka amidst the massacre of Igbos in Sabon Gari a Christian populated area of Kano (00:56:59 - 00:58:51) proved otherwise. For Igbos in the East, it was clearly the genocide of an already marginalized tribe and secession was the only solution as Odenigbo in outrage pointed out to Miss Adebayo as she tried to sympathize with him - '... the University community in Zaria kept silent while expatriates encouraged the killings, you will be one of them if you didn't live in Igbo land. How much sympathy can you have?' Laura went on to interject - '... to say that secession is not the only way to security does not mean I don't have sympathy'. Odenigbo countered - 'Did your cousins die? Did your uncles die? You are going back to your people in Lagos and nobody will harass you for being Yoruba. Is it not your people who are killing Igbos in Lagos? Didn't your chiefs go to the North to thank the Emir for sparing the Yoruba people?' (00:58:52 - 00:59:18).

This confrontation not only revealed a suspected Yoruba/Hausa alliance but an isolated Igbo victimization by both the North and West. Kainene's statement to Richard (01:02:38 - 01:02:52) 'War is looming; Port Harcourt is going crazy.' It's the oil, they can't let us go easily with all that oil'. This reveals 'oil' at the core of the conflict beyond just ethnic intolerance. This oil which is sited in the Southern part of the country and conveniently part of the land which the Igbos laid claim to as Biafran territory even though most of the inhabitants of the oil region are not ethnically Igbos but rather a combination of minority ethnic groups which together with the Igbos make up the Eastern region of Nigeria both geographically and politically. Hence it came as no surprise that Nigeria was ready to go to war for what was clearly a goldmine.

Access to the oil territories of the South-South region of Nigeria became a reason to keep Nigeria together and also a reason for the South-Eastern/Southern parts of the country to secede. One side of the divide looked at it through the lens of grievances seeing as the money derived

from the sale of oil is used to develop and empower the rest of Nigeria to the perceived detriment of the people from the region. This became worse after the nation was further divided into 12 regions from the isolating the Igbos from the territories where the oil deposits were. The northern elites and other beneficiaries of the oil wealth were invariably viewed from a position of greed as they fought to maintain the Nigerian status quo.

Even though Ojukwu bragged about the Igbo's preparedness for war (01:02:38 - 01:02:52), Biafra failed amidst Ojukwu's assurances of exploring all possible options (01:41:11 - 01:41:55). He eventually fled to Ivory Coast for asylum and Biafra surrendered as Odenigbo listens in resignation over the radio at the obvious futility of the whole war (01:43:26 - 01:43:35).

General Yakubu Gowon's 'No Victor, No Vanquish' was a sensational slogan widely propagated but for the Igbos there was clearly a vanquished group. They lost their quest for secession, pride, lives, properties, livelihoods and alongside the existing opportunities to partner with the Yorubas and Hausas as they became estranged with the rest of Nigeria. Unfortunately, the crises of marginalization and relative deprivation of the Igbos has seemingly continued especially when it comes to national leadership (amidst ongoing debates of exemptions from key appointments at the national level compared to the Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba). This with the outcries calls for a total restructuring the Nigerian state to properly accommodate the dysfunctions.

A Discourse on the Darfur Conflict

Directed by Uwe Boll, *Attack on Darfur* is an American movie about the conflict in Darfur. It is based on six western journalists who visited a small village (Nabagaia) in Darfur, Western Sudan in the company of few African Union (AU) soldiers. It covers the extreme racial/ethnic intolerance of Darfuri groups, the horrific massacre of an entire village and the desperate but fickle attempt of a few individuals to intervene.

Even though the entire movie is based on this small village and contains very minimal conversations, it still manages to convey the nuances of relative deprivation and the identity conflicts that has led to such violence and brutality. Whilst humanitarian intervention, violation of human rights and genocide seems to be at the core of investigation, the relevance of identity struggle is not lost in the conflict analysis.

The first hint of institutionalized violence against the oppressed groups (black African Muslims) was revealed as one of the journalists directed a question to the AU leader of their delegation - 'What is the AU doing to protect the people from attack from its own government (00:07:35 - 00:07:39)?' Even though the response revealed that the AU's mandate within Sudan was restricted to observation and relief support to the severe famine ravaging the country, failure to deny the accusation suggested a silent affirmation of systemic marginalization and victimization of a people by its own government'. The proceeding scene of an exchange between a uniformed state personnel handing a vehicle of weapons to members of the Janjaweed (an armed Arab Sudanese rebel group) at a brief open-air meeting only substantiates the noted claim (00:08:38 - 00:09:22). Furthermore, while questioning the village head, the same journalist again asked if he had evidence of the Janjaweed and the government forces working together to perpetuate any of the raids, the chief responded - 'We don't have a clue

about that, but it is clear the people have an idea who'. Though the response was guarded, it betrays that they are all aware it is all a government setup (00:17:46 - 00:18:21).

The government's collaboration with the Janjaweed is perceived as an attempt to silence the agitations of neglect, corruption, non-representation and deprivation of black Darfuris. Since the government do not want to be involved in brazen attacks on their people so as not to attract international condemnation, they resorted to colluding with armed militia groups to carry out their nefarious deeds. It should be noted that even before the government's collusion with the Janjaweed, there had been preexisting skirmishes between the armed group and other groups one of which is the black Darfuris over access to grazing lands and water for their flocks. This pitted them against the black Darfuri farmers over their arable farmlands and water sources. The conflict between them always gravitated towards an economically motivated conflict on the side of the Janjaweed who not only benefit from grazing lands and water sources but also benefitted from bounties of war and sponsorship from the government. This has continued to worsen the grievances of the other black Darfuri tribes.

Despite heavy casualties, loss of territories and even worsening conditions, it seems the people have resigned to their oppressed realities. As accounts of the villagers revealed how the Janjaweed raided the villages constantly, raped women and recruited young boys for their gangs. To this a baffled journalist asks a shop keeper 'why do you stay? 'what can I do, this is my country' he responds (00:24:30 - 00:24:32). This defiance seems the silent resort to fighting for the fundamental right to live amongst other rights. And reveals the resentment of barely surviving, as black Sudanese while their Arab counterparts thrived.

He further explains 'it is not easy for me to leave this village...this between us and the Janjaweed since 1988, before we have been living with the Janjaweed together... Because they are Sudanese and we are Sudanese...because they are Arab and we are black, but we are all Sudanese'. The journalist continued by asking - 'is there a difference now, because you both lived in relative peace...so it's not Muslims against Muslims, its Arabs against Africans'? The shopkeeper answered - 'yeah, its Arabs totally against us, for Africans, yes pretending No this is my Muslim, our brothers...they are pretending'. The journalist ensued - 'so it is a racial war'? To which the shopkeeper responded - 'Yeah, it will be only Arab' (00:31:42 - 00:33:12).

This conversation reveals that prior to the ongoing conflict there seem to be some sort of solidarity between the Darfuri Arabs and Black Darfuris, seeking a collective cause of Darfur (when the conflict was basically between the Arab Muslim North and black Christian South). At that point it seems more a religious war, until the black militia from Darfur (like the black southerners) also claimed a structural imbalanced system of deprivation relative to what was obtainable in Khartoum (or the Arabs generally). As the government and Janjaweed (Arabs) turned on the black minorities in Darfur, it became obvious as they were all Muslims that it was a conflict beyond religious but that of racial intolerance. Furthermore, utterances by the Janjaweed leader as he killed the AU (Nigerian) soldier collaborates this - 'You came here in your AU uniform thinking you can save these people...No one will save this people because like you they are black African monkeys and no one cares for them' (01:07:42 - 01:08:01) and just before killing the foreign journalist he said 'I want you to tell the West that Darfur is now clean of Africans' (01:20:32 - 01:21:25).

It becomes obvious that the Arabs never really considered the Black Africans as kin and the entire concept of a shared nationality was never truly regarded, hence the outright rejection of these blacks as Sudanese and the subsequent denial of their rights and privileges as citizens. Validating the root of the conflict to colonialism, the amalgamation of the North and South had always seemed like union of strange bed fellows. While the North was clearly aligned more with their Arab counterparts and neighbors (Egypt, Libya, Eritrea), the South on the other hand had more in common their black neighbors (Kenya, Uganda, Congo). With the automatic imposition of the Arabs in leadership, the black southern Sudanese were already at the disadvantaged end. A disadvantage that was institutionally sustained and brewed the conflict that spanned half a century. Unfortunately for the black Darfuris, they were still a minority in the Northern part of Sudan and they are no match for the Arab hegemony.

Conclusion

Because African societies are largely ethnocentric, socio-political affiliations are usually built along these ethnocentric lines and almost automatically determines access to state resources. Although resources are typically scarce and ideally not evenly distributed across citizens in most societies, acceptable and workable formulas are often developed overtime to cater for the needs of all. However, when groups begin to challenge the status quo due to perceived deprivations in comparison to another group and demand for more, it almost always ends up in conflicts as reflected in both Nigeria and Sudan respectively. This study thus surmises that most African internal conflicts have links to identity, deprivation, grievances and greed usually under the guise of religious, political, ethnic or class dynamics.

Walker and Smith (2002) pointed out that the relative deprivation theory does not only affect the response of disadvantaged minorities but also the privileged majorities. This rationalizes the term 'relative' in the relative deprivation theory emphasizing that deprivation is in fact subjective to the perception of a group and most often only in comparison to others. For the Igbos and the black Muslim Darfuris, they perceived themselves as marginalized and deprived only in comparison to the Hausas and Arabs respectively. Without the significant privilege of the others, they may have been content.

Similarly, the greed vs grievance model which clearly showed how the competing interest for access to economic, natural and political resources has pitted various identities against one another. The need to maintain privileged positions which means uninterrupted access to these resource and the need to gain access to these resources so as to change their fortunes to a more favorable life on the other hand. This inevitably paves the way for a zero-sum, win or lose scenario with little or no options for mutual gain. For the Igbos and the black Darfuris, it will not be easy to shake off the feeling of being deprived especially when they look at their situations relative to the Hausas and Arab Darfuris respectively.

Nevertheless, while movies have proved significant in creating awareness and setting the tone for the discourse of conflicts generally, its role in labeling African conflicts as savages engaged in the mindless killing of each other overtime cannot be overlooked. Yet, there seems has been an increased attempt recently to tell the stories of the conflicts through authentic voices (survivors, biographies, actual events). The Hollywood collaboration with Nigerians and the

actual documentary inserts of the Biafran War in *Half of the yellow sun* suggests a commitment for authenticity, truth and in-depth analysis of the conflict. This might give movies the needed credibility as an acceptable tool of research. These movies regardless have not only placed the search light on these conflicts but prompted a closer examination at play, revealing identity dynamics especially in African conflicts that are crucial to fully understanding the wars and possible resolution. Considering the claims of deprivation as still relevant today both for the Igbo and black Darfuris, a deeper analysis of these dynamics and understanding the contexts of relative deprivation and greed vs grievances cannot be overemphasized if more sustainable solutions are required.

Consequently, these have paved the way for the movie industry and by extensions news media and other documentaries to beam their investigative searchlights on many ongoing conflicts not only in Africa but in other conflict ravaged areas of the world today. These efforts help to bring international attention and pressure to bear on local or regional conflicts.

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INTERROGATING THE IMPACT OF RESOLVE AND CAPABILITY ON THE OUTCOME OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967 – 1970

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Abstract

The Nigerian Civil War, also known as the Nigeria-Biafra War, from 1967 to 1970 has been extensively studied. While numerous works have highlighted different aspects of the conflict, from various perspectives, this study delves into previously unexplored aspects of the civil war by examining the influence of resolve and capability on the outcome of the war. While it acknowledged that many factors contributed to the eventual outcome of the war, the resolve and capability of the belligerents were considered critical. Drawing on Conflict Theory and Zeev Maoz's capability and resolve models, the study contextualised and analysed how these concepts influenced the trajectory of the war and its eventual outcome. Through thorough historical and content analysis of qualitative data obtained from historical accounts, the study assessed how these concepts shaped the outcome of the Nigerian Civil War, providing extensive implications for understanding historical events and informing strategies for conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

Keywords: Armed Conflict, Nigerian Civil War, resolve, capability, military effectiveness, war outcome.

“The only thing as important for a nation as its revolution is its last major war.”
...**Robert Jervis**, *Perception and Misrepresentation in International Politics*.

Introduction

The subject matter of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967 – 1970 continues to attract the attention of scholars and experts as well as witnesses, observers and participants on different aspects of the war. The issues engendered by the war have already yielded enormous publications of diverse perspectives on its causes, course, strategies, outcome, consequences, and more. *Why We Struck* by Adewale Ademoyega shed light on the January 15, 1966 coup as a participant; *The Tragedy of Victory* by Godwin Alabi-

Isama provided an account of the Nigeria-Biafra War in the Atlantic Theatre from the perspective of the federal troop, the Third Marine Commandos; *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970* by John J. Stremlau covered how the international community reacted to the conflict; *Biafra's War 1967 – 1970* by Al J. Venter and Frederick Forsyth's *The Biafra Story* covered the war as observers; *Modern African Wars (5): The Nigerian-Biafran War 1967–70* by Philip S. Jowett offered strategic information on the Nigerian and Biafran armed forces and their weapons and equipment, to mention but a few. While these accounts and other works on the Nigerian Civil War highlighted the capabilities of the belligerent forces as well as their will to fight in defence of their strategic objectives, there has been no noticeable effort that deliberately examines as a subject matter how the resolve and capability of the military impacted the outcome of the war. In this study, effort is made to deploy the concepts of resolve and capability in understanding the outcome of the Nigerian Civil War.

While it would be erroneous to attribute the eventual outcome of the Nigerian Civil War entirely to the influence of resolve and capability of the belligerents, as the ultimate end of the conflict was a consequence of a multiplicity of factors, the impact of the concepts on the war outcome cannot, however, be overemphasized. For instance, some scholars have advanced the viewpoint that the Federal Government's armed forces' victory in the civil war was not a result of its preponderant capability nor a fervent drive of patriotism but largely because of Biafra's wrong choice of military strategy.³⁵ Other factors such as international involvement, diplomatic efforts, and the socio-political context also played a crucial role in shaping the war's outcome.³⁶

The outcome of any war, be it conventional or guerilla warfare, is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon shaped by various factors, including the resolve and capability of the belligerents involved. While the outcome of a war may encompass the results, consequences, and aftermath of the armed conflicts, and may extend into the broader implications for societies, economies, and geopolitical landscapes, for this study, the outcome of the Nigerian Civil War is examined strictly on the immediate military victories or defeats of the belligerents. Hence, the interrogation of the impact of resolve and capability on the Nigerian Civil War is examined only as far as it shaped the outcome of the military fighting efforts that ended with the surrender of the Biafran forces to the Federal Government in January of 1970.

Analysing the interplay between resolve and capability provides insights into the dynamics of conflicts and contributes to a deeper understanding of the historical events that unfolded during the Nigerian Civil War. Such investigations are essential for scholars, historians, and policymakers

³⁵ Philip S. Jowett, *Modern African Wars (5): The Nigerian-Biafran War 1967–70*. Illustrated by Raffaele Ruggeri. Men-At-Arms 507 (New York: Oxford Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2016); see also Peccavi. "BIAFRA-Strategic Military Lessons from the Nigerian Civil War (1)." *Peccavi: West African Security and Risk Management*, August 4, 2015, <https://peccaviconsulting.wordpress.com/2015/08/04/biafra-strategic-military-lessons-from-the-civil-war-1/>. (accessed 16 November 2023).

³⁶ See N.B. Enyinnaya, A. Uchenna and A.C. Eze, "The Nigerian-Biafra War: Economic Challenges and Quest for Survival in Biafra, 1967-1970", *International Journal of African Society, Cultures and Tradition*, Vol. 8, no.3 (2020); Chinua Achebe, *There Was a Country* (New York: Penguin Press, 2012); Auberon Waugh and Susan Cronje, *Biafra: Britain's shame* (London: Joseph, 1969); Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A history of Nigeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Frederick Forsyth, *The Biafra Story: The Making of an African Legend* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2015).

seeking to draw lessons from the past and inform strategies for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Fundamentally, it addresses how resolve and capability played out during the war, deciphered in the instances of who fought the war, what was the war all about, how was it fought, what was fought for and why was it fought.³⁷ It examines the influence of the concepts on war outcomes within the theoretical framework of Conflict Theory and Zeev Maoz's capability and resolve models, and conceptualised them within the context of the Nigerian Civil War. The work relied heavily on qualitative data obtained from historical accounts of the Nigerian Civil War as published in scholarly journals, books and other credible sources which are subjected to historical and content analysis.

Conceptualising and Contextualising Resolve and Capability in Warfare

The concepts of "Resolve" and "Capability" are here examined in relation to warfare to show how they are contextualised within the study. By conceptualising and contextualising these concepts, the study provides a framework for understanding the dynamics of the Nigerian Civil War and how the interplay between resolve and capability influenced its course and conclusion. Resolve, according to Allan Dafoe, refers to a state's willingness to incur costs in order to achieve its strategic objectives.³⁸ In the context of armed conflict, it is the unwavering determination, commitment, and willingness of a state or group to persevere through the challenges of war. In this light, resolve encompasses the psychological, political, and societal aspects of a group's dedication to achieving its objectives.

A state or group's resolve is crucial in determining its willingness to engage in conflict, persevere through challenges, and achieve victory. It is often influenced by factors such as national interests, political will, public support, and leadership.³⁹ According to J.F.C. Fuller, the focus of war should be "to enforce the policy of the nation."⁴⁰ For Michaels and May, "War is largely about willpower,"⁴¹ presupposing that war primarily revolves around determination, specifically the state's resolve to achieve its strategic objectives, even at the expense of significant costs. The resolve and capabilities to respond effectively to aggression as well as the evaluation of an opponent's interests, intentions, and actions is a vital part of a strategic calculus either in a deterrence relationship or outright warfare.⁴²

These definitions and designation of resolve find clear expression in the determination of both the Federal Government of Nigeria to pursue the strategic objective of defending the unity, peace, and

³⁷ Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War, The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict since Clausewitz* (United States of America: The Free Press, 1991), 1.

³⁸ Allan Dafoe, "Resolve, Reputation, and War: Cultures of Honour and Leaders' Time-in-Office", (Doctoral Thesis, University of Berkeley, California, 2012), 2.

³⁹ S. Wolford, "The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict," *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 51 no. 4 (2007), 773.

⁴⁰ J. F. C. Fuller, *The Reformation of War* (London: Hutchinson and Co, 1923), 214.

⁴¹ Michael and May, analysts for Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2011 cited in Joshua D. Kertzer, *Resolve in International Politics* (Princeton Studies in Political Behaviour, 2) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 1.

⁴² Heinrich Brauss, Kalev Stoicescu and Tony Lawrence, "Capability and Resolve: Deterrence, Security and Stability in the Baltic Region" *Policy Paper*, International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn, Estonia, (2020), 5.

territorial integrity of Nigeria against the secession of the Eastern Region of the country and Biafra's primary and overarching goal of seceding from Nigeria and establish an independent and sovereign nation to defend itself against what it perceived as existential threats from the Nigerian government and other regions.⁴³

Resolve, in the context of the Nigerian Civil War, therefore, pertains to the determination and commitment of the belligerent parties to achieve their respective goals. The ability of each side to endure hardships, mobilise resources, and sustain their commitment despite setbacks and challenges played a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of the conflict. The resolve of the Nigerian government to maintain the territorial integrity of the nation as well as the determination of Biafran separatists to assert independence were key determinants of the war's duration, intensity, and outcome.

During the Nigerian Civil War, the resolve of both the Nigerian government and the secessionist state of Biafra was evident. This manifested in political speeches, public sentiments, leadership actions, and the will to fight despite setbacks, all of which served to advance their determination throughout the conflict. The Nigerian government, led by General Yakubu Gowon, consistently portrayed a strong and determined stance in its political speeches. Gowon famously declared the government's intention to reunify the country, stating "To keep Nigeria one is a task that must be done."⁴⁴ This sentiment was echoed by other government officials and military leaders, emphasising the government's resolve to maintain the territorial integrity of Nigeria.

Public sentiments in Nigeria during the war were largely in support of the government's efforts to quell the secessionist movement in Biafra. Nigerians were mobilised and rallied behind the government's call for unity and national cohesion. There was a widespread belief that the preservation of Nigeria as a unified nation was paramount, and this sentiment fuelled public support for the government's actions during the war. The media in Lagos was instrumental in spreading government sentiments and its zero-sum agenda. For instance, Patrick Davies noted in his work that the media in Lagos, whilst international efforts were ongoing to prevent the war, demanded that the Biafrans could either surrender and seek honourable peace under new leadership or they could fight "to total destruction" under Ojukwu,⁴⁵ an inciteful publication that motivated both the Federal Government and Biafra to remain resolute on their strategic objectives.

On the other hand, the Biafran leadership, led by Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, also demonstrated determination through their political speeches and public sentiments. Ojukwu consistently rallied the Biafran people with impassioned speeches, emphasising their right to self-determination and independence from Nigeria. He portrayed the Biafran cause as a fight for survival and self-preservation, appealing to the public sentiment of ethnic identity and autonomy. The Biafran slogan advanced by the government through television, radio and leaflets, was "the price of liberty is eternal vigilance" encouraging Biafrans to make sacrifices for their liberation from the tyranny of the Gowon regime.⁴⁶ Odumegwu Ojukwu was cultivated by the Biafran media as the

⁴³ Patrick Ediom Davies, "Use of Propaganda in Civil War: The Biafra Experience," (Doctoral Thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, June 1995), 18.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 19.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 203.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 19.

saviour of Biafrans from genocide and pogrom at the hands of the Nigerian government.⁴⁷ The public sentiment in Biafra was characterised by a strong sense of solidarity and resilience in the face of adversity. Biafrans were mobilised to support the leadership's efforts to establish an independent state, and there was a widespread belief in the justness of their cause.

In terms of leadership actions, the Nigerian government pursued a military strategy aimed at defeating the secessionist Biafran forces. The government received significant military support from foreign allies, including the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, which enabled them to sustain a prolonged campaign against Biafra. The government's determination to defeat the secessionist movement was evident in their military offensives and blockades, which ultimately led to the surrender of Biafra in 1970. The Biafran leadership, on the other hand, pursued various strategies to assert their resolve to achieve independence. This included efforts to secure international recognition and support for their cause, as well as the mobilisation of their military forces to defend their territory against the Nigerian army. The resolve of both the Nigerian government and Biafran leadership ultimately shaped the course of the conflict and its eventual outcome.

The resolve of both sides to fight on in the face of critical challenges also reflected their unwavering commitment to their respective causes. For the Nigerian government, despite facing significant challenges such as international condemnation and sanctions, as well as logistical and military difficulties, the Nigerian government remained resolute in its efforts to defeat the secessionist Biafran forces. The government was determined to assert its authority and prevent the disintegration of the newly independent nation.⁴⁸

On the other hand, the Biafran was equally determined to fight on in the face of critical challenges. The region was blockaded by the Nigerian government, leading to severe food and medical shortages that resulted in a humanitarian crisis. According to Peccavi, "Once blockaded, Biafra was economically unsustainable."⁴⁹ They lacked the requisite international political support needed to gain more recognition, nor did they have the economic power to sustain themselves, the military or transport infrastructure to break the blockade, or the indigenous industrial base to make up the deficiencies.⁵⁰ Despite these hardships and existential challenges, the Biafran remained steadfast in their pursuits, defending doggedly against the ravenous Nigerian forces. John Stremlau captured this vividly in his description of the Biafran forces' resolve when he remarked "While one could reasonably question the fighting capability of Ojukwu's untrained and poorly equipped five-thousand-man army, the commitment to resist the reimposition of federal authority was beyond doubt."⁵¹ General Madiebo also saluted the doggedness of Biafrans (soldiers and people) in retrospect when he remarked, "...the people grappled with incredible odds in their determination to sustain the war efforts."⁵²

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ See Forsyth, *The Biafra Story*.

⁴⁹ Peccavi, "BIAFRA- Strategic Military Lessons"

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ John J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 60.

⁵² Alexander A. Madiebo, *The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran Civil War* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd., 1980).

The will to fight on in spite of these critical challenges during the Nigerian Civil War demonstrated the deep-seated resolve and willpower of both sides. The leadership and forces of both belligerents were determined to continue the fight at great cost which underscored the high stakes involved and the deeply held beliefs driving their actions. This corroborates Zeev Maoz's critical observation that "More specifically, the factors that account for the outcomes of conflict may be embedded in the motivational and situational conditions that drive nation-states to the brink of war."⁵³ Situated within the context of resolve, Maoz seemed to have concluded that the specific circumstances surrounding a conflict, including the nature of the threat, perceived injustice, or security concerns, can influence a nation's resolve. For example, a direct threat to a nation's sovereignty may trigger a higher level of resolve compared to a conflict based on economic competition as exemplified in Nigeria's military actions against Biafra's secession and Biafra's resolute defence of its territory against Nigeria to assert their sovereign rights over people and territory during the civil war. This explains why both belligerents remained motivated to a zero-sum engagement.

While resolve has been an influencing factor in the outbreak, trajectory and outcome of war, it cannot sufficiently or solely determine or account for the outcomes of war. Consequently, scholars have examined the factor of capability among others in shaping the outcome of war. Capability involves the practical and strategic aspects of a state's power, including military strength, economic resources, technological prowess, and organisational efficiency. It is the tangible ability to prosecute a war effectively. Kyle Haynes describes it as a state's ability to accomplish specific tactical and strategic objectives through the actual use of military power and that demonstrating capability is actually more important and strategic in armed conflict and deterrence relationships.⁵⁴ The motivation to invest in military capabilities is often linked to a nation's perceived or real threats and its strategic objectives.⁵⁵ Hence, capability is the resource base an actor can utilise to attain certain ends.⁵⁶ A military's capability encompasses its equipment, technology, training, organisation, logistics, and personnel. A strong military capability enables a force to effectively plan and execute operations, adapt to changing circumstances on the battlefield, and overcome adversaries.

In the context of the Nigerian Civil War, capability can be analysed by assessing the military infrastructure, economic resources, and international war support of both the Nigerian government forces and the Biafran secessionists. This involves understanding how the difference in capabilities influenced the war and its outcome since capability is the resource base an actor can leverage to achieve specific strategic goals. The Nigerian government had access to more significant economic resources due to its control over the country's oil-rich regions. This provided them with a steady revenue stream to fund their military operations, purchase arms, and maintain their forces. Additionally, the government had control over most of Nigeria's industrial centres, allowing them to mobilise resources efficiently. The Biafran secessionists, on the other hand, faced severe economic challenges. As a landlocked region, they had limited access to natural resources and relied

⁵³ Zeev Maoz, "Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, no. 2 (1983): 195–229.

⁵⁴ Kyle Haynes, "Signaling Resolve or Capability? The Difference Matters on the Korean Peninsula," *War on the Rock – Texas National Security Review*, May 2017

⁵⁵ Matthew Kroenig, *The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 43.

⁵⁶ John A. Vasquez, "Capability, Types of War, Peace." *The Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 39, no. 2 (1986), 317.

heavily on agricultural production. The Nigerian government imposed a blockade on Biafra, cutting off essential supply routes and severely impacting their economy. This led to food shortages and malnutrition among the civilian population, further hampering the secessionists' ability to sustain their military efforts.

The Nigerian government had a significant advantage in terms of military infrastructure. They possessed an established and centralised military apparatus, including a standing army, air force, and navy. They had access to weapons and equipment, which they acquired from various international sources, including the Soviet Union and Britain. The Nigerian government also had a more extensive network of military bases and logistical support systems, allowing for efficient deployment and resupply of troops. John Stremlau underscored this phenomenon in his account reporting an interview with Egbert Nworgu, Biafra's representative in Lisbon that "Nigeria had the military capability to terminate the rebellion."⁵⁷ Philip Jowett also acknowledged the military resource and structure of the federal armed forces stating that the Nigerian Army was sufficiently strong and well-armed to deal with the rebellion. As the conflict escalated into full-scale war the army obviously needed to be expanded, but while this was achieved rapidly it was badly coordinated.⁵⁸

The Biafran secessionists, on the other hand, faced significant challenges in developing their military infrastructure. As a newly formed entity, they lacked an established military structure and had to build their forces from scratch.⁵⁹ They faced resource constraints, making it difficult to acquire enough weaponry and equipment to prosecute the war. However, they did manage to establish a small air force and navy, albeit with limited capabilities. John Stremlau recorded the gradually diminished military capability of Biafran forces and their determination to continue to fight. At the beginning of the war, Stremlau recorded,

Although Ojukwu did not appear to have the military capability to launch a major offensive against the rest of the federation, there was ample reason to believe that with the planeloads of arms hastily acquired over the previous nine months, Biafra could take care of itself.⁶⁰

However, in late 1968, Ojukwu was quoted to have remarked when international support for their course was not forthcoming, "Rather than continuing to appeal for intervention on humanitarian grounds, Biafra would now seek to demonstrate that it possessed the military capability to attack and destroy targets beyond the Ibo enclave..."⁶¹ Nevertheless, the reality as the war drew close to its eventual end, Biafra never acquired the military capability to mount a major counteroffensive sufficient to reoccupy the lost territory of the former Eastern Region.⁶² This diminished capability influenced the eventual outcome of the war.

The dynamics of the Nigerian Civil War were significantly influenced by international war support provided to both the Nigerian government forces and the Biafran secessionists. The Nigerian

⁵⁷ Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, 234.

⁵⁸ Jowett, *Modern African Wars*, 8-9.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 12.

⁶⁰ Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, 72.

⁶¹ Ibid., 322.

⁶² Ibid., 322.

government forces received substantial military assistance from various international allies, predominantly the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Beyond military aid, the Nigerian government benefited from logistical and financial support, which facilitated sustained military operations. This included access to supply chains for military equipment, as well as economic assistance to strengthen their overall war effort.⁶³ The international war support bolstered the capabilities of the Nigerian government forces, enhancing their military infrastructure, combat readiness, and operational proficiency. This support significantly influenced the strategic conduct of the conflict by augmenting their resources, technical expertise, and combat effectiveness.

In contrast, the Biafran secessionists faced significant challenges in securing international war support due to a concerted arms embargo imposed by several nations, including the major powers of the time. The embargo restricted their access to modern weaponry, military equipment, and essential resources required for sustaining a prolonged conflict. Additionally, diplomatic isolation limited their capacity to secure comprehensive international assistance. Despite the embargo, the Biafran secessionists garnered limited clandestine support from sympathetic international sources.⁶⁴

This aid, often acquired through covert channels, provided some degree of military equipment and logistics, albeit on a much smaller scale compared to that received by the Nigerian government forces. The secessionists' resourcefulness and adaptive use of available resources played a key role in their efforts to overcome the imposed limitations.⁶⁵ The dearth of substantial international war support hampered the Biafran secessionists' military capabilities, affecting their combat readiness and strategic conduct. The embargo's impact on their access to critical military resources presented considerable challenges and influenced their operational agility and combat effectiveness. Ultimately, the international war support received by both sides in the context of the Nigerian Civil War illuminates the lopsided nature of military capabilities and resources, with significant implications for the conflict's dynamics and outcome.

Overall, the concepts of resolve and capability are intrinsic to the strategic analysis of warfare, representing distinct yet interrelated dimensions that shape the conduct, outcomes, and resolution of armed conflicts. In examining the Nigerian Civil War, these concepts manifest saliently, shedding light on how the resolve and capabilities of the conflicting parties influenced the war's trajectory, strategies, and ultimate outcomes. In the context of the civil war, numerous instances exemplify the pivotal role played by resolve and capabilities in shaping the conflict's dynamics and outcomes. Thus, by contextualising the concepts of resolve and capability within the Nigerian Civil War and drawing on scholarly assertions, a comprehensive understanding emerges, unravelling the multifaceted dynamics that underpin armed conflicts. Through this synthesis of historical events and scholarly contributions, we gain deeper insights into the enduring relevance of resolve and capabilities in shaping the complexities of warfare and its far-reaching repercussions on war outcomes.

Theoretical Framework

The study "Interrogating the Impact of Resolve and Capability on the Outcome of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967 – 1970" aligns closely with the framework of "Conflict Theory," which encompasses various paradigms and analytical approaches focused on understanding the dynamics, causes, and

⁶³ Jowett, *Modern African Wars*, pp. 19-21.

⁶⁴ Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, 222-237.

⁶⁵ Jowett, *Modern African Wars*, pp. 21-24.

outcomes of armed conflicts. Zeev Maoz's capability and resolve models also provide interesting insight into the dynamic influence of the concepts on the outcome of armed conflicts.

Conflict Theory

Within Conflict Theory, the study specifically resonates with the concepts of "Military Effectiveness" and "Strategic Decision-Making." The main proposition of the concepts of "Military Effectiveness" and "Strategic Decision-Making" within Conflict Theory revolves around understanding the interconnected influences of resolve, capability, and strategic conduct on the outcomes of armed conflicts. These concepts seek to illuminate how the determination, morale, and conduct of conflicting parties when intertwined with their material and strategic assets, shape the trajectories and conclusions of warfare.

Military Effectiveness theory delves into the critical interplay between resolve (determination, morale, and endurance) and capability (resources, training, and weaponry) as drivers of military success or failure in armed conflict. It aims to understand how these factors intertwine to shape the outcomes of warfare. The proposition behind Military Effectiveness is rooted in the idea that the success or failure of armed forces in conflicts is not solely determined by their material resources, such as weaponry and training, but also by their resolve and endurance. Military Effectiveness theorists assert that the interplay between a force's determination (resolve) and its tangible capabilities directly impacts its operational and strategic effectiveness, ultimately shaping the outcome of armed conflicts. Stephen Biddle emphasises the complex interplays of resolve and capabilities in determining military outcomes in his work, *Military Power*.⁶⁶ In a similar vein, Allan Millett and Williamson Murray in their work, *Military Effectiveness*, also adeptly captured the impact of resolve and capability on the outcome of war through an in-depth exploration of strategy, leadership, and the complex interplay of factors that shape armed conflicts.⁶⁷

Strategic Decision-Making theory within Conflict Theory assesses how the resolve and capabilities of conflicting parties influence their strategic choices, tactical decisions, and operational conduct during armed conflicts. This framework provides a lens through which to analyse how the resolve and capabilities of the belligerents in the Nigerian Civil War influenced their strategic choices, operational tactics, and overall conduct of the conflict. Proponents of this concept argue that a force's determination and material assets influence its strategic posturing, its manoeuvring, and its overall conduct during a conflict, thus impacting the conflict's trajectory and ultimate conclusion. Lawrence Freedman contributes insightful analyses in his book *The Future of War*, which delves into the multifaceted dynamics of strategic choices during conflicts.⁶⁸ Martin van Creveld, in his works, *The Transformation of War* and *The Age of Airpower*, explores the intricate relationship between

⁶⁶ Biddle, Stephen, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton University Press, 2004)

⁶⁷ Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (eds.), *Military Effectiveness*, Volume 1, 2nd Ed. (London: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

⁶⁸ Lawrence Freedman, *The Future of War: A History* (New York: Public Affairs, 2017)

resolve, capabilities, and strategic conduct in armed conflicts, offering valuable insights into the propositions underpinning Military Effectiveness and Strategic Decision-Making.⁶⁹

Zeev Maoz's Capability and Resolve Models

Zeev Maoz's capability and resolve models provide valuable frameworks for analysing the impact of these concepts on the outcome of the Nigerian Civil War so as to gain insight into the complex dynamics that shaped this conflict. Maoz in his study, titled "Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816 – 1976," advanced two competing models: the capability model and the resolve model, and explored their implications for conflict management and conflict escalation. *The capability model* argues that the outcome of the dispute is a function of the balance of capabilities among the belligerents and that the strongest prevails, while *the resolve model* argues that dispute outcomes are determined by the balance of motivation and resolve among the belligerents; that is, the actor with the highest level of resolve is likely to win. Maoz's findings suggest that capabilities are unrelated to dispute outcomes, whereas resolve variables are consistently related to dispute outcomes.⁷⁰ This, thus, highlights the significance of motivation and determination in influencing the outcome of conflicts, indicating that the relative resolve of the parties involved in the Nigerian Civil War was a critical factor in shaping its outcome. This justifies Maoz's claim that the factors that account for the outcomes of conflict may be embedded in the motivational and situational conditions that drive states to the brink of war.⁷¹

Based on Maoz's study, it is important to consider the levels of resolve and motivation exhibited by the various parties involved in the Nigerian Civil War, and how these factors influenced the ultimate resolution of the conflict. Additionally, this prompts a re-evaluation of the traditional emphasis on capabilities alone in conflict analysis and highlights the need to also account for resolve in the examination of the dynamics of conflict. Also, by grounding the study within the framework of Conflict Theory, particularly focusing on Military Effectiveness and Strategic Decision-Making paradigms, the study offers a nuanced understanding of the Nigerian Civil War's outcome through the interconnected dynamics of resolve and capability. These theoretical approaches enable a comprehensive examination of the war's complexities, shedding light on the pivotal roles played by the resolve and capabilities of the conflicting parties in determining the conflict's trajectory and ultimate conclusion.

Background and the Outbreak of the War

Independent Nigeria was birth into a whirlwind of political crisis which snowballed into a civil war by 1967. Before 1967, around October 1, 1960, Nigeria with initial promise and hope of being a giant nation with prospects for enormous greatness was manacled with one misstep into another misstep. Accordingly, Ayodele Abolorunde stated that "Nigeria's post-independence political crises could be traced to uncontrolled prolificacy of the pioneer leaders of Nigeria as a new nation".⁷²

⁶⁹ Creveld, *The Transformation of War*; Martin Van Creveld, *The Age of Airpower* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011)

⁷⁰ Maoz, "Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes..."

⁷¹ Ibid., 197

⁷² A.S. Abolorunde, "Nigerian Civil War and Britain's Peace Initiative, 1967-1970," *West Bohemian Historical Review*, vol. ix, no. 1 (2019).

Further looking at the country after independence, ethnic loyalty reigned supreme with consequences for the fledgling nation-state. Another dangerous path which the nation plunged into was, “structural imbalance and ethnic chauvinism during the pre-war period which encouraged hatred, suspicion, rivalry and division among these ethnic nationalities instead of unity.”⁷³ The military coups of January and counter-coup of July 1966 and the pogrom in the North targeted the Igbos, the failure of Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu to recognise the leadership of Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon after the killings of General Aguiyi Ironsi (Head of State, January 1966 – July 1966) and the military governor of Western Region, Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi with the mass exodus of Igbos from the Northern parts of the country precipitated the war. Other issues which included the 1962/63 Census, disagreement on revenue allocation formulation, the Western Region Crisis of 1962-63, the 1964 General Elections crisis, and the Tiv Riots of 1964/65 sundry issues exacerbated the tension in the land.⁷⁴ It was against this background that Adejumo and Aderemi argued that the Nigerian state at independence had an in-built potential for antagonism and inherent capacity for conflict and was seething with a political cauldron and prepared theatre for war.

The last straw that literally broke the back of the camel was the failure of the Aburi Peace Accord to find expression between the belligerents. Both sides to the conflict, that is, Gowon and Ojukwu interpreted the document differently and with that, it was a matter of ‘when and not if’. The living condition of the influx of easterners from the north was a major strain on infrastructure and with feelings of alienation, the east declared a formal declaration of independence. The federal government resolved to crush the rebellion by all means possible including the use of force.

In spite of the cocktail of events leading to the outbreak of the civil war in Nigeria, it appears the military and especially the Army was ill-prepared for action when it eventually came. Eze Okonkwo asserts that “the outbreak of the civil war would seem to have exposed the inexperience and ineptitude of the military in political engineering and nation-building.”⁷⁵ He went on to allude that it was simply a failure on the part of the military’s weakness in the politics of compromise and tolerance that precipitated the war. More so, he concludes that the military failed “in pulling together the country before the cataclysm that engulfed the nation from 1967 to 1970 and which nearly tore the country to shreds.”⁷⁶

The Nigerian Civil War

Martin van Creveld who wrote on the nature of war and the radical transformation of modern warfare, particularly 19th-century warfare, noted that war is a rational instrument of inter-state relations.⁷⁷ Although the Biafra War was an intra-state war, it was fought as a conventional war following the proclamation of the Republic of Biafra that commenced the secession in May 1967. Hence, as Creveld observed, war became the major instrument of inter and intra-state relations

⁷³ Enyinnaya, Uchenna and Eze, “The Nigerian-Biafra War: ...”, 9.

⁷⁴ Jacintha Chiamaka Nwaka, “The Nigerian Civil War,” in Christopher B.N. Ogbogbo and Okpeh O. Okpeh (eds.), *Nigerian History from Earliest Times to the 21st Century*, (Ikeja: Lanuv, 2021).

⁷⁵ O. Okonkwo, “The Armed Forces of Nigeria and Nation-Building” in O. Okonkwo (ed.), *Perspectives on Contemporary Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Professor Bolaji Akinyemi* (Abuja: Salwin Nigeria Limited, 2014), 22.

⁷⁶ O.C. Eze, “Pluralism, Ethnic Diversity and Nation-Building in Nigeria,” *Maiduguri Journal of Peace, Diplomatic and Development Studies*, No 5, Vol 1 (2014).

⁷⁷ Creveld, *The Transformation of War*....1.

between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the secessionist Republic of Biafra. And as Clausewitz noted in *Vom Kriege* about war, the civil war was “an act of violence carried to its utmost bounds.”⁷⁸

The Nigerian civil war was a watershed in the evolution of the Nigerian state by all standards. Before the war, there were coups (twice in January and July 1966) and several riots targeted at dislodging and consolidating the power base within the country with increasing political tensions. Following the July 29, 1966 coup, Gen. Yakubu Gowon had remarked, “Suffice to say that putting all considerations to test – political, economic as well as social – the base for unity is not there, or is badly rocked, not only once, but several times.”⁷⁹

The turn of events afterwards showed that war was ineluctable. As Coulombis and Wolfe asserted: Civil wars develop out of failure of a national political system and its institutions to function effectively. In this condition of institutional collapse according to them, significant sections of the population, including major factions of the elite, no longer accord those in power or even the regime they represent a sense of legitimacy.⁸⁰

Wars are executed using diverse strategies and tactics. No war in recorded history has been fought with a predictable end in victory for such warfare without the deployment of troops, use of armament and sustainability of objective(s) which may change from time to time. Wars are costly and the interplay of these variables shapes the outcome in either victory or defeat. This is the background to the event that shaped the Nigerian Civil War when, on June 30, 1967, Lt. Col. Chukuwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu addressed his people over the radio that war was imminent.

On July 6, Nigerian forces invaded Biafra’s Western border and then ensued the war.⁸¹ Both sides of the divide in the buildup of the civil war underestimated each other and this did not take long to come to public knowledge as events proved. Neither Nigeria nor Biafra did not possess enough military hardware expected of a conventional army in the march towards an offensive military onslaught and it was evident in the early stages of the war. One of the immediate consequences of the war was the massive humanitarian crisis it created. As villages and towns were overrun by federal troops, inhabitants fled to a relatively safe haven with lack of food, poor shelter, acute shortage of medical services. Intense diplomatic efforts to stop the carnage such as the OAU attempt to mediate failed in 1967 and 1968.

While the war was a civil war and expected to toe largely an asymmetry path, an irregular warfare that pit the state and its organised military forces against the secessionist Biafran military force hurriedly put together and inaugurated to defend the newly proclaimed republic, it however followed a conventional warfare pathway fought in the form of an inter-state warfare. While the war was largely asymmetric in nature in the analysis of the belligerents

⁷⁸ Carl von Clausewitz in *Vom Kriege (On War)* quoted in Creveld, *The Transformation of War...*, 34.

⁷⁹ Yakubu Gowon (1966), “Inaugural Speech by the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief.

⁸⁰ Theodore A. Coulombis and James Hastings Wolfe, *Introduction to International Relations, Power and Justice* (New Jersey, 1990), 181.

⁸¹ A.H.M. Kirk Greene, *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria*, volume 2, July 1967 – January 1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).

involved in the war: a state versus a seceding group, its prosecution was carried out as conventional warfare. According to Peccavi, this strategic choice by Ojukwu and his Biafran commanders had a significant impact on the course of the war and its eventual outcome. In Peccavi's analysis,

Biafran commanders were ex-Nigeria Army Regulars who fought the war they were trained to fight; a conventional war with defined lines of own and enemy troops, but with an understrength, underequipped, partially trained Army in heavily restricted terrain with limited mobility. This only worked as long as it did because the Federal Army commanders were trained the same way and obliged the Biafrans by fighting a conventional war with a poorly led, poorly trained, but heavily armed and mechanised army.⁸²

The choice of conventional warfare over guerilla tactics by Biafra was a wrong strategic choice, one that dictated the course of the war and its ultimate end. Strategic studies experts believed the rain forests and swamps of the Eastern Region were ideal for guerrilla warfare, which was viewed with disdain by the Biafran commanders. Major General Alexander Madiebo, the GOC Biafran Army, was quoted to have remarked that Biafra would have to formally surrender before commencing general guerrilla warfare! This was a fairly strange assertion as the Biafran Organisation of Freedom Fighters (BOFF) actively conducted guerrilla warfare in the Mid-West and parts of Biafra under Federal control.⁸³ Hence, much of the fighting took place along the road network of Biafra, since neither army was keen to get tied down in a classic jungle campaign.⁸⁴

In the closing stages of the war, attacks on the Federal Army's long supply lines by Biafran soldiers were effective but were not carried out on a large enough scale to significantly damage their war effort. In the opinion of Philip Jowett as illustrated by Raffaele Ruggeri, "If the heavily outgunned Biafrans had avoided conventional engagements from the outset and had concentrated on guerrilla warfare they might have inflicted far heavier losses on the Federal forces."⁸⁵ However, the wrong strategic option for a conventional war from the outset of the war by Biafra placed a more crucial role on resolve and capability, which greatly shaped the trajectory of the war, as the determined Biafran soldiers fought with endurance in the face of dwindling military capability that undermined their military effectiveness until eventual surrender and the federal forces battled with growing capability and resolve.

Conflict between conventional forces is a contest of firepower, manoeuvre and logistics.⁸⁶ The Biafran soldiers and mercenaries lasted long in the contest only by their resolve to fight to defend the territorial integrity of the Republic of Biafra against an invading force equally motivated to restore the unity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and maintain its territorial integrity against secession. The Federal Army tactics were generally unimaginative but they

⁸² Peccavi. "BIAFRA- Strategic Military Lessons...

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Jowett, *Modern African Wars*, 22.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 21.

⁸⁶ Peccavi. "BIAFRA- Strategic Military Lessons ...

had manpower and firepower in huge amounts. Their logistics were chaotic but existed and whilst less efficient than Biafra's were able to pump supplies to their forces.

The strategic interest of both belligerents was similar, defend the territorial integrity of the state, but existed in a zero-sum realm where the existence of one must be at the displacement of the other; existential in nature, the achievement of one equals to the vanquish of the other. The resolve of both belligerents, as a driving force, alongside their fluctuating capability influenced the course of the civil war and its eventual end even when the balance of capability tilted from parity to steeply in favour of the federal troops that enjoyed the inexhaustible support of the federal government as well as foreign allies who influenced the capability and military strength of the belligerents through equipment and ammunition supplies, financial supports and diplomatic involvement that tilted international support hugely in favour of the federal government to the detriment of struggling Biafra, especially as the war near its end.

Impact of Resolve and Capability on the Nigerian Civil War

The federal forces were reactionary at the initial stage of the war and that gave initial momentum to the Biafran forces until the Gowon administration's reaction to the war shifted from appeasement to nesting its broad military objective which was nested in a "united Nigeria", with a broader phenomenon that some argued at the initial stage which made the government vacillatory and wandering from one misstep to another. This apparent lack of broad military objective infuriated some military officers bent on an all-out military assault.

By the time the federal forces advanced into the Biafran concave, not much had changed as the forces struggled to articulate sensible, straightforward strategic priorities around which to structure a well-articulated resolve and deploy the requisite capability to sustain the military offensive. There is little doubt that the obvious initial gaps affected the federal forces until much later in the war, when the Gowon administration realised that it was either going to prosecute the war militarily or not and an immediate re-structuring of the armed forces and especially the combat arm deployed was both expedient and necessary.

Contemporary reconstruction of the state system as a consequence of the Westphalian Treaty of 1648 placed the responsibility and defence of the state squarely within the ambit of the security forces, hence the survivability of the state is assumingly reposed with the security forces (army). For the Nigerian Army, the civil war was a gruesome experience. In order to interrogate the impact of resolve and capability on the outcome of the war, it would be pertinent to state that the war though executed by the Armed Forces (Army), various factors relating to the decisiveness on the battlefields on the federal sides combined to give it the decisive edge. Flowing from these are three interrelated and interdependent levels of the war which are identified: strategy, operational art and tactics.

For a given, the operational level provides the most fundamental connection between military-strategic objectives and the tactical employment of the fighting troops on the battlefield. Leading military historian, C.J. Dick asserted that "it is in the realm of the conception, planning and execution of major operations and campaigns designed, through a succession of steps, to destroy the enemy's centre of gravity."⁸⁷ The situation is such that, battle outcomes are essentially determined by where,

⁸⁷ C.J. Dick, *From Victory to Stalemate, The Western Front, Summer 1944* (Kansas: University of Kansas, 2016).

when, and to what purpose tactical units and formations are committed to battle. Probably the most profound explanation of their interconnectedness was provided by A.A. Svechin when he stated that “tactics makes the steps from which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the path.”⁸⁸

Strategy: Leading military analysts opine that strategy, as a concept, sets out the operational goals in any theatre of war. In a simple analogy, especially in either inter or intra-state conflict, the goal will be for destruction of the principal enemy grouping or the seizure of a specific territorial objective of critical military, political and/or economic value. The federal forces stated that part of its grand objective was the capture of certain cities such as Owerri, Aba and Umuahia. Other cities such as Port Harcourt because of its economic value and Calabar with access to the Atlantic Ocean were part of the grand military and economic goals of the federal forces. The perception is that what objectives can undermine the enemy’s centre of gravity, that is, which, out of the political, economic, military power or resolve if eliminated could quickly damage the enemy’s capability to continue with the war.

Once such an objective is established, then the commander as was the case with Benjamin Adekunle was to ensure that nothing was spared in resources, men and equipment to ensure that such was attained within the relative time constraint of such an operation and this was what was responsible for the federal forces, particularly the 3rd Marine Commando to set their eyes on Owerri, Aba and Umuahia and with a ferocious determination to attain such an objective when it one or either of the two proved intractable. The mobilisation and corresponding procurement of armament buttress reinforces such conviction.

Operational Art: In the case of operational art, it has always been concerned with the relationship between mass, firepower, and manoeuvre in battles. The term itself is rightly chosen because it is not a science. There is great scope for creativity at the operational level, and the more senior the commander, the more scope there is. A crucial link between tactics and operational art is the provision, in advance, of forces and plans to convert tactical into operational success. The skill of a commander is the most potent factor in the implementation of operational art for success or otherwise. For instance, the commander uses deception, interdiction, operational manoeuvre, unlimited logistics flow and carefully orchestrated battles to structure a successful campaign.

Tactics: In military campaigns, tactics is the game changer. It is employed by field commanders to solve the problems that stand in the way of operational goals/victories. The concept, in other words, is concerned with the conception, planning and execution of military campaigns. At the tactical level, as at the operational level, success depends on the perception amongst other variables before the commander, which is achieving synergistic effects. The battle and the operations of which they are part must be linked in aim, timing and geographical location, such that the totality of their achievements is greater than the sum of the individual parts. While the Nigerian-Biafran war has proven that with superior technology, numbers and various other variables such as operational environment, victory depends ultimately on the sound knowledge of the commander(s), selection and maintenance of the objectives of the war, morale, offensive action, concentration of force, flexibility, economic of effort and finally, element of surprise.

⁸⁸ A.A. Svechin quoted in David M. Glantz, *Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle* (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1991), 23.

Conclusion

The Nigerian Civil War marked an important milestone in the evolution and development of the Nigerian Army on several fronts. Both at the doctrinal, tactical, strategic and operational levels, the army responded to the war based on resolve and capability, made mistakes, learnt from them and consolidated on successes that eventually tilted the scale of balance in favour of the federal objective(s) of uniting the country and crushing the war. Arguably, the military as an institution and its leadership cadre level contributed to the end of the civil war in several ways. The federal victory has been variously attributed to many factors such as argued in this paper as chiefly based on resolve and capability, committed political will, military leadership and access to arms and ammunition to prosecute the war.

The dual concepts of resolve and capability were a win-win for the federal forces as they sustained the military offensive and objective. On the whole, without the resolve and the capability of the federal forces, the end of the war could have been all-in-all different.

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MAKING GENDER MAINSTREAMING A VALUABLE CONCEPT AND STRATEGY IN ADVANCING GENDER EQUALITY IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Making gender mainstreaming for gender equality, is one of the most important issue in the contemporary world today, mainstreaming gender is a methodology that ensures that women and men have equal access to opportunities, rights, rewards, and society's valued resources. Women in Nigeria, despite the effort and provision of all those opportunity for the women in Nigeria, available evidence indicates that women have continued to be marginalized in all aspect of life, such as political, economic, social, cultural, marital, and educational aspect of life. However, some valuable concepts and significant reason are used in the paper, therefore, this paper identified and discussed some key issues related to gender mainstreaming in Nigeria. Some of these issues are the conceptual definitions of gender, gender mainstreaming, and gender equality, significant strategy used in making gender mainstreaming most valuable concept, reasons for the adoption and propagation of mainstreaming for gender equality, mainstreaming gender strategy for national development, challenges of gender mainstreaming for gender equality in Nigeria, as well as the theory of mainstreaming and sustainable theory. Finally, this paper has provided some importance recommendations to boost up gender mainstreaming in Nigeria.

Keywords: Gender, Gender mainstreaming, Gender equality, Mainstreaming strategy.

Introduction

The concept of gender mainstreaming is a globally related issue and also, a subject of considerable intellectual discourse, policy making, and debates to all developed, developing, and underdeveloped countries. Nigerian laws including sections 40 & 42 (1) and section 77(2) of the 1999 Constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria, outlaws every form of gender discrimination and the Nigerian National Gender Policy of 2006, proposes a 35 per cent affirmative action quota for women to complement. Despite the effort and provision of all those opportunity for the women in Nigeria, available evidence indicates that women have continued to be marginalized in all aspect of life, such as political, economic, social, cultural, marital, and educational aspect of life. (Omotoso & Enweremadu, 2022).

Gender mainstreaming became a strategy introduced to address the challenges to women, including recognition of the inequalities within households, unpaid labour, feminisation of poverty, differences in legal status and entitlements, discriminatory practices, gender-based violence and ultimately in educational, economic, social, cultural, and political power where decisions are made. Among other things, gender mainstreaming aims at determining 'who will be consulted and how, on matters such as the formulation of the issue, the definition of information needs, and assessment of options and how policy choices would be formulated and presented to capture gender equality issues. (UN 2002). Gender mainstreaming includes decentralising to achieve equality, envisioning an equitable future by engaging gender impact assessment methods, gender budgeting, and gender disaggregated statistics. This process is more successful in practice when it affliet factors cultures, norms and state disposition so that In practice, gender mainstreaming spotlights a wide range of activities that institutionalized equality by entrenching gender-sensitive practices and norms in the structures of public policy. Mainstreaming a gender perspective in all types of activities (referred to as gender mainstreaming) is a globally accepted strategy for promoting gender equality. Mainstreaming is not an end in itself but a means to the goal of gender equality. Mainstreaming involves ensuring that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of gender equality are central to all activities - policy development, research, advocacy/dialogue, legislation, resource allocation, and planning, implementation and monitoring of programmes and projects. Development of an adequate understanding of mainstreaming requires clarity on the related concepts of gender and equality. (UN 2015).

The Concept of Gender

Gender: refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men or girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They are context or time-specific and changeable. Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a women or a man in a given context. In most societies there are differences and inequalities between women and men in responsibilities assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, as well as decision-making opportunities. Gender is part of the broader socio-cultural context. Other important criteria for socio-cultural analysis include class, race, poverty level, ethnic group and age, etc. (UN 2015).

The Concept of Gender Mainstreaming

Accordingly, in 1997, the United Nations Economic and Social Council, in their agreed conclusions, defined; gender mainstreaming as:

“...the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.

The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality... Gender mainstreaming does not replace the need for targeted, women-specific policies and programmes or positive legislation, nor does it substitute for gender units or gender focal points.”

Gender mainstreaming starts with the recognition that gender equality is a basic development goal and a key objective of development planning. It is therefore a strategy that ensures that both women and men have access to, and control over resources, decision-making, and benefits at all stages of the development process in ways that promote human rights, gender equality and social justice. Its goal is to complement and facilitate women’s empowerment and autonomy. Strategically, it ensures that goals, such as poverty elimination or economic development, also advance gender equality (UN 2015).

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines gender mainstreaming as “taking account of gender concerns in all policy, programme, administrative and financial activities, and in organizational procedures, thereby contributing to a profound organizational transformation ”.

Similarly, according to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat “Gender mainstreaming is a good governance issue – making government more efficient and effective at producing policies and services that will strengthen the social and economic wealth of a nation. It is about rights – women’s and men’s rights to equal opportunities, equal recognition and equal rewards within societies.”

Mukhopadhyay (2007) divides gender mainstreaming into two dimensions. **The first** is integrationist mainstreaming’, which integrates gender equality into the analyses of issues across sectors. Integration promotes the incorporation of gender concerns and issues and analysis into the existing development priorities of the government and its development partners, without changing the overall agenda. **The second** dimension is ‘transformative’ ‘agenda-setting mainstreaming’, which seeks to understand why women are a symmetrically positioned in the first place and addresses the causes of those inequalities. Agenda-setting aims to transform the existing development agenda, and enable women and men to be active participants in decision-making processes that affect their daily lives and livelihoods, through the systematic application of a gender perspective. To illustrate, quotas can be considered an integrationist approach since they advance women’s equality without necessarily altering existing patriarchal ideologies or structural reasons for exclusion.

Ensuring agricultural extension services address both women and men and it integrates gender into agriculture is another example. On the other hand, advocating for women’s land rights so

that women gain economic autonomy and do not just participate as wives or dependents is agenda-setting.

Hay (2012) defines gender mainstreaming as bringing a feminist lens to policies and policy making.

This requires an awareness that policies can reproduce a symmetrical gender power relations that mostly benefit men and disadvantage women. It also requires recognizing that some voices have been systematically silenced and that those with less power have been excluded from political decision making. It is concerned with who has been silenced, how and why this silence is maintained, and how it can be challenged.

Barribeau (2013), therefore, described gender mainstreaming as a process that “attempts to harness political will to remove, or at the least close the political gaps between women’s *de jure* right to Participate in the governing of their communities and their *de facto* experience of continuing albeit varying, levels of exclusion”. A feminist lens considers how gender and its intersections with race, class, and ethnicity impact the lives of women, girls, men, boys, and those who do not fit into these categories. It also highlights how seemingly ‘neutral’ policies can both implicitly and explicitly reproduce gender biases.

The Concept of Gender Equality

Equality between women and men (gender equality): refers to the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female. Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration – recognizing the diversity of different groups of women and men. Gender equality is not a ‘women’s issue’ but should concern and fully engage men as well as women. Equality between women and men is seen both as a human rights issue and as a precondition for, and indicator of, gender equality. It involves both achieving equal representation and equal influence, equal access and control over resources, and equal sharing of care labour. Where there is gender equality, the differing perceptions, interests, needs and priorities of women and men are considered in policies and plans to change gender systems. When these are better understood in terms of how they reproduce inequalities, they can be accounted for in the process of national planning in ways to address them with specific measures aimed at reducing gaps and promoting the autonomy and empowerment of all women to achieve goal in gender equality.

Significant Strategy Used in Making Gender Mainstreaming Most Valuable.

The strategy of mainstreaming is defined in the ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions, 1997/2, as “...the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.”

Mainstreaming was clearly established as the global strategy for promoting gender equality through the Platform for Action at the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. The need to ensure that attention to gender perspectives is an integral part of

interventions in all areas of societal development was made clear in that document. For each of the strategic objectives identified in Beijing specific reference was made to the importance of the mainstreaming strategy. For example, in the chapter on Women in power and decision-making paragraph 189 specifically addresses mainstreaming: “In addressing the inequality between men and women in the sharing of power and decision-making at all levels, Governments and other actors should promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies and programmes so that before decisions are taken, an analysis is made of the effects on women and men, respectively.”

Mainstreaming is not about adding on a ‘women’s component’, or even a ‘gender equality component’, to an existing activity. It involves more than increasing women’s participation. Mainstreaming situates gender equality issues at the centre of policy decisions, medium-term plans, programme budgets, and institutional structures and processes. Mainstreaming entails bringing the perceptions, experience, knowledge and interests of women as well as men to bear on policy-making, planning and decision-making. Mainstreaming can reveal a need for changes in goals, strategies and actions to ensure that both women and men can influence, participate in and benefit from development processes. It can require changes in organizations structures, procedures and cultures to create organizational environments which are conducive to the promotion of gender equality.

United Nations (2015) in line with the ECOSOC agreed to establish some basic strategic principles of Mainstreaming. This includes the following:

1. Responsibility for implementing the mainstreaming strategy is system wide, and rests at the highest levels within agencies, departments, funds, and commissions; and adequate accountability mechanisms for monitoring progress need to be established.
2. The initial definitions of issues/problems across all areas of activity should be done in such a manner that gender differences and disparities can be diagnosed – assumptions that issues/problems are neutral from a gender equality perspective should never be made. Gender analysis should always be carried out, separately or as part of existing analyses.
3. Clear political will and allocation of adequate resources for mainstreaming, including if necessary additional financial and human resources, are important for translation of the concept into reality.
4. Gender mainstreaming requires that efforts are made to broaden women’s equitable participation at all levels of decision-making.
5. Mainstreaming does not replace the need for targeted, women-specific policies and programs, and positive legislation; nor does it do away with the need for gender units or focal points.

Reasons for the Adoption and Propagation of Mainstreaming for Gender Equality

The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 established gender mainstreaming as the global strategy for promoting gender equality. The outcome document of this Conference, the Beijing Platform for action, identified twelve critical areas of concern for urgent action to accelerate the achievement of gender equality and equal opportunities for women and men. In each of these areas of concern, the Beijing Platform for action calls on governments and other actors to “promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes, so that, before decisions are taken, an analysis is made of the effects on women and men, respectively. Since then, several United Nations inter-governmental resolutions, mandates and decisions have reaffirmed the commitment to gender mainstreaming, and the goal of gender equality and the empowerment

of women and girls. These include the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.

Gender mainstreaming remains widely accepted as the most practical means to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of women. It moves gender equality and the empowerment of women from the margins to the mainstream of decision-making, integrating gender perspectives into all policies, programs, functions and structures of an institution. Gender mainstreaming thus propels progress towards the ultimate goal of attaining gender equality. It transforms society positively through the elimination of discriminatory laws, norms and practices that limit women's and girls' voices, choices, and opportunities and impede them from achieving their full potential.

Some of the reasons are follows

- (1) It's estimated that, 35% of woman have experience either physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence or sexual violence by a non-partner at some point in their lives. Particularly in Nigeria's population constituted over 2000 million people and women constitute 49.5% of this population.
- (2) Within the range, women between the (aged of 25-54) have occupied only 63% in labour force participation rate, compared with men is 94%. While in Nigeria labour force participation rate is 64.5% of the total women and 70.3% of the male counterpart.
- (3) UN reported that, about more than 49 countries still lack laws protecting women against domestic violence. Nigeria inclusive respectively. This particularly occurred more especially in the northern parts of Nigeria such as wife battery, child abuse, child labour, street begging, and street hawking etc.
- (4) There are more than 650 million women and girls in the world today who were married before the age of 18 years old. This particularly occurred in Nigeria more especially in the northern parts of Nigeria among hausa/fulani ethnic group
- (5) Many more women spend approximately 2.5 times more time on unpaid care and domestic work than men counterpart.
- (6) At least 200 million girls and women worldwide have undergone some form of female genital mutilation.
- (7) Between 1990 and 2017, women constituted only 2 per-cent of mediators, 8 per-cent of negotiators, and 5 per-cent of witnesses and signatories in all major peace processes.
- (8) As of June 2019 up to date, only 11 women or bellow are serving as head of state and 12 or bellow are serving as Head of government.
- (9) Only 24 per-cent of all national parliamentarians were women as of February 2019, a slow increase from 11.3 per-cent in 1995, up to date.
- (10) In areas of livelihood and basics necessities of life such as food, water, education, clothes, health, and shelter. Women earn 23 per-cent less than men. (UN Women 2015 & NBS 2015).

Theoretical Framework

Theory of Gender Mainstreaming and Sustainability Theory

Gender mainstreaming theory is grounded in feminist political frameworks that account for gender consciousness, gender awareness and the deliberate embedding of gender-sensitive procedures within society and organizations. As a concept, ‘gender mainstreaming’ appeared for the first time in international texts after the United Nations Third World Conference on Women (Nairobi 1985). This was in relation to the debate within the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) on the role of women in development. It was seen as a ‘means of promoting the role of women in the field of development and of integrating women’s values into development work. Over time, it has translated from being a concept and theory to a signifier and/or strategy for underscoring exclusionary tendencies and proposing and promoting inclusivity (Anderson 2018).

Gender mainstreaming became a strategy introduced to address the challenges to women, including recognition of the inequalities within households, unpaid labour, feminisation of poverty, differences in legal status and entitlements, discriminatory practices, gender-based violence and ultimately in political power where decisions are made. Among other things, gender mainstreaming aims at determining ‘who will be consulted and how, on matters such as the formulation of the issue, the definition of information needs, and assessment of options and how policy choices would be formulated and presented to capture gender equality issues. (UN 2002). Gender mainstreaming includes decentralizing to achieve equality, envisioning an equitable future by engaging gender impact assessment methods, gender budgeting, and gender disaggregated statistics. This process is more successful in practice when it factors cultures, norms and state disposition so that it is seen to be operational in words and deeds (Kolawole 1998). In practice, gender mainstreaming spotlights a wide range of activities that institutionalized equality by entrenching gender-sensitive practices and norms in the structures of public policy. For Daly (2005), gender mainstreaming should encapsulate theorizing political strategizing as well as policy articulation. Pertinently, Daly (2005, p. 434) considers ‘it fair to say that gender mainstreaming is better developed as a (policy) approach than concept’.

Consequently, Khoalenyane & Enaifoghe (2018) allude to a three-point approach to any gender mainstreaming process, by:

- i) Identifying men’s partnership in gender equity drive;
- ii) Acknowledging a mind reset for men, particularly with regard to women’s rights as human rights; and
- iii) An awareness of the long-term implication of gender frameworks being developed.

Our choice of gender mainstreaming theory for this study rests on the recognition of the problematic nature of the theory in achieving gender equality. This has been widely discussed with examples from various countries (Daly 2005; Prugal 2009; Hankivsky 2013; Anderson 2018), revealing the failure of its translation to the achievement of pre-defined objectives. Antigua and Barbuda’s Medium-Term Development Strategy (MTDS) represents a set of strategies and actions to be undertaken over the medium-term (2016 to 2020) to foster “A harmonious, prosperous and modern Antigua and Barbuda founded on the principles of sustainability and inclusive growth; where equality of opportunity, peace, and justice prevail for all citizens and residents”. The Strategy’s gender analysis identifies gender discrimination

as a potential cause for under-utilization of human resources. It states that “much progress in addressing gender issues” has been made, but that “there is still work to be done to reduce gender-based violence, and to address, premature termination of education by teen mothers, and sexual exploitation of young women and children”. The Strategy singles out “the performance of males within society as it is widely thought that they are becoming marginalized and are generally underachieving in the workplace and academically”. Political leaders and key decision-makers are considered to have a “critical need for gender sensitization”. However, the Strategy notes that “a key obstacle to the integration of gender in sector programmes lies in the absence of quantitative and qualitative sex-disaggregated data, gender analysis, and gathering and synthesizing of gender-related data across sectors”.

Using a sustainable development framework, the development strategy is articulated around four broad Sustainable Development Dimensions (SDD), each accompanied with necessary conditions. These include optimal generation of national wealth (SDD 1), enhanced social cohesion and resilience (SDD 2), improved health of the natural environment and sustained historical and cultural assets (SDD3), and enhanced citizen security (SDD 4). Gender is mainstreamed across all four dimensions. The Strategy outlines specific measures to support gender equality and more so gender mainstreaming in relation to such issues as labour force participation, gender-based violence, poverty eradication, disparities in access to education, and the provision of safe and inclusive learning environments for children. Specific measures include: 1) sensitizing senior public sector officials about the impact of gender discrimination on national development; 2) developing a gender strategic plan to create approaches for addressing discrimination and violence against women, male underachievement and encouraging participation of women in politics, and; 3) instituting greater fiscal responsibility and accountability across government to ensure that the needs of women, men, girls and boys are considered. In addition, a gender strategic plan will include “approaches for: reducing negative gender attitudes that fuel discrimination and violence against women; reversing adverse trends regarding the achievement of males academically and in the workplace; and encouraging greater participation of women in politics”. However, the Monitoring and Evaluation Indicator Framework only mentions gender in relation to SDD 1, with the note to monitor unemployment levels by gender, age and locality; and in relation to SDD 2 with regards to reducing the incidence of gender-based violence. However, the baseline values and years, and the corresponding targets, are not identified. Where gender analysis is included, as part of achieving a Human Development Index score in the top 50 out of 187 countries by 2030, it is spoken of generally, for example in terms of reducing “at least by half the proportion of men, women, and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions”.⁷⁰ There is no target for increasing the ratio of women to men serving in the National Assembly (Parliament) from two women out of seventeen possible seats. The SDGs and related targets are included at the end of the Strategy, but are not integrated into its goals, key performance indicators or targets. Gender responsive budgeting, a key mechanism for gender mainstreaming, is also not mentioned.

Mainstreaming gender strategy for national development plans.

Gender mainstreaming requires a series of combining and intersecting factors for its successful integration in national development plans, strategies and visions, and their subsequent implementation. Among them it is the political will in order to create consensus on the need to

question current gender relations in the public and private spheres, and to create a culture of gender equality. This should encompass, but it is not limited to, the development and implementation of specific national gender equality policy that includes legislative protections, institutional oversight and accountability, a strategically placed national gender machinery, focal points within ministries, awareness-raising and capacity-building. Gender equality policies are roadmaps for the State that indicate the priorities for the country to achieve gender equality. They should be aligned with long and medium-term national development plans for policy coherence and complementarity of goals and objectives (2015). This alignment should be informed by research, using sex-disaggregated data, that establishes the baseline and makes projections for the desired outcomes, as well as by analyses that include cost-benefit analyses, gender impact assessment, and gender-responsive budgeting to provide the evidence base for decision making related to this is the need to allocate corresponding technical, financial and human resources to ensure medium and long-term achievements of gender equality and its integration into sustainable development efforts. Formal and informal networks and donor assistance have been crucial to drafting action plans, implementing legal reforms and the introduction of programmes and tools to advance gender equality (Fernós, 2010). Gender mainstreaming efforts have produced “mixed results” in the sub region. For example, a regional review of the situation in the Bahamas, Belize, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago found that national gender policy-making illuminates “deeply contested policy spaces” with “competing interpretations of women’s and men’s gendered realities, and gender power relations”. The next step of gender policy implementation highlighted difficulties, particularly in relation to sexuality, reproduction and women’s rights, because of challenges to transforming a patriarchal status quo in the very organizations and institutions responsible for implementation. Additional sector specific reviews focus on areas such as gender mainstreaming in other to include on agreeing to formulate a gender policy, Mohammed explains that States effectively committed to the following goals:

- To assist policy makers in understanding and tracking the gender implications of new and existing policies and to ensure that all policies and planning undertaken by government is informed by a gender perspective.
- To provide government with a dynamic framework to address ongoing issues of gender in society.
- To inform government on strategies in training and education to maximize the country’s most important resources its people, for the benefit of the territory;
- To educate and change attitudes of the public on key concepts such as gender equity, gender equality, social justice, gender roles, and responsibilities toward having them accept the importance of a national policy on gender.
- To review existing legislation aimed at removing measures that place one sex at a disadvantage with the other and to facilitate legislative change and public awareness of relevant legislation and their implications for gender-differentials in the society.
- To develop new strategies and approaches toward eradicating domestic and other forms of gender-based violence in the society.
- To begin training a cadre of persons in the government skilled in the applications of the tools of gender analysis, while strengthening the gender offices to implement and monitor the recommendations of the gender policy.

In addition, Mohammed (2016) identifies several areas of concern that demand gender responsive policy making: education, crime and violence (including gender-based violence),

health, female employment and the family, poverty, the law and women's rights, and attitudes toward diverse sexualities. In formulating four of such policies, Mohammed (2014) details: The process of gender consultation with the various stakeholders - individual, communities, civil society, commerce and members of the government demonstrates a democratic method of policy formulation. In each sphere of work or occupation examined, participants are asked to break down how male and female, masculinity and femininity are differently affected. For example, if the health sector is approached, how health workers treat with and understand differently the health seeking behaviors of women versus men, the different conditions that each sex is prone to because of physical differences and the resources that are made available for each as result are considered.

The idea is always to have a policy that is shaped by the needs of the local community and accepted by the stakeholders within, thus reflecting closely their own sense of gender identity and visions for change in gender relations.

Challenges of gender mainstreaming for gender equality in Nigeria.

Nigeria is one of the most giant country in Africa with multi-heterogeneous groups of people with different languages (dialect), as well as materials and non-materials culture that dominates those peoples in the country, therefore, this serves as the genesis in making gender mainstreaming difficult to thrive. Amongst the challenges are as follows:

- (1) Cultural Ethnocentrism in Marital relationship - Orisaremi (2022) observed that, Patriarchy has long been established among the various ethnic groups in Nigeria, and indeed in Africa. It is obvious in the various aspects of gender relations. Traditionally, in most Nigerian societies, men were the recognized decision makers at home and in the public sphere; men owned and controlled scarce and essential resources; men married women and paid the much valued bride wealth; men owned the offspring of marriages even in most matrilineal societies in Nigeria; men largely led religious groups and worship; men for the most part, fought wars and had the power to use women or girls to broker peace between warring communities or to avert war; men's interests generally subsumed those of women as a second gender or an appendage. Traditions die hard. Despite some recognisable changes, a clear break with the past has not been established in modern times and matrilineal societies are not exempted. Even in urban communities where men and some women engage in white and blue collar jobs, women's inevitable domestic or productive work is not as valued as work in the public sphere, simply because the latter is dominated by the men folk. Against this backdrop, historically in Nigeria beginning from precolonial, colonial and postcolonial era, despite the language spoken, ethnic group, tribe, and cultural habit, mostly is the male (husband) that dominates and control female (wife). Therefore husband are considered to be the great protector and final says on all activities in the house hold.
- (2) Religious belief and practice: Religion is one of the most powerful and fundamental social institution in Nigeria, as a multi-religious nation. It is generally estimated that the religious distribution of the Nigerian population is about 50% Muslims, 40% Christians and 10% indigenous faith, Nigeria is a pluralistic society, there are over five hundred (500) ethnic groups with diverse and socio-cultural differences trying to put

these groups into same ideology is not a simple task. To live in harmony means that these diverse groups are expected to work together in peaceful agreement environment based on respect and mutual co-operation despite gender inequality (Nahuche, Shehu & Nuhu 2023). Nigeria is arguably, a pretty conservative society with relatively inflexible cultural and religious values and practices. Religion is often used to justify gender-based violence and other forms of gender inequality against women especially in the family setting. Christians for instance, would urge women to “submit” to their husbands whom God has anointed as “head” over the family (Orisaremi 2022). However, religious teaching will only determine ‘what roles, responsibility, position, and decision that male or female should exercise in any given society/community.

(3) Low level of education among women’s and socialization process: In every society, home (women) are the first agent of socialization, unfortunately, many study revealed that, more than 70 per cent of girls are not enroll in school (poor girls child education) more especially in the northern part of the country, this have necessitated difficult challenges for the adoption and propagation of gender mainstreaming in Nigeria. Orisaremi (2022) added that, most societies globally, socialize their males and females from infancy to act and play roles that are socially assigned to their distinct gender as boys or girls. Yet, the process is discriminatory to the disadvantage of the girls. Gender socialization is influenced by biology, the family, education, and religion among others. It is very handy in transmitting cultural rules, norms, values, and expectations through generations. It ensures that gender roles and gender role stereotypes are preserved and sustained. For instance, home management, nursing and children’s education are perceived as women’s roles while higher education, politicking, politics and decision-making are the preserve of the men. Nigerian women are often frustrated out of politics because of the numerous challenges they have to contend with, like exposure to violence and harassment, poor accountability, high cost, sexism, misogyny and so on.

Conclusion

In the contemporary era, there is an increased global awareness more especially on men’s indigence and incapacity without their female partners in developmental agenda. Hence, men affairs alone can no longer occupy the centre stage. The stage has to deliberately make room to equally accommodate women so as to reflect the needs, concerns, experiences, aspirations, etc. of both genders in all planned actions this includes legislation, policies, and programmes, as well as their implementation, processes, monitoring and evaluation at all levels. Gender mainstreaming is a deliberate strategy towards ensuring that men and women benefit equally from intentional, premeditated and strategic actions. It ensures the inclusion of women and men in all aspects of developmental process. Although the idea of gender mainstreaming was first muted at the third world. Almost three decades after, not much success has been recorded in Nigeria especially in the areas of legislation, policy making, leadership (politics) and equal opportunity to decision making positions in the public space, through affirmative action.

Recommendations

(1) Government at all levels and collaboration with non-governmental organizations should provide and prepare medium-term plans and budgets in a manner that gender perspectives and gender equality issues are implicitly and explicitly used.

- (2) All branches of government and international donors should provide sufficient resources and maintenance of gender units, department, ministry, division and focal points. Along line, women can be encourage and motivated to have participates in every aspect of social life. Beyond this, it help to raise awareness that gender mainstreaming is everybody's responsibility so as to ensure active contribution of all at interpersonal and group levels.
- (3) Government should collaborate with UN-Women for the Provision of training to all personnel at headquarters and in the field as well as appropriate follow-up to ensure smooth propagation of gender mainstreaming for gender equality in Nigeria. Above this, it serves significant improvement to increase efforts in generating much needed gender disaggregated data to enable a more realistic gender analysis of the Nigerian population.
- (4) Parents, Government, Non-Governmental Organization and Civil Society Organization should Promotes full participation of women at all levels in decision-making, policy making, in development activities and peace processes, that is, all those stake holders should appreciate the need to create equal opportunities for boys and girls in the course of equal access to available opportunities related to the utilization of human and natural resources in the country.
- (5) All religious leaders should be honest in teaching and, in revealing any reports and recommendations on issues and responsibilities related to gender differences and disparities in order to ensure proper maintenance of human rights. This strategies will help in achieving gender mainstreaming priorities from religious objective that "women first to sympathize".

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THE CONTEMPORARY IMPLICATIONS OF POVERTY ON HUMAN SECURITY AND MIGRATION IN NIGERIA, 2010 TO 2023

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Abstract

The paper discussed the current menace of poverty in Nigeria and how it affects security as people devise methods, including engaging in criminal activities to survive. Suffice to state that Nigeria is blessed with both human and natural resources which if harnessed would propel the country towards a level of sufficiency for her burgeoning population considering the attendant increase on an annual basis. It is important to assert that the nation should have overcome her challenges considering her abundant wealth over the years. Even with the appellation, “Giant of Africa”, because of her capacity in the continent of Africa, however, it is important to note that the performance of leaders have been abysmal while the level of poverty increases daily, specifically in recent years. The country is currently regarded as the “Poverty Capital of the World” by world poverty clock and the effects of poverty are exacerbated by factors such as terrorism and other forms of social ills. The scenario in Nigeria is that of poverty in the midst of plenty. This, to a large extent, has undermined the true essence of human welfare and security in the country. Though there is no justification for crime and criminality which some have been engaged in and which have forced some people to migrate to other environments and countries, non-state actors have always adduced reasons such as the endemic poverty and poverty-related issues like hunger, starvation as the rationale for resorting to their nefarious activities. Insecurity like the Boko-Haram group in the North-East, banditry in the North-West, activities of the secessionist group in the South-East, violent conflicts in different parts of the country, among others have advanced to full blown terrorism with the use of sophisticated weapons. It is now common knowledge that human life is not completely guaranteed, especially in the North with dire insecurity while the toll arising from this security challenges in recent years is incalculable, thus, resulting in displacement and forced migration. Even the security apparatuses are not spared with the news awash about them losing their lives on daily basis. The study advanced contributing factors to

poverty, which includes unemployment, corruption, inequality, poor education and non-diversification of the economy and its implications on human security and migration. The study recommended that concrete initiatives be taken to drastically reduce the rate of poverty, more industries should be built to employ the teeming young unemployed people while security must be prioritized and enforced.

Keywords: Contemporary, Poverty, Human Security, Migration, Nigeria

Introduction

Nigeria is the sixth largest producer of oil in the world, but its vast resources and revenue in truism have not translated into uplifting the standard of living of her citizens. A World Bank report (2014) listed Nigeria among the five poorest countries in the world with most Nigerians living below the poverty line (Taiwo, 2015). Similarly, recent figures in 2023 pointed to the fact that an alarming seventy-one (71) million were plunged into poverty out of the over two hundred million, they are regarded as extremely poor and one hundred and thirty-three million people were believed to be multi-dimensionally poor (Punch, 2023 June 19). The state with the highest hunger index score is Yobe, with a score of 44.2, followed by Sokoto, with a score of 42.1. Other states with high scores include Zamfara, Kebbi, and Jigawa. These states have high rates of undernourishment and child wasting (Punch, June 19, 2023). Some of these states and others not captured are already going through serious security challenges like the Boko-Haram phenomenon, banditry, among others. From the above figure, it is obvious that the standard of living of Nigerians has seriously deteriorated and this is evident in the rise of malnutrition level, and decline in the quantity and quality of health and education services. Poverty in all its manifestations is antithetical to human security. Therefore, it is not possible to meaningfully talk about human security without addressing factors or issues hampering human security in Nigeria. These factors, which include unemployment, inequality, corruption, non-diversification of the economy and poor education are elements that have the capacity to activate poverty which in turn have damning effects on human security. The experience of Muhammed Bouazizi's self-immolation – in Tunisia in December 2010 arising from unemployment which later started the popular uprising in the Arab world termed “the Arab spring”, confirms the position of this paper that there is a nexus between poverty and human security.

In recent time, the rising cost of living is being felt across the continent. In Nigeria, fuel prices have soared; in South Africa, foodstuff keeps getting more expensive; Kenyans face the highest cost of living in years. This stark reality makes budgetary more necessary than ever, this is based on a detailed analysis by The Conversation (October 2023). It is axiomatic to state that the level of poverty and its attendant challenges in contemporary Nigeria is not only mind-boggling but gradually constitutes security challenge. The return to democracy in 1999 as against military rule practiced for over twenty nine years till date has not translated into a drastic change in the lives of majority of the masses. The democratic experience has been tortuous, especially in recent years with the level of endemic poverty. Years of neglect and inability to pay

attention to the plight of Nigerians by leaders have forced some to resort to criminal activities, this is gradually consuming the nation and seems insurmountable. While efforts have been made by previous administrations or governments, the results in the lives of the masses have been minimal. Nigeria has a burgeoning population which is a blessing, conversely, this is a challenge because the rate of security challenges keeps increasing coupled with the current incidences of poverty. Home to over two-hundred (200) million people, Nigeria is the most populous country on the African continent and the seventh largest in the world. The United Nations forecasts that the population will double by 2050, making the third largest country in the world (National Bureau of Statistics 2022). It is against this background that the paper examined the effects of poverty on human security in Nigeria which is quite alarming.

Statement of the Problem

Researches have been carried out on the problems plaguing Nigeria in recent time, especially since the return to democratic rule in 1999. The most recent challenge is that of insecurity, however, scholars have paid less attention to the cause of insecurity, largely being poverty and years of neglect of the masses. The current security challenges gets worse by the day and seemed to have defied strategies and tactics adopted by security apparatuses. The current state of poverty is one of the precursors to insecurity, which inevitably is the basis for displacement and migration. The crux of the matter is that concrete steps were not taken over the years to improve the standard of living of Nigerians. This study is tailored towards an appraisal of the current situation after sixty-three (63) years of independence and twenty-four (24) years of uninterrupted democratic rule in a nation-state regarded as the Giant of Africa.

Conceptual and Contextual Issues

It is pertinent to explore the relevant concepts which underpin this study. This is with a view to clearly establish their relationship to the current exposition, they are as discussed below:

Poverty

Poverty as a concept has been defined in various ways due to its multi-dimensional nature. Generally speaking, poverty simply means a state of being poor. In such a state, the means of achieving minimum subsistence for health, education and comfort are absent. The World Bank describes poverty in terms of material deprivation, low level of education and health, exposure to vulnerability and risk, 'voicelessness' and 'powerlessness' (Chioma 2010, p. 46). Corroborating on the World Bank's perspective concerning poverty is the United Nations statement in 1998. It stated that:

“Poverty is a denial of choices and opportunities, a violation of human dignity. It means lack of basic capacity to participate effectively in the society. It means not having enough to feed and clothe family, not having a school or clinic to go to; not having the land on which to grow one's food or a job to earn one's living,

not having access to credit. It means insecurity, powerlessness and exclusion of individuals, households and communities. It means sub-captivity to violence, and it often implies living on marginal or fragile environments, without access to clean water or sanitation” (Chioma 2010, p. 46).

From the above, the definition given by the United Nations is more comprehensive and encompasses virtually all the dimensions as it relates to the manifestation of poverty. This statement by the United Nations on poverty widens the horizon of poverty beyond mere basic needs such as food, water, shelter and clothing to incorporating access to other assets such as education basic healthcare, credit, participation in political process, security, sanitation and so on. This actually unveiled that poverty is not just limited to how much we have as our possession, but how we can meaningfully live in an environment where human dignity is recognized and prioritized so that one can exercise and attain his or her God given potentials to the fullest. Many of Nigeria’s negative human development ratings are due more to the large population who live on extremely low incomes. Nigeria’s poor developmental indices (of inequality in wealth and welfare) accurately describe the lot of about 45 percent of its 211.4 million population who live on less than N38,173 income per month. In 2019, the poverty line was N137,430 per annum, this suggested that the country had over ninety-five (95) million persons living on less than N11,450 per month in 2022 (Dataphyte Research 2022). Peter (2008, p. 92) opined that poverty is undoubtedly the most significant of a wide range of threats to life. Poverty kills directly in huge numbers when people are unable to secure sufficient food to live because they lack the economic means to purchase or produce it. Poverty is also an underlying cause of human death by other security threats. Satisfying the ‘basic material needs of humankind’ is not solely an economic task but it is, without doubt, achieved principally by the possession of money, both personally and societally. Basically, self-sufficiency in food production, either for individuals or states, is an increasingly difficult means of achieving security. Poverty is a persistent fact in Nigeria in recent years, however, its continued prevalence is not treated with the urgent attention it deserves. Far more people are poor and die from starvation while others are malnourished. Nigeria is not a poor country; it is Nigerians who are poor and the level of poverty continue to increase in recent years, deepening the economic woes of the people.

Poverty has forced many to become vulnerable as beggars, thus, constituting nuisance and security risks to the society. In the North, begging is now a public activity as both adults and children who should have been engaged productively and catered for take to such act. Unfortunately, some parents have taken advantage of their situation to use their children as excuse in order to survive. It is obvious that the Almajiri system is being abused by the parents and some Malams. In essence, the prevalence of this system demands a drastic approach because some of these children are minors who should rather be properly taken care of. The phenomenon of street children is still on the

increase and culturally entrenched in Africa. Major urban cities across Africa (Johannesburg, Kinshasha, Nairobi, Bamako, among others) normally record street children. Most striking is that they are more pronounced in Nigeria. Different postulations have arisen to justify this emerging security threat which is not being given the necessary attention it deserves currently. The social exclusion dimension believe that African states, Nigeria in particular is characterized by extreme poverty, poverty causes malnutrition and poor health and reduces a family's ability to work, thus, creating conditions for children to move and occupy the streets (Yusuf 2022, pp. 68-73). The wider picture is being prone to crime and the surge in their criminal activities. At this point where the security threat is alarming, it is beyond chasing beggars generally out of the streets as sometimes witnessed in Nigeria, it entails providing comprehensive policies targeted at getting them out of the streets. More so, they are like other Nigerians trying to eke out a living and need to know that their condition could have far reaching effects and become detrimental to security. On the other hand, Chimere and Hyacinth (2021, p. 1) after studying terrorism in twenty-six (26) African countries stressed that poverty is not the sole determinant of terrorism as earlier discussed.

In recent years, continuous infrastructural decay has become the norm in the society. While it is a fact that the country is blessed with an array of human and natural resources, it has not spurred us to our desired end. The prospects and expectations of the people have been dashed, while policies, programs and its implementation have not stimulated concrete growth and development (Esamagu, Choji and Yusuf 2021, pp. 188, 192). The poverty index is alarming by the day and unfortunately leadership has fallen into the hands of a group of political class without viable ideas to transform the society. Most leaders at different levels are bereft of vision, adopt quick fix policies, lack accountability, display greed and corruption, thus, widening the gap and increasing the level of servitude. Poverty encompasses different dimensions of deprivations and manifests in diverse ways in the country. Poverty in present day Nigeria is associated with lack of dignity, low status, lack of security, and general hopelessness which pushes the agile population to embark on dangerous adventure. Associated with the latter are issues of poor housing or shelter, hunger, and insecurity. Poverty in Nigeria is believed to be leadership perpetuated and sustained while policies of different administrations in recent years have not really been favorable (Amin and Christiana 2016, pp. 97, 100, 102). In a country where poverty is evident, the Federal House of Representatives also known as the lower legislative house has budgeted one hundred and thirty million each to buy car for its three hundred and sixty members which is to gulp billions whereas Nigerians, that is the masses are going through difficult times especially with the removal of fuel subsidy, insecurity has also been heightened. In order to downplay the issue, the spokesperson for the House, Akin Rotimi denied that each of the vehicles would cost two hundred million. The explanation that the vehicles are not gifts to members, but operational vehicles that will remain the property of the National Assembly is far from the truth (Bakare, October 16, 2023). These same set of people

are paid humongous amount running into millions on a monthly basis with all manner of allowances. It is uninspiring to see how the actions of those occupying positions of authority, not just the legislative arm of government indirectly encourage the level of crime in our society.

Adamaagashi et al (2023, p. 60) referenced the National Bureau of Statistics in 2019 whose report put Nigeria's poverty rate at a staggering 40 percent, which suggested that almost half of the country's population lived below the poverty line. While the cost of standard of living keeps increasing, there are no viable Social Investment Programs (SIP), Graduate Enterprise and Empowerment Program (GEEP) to empower the people, neither is there an increase in Minimum wage in the country. Abubakar et al (2023, p. 278) were unequivocal in their assertion that with poverty being pervasive in Nigeria, there were several poverty alleviation programs to address the problem. Some of the programs such as the National Poverty Alleviation Program (NAPEP), Fadama II, National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), Community and Social Development Project (CSDP), Local Empowerment and Environmental Management Project (LEEMP) were indigenous initiatives, while others like the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were global initiatives. While some of these programs yielded the desired results, others did not. The ongoing Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which targets elimination of obstacles to development in third world countries is to elapse in less than a decade. The SDG (goal 1) involve making sustained efforts towards stemming the tide of poverty. Soft loans were provided in some case which enabled the indigent poor to start small scale businesses. Criminality seems to persist because with the depth of poverty which seems to be taking its toll on many Nigerians, politicians have remained adamant with regards to cutting the cost of governance. The democratic experience is only providing an avenue for office holders to enrich themselves at the expense of the masses whose status quo have not changed. Gradually, the middle class stratum is phasing out of the country which was a bridged the gap between the rich and the poor. Government officials move about with convoys which strain our national coffers as well as employ retinue of associates as personal assistants (PAs), special advisers (SAs), senior special advisers (SSAs) etc., just to create unnecessary portfolios for people to amass wealth. While the security situation seemed not to have improved in recent years, especially since 2009 when the Boko-Haram ideology became pronounced, subsequently banditry, thus, hampering safety, the focus of leaders have shifted to themselves rather than the people who elected them to occupy the various offices. Recently, the legislators at the federal level were interested in approving seventy billion for themselves, quite an insignificant number of people, whereas, many Nigerians barely eat two square meals. The internally displaced camps are littered with people who were forced out of their homes and communities. These displaced persons have no hope of returning to continue with their normal lives. With the persistence of poverty, it is important to examine the relationship between government expenditure from 2000 to 2022 and attempts at poverty reduction in Nigeria which has not yielded the desired result. Government policies and programs

on poverty alleviation have not been people-driven, which have made it ineffective. Poverty reduction strategies in clear terms have been merely technical responses inconsistent with internationally acclaimed standard known for poverty reduction. Most importantly, Third World countries like Nigeria must emphasize political reforms and home grown strategies to deal with this challenge. The increase in the level of poverty calls for concern because we keep hearing of the phrase “multi-dimensionally poor” within the context of Nigeria. The Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is the dependent variable, while the expenditure by government on areas like education, health, and infrastructure are the independent variables. Thus, sustained, improved and proactive investments in capital projects and infrastructural development might just be the solution to poverty reduction (Dii 2022, p. 100; Ogochukwu 2022, pp. 168, 174-175). Poverty has continued to fester alongside forced movement to the global south because stakeholders, including the civil society have not been carried along in strategies adopted to stem it, in essence, unlike what is obtainable in developed climes, there is a gap in terms of cooperation and partnership. The challenge of poverty demands evolving short, medium and long term strategies, otherwise, the situation would not change as poverty is associated with underdevelopment in its entirety. Whereas, developed countries invest heavily in capital projects which has been instrumental in reducing poverty, this is not the case in Nigeria and the so called investments over the years have not been visible. The recent exodus of companies like GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), Procter and Gamble not only made millions to lose their jobs, it worsened our poverty index, even though Nigeria is already being perceived as the world’s poverty capital (Sahara Reporters, August 5, 2023; Punch 2023, June 19). Abject poverty and non-availability of amenities continue to fuel discontent and social unrest in many communities in Nigeria. Zekeri and Patience (2018, p. 40) averred that though Nigeria is among the fastest growing economies in the world, however, available records have it that 69 percent experience various degree of poverty as a result of corruption which is fuelling the migration out of the country. This paper will adopt the statement of the University Nations in 1998 in order to underscore the implications of poverty on the advancement of human security.

Human Security

The notion of human security can be traced back to the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 with the view expressed by the then US Secretary of state Edward R. Stettinus, Jr., who submitted that;

“The battle for peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security from where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace. No provision that can be

written into the charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs” (Todd).

It is obvious that two ideas are prominent from Edward’s expression. That is freedom from fear and freedom from want. These two in actual sense express the totality of the dimensions of what constitute human security. In fact, it is all encompassing, covering all areas of human existence. It also implies that security and peace can only be experienced when both military and non-military threats are non-existence in a society. Therefore, security in essence is a twofold element and when one is not visible, it affects the other. The two ideas, which are Freedom from fear and Freedom from want must be jointly promoted in order to have any form of meaningful security.

Human security as a concept was popularized in 1994 when the United Nations, sought to highlight new concerns about global security and the importance of addressing chronic threats to human life. The report criticized narrow concepts of human security that focus on state security and emphasized security as regards to protection from threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, and environment hazards. It advocated that people who make up the state should be given the latitude to define their own security. Practically, all the definitions of human security provided by scholars, agreed that the person is the referent of human security. Of all the definitions, the one crafted by the United Nations provided a comprehensive and reliable dimension to this discussion. In his report, Road Map towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration dated 6th September, 2001, the then Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that:

“Human security is not limited to the absence of armed violence and wars, but should include human rights, good governance, access to education, health care and equal opportunity for each person to achieve his/her aspirations. Each of these is also a step to reduce poverty, to achieve development, and to reduce conflicts. Freedom from want, Freedom from fear, the right of future generations to inherit a clean interrelated elements constitute together human security” (Kofi 2006, p. 17).

From the above, it is apparent that the absence of armed violence and wars should not be mistaken to mean the presence of human security. Annan’s view also confirmed that absence or reduction in poverty is one of the ways by which human security can gain currency in any society. Therefore, freedom from want must be given priority, likewise, the freedom from fear. It also presented a dimension of human security that is beyond the present, incorporating the future generation which other scholars unwittingly left out. ‘Collective violence’ subsumes wars and all ‘organized’ killings including non-state violence (e.g. terrorism) and gang crime. Globalization allied to increase state arms surpluses since the end of the Cold War, this has also contributed to disaffected non-state groups finding it easier to avail themselves of weapons with the proceeds of their fundraising activities (Peter 2008, pp. 17, 75).

Dimension of Human Security

In order to vividly capture the dimension of human security, report of the United Nations Development Program of 1994 cited seven key dimensions which provide the broadest range of human security. These are:

- Freedom from extreme poverty (i.e. economic security)
- Freedom from hunger or secure access to food;
- Health security: access to prevention and treatment of infectious diseases.
- Environmental security or protection from pollution and the depletion of non-renewable resources.
- Freedom from fear for persons such as protection of one's physical safety.
- Freedom from fear for communities such as protection of traditional cultures and vulnerable groups.
- Political security; which is freedom from repression and the ability to enjoy civil and political freedoms and other human rights.

Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, the security situation has assumed a frightening dimension. Crime and criminality has become greater with the security agencies unable to curtail the excesses of miscreants. Quite unfortunate is the axiom that security agents are not in possession of sophisticated weapons to counter the threat and activities of these criminal elements. At different times, security agents have absconded due to complaints of insufficient weapons and they must be alive to protect the citizens. Ordinary people as well as state institutions have been threatened. Farmers-herders clashes, Boko-Haram phenomenon in the North-east, banditry in the North-west, kidnapping for ransom, among others have become disasters of unimaginable proportion and the people seem to get used to these occurrences (Boris and David, 2023, p. 38). Boko-Haram has become a disaster of unimaginable proportion which has affected lives, retarded socio-economic and political development of the country, especially in the north eastern region. Linus (2015, p. 5) stated that Nigerians are surprised that so-called Africa's best army has been unable to wipe out completely the activities of this nihilist group. His work quickly noted that military approach must be backed by a political solution, which will address the challenges of poverty. The country is going through a phase in her national life, which threatens the existence of her citizenry. Never in the history of Nigeria have we ever had it so difficult like the current episode. Most recently, certain groups have decided to unleash terror on citizens especially in the North Western and central part of Nigeria. Terror, terrorism (means of acquiring money through terrorism) and armed banditry have had dire consequences on national security (Esamagu et al). On the other hand, violent conflicts have continued to reoccur without proactive and sustained efforts to stem its tide. From the above, it is obvious that poverty constitutes one of the threats to human security and as such where poverty is prevalent, it implies that human insecurity is the order of the day.

The democratic space has been bedeviled with security challenges since the outset of civil rule in 1999. It is important to note that insecurity constitutes both national and international challenge and this has intensified in recent years. There have been incessant incursions of terrorism, unabated smuggling of contraband goods and illicit weapons, armed banditry and the recent herdsmen killings. These have had dire consequences on national security. Others include armed robbery, sea piracy, kidnapping and hostage taking, ethnic religious and electoral violence as well as Niger Delta crisis. This security issues are tied to food, health, education, environment, among others (Kamil 2019, pp. 43-44). Near anarchy is noticeable in certain communities as different communities struggle for available lands and some live in perpetual fear and uncertainty, which have forced people to abandon their communities and migrate to other secure places. While the rate of bomb explosions have drastically reduced as evident in the past, the scourge of banditry have continued to increase, coupled with the staggering poverty and unemployment levels. At different times, security agents have been mentioned to have been killed. In essence, the signs are glaring that if something is not done urgently, the country might be drifting towards a failed state where a single government cannot be said to be in effective control within its borders. There is already the preponderance of insurgency or lawlessness by marauders, bandits, kidnappers who execute their activities with reckless abandon. This has forced people to flee their communities as reported in Borno state in Nigeria where insurgency is responsible for migration towards Chad Republic and Cameroon. Farmers in some communities in North-Eastern and North-Western Nigeria pay taxes to bandits or seek permission from them to cultivate their farms. Doing otherwise leads to attracting the anger of these terrorist groups which in return leads to food insecurity. Others have been forced to vacate their communities as they have been taken over by these terror groups. Insecurity as witnessed in present day Nigeria slows down development on all fronts. Undoubtedly, national development requires the devotion of considerable resources to manpower development and execution of capital projects. Aside the amount of resources required towards the restoration of peace, no serious production or activity could be undertaken by individuals or groups in any security situation, more so, if such a situation is prolonged and widespread (Bukar 2015, p. 29).

Arms proliferation has become a booming business for some who after profiting from perpetrating criminal activities purchase more weapons. Present day Nigerian society is such that some homes, communities, are stocked with dangerous weapons. Overtime, some have been advised to surrender theirs while others have been adamant. The fact remain that weapons have gotten into the hands of the wrong people in the society, thus, making it unsafe. It is difficult to understand how some of the terrorists like Boko-Haram, bandits, kidnappers, who sometimes after receiving huge amounts as ransom still kill their victims. The security situation is

so poor that the lines and hideouts of these terrorists cannot be traced, thus, giving fillip to their persistence in these dastardly acts. John (2021, p. 201) in a detailed study was of the opinion that the presence of Small Arms and Light Weapons is a major obstacle to peace, security and sustainable development. Economic regression, failure of states to deliver the basic necessities to its citizenry, ethno-religious segmentation, rising rates of unemployment and corruption are some of the major internal factors stifling efforts at combating insecurity in Nigeria. The fragility of the Nigerian state is seen in her inability to exert total dominion over its territory (Olaniyan 2023, p. 28), making non-state actors to unleash terror on the people with forced displacement and migration being the result. This brings to the fore synergy between security agencies as always being canvassed, inter-agency cooperation on intelligence and information gathering and sharing.

Factors Contributing To Poverty and Its Implication on Human Security

Unemployment

There is a nexus between poverty, unemployment and inequality. Unemployment usually aggravates inequality which inevitably is one of the major factors leading to poverty in Nigeria. When people are unemployed, their source of livelihood becomes a problem. In 2007, the formal unemployment rate in Nigeria was estimated to be 4.7 percent and ranked 61st across the world's countries (World Bank 2007). In 2023, Nigeria's unemployment rate plunges to 4.1 percent (Cynthia, Business Day 2023). This level of unemployment in the country has the capacity to induce poverty which in turn increases the rate of crime and violence in the country. Has the government evolved concrete initiatives at job creation, especially with the unabated increase in the number of unemployed in Nigeria? Most unemployed youths resort to crime such as armed-robbery, kidnapping for ransom and other social ills like terrorism, prostitution and so on. All these activities are inimical to human security. Even with the belief that infrastructure will snowball in poverty reduction, employment and income generation as well as facilitate heavy investments in developing countries, specifically Nigeria, poverty reduction and employment generation has become a mirage. Annual budgetary allocations for capital expenditure in Nigeria where over 70% of the total budget is channeled to recurrent expenditure which normally should have direct bearing on the masses have not resulted in any deliberate change in the status of these set of people. Insecurity has been worsened because employment opportunities for those who fall within the working population known as the labor force are grossly inadequate or not available. While it is not the duty of government to create employment for everyone who desire to work, it is the responsibility of government to provide enabling environment for businesses to thrive. This has not always been the case as more Nigerians daily become paupers and destitute. Unemployment is also associated with bad leadership, inequitable distribution of resources and debilitating social and physical amenities. Billions have been spent on many pet projects by wives of Nigerian leaders

to supposedly alleviate the plight of the poor without any commensurate difference or change in their statuses (Amin and Christiana 2016, pp. 101-102). Another analysis by Onwunali, Osai and Amadi (2023, p. 29) revealed that international migration differ from individual to individual, from community to community and unemployment is one of the causes of international migration. Chimere and Hyacinth (2021, p. 1) asserted that unemployment, economic growth issues and political instability are determining factors to terrorism which is a security challenge, beyond poverty. It is sine qua non that they made a case for unemployment reduction.

The ventilation of pent up anger by various young groups in the country seems to have aggravated the insecurity situation far beyond the capability and capacity of the Nigerian security forces. The situation has been worsened with deep rooted unemployment problem which analysts have considered to be threat to security if not checked. Femi (2013, p. 130) submitted that with over 70 percent of the Nigerian youths either unemployed or underemployed, it is easy for the elite to recruit these frustrated youths to fight their political, economic interests/battles without weighing what could be the aftermath of their decisions. Admittedly, the massive unemployed people in some parts of the country have been used at different times to perpetrate political, ethnic, economic, religious, electoral crises which have almost consumed the nation.

The unemployment rate is massive such that it seems that the government lacks viable ideas to reduce it. We have heard so much about the 70s and early 80s when jobs were readily available for graduates to choose from (Igwe 2010, p. 98). This excludes certificate holders who cannot further their education, graduates emerging from regular program, part time, distant education and sandwich programs from the country's universities, polytechnics and colleges of education stand at over 200,000 annually (Igwe 2010, p. 98). One would then expect that this could lead to new perspectives and dimension in crime, as gradates and unemployed have advanced poverty as the reason for many social misdemeanors and high-crime rate. We are inundated with the news of billions of dollars accrued from the sale of crude oil and export of other minerals, we only hear most times of these figures without its effects on the people.

The most unfortunate aspect is that some industries like the Ajaokuta, Katsina steel rolling companies which employed people in the past have become moribund, yet there are no concrete steps to revive them. To add to the latter problem is the rate of business divestment, capital flight and exit of foreign industries and companies, like GlaxoSmithKline, a British pharmaceutical company after fifty-one (51) years recently due to unfavorable economic policies. The sudden rise in the price of petrol and abolition of the official Naira rate in 2023 further affected GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) involved in manufacturing, Procter and Gamble whereas Nigeria is expected to be a hub for doing business and investment in Africa, thus, forcing people out of employment (Dike, This Day Live; Sahara Reporters, August 5, 2023; Gloria, August

11, 2023). Millions lost their jobs, this has increase the propensity to adopt strategies to survive and in the process, some might have been lured into criminal activities. The government has not been able to initiate tangible projects and could not prevent the exodus of these companies whose contributions to reduction of unemployment has been immense. The persistence of large scale unemployment presupposes poverty and invariably crime, if not tackled. Last year, being 2022, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) initiated the redesign policy of the Nigerian currency, though the policy sought to reduce the circulation of cash, increase the adoption of e-naira and prevent access to cash by bandits, it succeeded in destroying small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

Inequality

Inequality implies the concentration of a country's wealth in the hands of few at the expense of many. The level of unemployment is a negative phenomenon which widens the existing gap between the rich and the poor, thus, making the rich, richer and the poor, poorer and destitute. Recent research in Nigeria indicated declining income inequality. In contrast, anecdotal evidence suggests that only the upper class had benefitted from economic growth over the years. There is a significant disparity across the Northern and Southern regions and this can be corroborated with the estimates of poverty, with the level of backwardness and poverty known to be more severe. A study carried out by John and Ruth (2023, p. 1) suggested that welfare for those at the lower end of the distribution has decreased over the years which is consistent with the current sentiment of declining living standards in Nigeria for many households. Chioma (2010, p. 51) reinforced Oyekale and Adeoti's assertion in her statement that inequality means a concentration of a distribution, whether one is considering income, consumption or some other welfare indications. It is glaring that the income inequality between the people in the rural and urban areas in Nigeria is remarkably high. This makes the rural dwellers more vulnerable to poverty and this in itself leads to some social and economic problems. The tendency for many rural dwellers to move to the urban areas is becoming very common i.e. rural-urban drifts. Consequently, the urban centers become saturated and overcrowded thereby serving as a breeding ground for social vices to grow. Health security elements begin to manifest and these have the capacity to endanger human security in Nigeria.

In recent time, the rate of rural-urban migration is alarming because of years of neglect of that level of government. Lending credence to the issue of disparity in the urban and rural areas, reports showed that urban areas in Nigeria offer more social amenities, greater economic possibilities and income than the rural areas, and in turn, better health, education, and survival outcomes (Dataphyte Research 2022). More so, individuals, government, corporate organizations and the government at the local government, i.e grass root have not been strategic in siting projects that will be of benefit to the people at that level. Most local governments have deliberately been made non-functional and workers are paid in percentage compared to the state and federal government workers.

Security at that level is also poor because of the large concentration of security apparatus at the federal and state levels. The people are now susceptible to different forms of attacks from marauders, herdsmen, bandits and criminals of all categories. Not only do the survivors migrate to the cities considered as somehow safe, they stretch the existing facilities and the security architecture at that level. Adamaagashi et al (2023, p. 65) study reinforced the aforementioned in their analysis where they were specific that exponential population growth in Nigeria not only puts a strain on our natural resources but expands the demands for food, water, energy, and other essential resources. Criminal elements now join the fray for these resources, thus, compelling the vulnerable population to scout for whatever is available or migrate. In some situations, state governments have been compelled to set up internally displaced camps (IDPs) in states like Benue, Borno, Plateau, among others. Inequality in terms of opportunities created by the government is gradually overtly or covertly resulting in migration to greener pasture abroad through whatever means possible, without considering the security implications.

Corruption

According to Transparency International, corruption is “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International). Corruption has caused much havoc in Nigeria. The funds allocated for the people’s welfare many times are mismanaged or channeled for private use. Thus, it is believed by many in the society that corruption is the bane of Nigeria. It cuts across faiths, religions, denominations, ethnic groups, formal and informal sectors. It has contributed immensely to the poverty rate of a large segment of the Nigeria population. Instances abound where money earmarked for the provision of clean drinking water, good roads, education, health care centers and so on are misappropriated and diverted into personal pockets at the expense of people’s welfare. The implication of this is that people are obviously left under a deplorable and despondent situation which negates the idea or tenet of human security. One key factor festering insecurity is the level of corruption in the country, a cankerworm which has eaten deep into the fabrics of the society, with corruption being altitudinal and attitudinal. Nigeria was mentioned among other countries like Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ivory Coast, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo as the most corrupt ten countries in the world in 2005. Unfortunately, previous and successive leaders have not helped matters with their propensity to amass wealth. Kleptocratic, patrimonial leaders even in recent years, not only give the country a bad image, but create poverty and despair, while they incite civil wars and ethnic conflicts. What is witnessed in recent years are leaders who focus on power for their good and not for the well-being of the masses, they are indifferent to the plights of Nigerians who in most cases queue and vote for them (Rotberg and Arthur 2007, pp. 348, 350). Corruption is universally declaimed and constitutes a phenomenon in itself and is invariably the output of a conglomeration of discrete failures; a failure of institutional controls over bureaucrats or a failure of the legal system that checkmates the behavior of those who perpetrate

the crime (Igwe 2010, p. 89). This cankerworm which has eaten deep into the fabrics of the society includes fraud (theft through representation), embezzlement (misappropriation of corporate or public funds) to bribery (payments made in order to gain an advantage or to avoid a disadvantage), etc. The endemic corruption has become an integral and essential aspect of our economic, social and political system, such that we do not envisage its resultant implications on the country's development, particularly the masses. Nigeria was at the bottom of Transparency International's most corrupt nations in 2007, ranking 148 and 120 in 2008 out of the 180 world nations. Recent rankings have not portrayed the country in a positive light, considering the retardation of economic development (Sonni 2008, p. 18). The anti-corruption strategies of the government have been less effective.

The establishment of Independent Corrupt Practices And (Other Related Offences) Commission (ICPC) Act, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act, and Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004 have only recorded minimal successes. In some situations, the heads of these anti-graft agencies have been accused of corrupt and shady dealings which call to question the legitimacy of these agencies to effectively combat financial and illicit crimes. It is important to state that we do not lack institutions then, but indirectly promoting crime and insecurity because these anti-corruptions lack enforcement. People sometimes feel that if they cannot be involved in public corruption, involvement in criminal activities like kidnapping, terrorism, among others might just be the way out. Corruption has also damaged economic development and reforms and by extension, inhibits the growth of democratic institutions. It has been a fertile ground and an environment for corrupt practices to thrive at the expense of national socio-economic, cultural and political development. Nigerians who venture into criminality use the lack of government accountability, transparency, service delivery by public office holders and the entrenched corruption in all facets of national life as a ploy.

Non-Diversification of the Economy

The mainstay of the Nigerian economy before the 1970s was the agricultural sector. The oil sector only constituted 1 percent of the country's export revenue in 1958 and has since then not gone below 90 percent (Ucha 2010, p. 52). In 2008, the oil and gas sector constituted about 97.5 percent of the export revenues (Ucha 2010, p. 52). Consequently, those in power obviously neglected the agricultural sector because of the 'lucrative' oil sector thereby placing Nigeria in a sort state of over-dependency on oil at the expense of agriculture. This shows that with the exception of the few working in the oil sector, the majority of the people have been impoverished as their product (i.e. agricultural products) has become less relevant. The agricultural sector, which was their main source of income before the discovery of oil, is considered almost useless. Beyond over-dependency on oil, is the issue of 'resource curse' which is obviously reflected in the Niger Delta crisis. Corroborating the aforementioned view is that of

Collier. Collier succinctly submitted that resource wealth sometimes contributes to a conflict trap and the surplus from natural resources exports reduces growth (Collier 2007, p. 50). He explained how dependency on oil can damage the growth process by closing out on exports in other promising sectors of the economy.

The Nigerian economy periodically experiences downturn movement as a result of the fall in oil prices in the international market. Nigeria's crude oil has been declining since 2012. In August 2022, it fell below 1 million barrels a day, the lowest since the 1990s as well as lost its position as the biggest oil producer on the continent, falling to third place after Angola and Libya (The Conversation, September 2022). Vandalism of oil pipelines also has a way of reducing government revenue, even with the calls from different quarters for better law enforcement against this menace. In essence, insecurity of assets and life with declining capacity for technical and market production are responsible for Nigeria's low crude oil production. This causes untold hardship on the people because the government during these periods finds it difficult paying workers under the government's establishments their salaries as well as providing comprehensive welfare to her citizens. The discovery of crude oil in 1956 which has served as our major export till date has become our doom such that whenever there is a drop or a fluctuation in the price of the product in the international market, Nigeria is seriously affected. The country's annual budget revolves round the sale of crude oil. Our focus mostly on revenue accrued from oil export is an issue which must be dealt with if the country intends to accommodate the growing population, especially young people who must be engaged to avoid crime.

Poor Education System

Education can play a major role in reducing poverty. In Nigeria, the population with no education account for most of the poor. The United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) stated that "everyone has the right to education." From all indications, this right to education has been denied and become inaccessible by Nigerians in their large number, as a result, they are placed at a disadvantaged position in the society. The higher the educational attainment level, the lower the incidence of poverty, because people can easily distinguish themselves and put their knowledge to use. Research has shown that the incidence of poverty of those with only primary education in 2004 were estimated to be 48.7% and those without education were about 68.7% while those with post-secondary education were 26.3% (NBS 2005). The implication of the above is that education has the potency for reduction of poverty in a country. In a case where the educational system is poor, it implies that poverty will prevail and this is the case in Nigeria where the poor educational system has continued to be a breeding ground for poverty to strive at the expense of prosperity. In the Northern axis of the country, education continues to suffer with a large number of out of school children. The figures keeps increasing and is indeed staggering, thus, the Almajiri system has festered, whereby children are kept in the custody of a certain individual known as 'Mallam' who sends them out to fend for themselves and

sometimes return with something for him. These children not only constitute nuisance but security risks in the society. In moments of conflicts, and nefarious acts like ethno-religious conflicts/crises, banditry and Boko-Haram phenomenon which permeates especially the North, they are trained and used as messengers, informants, fighters to cause havoc in the society. Hence, insecurity has taken the center-stage undoubtedly, especially in the North ravaged by this menace. Specifically, during the administration of former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, i.e between 2010 and 2015, he made attempts to revamp the education sector and improve education in Nigeria. He decided to direct his attention towards the North which had begun experiencing the wave of insurgent activities by constructing schools for Almajiris. Retrospectively, successive administration, including state governments could not complement his efforts. As such, nothing has been heard of those lofty ideas and gigantic projects meant to partly change the fortune of education in the country. Unfortunately, less emphasis on girl child education in some parts of the country is also affecting the female gender. In some instances, they are married out in their teenage years while some are involved in social menace. Over the years, some have also served as informants to terrorists, especially the Boko-Haram group in the North-East and bandits in North-Western Nigeria.

Discussion/Conclusion

This paper has been able to x-ray the nexus between poverty and human security in present day Nigeria, just as unemployment, inequality, corruption, non-diversification of the economy, poor education system were considered as some of the key determinants of poverty and drivers of insecurity. Poverty and its attendant result of dire security threats currently threaten the survival of democracy in the Fourth Republic and the Nigerian populace in general. The failure of the government over the years to tackle years of sustained poverty is gradually stifling the progress that should have been recorded and by extension affects all steps being taken to put the nation on course. Insecurity in Nigeria, either overtly or covertly, especially in the Northern part of the country can be regarded as the most significant and immediate triggers for forced displacement and migration. Persistent attacks have compelled some people to flee to neighboring cities and countries. Other cities perceived as safe and secure have become populated, including Maiduguri, Makurdi, Jos, the federal capital city, being Abuja with internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps, among others. Even these camps are not safe as they could be havens for fleeing terrorists as well as breeding grounds for terrorists and social vices. More so, the sanitary situations in these camps are mostly unpleasant while there have been several complaints of sexual harassment, among other issues. Quite unfortunate is the fact that in this age of technological advancement where normally, detection and tracking criminals, terrorists and their hideouts should be without stress, these social misfits who have caused untold harm still operate with reckless abandon. Nigerian security apparatuses known for military prowess are unable to quell the activities of terrorists within her territory. Poverty and by implication, insecurity in the Nigeria scenario slows down development on all fronts. Insecurity is

also the precursor to migration of all sorts either within the country or out of the country, sometimes, through dangerous routes without taking into consideration the risks involved. People who advance the poverty level or security situation to migrate abroad make use of the common local language or coinage for massive movement abroad “Japa”, meaning to move abroad or to a hopeful homeland. The latter is a common local language, i.e pidgin, understood by many Nigerians. All these factors are correlated and must be tackled together to create a conducive environment for human security to thrive in Nigeria.

Policy Recommendations

Poverty in Nigeria is increasing at an alarming rate and needs to be tackled quickly. Failure to adhere to the former statement will continue to fuel the increase in crime and criminality as partly seen currently. The current effort of the federal and state governments seems minimal in light of the poverty rate in the country. Based on the foregoing, the following recommendations should be taken into consideration:

- The federal, states and local governments must make it a point of responsibility to embark on genuine and sincere programs to open up job opportunities for the teeming youths, establish schools with sound education to combat illiteracy and ignorance, provision of skill acquisition centers. The country needs a comprehensive blueprint to achieve resourceful economic management, ensure food security and reduce absolute poverty.
- The government must take serious the issue of building more industries, reviving moribund industries to cater for the teeming young unemployed population which poses serious challenge to security.
- Government at all levels and private sector support fund is necessary to enhance entrepreneurship considering the poverty rate which increases tendencies to crime and insecurity in the long run.
- One key factor critical for Nigeria’s accelerated growth is the need for economic diversification and also a genuine policy framework of zero-tolerance to corruption. In fairness to government, its previous efforts in the area of poverty alleviation programs, provision of access to basic education must be commended. However, these programs must be sincerely and genuinely carried out to the latter. When all these are put in place, it will go a long way in reducing poverty and at the same time create conducive environment for human security to thrive in Nigeria.
- The first duty of government as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria As Amended is the protection of lives and properties, this must be taken seriously by both the Federal, state and local governments.

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THE ROLE OF WARRIORS IN STATE BUIDING DURING THE PRE-COLONIAL BILAD AL-SUDAN: A REFLECTION OF SOME POLITICALWARRIORS OF SAYFAWA DYNASTY OF BORNO

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Abstract

There are many literatures written in relation to the history of Bilad Al-Sudan (Africa South of the Sahara), But most of the works have concentrated on the study of precolonial state formation, consolidation, socio-economic and political development. Those that emphasized on the role of warriors' and their contributions to the formation, protection and expansion of the state are very scanty or comprehensively not academically documented. However, the study of the role of precolonial warriors has become of paramount importance as their contributions were what really defined the existence of those empires and kingdoms. This paper specifically deals with the role of warrior's political leaders in Kanem-Borno empire. It is fundamental to note as buttressed in the paper, that almost all the precolonial political gladiators of this empire had been engaged in one war after the other considering the volatile nature of the period under discussion. Few examples of some political leaders among the Saifawa and El-kanemi dynasty has been discussed. Warriors like Hume Jilme (the founder of the Saifawa dynasty), Dunoma Diballeme, Idris Katakarmabe, Ali Ghaji, Idris Alooma and Muhammad Elkanemi to mention a few. The research also highlights on some major factors that facilitated the constant internal and external conflicts that bedeviled the empire for more 500 years. The study also revealed the relevance and importance of precolonial political warriors and the need for further research by historians of modern time in order to unveiled one of the most fascinating achievements of African political leaders in the historical contex.

Keywords: Warriors, Sayfawa Dynasty, Precolonial, Borno

Introduction

The Saifawa dynasty of Borno was known to had been the longest surviving dynasty in Africa South of the Sahara. To some historians, it was considered the longest in Africa with the exception of Solomonic Dynasty of Ethiopia.⁸⁹ The beginning of the empire since around 11th century which lasted between **1085-1893** had been faced with series of wars and battles to enable the royalty consolidate its authority in far eastern lake chad. Kanem, which is popularly known, traced its origin from Mai Hume Jilme, an Arabian adventurer who was said to have founded the empire.⁹⁰ What is tentatively known is the consolidation of both first and later second Kanuri empire from the 8th century AD onward and lasted as the independent kingdom of **Bornu** (the **Bornu Empire**) a period of almost 1000yrs⁹¹

The Kanem Empire (c. 700–1380) can be found in the present day countries of Chad, Nigeria and Libya. During its political peak, it subsumed an area covering not only most of Chad but also parts of southern Libya (Fezzan) and eastern (Niger) northeastern Nigeria and northern (Cameroun).⁹² The Bornu Empire (1380s–1893) was a state in what is now northeastern Nigeria, in time becoming even larger than Kanem, incorporating areas that are today parts of Chad, Niger and Cameroon.

The early history of the empire is mainly known from the Royal Chronicle, or Girgam, discovered in 1851 by the German traveler Heinrich Bath. Remnant successor regimes of the empire, in form of Borno Emirate and Dikwa Emirate were established around 1900 and still exist today as traditional states within Nigeria.⁹³

This paper attempts to buttress the role of military warriors in the struggle of this empire to become politically consolidated and expanded at the time most of the states in western and central Sudan were in conflicts with each other in order to have greater influence in terms of political, economic, military and even cultural superiority. The fact that, almost all the political leaders of pre-colonial African were said to be warriors in attempt to effectively rule and protect their kingdoms from external forces or to expand the kingdom for more territorial domination, there were some leaders who were exceptional in terms of bravery and resistance to external forces of enemies. However, it is against that background this paper analysed some of these political military warriors whose period marked exceptional bravery during the reign in Sayfawa dynasty of Borno.

⁸⁹ This is the general impression of many African and even European scholars. Abdullahi Smith has mentioned it in his Chapter in a book edited by M.N. Alkali and Bala Usman titled: Studies in Precolonial Borno.

⁹⁰ Even though this historical assertion has been contested by many historians as just a mere Himitic hypothesis. But majority of Kanuri people agreed with this historical tradition probably to project the values of later period.

⁹¹ See Muhammad Nur Alkali: Origin, Growth and development of Sayfawa Dynasty of Borno PhD thesis ABU Zaria 1978.

⁹² Wikipedia.org/Kanem Borno empire

⁹³ ibid

Methodology

Because of the paucity in oral tradition or lack of accuracy in the research, the methodology applied was to a greater extent secondary source, these involved both published and unpublished materials particularly archival materials. Most of the written source could be found in the writings of Arab scholars who had spent sometimes in the state such as Wahb ibn Munabbih, Muhammad ibn Musa al-Kwarizimi, Ibn al-Nadim, Muhammad ibn Mani, Ibn Fartuwa, Al-Magili as well as the travels and discoveries of Heinrich Barth. The Gargam which is the royal compilation of the Sayfawa history has become a taboo to be consulted.⁹⁴ Other methodological sources materials include posters and photographs portraying the exceptional bravery of some of these warriors.

Emergence of Warriors in pre-colonial African Society.

African societies have evolved and developed state formation mostly under war and conquest.⁹⁵ There was no single society that had no standing army to protect, preserve and build the empire, kingdom or state. The traditional political system was to carry out an expedition and bring the smaller one under political control in order to have additional tributary state. The more expanded empire, the more resources to control. Thus, war and conquest had become inevitable. As such, the warrior class had played a vital role in the formation and consolidation of political and socio-economic status of their communities. In most precolonial African communities, the warriors organized raids, which culminated in amassing substantial wealth from the defeated communities. This was mostly in the form of cattle, slaves, and other materials beneficial to the society.

Pre-colonial Africa war, was fought due to many factors which include: territorial expansion, self-preservation, defense, protection against external aggressors, etc. War has been profoundly important in shaping Africa's past; it has been both the outcome and driver of broader political, social, and economic change.⁹⁶

It should be noted that, the rise, fall and expansion of most pre-colonial Africa kingdoms were credited to the role warriors and warfare. To preserve their communities, societies tried and developed warlords, unique military techniques and tactics like the Zulus, particularly during the inter-war periods. In fact, such Africa bravery had lasted up to the period of colonial conquest where most of them had given serious resistance to the Europeans for a very long period of time. It was only advanced technology that succeeded over them. The blacksmith was the fulcrum of pre-colonial war armory and strategy. The knowledge of iron metallurgy was the exclusive domain of the blacksmith. The knowledge of metallurgy made the blacksmith indispensable in actual execution of wars, hence he fashioned the weapon, went with the army

⁹⁴ This is the belief of the Kanuri royal family. Most of the information contained in the Gargam was secretly kept for centuries as it is believed something could happen to the history or probably for fear of misinterpretations of scholars.

⁹⁵ Heinrich Barth, *Travels and discoveries*

⁹⁶ G N Uzoigwe, *The warriors and state in precolonial Africa: A comparative study*. 1975.

to the battlefield to ensure adequate supply of weapons and repair of worn-out weapons for the reinforcement of the armies in the battleground.⁹⁷

However, a little example of such warlord or warriors in precolonial Africa include: Shaka of Zululand in southern Africa, Queen Amina of Zaria and Kanta Kotal, 'Yan Bindiga in Hausaland of Central Sudan, Jaja of Opobo in Southern Nigeria, Othman Ibn Danfodio in Hausaland, Umar Muktar in North Africa, Samoro ibn lafiya Touri in madinka empire, Idris Aloom in Borno, the Omukama of Bunyoro and the Kabaka of Buganda all in East Africa, etc all had demonstrated strong military power and bravery during their time of political power. As the One important historic value of warrior role in pre-colonial Africa was how political appointment was usually a reward for military performance. The African warriors were, therefore, from the examples we have seen, an indivisible element of the central government. But since they were also military leaders as well as administrators, they played crucial roles in territorial administration.⁹⁸

Sayfawa Dynasty and the role of military warriors in state formation

The warriors in Sayfawa dynasty of Borno, were a political animal, more so than the rank and file of the citizenry. They saw politics as a ladder to state power and thus they knew that the art of politics concerns how to acquire that power. That is why in the history of that empire, there were series of power crises in respect of acquiring power ever since the formation of the state.⁹⁹

Kanem Borno's expansion peaked was said to be around 13th century during the long and energetic period of Mai Dunoma Daballeme (1210–1259). Who entered diplomatic exchanges with the leaders of North Africa and that resulted in a serious political and religious relationship where he paved way for easier to go to pilgrimage in mecca by building madrasa of al-Rashid in Cairo. The era of Ali Ghaji or Gazi in the 15th century was also a clear demonstration of political warriors that led the empire of the Borno.¹⁰⁰ It is fascinating to note that among the warriors of include a Queen political leader called Aissa Koli Ngirmaramma (1497-1504) or (1563-1570) Even though the period of their reigns varied according to different interpretations or information provided by the scholars, the central issue of discussion is their military role which had contributed to the longevity and strength of the empire.¹⁰¹ One factor which made the Sayfawa to produced Military head of Political empire was the constant attacked from external and internal enemies that kept the political organization always on alert. So traditionally, Sayfawa spent greater span of her life in war and conquest. Some of the most serious battle and internal crises include the war with Rabeh Fadallah, war with Bulala people, attacks by the Tuaregs and Jukun and destruction of "MUNE THING" which according to Kanuri ulamas was the genesis behind their thirty years of political instability. Some of the leaders were appointed and overthrow either in few hours, week or months because of internal

⁹⁷ ibid

⁹⁸ ibid

⁹⁹ M N Alkali: Op cit

¹⁰⁰ Levtzion, Nehemia (1978). Fage, J.D. (ed.). The Sahara and the Sudan from the Arab conquest of the Maghrib to the rise of the Almoravids, in The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 2, from c. 500 BC to AD 1050. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 667, 680–683.

¹⁰¹ African historians presently use several conflicting chronologies for the history of Kanem–Bornu. Most of the dates provided by Barth, Palmer and Urvoy has varied according to their scholarly work.

political fracas. e.g Kadai Afuno 1399-1400 whose political life was less six months. Mai Sa'id ibn Idris 1398-1399 and Othman iii ibn Kaliwama 1432-1433.¹⁰²

Below are few among the warrior political leaders of Kanem-Borno empire

Mai Hume Jilme (1086–1097):¹⁰³ he was said to have been the founder of the Sayfawa dynasty. It believed the name of this great precolonial society was said to have been derived from his name. Even though the credit of founding the empire was credited to him by majority of Arabs and European writers, particularly scholars of Kanem Borno and other Sudanese state, but most of the modern African historians have rejected such historical assertion as a mere Hamitic Hypothesis. Which is referring to historical records that attributed most of the achievements of Africa to foreign heroes.¹⁰⁴ Such hypothesis was said to have narrated in the case of Bayajida in Hausaland, Oduduwa in Yorubaland, Zatul yamin in Songhai and of course several histories of precolonial Africa. But whatever dimension the role Saif B. Yasad may take, he was a great Arab warrior whose fame and Military exploits have become known throughout central Bilal-Al-Sudan. According Y. Mukhtar, *“despite the lack of strong authenticity in the tradition of origin of the Mais of Kanem from Saif, especially in view of the wide gap between the emergence*

¹⁰² Mune is a hidden thing which the Kanuri believe should not be destroyed. Such action was considered to be a taboo and thus its destruction was what brought calamity to the empire for a very long period of time.

¹⁴ Both Barth (1857), Palmer (1936) and Urvoy (1947) have agreed to the the period of Hume reign in Safewa Dynasty. See John Stewart's *African States and Rulers* (1989)

¹⁵ Most of the precolonial histories of Africa has been attributed to foreign heroes in order to project the values of later period as descendants of outside world lie Arabia or spiritual extension. This has been built ever since despite contradiction in the origin of traditions. For clear explanation one can read the analysis of Abdullahi Smith

of this Arab hero and that of the Saifawa had a strong unifying effect among Kanembu, who believe in it and had formed one of their basic identities as a people.”¹⁰⁵

Dunoma Dabbalemi: (1221-1259). It was during the era of this great warrior political leader Kanem Borno impact was felt in other parts of the world. He was a Political warrior whose era had made sefewa so powerful by carrying out territorial expansion and the rapid growth of the empire. He was a strong military leader with exceptional war techniques especially when he decided to appoint various governors in the far flung territories with military garrison to maintain the area. The appointment of Kaigama (Commander of the army) he was the one who fought the TUBU warriors for seven years, seven months and seven days consecutively, to some scholars in an attempt to gain control of the north up to Fezzan.¹⁰⁶ The war with Bulala tribe as well as Gayu had clearly indicated his warrior ship until his death in a place called Zantam few kilometers north-east of later Birnin Ngazargamu. His death marked the beginning of trouble as most of his successors couldn't maintain the vast territory from the enemies and internal warring royal faction.

Mai Ali Ghaji (C.1465-1497) out of the confusion of long internal crisis and the constant attacks by different enemies, emerged what is popularly known in history as “Man of the hour”, in person of Ali B. Dunoma. Surname Ghaji i.e. “the Young one”. The emergence of Ali coincided with the political crises within the royal dynasty and the periodic forays by the Bulala people by defeating them at Ladi and recaptured Njimi the old capital of the Kanem. He succeeded in destroying the rival Dawudid house and took over power himself after being a kingmaker for quite sometimes because of his warrior ship. One of the fundamental problem of Kanuris throughout the era of state building in far east lake chad was their inability to establish permanent base as political capital with strong consolidation of authority. However, the foundation of Ngarzargamu by Ali Ghaji in the 2nd half of the 15th century marked an important milestone in the history of the Sayfawa dynasty. According to Y. Mukhtar, the correlation between walled towns and military power and security by Ali, symbolizes the establishment of Ngazargamu.¹⁰⁷ To the Kanuris he is called in song: “*Ali who built the city.....Mai Ali.....he of the tall-walled towns and long spears...*”¹⁰⁸ Thus the era of Ali Ghaji was one of the turning point in the history of political warriors of Sayfawa dynasty.

Idris B. Ali: (1504-1526) popular known as Katakarmabi was also another warrior political leader of the Sayfawa dynasty. During his reign of twenty-two years as Mai, he was remembered for his military bravery and activities over a very wide area. His greatest victory was the defeat of the long nagging trouble of the Bulala tribe which enable him to re-enter Njimi the former capital of Sayfawa which was abandoned almost one hundred and twenty (122) years. Idris was reported to have died in the lower Gongola region, an area through which

¹⁰⁵ See Y Mukhtar work titled: State and state routes in Borno. PhD thesis University of London. College of oriental studies. 1992.

¹⁰⁶ This unique period of war was attributed to the destruction of the MUNE “thing” which according to imam Ahmad ibn Fartua in his Diwan, Dunoma was warned by some great people probably members of the royal lineage that he should not open the Mune.

¹⁰⁷ Y Mukhtar cited

¹⁰⁸ Imam Ahmad ibn Fartua in his Diwan translated into English from Kanuri by M N Alkali in his PhD thesis titled Origin, growth and development of Sayfawa Dynasty of Borno ABU 1978

the Kororofa had raided Borno in the days of his forefathers.¹⁰⁹ However his demise later made the trouble to re-appear with attacks and counter-attacks between Sayfawa and external enemies which led to victory and peace treaty but not a permanent solution to the crisis.

Aisa Koli: (1497 to 1504)¹¹⁰ known as Aisa Kili Ngirmaramma appearance in the lineages of Sayfawa political history clearly demonstrate the warrior's contributions in the political, economic and social development of precolonial Africa. That is to say women had also played a significant role in state building. She was a daughter of King Ali Gaji Zamani. According to Kanem History, Dunoma's reign came with a serious rivalry among the royal family members and thus he instructed all heir apparent to the throne of Mai should be eliminated. The little girl Aisa was smuggle by her mother together with brother to the Bulala people where she was trained as a military warrior. When Dunoma died she succeeded him in the absent of any Male heir. She ruled Kanem for seven years. Historical version had it she was the mother of great ruler of Borno mai Idris Alooma.¹¹¹ it was reported she used to dressed like a man to received education among her male counterparts and also go to battle where she led with warrior ship and defeated enemies and rivals several times.

Mai Idris Alooma: (C. 1538-1596) Idris Ali, who was posthumously named Idris Alooma,¹¹² was so far in the history of Borno the greatest mai (warrior ruler) A lot had been written on him by Ahmad ibn Fartuwa, the chief religious leader of Bornu, wrote elaborate accounts of his military campaigns.¹¹³ His extensive military expeditions and innovations was demonstrated in the writings of Henry Barth such as how he:

*“employed Turkish military advisers to train his gunmen so they fully utilise his newly acquire muskets. These Turks were likely mercenaries who migrated to Bornu in pursuit of renown and riches.”*¹¹⁴

Alooma was also said to have introduced the widespread establishment of *ribats*, fortified military posts, to uphold his authority and secure control across the entirety of Bornu. he was credited with introducing the use of camel cavalry in the Lake Chad region.

Alooma also introduced new policies that helped his military and wars into victories. Some of the difficult wars he fought include the war against Amsaka people which he started with the great Babur warrior Yamtatwala but ended around 15 with the second invasion where according to ibn fartua: *“On the last day of the Islamic month Sha'aban, which fell just before the start of Ramadan, specifically on 4 December 1575, Mai Idris led the siege of Amsaka and sacked it.*

¹⁰⁹ Palmer, Richmond. The Borno Sahara and Sudan. London: John Murry

¹¹⁰ There are some inconsistencies about the dates of her rule. Most of the Kanem Borno scholars did not record her rule probably because of the Islamic tenants that prohibited women from political leadership. In some records it was stated her period was between 1563-1570.

¹¹¹ Ghargham a kar mai-a Tarihi-a Aisa Kali Ngarmaram, 1947-OpenBU (The Historu, leadership and legacy of Aisa Kali Ngarmarm, 1497-1504.

¹¹² See <https://www.encyclopedia.com>, history, idris Alooma-al

¹¹³ Ibid

¹¹⁴ Heinrich Barth, Travels and discoveries in North and Central Africa.

He ordered the complete destruction of the town and the slaughter of all its inhabitants. According to Ibn Fartua, Mai Idris' army suffered only one casualty, a man named Ajima ibn Kalle, during the conquest. This victory in Amsaka elevated Aloom's reputation and standing. As a result, numerous settlements in the region sent representatives bearing gifts, signifying their submission to his rule and their agreement to pay a regular "poll-tax". Amsaka never regained its 'might' and is today a village with a small population."¹¹⁵

His armies had carried out a far-reaching campaign that covered a vast geographical area, from the Fezzan region in southern Libya to the Kavar region in northern Niger, the Kanem region in eastern Chad, the Mandara region in northern Cameroon, and even as far as Hausa land in northern Nigeria, reaching as distant as Kano. He embarked on a mission to restore Bornu's authority over the territories the empire had lost due to the bloody dynastic conflict it had suffered for a century.¹¹⁶ In other few words, Aloom's reign had shown he as the greatest of all Sayfawa dynasty warrior who had achieved substantial victories and modernized the city of 'Ngazargamu free from the constant attacked of the enemies. Many scholars had visited Borno during his time and had written many literatures on his military campaign and activity.

Muhammad Al-Amin Elkanemi: known as Shehu al-Hajj Muhammad al-Amîn ibn Muhammad al-Kânemî (1776–1837) he was said to have been the founder of El Kanemi dynasty, a kanembu scholar who changed the title of Borno political leadership from "Mai" to "Shehu" when he took over power in the early 19th century. His warrior ship was demonstrated blatantly when The Fulani jihadists, under Usman Dan Fodio's banner tried to conquer Borno, under Mai Ahmad, in 1808. They partly succeeded. They burnt the capital, Ngazargamu and defeated the main army of the *mai* of Borno. Ahmad called for the help of Al-Kanemi to repel his Fulani opponents.¹¹⁷

However twice the jihadists attacked and re-attacked and twice the Shehu el Kanemi drove them out of the Borno. S. Abubakar mentioned, he had been known for hostility to felata pretension in the Chad district..., a warrior scholar with large number of well-trained disciples with military training of Calvary warfare, (emphasis mine)...that might have been the factor why he was invited by the Mai to surmount the Fulani.¹¹⁸

RABIH AZ-ZUBAYR IBN FADL ALLAH OR RABIH FADLALLAH: Usually known as **Rabah** in French (c. 1842 – April 22, 1900), was one of the most remembered warlord in the history of Kanem Borno empire. Originally a slave but was trained as a soldier. He established a powerful empire east of Lake Chad, in today's Chad. In 1893, Rabih also turned his attentions to the Borno Empire of *Shehu* (king) Hashimi of Borno. Borno was a Sahelian Kingdom that

¹¹⁵ Ahmed ibn Fartua, *History of The First Twelve Years of the Reign of Mai Idris Aloom of Bornu (1571–1583)*

¹¹⁶ Gavin, R. J. (1979). "Some Perspectives on Nigerian History". *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*. 9 (4): 15–38. ISSN 0018-2540

¹¹⁷ Elizabeth Allo Isicher, *History of African Societies to 1870*. Cambridge University Press pp 318-320

¹¹⁸ See Lamibe of Fombina: A political history of Adamawa, 1809-1901 by S Abubakar ABU Press. 1977.

had existed for several centuries. That year, the empire consisted of 80,000 soldiers, mostly slaves commanded by slaves, and was in full decline.¹¹⁹

In 1892, Rabih on his mission to attacked Borno captured and imprisoned the sultan of Karnak Logone, who was said to have connived with *Shehu* Hashimi of Borno, who sent 15,000 men to confront Rabih; the latter routed them in May or September 1893 first at Am Hobbio (south of Dekoa) and then at Legaroua with only 2,000 horses.¹²⁰ Hashimi fled north of the Komadougou Yobe. He was assassinated and later his nephew Kyari, became *shehu* who continued to fight Rabih. Their clash at Gashegar, led to the defeat of Rabih. M. Kyari mentioned: “*The following day Rabih gathered his forces, and ordered 100 lashes be given to all his banner men, including his own favored son Fadlallah. Only Boubakar, who had fought bravely, was spared. Then he ordered a victorious counter-offensive; Kyari, who had refused to flee, was captured and beheaded. As for the capital city, Kukawa, it was plundered and razed to the ground.*”¹²¹

when Shehu Kyari was killed in 1894 by Rabih, almost all members of the El-Kanemi Dynasty were said to have been disintegrated and dispersed. Some fled to Damagaram, while others to Kano. In other words, some moved Kanem, other to Mandara, while, the remaining went into hiding inside Borno.¹²² It was reported that Rabih later invited members of the Dynasty to come live with him in Dikwa his capital, twenty-three members including two Shehus, Abubakar Garbai and Umar Sanda Kiarimi, accepted it.¹²³ It was the French colonial encroachment that ended this era of this African warrior.

Challenges and Resistance

One of the serious challenges of most societies and their warriors in precolonial Africa was the constants pressure from both internal and external factors. Among them include:

a. *Desire for political domination.*

Many smaller societies had been swallowed by the bigger one especially when the former resisted the demand of the latter. Kanem-borno’s serious challenge was constant war with enemies which led the empire to be shifted to eastern part of the lake chad by Mai Ali Gaji where a new capital Birni Ngarzargamu was founded to replace N’jimi.¹²⁴

¹¹⁹ Mohammed Kyari, Borno in the Rabih Years, 1893-1901: The Rise and Crash of a Predatory State (Maiduguri, Nigeria: University of Maiduguri. 2006)

¹²⁰ *ibid*

¹²¹ *ibid*

¹²² Encyclopedia Britannica, “Rabih Az- Zubair” (2000)

¹²³ *Ibid*

¹²⁴ [Shillington, Kevin](#) (4 July 2013). [Encyclopedia of African History 3-Volume Set](#). Routledge. p. 733. [ISBN 978-1-135-45670-2 reported that](#), around 1460 [Ali Gazi](#) (1473–1507) defeated his rivals and began the consolidation of Bornu. He built a fortified capital at [Ngazargamu](#), to the west of Lake Chad (in present-day [Nigeria](#)), the first permanent home a Sayfawa *mai* had enjoyed in a century.

b. Royal tussle.

Another serious issue that had destabilized most of the precolonial ruling family including Kanem Borno was the internal squabble among the members of the royal family. Political ambition usually destroyed them and external enemies had taken their advantage several times. That is why within the period between (1085-1893) not less than sixty (60) Mai under Sayfawa Dynasty had ruled Kanem Borno.¹²⁵ Most of them came to power under political crisis.

C. Expeditions of external enemies.

Most of the precolonial societies had a tradition of carrying expedition against one another with view to assert their influence either culturally or militarily. In other words, expedition was carried out severally in order to demonstrate military and political power. For instance, in 1670, Kwararafa invaded Katsina and Zaria thus ended in launching an invasion of Borno empire but was repelled by Mai Ali bin Umar. Both sources from Leo Africanus and Katsina Chronicler Dan Marina records that, Mai Ali succeeded in wounding and capturing of many Kwararafa soldiers where he sent back three of the captives back to their leaders, with their ears severed and hung around their necks.¹²⁶

D. Civil Unrest and epidemic: another calamity which devastated the most of the precolonial society of Borno was constant civil unrest which had to do with revolt against the existing authority. For instance, in Kanem Borno empire they believe that one spiritual thing called MUNE which was destroyed led to the internal conflict for more than thirty years. “*Dierk Lange mentioned that few events in the history of Kanem Borno have left such a great impact on tradition as the destruction of the Mune symbol by Dunama Dabbalemi in the first half of the thirteen century*”¹²⁷.

Inter-tribal war: another aspect in this research work was also the constant inter-ethnic war, looking critically at the troubles of Sayfawa dynasty, it is clear to grasp that most of the conflict or war fought apart from internal royal crisis, was war against one tribe or another, e.g the long and nagging war with Bulala people, Tuaregs, Judham Arabs, Kororofa etc.¹²⁸ the various inter war with rebels or powerful external forces had been one of the fundamental challenges of state formation in Africa South of the Sahara and which systematically had aggravated the obstacle to the smooth running of administration and socio-economic development of societies over time.

Conclusion

By and large the warrior ship history of precolonial Africa with little emphasis to Kanem Borno empire had a lot of lesson to learn. This is in view of the fact that African political leaders

¹²⁵ List of rulers of the Sayfawa dynasty according to John Stewart's *African States and Rulers* (1989)

¹²⁶ H. J Fisher. The Sahara and Central Sudan. In the Cambridge History of Africa: From C. 1600 to C 179, Richard Gray, J.D. Fage, Roland Anthony Oliver, eds. Cambridge University Press, (1975) pp 134-136

¹²⁷ Dierk Lange, The Mune Symbol as the Ark of the covenant between Duguwa and Sefuwa. Borno Museum Newsletter nos. 66 & 67.

¹²⁸ See the work of Y. Mukhtar on Borno Provinces M.A. thesis department of History University of Maiduguri (1986)

except with coming of the Europeans, would have been distinctively independent of each other, having an established political authority. Almost all the successors to the dynasty had demonstrated warrior ship. For instance, Mai Sa'id (c.1387), Kadai Afnu (c.1388), Othman ibn Idris (c.1389-1421) were all clear illustration of strong political warriors of the Sayfawa Dynasty. Thus, almost all the Kingdoms and empires, state and smaller chiefdoms in Africa south of the Sahara or even the larger continent was nothing but the making of war heroes and warriors.

IMPACT OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR ON INFRASTRUCTURAL FACILITY IN THE NIGERIAN ARMY: A GLIMPSE AT THE ARMY BARRACKS, 1970- 1983

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Abstract

One common feature in African military history during the post-colonial era was its intervention into national politics. The intervention was according to them (the military) as a result of failure of governance by the crop of leaders who took over power from the colonial regimes. But whenever, the military tastes the palatability of power, retribution through coup and counter-coups becomes the norm among themselves. This also, unfortunately, manifests along ethnic, sectional, religious and ideological differences. Parts of the consequences of this are; riots, conflicts, complex emergencies and civil wars, in many African nations. After the civil wars, the military institutions themselves, bore or suffered terribly from the impact of the conflicts in so many ramifications. In Nigeria, after the civil war in 1967-1970, the Army witnessed wide expansion in its numerical strength. This has no doubt adversely affected the professionalism of the force, because of the lack of enough accommodation of the expanded number of the personnel immediately the war ended. The findings of this paper reveal that, interactions between the Army and civilian population in the towns occupied by the military resulted to indiscipline, corruption, poor civil-military relations among other unprofessional practices. The paper adopts both primary and secondary sources of reconstruction of history through the use of oral interviews, newspapers and published books.

Introduction

Of the many developments which took place in the 20th century history of Nigeria, possibly the most important was the end of the country's Civil War in 1970 which saw the emergence of the nation out of the ravages of the war. This really marked a turning point in historical development of the country.¹²⁹ The day of 15th January, 1970 was

¹²⁹ A. Mahadi, 'The Roles of Neighbouring Countries in the Nigerian Civil War' in (eds.) T.N. Tamuno and S.C. Ukpabi, *Nigeria Since Independence: The First 25 Years, The Civil War Years*, Volume VI, Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1989, p. 252.

indeed a landmark in the history of the Nigerian state.¹³⁰ It was certain that, days earlier than this, were days of serious uncertainty and confusion in the entire country especially, in the debunked eastern region. At this period, the Nigerian Army was at war front in trenches and creeks fighting the Biafran secessionists. Suddenly, the announcement was aired on Radio Nigeria, Lagos, that the secessionists had surrendered and accepted the unity of one Nigeria. Because of the state of enormous fear and uncertainty around the period, many among the officers and men of the forces could not believe it. Sergeant Isa Shu'aibu testified that, it baffled him when he heard the announcement at the time holding his rifle in a trench, even though, there were circulated rumour at that time that the Biafrans were about to surrender. As a result of the worsening situation on both sides (Biafrans and Nigeria), soldiers became so distressed that the surrender provided a serious relief to them.¹³¹ Alas, while the conflict ended, victory was recorded by the Army, another fresh challenges broke out in the Nigerian Army which affected the smooth running of the Nigerian Defence sector. These challenges include: demobilization in the army, re-organization of the Army, corruption, civil-military relations as well as barracks or accommodation challenge. In the light of the foregoing, this presentation deals with the latter and how the subsequent regimes in Nigeria approached the problem. Thus, for simple analysis, the paper is divided into sub-headings: introduction, barracks accommodation under General Gowon, 1970-1975, barracks under General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, 1975-1976, barracks under General Olusegun Obasanjo 1976-1979 challenge of the barracks, attempts by the successive regimes to address the problem and conclusion.

Barracks Accommodations under General Gowon, 1970-1975

When the end of the Nigerian Civil War came in 1970, the Nigerian Army was at various war fronts in the defunct Eastern Region of the country. At the time of the war, little attention was given to other things by the federal government than to win the war by any means possible. This means that, the Nigerian Defence policy makers failed to think of many other things such as accommodation of the massively recruited soldiers during the war. This is because the available barracks in the country were not enough to contain more than 10% of the total number of the officers and men as a result of the increase in the numerical strength of the force.¹³² Therefore, when the war ended, the troops could not be relocated from where they were to any other place. Some of them that had captured a particular town at that time were instructed to remain there while

¹³⁰ It was the day when the Federal Military Government of Nigeria under General Yakubu Gowon officially announced the end of the obnoxious thirty (30) month war that engulfed the country since July, 1967.

¹³¹ Interview with Sergeant Isa, ex-serviceman of the Nigeria Civil War, Shu'aibu, 72 years, Nigerian Legion Office, Katsina Branch, 02/02/2013.

¹³² Group interview with some ex-servicemen of the Nigerian Civil War at their Legion Office in Birnin Kebbi, Kebbi State, on 03/06/2013.

some that were in the forest were ordered to move to the next available town for settlement.¹³³

For temporary settlement, soldiers were ordered to build *bashas*¹³⁴ which became their rooms at battalions for about three to four years before the government was able to construct barracks in different parts of the country. At certain times the soldiers had to be instructed to leave Eastern region because it was saturated with artificial military barracks. This means that the government had to devise another means for settling the large number of the surplus soldiers that were created by the just concluded war in the country. This has undoubtedly created a serious problem in the country because of different government's policies used in redeploying these soldiers from East to other parts of the country. In this regard, the then Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Defence, Alhaji Yusufu Gobir expressed that, the FMG allocated the sum of £8 million to all states of the federation to be spent on building suitable accommodation for the troops. There were about 18 different locations for the project all over the country.¹³⁵

The then Chief of Army Staff, General Hassan Katsina, did well in this respect. Through his influence, temporary Army barracks were established in some towns of Northern states with support of the local communities. For instance, in his home town, Katsina, a temporary accommodation was provided to 82 Battalion which was instructed to settle there in May 1970.¹³⁶ On their arrival in 1970, accommodation was provided to officers at *Kayalwa* primary school while other ranks of the battalion were camped at *Sabon gida* and *Gidan kwakwa*. By 1973, the building of their permanent site began and by 1977 it was completed and commissioned by the General Obasanjo administration.¹³⁷

Similarly, in some parts of the country workers housing estates already belonging to some civil servants were seized in favour of the soldiers. For instance, by March 1970, the sole administrator of Kogi Division Mr D.O. Ejiko issued a 'quit order' notice to more than 500 civil servants occupying the Up Hill Nedikko quarters in Lokoja. They were given two weeks within which to pack out. This order followed what was described as 'accommodation problem for a unit of the NA which was planned to be

¹³³ Interview with retired Sergeant Isah Shuaibu, Civil War Veteran, 62 years, Nigerian Legion Office Katsina, 13/04/2014,

¹³⁴ These were rooms made up of palm wood and leaves with collection of timber or any other strong tree in the forest. Soldiers entered into forest cut down trees, come to their garrison and build rooms. Each soldier would be given a space by his Company Commander to do that. This information was provided to the researcher by group of Civil War veterans in Kano, Katsina, Ibadan and Ilorin.

¹³⁵ C. Abidina, 'Army Barracks', New Nigerian Newspaper 8th May, 1970, 12

¹³⁶ Interview with retired Staff Sergeant Adullahi Muhammed, Civil War Veteran, (Chief Security of IFAD Katsina), 64 years, 16/08/2014. He is a Nupe man who served the Nigerian Army between 1968-1990. He was among the soldiers of the 82 battalion that were transferred in 1970. Even though, he was posted out to other units of the Army in the country like Lagos and Kaduna before he retired, he was able to maintain his accommodation at the Barracks in Katsina because he married a woman from the city. He finally retired in Katsina and also decided to obtain a land which he now occupies with his family.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

stationed there. This action was followed by a wide protest by the civil servants. They sent a delegation to the sole administrator and have explained that before the quit order be issued to them, there was already an accommodation problem in the area as a result of the influx of people from other parts of the federation to the area.¹³⁸ At the same time, there were other reports similar to this that at Ankpa and Idah Divisions, the administrators in those areas were facing similar problems of providing accommodation for troops who would be stationed there. Even though, no quit order was sent to them, officials in Dekina, Ankpah and Idah were said to have planned to clear some areas, erect camps for the troops who were reported to be ready to move into the Divisional Headquarters.¹³⁹

Problem of shortage of barracks around this period became so serious to the extent that the Federal Government could not handle it alone. For this, state governors were requested to construct army barracks in their states to decongest the soldiers in the Eastern states. In Kano, the governor, Abdu Bako constructed a new £360,000 army barracks. The barracks of 640 land acres, well-furnished and provided with electricity, water and drainage was given freely to the army by the state government of Kano. In the barracks, there were offices, sergeants and officers' messes, officers and men quarters, recreation hall and other welfare facilities.¹⁴⁰ With this kind of intervention, by May 1971, some barracks were constructed to reduce the problem of accommodation facing the armed forces especially in North-Central state. Notwithstanding, according to General Hassan Katsina, the eventual evacuation of the soldiers would be finished in the next four years, 1975.¹⁴¹

Similarly, the governor of North-West state, Superintendent of Police Usman Faruk provided accommodation to 35 Brigade of the Two Division under Colonel J.J. Oluleye which was recently transferred out of the One Division¹⁴² in the state capital of Sokoto in order to reduce this problem.¹⁴³ This gesture was warmly welcomed by the Federal Military Government through the Chief of Staff Army, Brigadier David Ejoor who visited the governor at the Government House in Sokoto on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, General Gowon.¹⁴⁴ In the same vein, the government of Kwara State built Army Barracks that costed about £ 210,000 at Sobi Hill in Ilorin with facilities in order to assist the Federal Government in addressing problem of shortage of accommodation

¹³⁸ Audu. N, Civil Servants Ejected for Army Unit', New Nigerian Newspaper, 30th March 1970, p. 1.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ Ibrahim. K, 'Bako Inspects Army Barracks', New Nigeria Newspaper, 17 September, 1970, p. 9.

¹⁴¹ 'Army Units will move to new Sites', New Nigeria Newspaper, 7th May, 1970, p. 1.

¹⁴² Around this period, there were changes in the formation of the units in the Nigerian Army as will be treated later in this chapter.

¹⁴³ 'Faruk describes Army Officers as Ambassadors of the Military', New Nigeria Newspaper, 26 July, 1972, p. 1.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

to the soldiers.¹⁴⁵ Unfortunately, the above wish of General Hassan Katsina could not materialize because he was relieved by General D. Ejor as the Chief of Army Staff. Many officers and men were not happy with his slow attitude towards solving their problems.¹⁴⁶ They were angry with being quartered in *bashas* for four years after the Civil War. Gowon was aware of their hardship and sympathized with them. But the soldiers needed more than sympathy. While contracts for the building of army barracks had been given out, soldiers were unhappy with the slow progress made towards their completion. At times, contractors colluded with military officers to make cheap money out of the Ministry of Defence. Commanders and some strategically placed military officers enriched themselves to the chagrin of the average soldier who still lived in the *bashas*.¹⁴⁷ Finally, on the question of problems of the barracks, the Permanent Secretary suggested that, the project problems were enormous and it would take three to four years to provide adequate accommodation for the soldiers.¹⁴⁸

General Murtala's Administration and Barracks Problem, 1975-1976

Five years after the end of the Civil War, majority of the soldiers in the Nigerian Army were still without suitable accommodation. It was only in July, 1972, after the completion of the necessary plans and surveys, that contract began to be awarded by the federal government.¹⁴⁹ Some of the reasons forwarded as why the Army up till 1975 faced serious problem of accommodation could be attributed to, firstly, lack of adequate cement and building materials in the country. The ports congestion was often used as an excuse. There were also poor attitudes of the contractors to work. Most of them were only interested in getting the contract and not executing the job. If at all, they tried to, the end of the work was rickety structures that could not stand first batch of tropical rains. A good example of this was a barracks built along Yola-Numan road which collapsed within a year from the date of completion. And in many other towns, the soldiers lest they risk their lives, refused to occupy such buildings.¹⁵⁰

Therefore, in its bid to radically approach and counter those challenges for betterment of the Army, General Murtala's administration resorted to introducing new guidelines for Army Barracks projects all over the country so as to clear the backlog of soldiers that were still occupying un-conducive accommodations. In view of this, the Federal Military Government introduced an 11-point guideline to overhaul the entire machinery of the Army Barracks development projects. To this, about more than 300 Army contractors were invited in Lagos by General Murtala's Chief of Army Staff, then

¹⁴⁵ Bamigboye, 'Top Military Officers Visit New Barracks', New Nigeria Newspaper, 3rd August, 1972, p. 2.

¹⁴⁶ J.I. Elaigwu, Gowon: The Biography of a Soldier-State..., p.194.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ 'Money Voted for Army Spent Wisely', New Nigeria Newspaper, 27th July, 1975, pp. 1-6.

¹⁴⁹ I. Campbell, 'Army Reorganization and Military Withdrawal' in B.K. Panter (ed), *Soldiers and Oil: Studies in Commonwealth Politics...*, p. 75.

¹⁵⁰ 'Problems in the Army Barracks Construction', New Nigeria Newspaper, 1st October, 1975, p. 1

Brigadier T.Y. Danjuma. Danjuma expressed federal government's regret that, the result so far achieved from the contracts so far already awarded had not justified the expenditure already committed.¹⁵¹ The new measures include

- a. Giving a grant of 10% mobilization sum to contractors who require them in order to improve their liquidity positions with their banks in respect of new contracts.
- b. All contractors will from now enter into and sign agreement before commencement of works.
- c. All agreements will make provision for penalty clause which the Army shall not hesitate to invoke if a contractor fails to perform according to schedule or specification.
- d. A fluctuation clause will be inserted in all contract agreements to safeguard the contractors against heavy losses as a result of the present day world-wide inflation.
- e. All future contract awards are to be subject to the approval of a tenders board.

Only competent and reputable contractors will be awarded contracts for execution of building projects.

- f. Contractors who win Army contracts for barracks building will be responsible for the nomination of sub-contractors for electrical, water and other ancillary works.
- g. Such contractors must receive approval of the Army Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence.
- h. The Army Engineer Corps in conjunction with the General Officer Commanding (GOC) and Commanders will now handle supervision of barracks construction in the fields which plans are on hands to import professional Supervisory Team from abroad.
- i. Pre-contract award will now be handled by the headquarters 'Q' branch and the Ministry of Defence.
- j. In view of shortage of quantity surveyors, elementary bill of quantities, otherwise known as stage-by-stage construction development quantities will be the standard system of cost analysis to be adopted. Valuation could thus be done by any technical staff other than quantity surveyors, architectures and engineers.
- k. Brigadier Danjuma explained that it would be easier through the new system to administer payment of construction than in the traditional bills where the quantity surveyor has to visit the site in order to sort out items through trade by trade while payment of bill will be automatic on production of valuation certificate at the Ministry of Defence.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ 'Federal Military Government Introduces new Guidelines for Army Barracks', New Nigeria Newspaper, 30th September, 1975, p. 1.

¹⁵² *Ibid*, pp. 1-2

In the meeting, the Chief of the Army Staff enumerated some of the reasons which caused disappointing failure in the execution of the contracts. These include un-coordinated development, lack of experience and expertise on the part of the contractors, faulty contract prices, lack of comparative quotations, lack of penalty clause, inadequate supervisory and valuation staff to ensure that work done by contractors was valued quickly and irregular payment. Consequently, the new military authority in the country, would not tolerate these inherent ills. It would therefore, be disservice and disloyalty to the nation on the part of any contractor who misused or diverted government fund given to him in respect for barracks construction to other businesses. The government suggested that this policy would encourage local contractors' professionalism that 'it is our belief that this policy is the right one, it provided local contractors drive not only monetary gain but also managerial and technical know-how through execution of government contracts'. In pursuance of policy, only good and reputable local contractors would be rewarded with more contracts while bad and inefficient ones would be black listed and their names struck off the federal list of contractors. At the session, some contractors pointed out their difficulties which the Chief of the Army promised to look into their complaints.¹⁵³

Another reason for the delay in the construction of Army barracks in the country was attitude of some of the contractors who used the advance money given to them by the Federal Government but dashed their workers as their own shares of Udoji salary arrears enjoyed by other Nigerian workers. To this issue, the previous government became reluctant to address the case. After the coup, the new government in the country reversed this case. For example, the General Officer Commanding three Division, Brigadier Emmanuel Abisoye stated that all building contractors engaged in the construction of Army barracks who had converted the advances given to them by the Federal Military Government for the payment of Udoji salary arrears to their workers into their private use must vomit the money.¹⁵⁴ He presented this during inspection of Army barracks projects currently under construction for his Division and this same treatment was forwarded to the Army Headquarters in Lagos for action. He appealed to journalists in the states to expose any contractor who had converted such subventions into their private use.¹⁵⁵

With the procedures for getting Army building contracts as outlined by the Chief of Army Staff, if followed strictly would surely hasten the building of the barracks. Undoubtedly, the provision of good barracks added tremendously to the morale and discipline of the Army.¹⁵⁶ These reforms introduced by the new government were no doubt out of the expertise of the Chief of Army Staff, Danjuma, as good officer. In

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ 'Soldiering and Private Work not Interwoven: Abisoye', New Nigeria Newspaper, 5th December, 1975, p.2

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ 'Problems in the Army Barracks Construction', 'New Nigeria Newspaper...', p.1.

1971, when he became the GOC of Third Division of the Nigerian Army, the entire Division witnessed a new phase of professional military career. One of his most important landmark policy was his decision to pay particular attention to restoring the credibility of the Army by first warning and later court-marshalling a number of Army officers who were proven to have misappropriated Army funds and in other ways to have betrayed the trust reposed on them as Army officers and the basic discipline expected of them as Army officers. He pursued this line with single-mindedness between 1971 and 1973 that both in the Army and through the reports which appeared with great frequency in the public media he gained a reputation for transparent honesty and selfless dedication to the restoration of a disciplined image of the Army.¹⁵⁷ This image of Colonel Danjuma was re-enforced by the comments made in his confidential report by the then Chief of Army Staff, Major General David Ejoor where he wrote,

Colonel Danjuma is a soldier, a gentle man, an outstanding officer. His integrity is exceptional. He is answering in allegiance to the service, and to seniors and juniors alike. He is eager to serve and enthusiastic in fulfilling the responsibilities of an officer. He sets a good example, commands respect in any company. He has a very good appearance. Slightly awkward in drill but presents a first-rate appearance. He has run his Division very well. He has restored discipline and has cut down misappropriation of government funds. He is a good disciplinarian and his justice is apparent. He expresses himself very well and very precisely. His arguments are matured and sound, and they are effectively and forcefully put either in words or in writing. He has marked ability for clear and concise writing. He is one of our best officers on the application of military law. All the assignments given to him he has performed extremely well. He is one of the best officers in the Nigerian Army. I have absolute confidence in Colonel Danjuma. The nation can rely on him as the custodian of the Nigerian Army.¹⁵⁸

Barracks Problem under General Olusegun Obasanjo, 1976-1979

When he assumed power as a new Head of State in Nigeria, General Obasanjo concentrated his efforts on his predecessor's attempts on tackling the accommodation problems that engulfed the Army since the war ended in 1970. In March, 1976, the GOC of 1 Infantry Division Nigerian Army, Major General Akinrinade disclosed to officers and men of the 127 Battalion, 4 Infantry Brigade Agbor, Bendel state pledging on behalf of the FMG to accommodate the soldiers in standard military quarters within four years. Steps, he said, had been taken to bring in experts from abroad to help in overcoming bad planning, embezzlements and indiscriminate contracts awarded for the construction of army barracks. He then, announced that in the next two to three weeks, every soldier would have adequate clothing, boots and other equipment vital to his profession. And enjoined the soldiers in the Battalion that they should continue to

¹⁵⁷ L. Barret, Danjuma: *The Making of a ...*, p. 70.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p. 71.

cooperate and live in absolute harmony in and outside the barracks as well as in work and play with the civilians in the town.¹⁵⁹

Despite the efforts put forward by the various successive governments in Nigeria after the Civil War to cater for the problem of lack of enough accommodation for the Nigerian Army, the efforts were sabotaged by some local indigenous contractors in the country. According to the then Quarter Marshal-General Brigadier Olu Bajowa, when he expressed anger at the inspection tour of the barracks built in Ojo near Ibadan. Highly disappointed with the conduct of the contractor, he instructed for setting up a committee for inquiry into the matter. Brigadier Bajowa discovered that, the buildings constructed which were yet to be handed over to the Army were shoddy and badly constructed. It was observed that, the buildings were not habitable and were in a deplorable condition, as such, ordered that two of the buildings should be demolished since no amount of repair would make them habitable. The Quarter Marshal-General also announced that the commission of inquiry would determine whether there was any collusion between the military engineering inspectors or civil servants engaged in Army projects and contractors to defraud the Federal Military Government. The board would also find out who the contractor was, who recommended him, how much he had been paid up to date and the amount of money to be recovered from him in view of his poor workmanship.¹⁶⁰

The involvement of the Army engineers did not fully tackle this problem as expressed by the Chief of Army Staff, General Danjuma. The excellent war-time records of the Nigerian Army engineers had been severely tarnished by the Army engineers' involvement in the supervision of the Army barracks projects in the country.¹⁶¹ This was because of the sheer magnitude and sizes of these projects which were beyond the supervisory capacity of the Army. In addition, the nature of these projects was very unfamiliar to them. The result was that army barracks were shabbily built while the Army engineers themselves were disorganized.

On her own part, the Army Headquarters also established a Special Task Force for Army barracks development projects in order to see that a sizeable number of the members of the Armed Forces moved into the barracks and were properly be quartered. The Task Force was made under the command of the permanent secretary for special duties in the Ministry of Defence.¹⁶² As a result of these actions, there was speedy completion of some unfinished barracks in the country. For example, soldiers of the 82 Infantry Battalion of the Army in Katsina city, Kaduna state had by May, 1977 moved from their temporary site¹⁶³ to the newly constructed barracks along Katsina-Jibia

¹⁵⁹ 'Three Steps to Demobilization of Soldiers', Nigerian Tribune Newspaper, 4th March 1976, p. 1 (obtained at the Library of Nigerian Institute....,

¹⁶⁰ 'Ojoo Barracks Building not Habitable', Daily Sketch Newspaper 23rd April 1977, p. 16

¹⁶¹ 'Danjuma Hits Army Engineers', The Nigerian Tribune Newspaper 30th November, 1978, p. 16

¹⁶² 'Task Force for Army Barracks Job', Daily Times Newspaper 24th April, 1977, p. 3

¹⁶³ The temporary site was then located at Kayalwa Primary School along the present Usman Nagogo road in Katina.

road.¹⁶⁴ About 1,620 housing units were constructed including quarters for commissioned officers, a block of offices, a market, an officers mess, two churches, one mosque and the general arrangement for water supply was fully completed. Addressing the news men in Katsina, the soldiers were enjoined by the Commanding Officer, Major E.S. Ajayi to pay their rents to people in their host community before moving to the barracks completely.¹⁶⁵

A year after this development, the Quarter-Master General of the Nigerian Army, Brigadier Olu Bajowa, while making a press briefing concerning the accommodation and shortage of barracks in the N.A, he was reported saying that, about 100,000 soldiers were housed in the old barracks of the country, while the newly constructed barracks all over the country accommodated 60,000 soldiers. In addition to this, the barracks projects going on in different parts of the country would accommodate about 30,000 soldiers. He assured that by 1980, nearly all barracks would be completed and all soldiers would move into them.¹⁶⁶

Towards the end of 1978 (on the eve days of the transition of power from the military to civilians), issue of accommodation to soldiers became politicized by some politicians in the country. Aspect of partisan politics under the guise of tribal unions was introduced in the barracks. In this regard, shortage of the barracks in the country was used as a political campaign in support of a particular party.¹⁶⁷ To this action, General Danjuma while addressing Regimental Sergeant Majors and Senior Non-commissioned Officers of the Nigerian Army in Calabar and Akamkpa warned them to ensure that partisan politics was not brought into barracks in whatever disguise. The soldiers were also warned not to fall victim to civilians bent on bringing politics into the barracks through religious activities like joint worship in unit churches or mosques.¹⁶⁸

With the above stated shortcomings associated with the provision of adequate and standard accommodations for the Nigerian Army, by the end of General Obasanjo's tenure in office in October, 1979, as Nigeria's Head of State, large numbers of the Nigerian soldiers were adequately accommodated in different barracks across the country. General T.Y. Danjuma around that period believed that the movement of soldiers from temporary houses to permanent barracks no doubt would further enhance regimentation and professionalism in the Army.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁴ 'Soldiers in Katsina Move into Barracks', New Nigeria Newspaper, 2nd May 1977, p. 12

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*

¹⁶⁶ 'Barracks for 100,000 Soldiers', Nigerian Herald Newspaper 6 July, 1978, p. 16 (obtained at the Library of the Nigerian International Institute for International Affairs Lagos, Nigeria)

¹⁶⁷ This was in considerations of the new Nigeria's constitution that would come to effect in October 1979. The constitution provided that all members of the armed forces in the country could vote in the forthcoming national elections.

¹⁶⁸ 'Danjuma Says, No Politics in Barracks', Nigerian Chronicles Newspaper, 1st October 1978, p. 1 (obtained at the Library of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs Lagos, Nigeria)

¹⁶⁹ R. Balogun, 'Loyalty Must Be Your Watch Word: Danjuma Tells Soldiers', Daily Sketch News...,

Barracks Accommodations under Alhaji Shehu U. A. Shagari, 1979-1983

Despite all efforts put forward within nine years of post Civil War military rule in the country, the problems of lack of enough accommodation for soldiers could not be properly addressed. Therefore, at the beginning of his tenure in office, Shagari disclosed that his government would overcome the problem. He introduced 17 housing programs in 1980 with the sole aim of every soldier having adequate and proper housing by 1983.¹⁷⁰ One among other fundamental impact of shortage of accommodations to the Nigerian soldiers around the period was affecting discipline of the troops as a result of intermingling with civilian population in some parts of the country. As a result of that, as pointed out above, many soldiers had sent their families to their towns and villages because they had to share rooms pending the completion of new barracks in their respective military units. In Three Infantry Brigade, Kano, while soldiers and their families were barely managing single rooms in the Brigade Headquarters, there was a large number of civilian squatters also living with soldiers doing illegal businesses to make money in the barracks.¹⁷¹

Conventionally, in all units in the Nigerian Army, civilian traders squat outside the barracks in designated areas called *Mami* markets.¹⁷² In *Mami* Markets all sort of things from food stuff, clothing for troops in the barracks and their families were found and still could be found. Unfortunately, there could be found also in the *Mami* market all kinds of characters, from genuine traders, thieves, prostitutes, smugglers and rest. Mammy Markets were and are still legal as they offer useful services to the soldiers. In the case of 3 Infantry Brigade Kano, the traders were in large number and some of them became rich and owned private and commercial vehicles and houses in the city. Their presence in the barracks contributed a lot to the indiscipline of the soldiers. Some of them were local beer and illicit gin brewers popularly known to the soldiers as 'akpeteshie' or 'push me I push you', kola nut sellers, smugglers, prostitutes and drug dealers. It was therefore, convenient for them to hide in the barracks to avoid detection and prosecution, especially the smugglers and the drug pushers.¹⁷³

But with the posting of the new Brigade Commander, Brigadier P.C. Tarfa in the Brigade, he felt he could not withstand these anomalies in the barracks. He, therefore, ordered for the immediate eviction of these elements from the barracks. Some cried that they had no place to go to and that they had all their investments in the barracks. In addition, while majority especially soldiers' wives applauded the idea, some soldiers who had become very friendly with the traders and the prostitutes received new orders

¹⁷⁰ 'C.A. Kaduna, 'No Demobilization Exercise: Shagari Reassures the Army', Nigeria Standard News...,

¹⁷¹ P.C. Tarfa, (Major General retired) *Profile in Courage*, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2007, p.292-296

¹⁷² The name 'Mami' market is originated from Mini market which means a small place allocated in military barracks in Nigeria purposely for trade and other commercial activities for the benefit of soldiers' families.

¹⁷³ P.C. Tarfa, (Major General retired) *Profile in...*, p. 295

with mixed feelings. It was hard but it was in the interest of the soldiers to have the undesirable evicted from the barracks. He summoned all the quarters to the parade ground for the order to move out of the barracks within 24 hours. The very rich ones among them found it difficult to move within the 24 hours and pleaded for a few more days. As a result, of this some of the affected people performed *juju* in order to make him change the decision or harm him, but that did not help the situation. Within a week of that order, the barracks became back to normal order. As such, normal training, sporting activities and general discipline resumed in the Brigade. As a result of this, the Ministry of Defence became more fully committed to improving this kind of situations in all the units of the Army in the country.¹⁷⁴

In fact, the accommodation problem was so enormous so much so that by the end of 1981, the retired Chief of Defence Staff, General J. Akinrinade was quoted as saying out of the huge amount of the money earmarked for defence, about 75 per cent of the budget was spent on the construction of barracks, provision of amenities and payment of salaries.¹⁷⁵ According to some senior Army Officers in the country, the cause of this problem was the government over reliance on civilian contractors in tackling the barracks problem since the end of the Civil War in 1970. In the early days of President Shagari, one of his senior Army Officers, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) the 1st Infantry Division, Major General George Innih disclosed that under no circumstances should maintenance or minor works in his Division be awarded to civilian contractors. According to the General, the Army engineers would from now execute such jobs.¹⁷⁶ At that period, Army Engineers had completed some houses at costs far below what civilian contractors were asking for. He drew attention of the Engineers to the bad roads and bridges within Army cantonments and the numerous houses in need of repairs and called on the Engineers to be prepared to put them in order. The GOC emphasised that, contractors would be called only as a last resort, and even then, supervision would be carried out by Army Engineers.¹⁷⁷ Prior to 1977, the FMG revoked some barracks contracts awarded to some civilian firms as a result of inability to execute their assignment as expected. The Federal Permanent Secretary in charge of Armed Forces Development Projects, Mr Fola Alade disclosed that, the cancellation was against Messrs Basic Engineering which which lost the sum of N27,121,117 contract for construction of Zuru barracks.¹⁷⁸ The firm lost the contract because it was found to be far behind schedule. Sequel to this, the contract was split into two and re-awarded to two companies: Messrs Frank Briscoe and Bagudu Construction and Commercial Company. The other firm that was affected was Messrs

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p. 296.

¹⁷⁵ Defending the Nation with N16.48 Per head, The Punch Newspaper, 2nd October, 1981, p. 5.

¹⁷⁶ 'General Innih Gives Guidelines in Army Contracts', Sunday Standard Newspaper, 11th November, 1979, p. 16

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*

¹⁷⁸ Federal Ministry of Information, 'Federal Military Government Withdraws two Contracts', News Release 10th October, 1977, p. 1

M.I.A. and Sons who lost N27, 291, 604 contract for construction of Kontagora barracks. According to Alade, it was discovered that, the company had no adequate financial and executive capacity to prosecute the project 15 weeks after the award.¹⁷⁹

However, in 1980, the Minister of Defence, Professor Iya Abubakar disclosed that work had been completed and most of the buildings were already occupied by the soldiers in the following locations: Kaduna, Jaji, Zaria, Bida, Katsina, Nguru, Onitsha, Ohafia, Ibadan, Ilorin, Sokoto, Agenebode, Jos (phase I), Bauchi, Takum, Maiduguri, Yola, Calabar and Abeokuta. Efforts were then also being made to ensure that the remaining ancillary buildings under construction in the 27 barracks-locations scattered all over the country were completed on schedule. Work on permanent water supply was in progress at the following locations: Bida, Nguru, Ohafia, Onitsha, Akure, and New Bussa, monitored by the Ministry of Defence in conjunction with the Nigerian Army Engineers.¹⁸⁰ In the case of the Nigerian Navy (NN), two blocks of rating barracks at Malu Road, Apapa were constructed. Three out of the four blocks of Officers Quarters under construction at Wilmot Point, Victoria Island were also completed and barracks of Nigerian Navy Technical School Port-Harcourt was about to be completed. There was also provision of barracks accommodation on a large scale at Ojo (off Badagry Creek) in Lagos and Calabar. For the Nigerian Air Force, two administrative blocks were built in Ikeja and Kaduna.¹⁸¹

Conclusion

In the final analysis, the paper provided empirical evidences on how the successive regimes during the post-civil war period in Nigeria approached the problems of shortage of barracks to the soldiers. However, despite all the efforts, the accommodation issue continued to become a problem up till date because of the continuous expansion of the force over time. The Nigeria's quest for supremacy in the West African sub-region in the 1990s made more recruitments of young men into the service of the Army. Similarly, the 21st century insurgent activities also demanded for the same. This is among other reasons that the accommodation problems still exist in the Army.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid*

¹⁸⁰ 'Re-identifying the Priority Needs of the Nigerian Armed Forces', News Focus Number 1, Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, Nigeria, 2nd January, 1980.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid*.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING AS A HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: OBLIGATIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NON-STATE ACTORS

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Abstract

It is submitted that one reason why it is difficult to promote a human rights framework in relation to trafficking is that a comprehensive analysis of the practice utilizing an application of the established human rights norms and principles has not been undertaken. As a result, many important questions remain unanswered, such as: What exactly are the human rights norms and principles applicable to trafficking? Does international human rights law establish and articulate obligations in relation to this practice? If so, what is their nature? What are the levels of obligations imposed upon State actors and non-State actors? Does the Trafficking Protocol have the potential to promote the human rights approach to the practice? This paper seeks to answer these questions in an attempt to establish a human rights framework, not only to understand, but also to address trafficking and the wider issues surrounding the practice. This paper focuses on the obligations and accountability of non-State actors. It begins by highlighting some human rights issues relevant to the causes, processes, and consequences of trafficking, such as poverty, discrimination, inhuman or degrading treatment, forced labor, and law enforcement practices. The paper then examines the obligations and accountability of non-State actors, such as organized criminal groups, under international human rights law. Although the duties of non-State actors are recognized in several international human rights instruments and widely supported by different actors, non-State actors do not have legal obligations under international human rights law. The importance of human rights norms and principles, however, is not to be underestimated as they may be enforceable indirectly. It will be shown that criminal and civil proceedings offer an alternative means by which the human rights

norms and principles can be enforced at the national level, and therefore indirect application of human rights law is a viable option. At the international level, it is argued that trafficking can be regarded as a crime against humanity, and therefore the involvement of the International Criminal Court becomes a possibility. In conclusion, this paper stresses that accountability of non-State actors who abuse human rights during the process of trafficking can still be addressed at different levels.

Keywords: Human Beings, Trafficking, Migration, Human Rights, Non-State Actors, Smuggling.

Introduction

Human trafficking occurs frequently in today's world. Numerous victims of human trafficking, mostly women and children, are said to number in the thousands each year. Nearly all States are impacted by trafficking, and it is estimated that traffickers make billions of dollars annually in unlawful profits as a result of their activities.

A variety of causes have had an impact on the contemporary era's rise of the human trafficking industry. The rise of the trafficking industry in Eastern Europe coincided with the conclusion of the Cold War and the fall of the iron barrier. Due to ineffective border and law enforcement management, newly independent Eastern European States were exposed to illegal activity like people trafficking as they tried to build their own systems of government. Additionally, with the development of communication and transportation, the movement of globalization has made it easier for traffickers to smuggle people. These modifications have coincided with the adoption of strict immigration laws and regulations by developed States, all of which are popular destinations for human trafficking victims.

People are frequently trafficked by land, sea, and air from impoverished countries to less developed ones, and Larry Diamond and Adetoun Adelakin have identified specific trafficking routes. They stressed the frequent trafficking of individuals from the Middle East into Greece and Italy as well as into Western Europe, the US, and Canada. They also emphasized that traffickers frequently traffic people from Africa into Western Europe, as well as from Africa into China and South East Asian States, as well as into North America via the same routes¹.

It is acknowledged that numerous individuals and groups are involved in trafficking. One important issue in contemporary trafficking is the existence of organized crime groups. It is commonly known that groups like the *Russian Mafia*, *Yakuza* (Japan), and *Snakeheads* (China), all actively engage in trafficking. Family members, acquaintances, and well-known neighbors typically persuade potential victims to participate in the procedure. Evidence also points to the involvement of some intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and peacekeeping mission personnel in human trafficking. A significant step was made when the United Nations adopted the *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children* (Trafficking Protocol), attached to the United Nations *Convention against Transnational Organized Crime* (Organized Crime Convention), in December 2000. Due to the transnational character of human trafficking and its rapid expansion, the international community felt obligated to take immediate action. One of the most crucial aspects of the Trafficking Protocol is the adoption of a definition of trafficking, the first of its type in

international law. The adoption of this idea represents an important turning point since it provides academics, governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) with a fundamental framework for understanding and combating trafficking.

The idea that human trafficking is a problem for human rights is one of the major issues in this paper. It is said that one reason it is challenging to advance a human rights framework with regard to trafficking is because the practice has not been thoroughly examined using an application of the existing human rights norms and principles. Many crucial concerns are left unexplained as a result, such as: What specific human rights standards and principles apply to trafficking? Does international law on human rights impose and specify obligations with regard to this practice? If yes, what kind are they? How much responsibility is placed on State actors versus non-State actors? Is there a chance that the Trafficking Protocol will advance the human rights perspective on the issue?

In order to understand and confront human trafficking and the larger concerns surrounding the practice, this paper aims to provide answers to the questions raised above. The obligations and accountability of non-State actors are the main topics of this paper. It opens by outlining a few human rights concerns that are pertinent to the origins, progression, and effects of trafficking, including deprivation, prejudice, cruel or inhumane treatment, forced labor, and law enforcement practices. The next section of the paper looks at non-State actors, like organized crime rings, and their responsibilities under international human rights law. Non-State actors do not have legal obligations under international human rights law, despite the fact that these requirements are broadly endorsed by various parties and acknowledged in a number of international human rights agreements. Human rights norms and concepts, however, should not be undervalued because they may be indirectly enforced. Indirect application of human rights law is a realistic approach since it will be demonstrated that criminal and civil processes provide an additional method for enforcing the standards and principles of human rights at the national level. It is believed that trafficking can be considered a crime against humanity on a global scale, opening the door for the International Criminal Court to get involved. In conclusion, this paper contends that non-State actors who violate human rights while engaging in human trafficking can still be held accountable at various levels.

Human Rights Analysis of Trafficking

Poverty is a common contributor to trafficking. Many people migrate to industrialized States in search of better possibilities because of the deplorable economic situations in their home countries². The freedom from want clause in the preambles of the 1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR), the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR), and the *International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights* (ICESCR)³ makes it clear that poverty has an adverse effect on the enjoyment of human rights. This fact is also acknowledged by UN human rights mechanisms like the Commission on Human Rights⁴, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR)⁵, and the Independent Expert on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty.⁶ More specifically, economic, social, and cultural rights like the rights to work, food, shelter, a sufficient level of health care, and education are all impacted by poverty.⁷ In addition, civil and political rights such as life, liberty and security are also affected by poverty.⁸

Discrimination based on race, gender, and other factors is a connected factor in human trafficking.⁹ Sometimes racism results in a lack of employment possibilities for members of particular racial or ethnic groups, forcing them to look for work elsewhere.¹⁰ Similar to this, women turn to traffickers because of gender inequality. They lack many of the basic rights afforded by males since they are economically, socially, and politically excluded in many regions of the world. This has made poverty more feminized and prompted women to leave their homes in search of employment overseas.¹¹ Their cause is also supported by violence against women and traditional family systems that sexually or otherwise oppress women.¹² Humanitarian disasters also cause population movements. Because of their ethnicity, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political beliefs, some people may face persecution in their home countries. Due to military conflicts on a national or international level,¹³ more people flee their home countries.¹⁴ Humanitarian crises can lead to violations of a wide range of civil and political rights, including the rights to life, liberty, and security as well as the prohibition on torture.¹⁵ It is also clear that a number of economic, social, and cultural rights, including the rights to housing, food, and health, can be significantly impacted.¹⁶ Many people have no choice but to escape their States of origin under these circumstances, and one way to do so is to seek assistance from traffickers.¹⁷

Several difficulties of human rights occur when trafficking is taking place. For instance, because they split the expense of transportation, family and relatives in the country of origin end up in debt to traffickers.¹⁸ In many States of origin, there are few official channels for obtaining loans, which is thought to have led to the emergence of unofficial networks of high-interest rate lenders.¹⁹ As a result, many lose their homes, lands, and other possessions,²⁰ making them vulnerable to slavery and bonded labor.

The process of recruitment and transportation also raises a set of human rights concerns. In some cases, people are forcibly recruited. Traffickers use violence and intimidation and other tactics to traffic people internally or internationally.²¹ Abduction or kidnapping of children for adoption, organ extraction, or participation in armed conflicts are practices evidenced in some parts of the world.²² Instances of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment²³ are also common during the process of trafficking. In addition, many of those trafficked are forced to travel in overcrowded trucks and shipping containers for long periods of time.²⁴ Because of these conditions, many people suffer from exhaustion, dehydration and malnutrition²⁵ and their health deteriorates as a result. Moreover, it has been reported that many traffickers, as well as smugglers, abandon people during the course of their journey and sometimes use physical and sexual violence as a means to demand more money for their services.²⁶ Finally, the right to life²⁷ is also relevant as there are cases where people lose their lives. In 2014, for instance, an overcrowded ship with migrants on board sank off the coast of Indonesia and 356 people died as a result.²⁸ Such cases of fatalities have also been reported in Ireland, Libya, Mexico, Niger, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.²⁹

In States of destination, many of those are exploited by transnational corporations, farmers, restaurant owners and others, and forced to work long hours with minimal pay in order to clear their debts imposed by traffickers,³⁰ raising the issues of slavery and forced labour.³¹ A related issue is the conditions in which they are held. Those working in the agricultural sector, for

instance, are exposed to dangerous chemicals, and their health is affected as a result.³² The right to just and favorable conditions of work, therefore, is commonly denied.³³ Because of their illegal status, such people are unable or unwilling to seek medical assistance due to a fear of enforcement actions.³⁴ Moreover, instances of physical, mental or sexual abuse, especially against migrant women, have been reported.³⁵ Furthermore, freedom of movement³⁶ is often restricted. Traffickers may take identity documents away from those trafficked as a way to gain control over them,³⁷ lock them in sweatshops, factories and brothels, and threaten them by hinting at the possibility of enforcement action and retaliation against their family members.³⁸

Additionally, in the States of destination, severe problems with human rights include racism and xenophobia.³⁹ For instance, it has been noticed that racism and xenophobia have made it simpler for people to defend the exploitation of persons trafficked in the sex industry and other businesses.⁴⁰ Many societies associate the term "illegal immigrants," which refers to many people who are trafficked, with negativity, which can occasionally result in acts of violence and prejudice.⁴¹ In many situations, these illegal immigrants are also held responsible for flaws in the social security, health, and education systems in the states of destination.⁴² Once again, their illegal status makes it difficult for them to report instances of racism and violence, and therefore perpetrators are rarely punished.⁴³

Finally, there are a number of human rights issues raised by law enforcement activities in the States of destination.⁴⁴ For instance, there have been instances of law enforcement officers firing directly at civilians at borders, either killing or injuring them.⁴⁵ Some law enforcement officials may demand money or sexual favors in exchange for freedom when making an arrest; failing to comply may result in a lengthy imprisonment.⁴⁶ Concern has also been expressed over the confinement circumstances.⁴⁷ It has been alleged that there have been cases of torture⁴⁸ in the detention facilities where those who have been trafficked are kept. Other rights, like the right to know about accusations made against individuals, access to the court system, use of translators, access to legal counsel, and consular help are likewise curtailed or nonexistent.⁴⁹ From all of this, it is apparent that trafficking of human beings entails a wide variety of human rights concerns.

Obligations and Accountability of Non-State Actors

It is therefore required to examine how and to what extent international human rights legislation may be used to address the activity after identifying the key human rights norms and principles in relation to trafficking. Although there are instances in which States, like in the case of corruption, may be involved in trafficking⁵⁰, the practice is primarily carried out by non-State actors like organized criminal gangs. This necessitates a review of the obligations that these non-State actors that violate human rights are subject to under international human rights law. The basic finding is that while there is an increasing tendency toward recognizing non-State actors' legal obligations and holding them accountable under international human rights law, their current status still precludes holding them directly accountable because they do not have any legal obligations. The evolution of international human rights law makes this obvious.

Looking at the place of non-State actors under international law may be the best place to begin this analysis. According to the conventional wisdom, States are the ones who are legally obligated to fulfill obligations. This is based on the notion that they are covered by international

law and as a result, have certain rights and obligations.⁵¹ As a result, when States fail to uphold duties outlined in international conventions, they may be held legally liable. It is widely accepted in the field of international human rights law that people have rights and that governments have obligations to uphold and advance those rights.⁵² This implies that non-State actors are immune from liability under international human rights law since they lack obligations.

However, it is being argued more and more that the conventional wisdom is out of date and that the issue of accountability for non-State actors needs to be revisited in light of the global changes that have facilitated the expansion of non-State actors' authority and the ensuing restrictions placed on the authority of States.⁵³ Particularly, it has been argued that non-State actors are subject to obligations since they also have a responsibility to advance and defend human rights.⁵⁴ Some of the current human rights accords also take the notion that people are duty holders into account. Such non-binding instruments as the UDHR,⁵⁵ the *American Declaration on Rights and Duties of Man* 1948,⁵⁶ the *Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* 1999⁵⁷ as well as legally binding instruments such as the ICCPR and the ICESCR,⁵⁸ the ECHR,⁵⁹ the ACHR,⁶⁰ and the African Charter⁶¹ explicitly provide that individuals have duties to other individuals and/or to their community.

A few human rights mechanisms also discuss the obligations of non-State actors in the advancement and defense of human rights. The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, for instance, stated that international financial institutions "should pay greater attention to the protection of the right to health in their lending policies, credit agreements, and structural adjustment programs" in relation to the right to health.⁶² The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights emphasized the obligations placed on non-State actors in respect to poverty.⁶³ The Human Rights Committee also underlined its belief that families, society, and states all share responsibilities for protecting children in its elaboration of the rights of the child under the ICCPR.⁶⁴ Moreover, the Special Rapporteur on Sales of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography goes further to argue that "international human rights law has long imposed direct obligations on the private sector."⁶⁵ All of this marks a significant development in international human rights law, as it reflects the growing recognition that human rights abuses committed by non-State actors must be also addressed.

These views, however, must be treated with caution. In order to hold that international human rights law imposes direct obligations upon non-State actors and that they can be held directly accountable, it must be shown that international human rights law is directly enforceable against them. In other words, a horizontal application of international human rights law at the international level must be established. In examining the current status of international human rights law, it becomes apparent that a horizontal application is not possible. As a result, non-State actors do not bear legal obligations and therefore cannot be held directly accountable.⁶⁶ The Human Rights Committee makes this clear by stating that "obligations are directed to States and do not, as such, have direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law."⁶⁷ This position is also supported by jurisprudence in which claims against non-State actors have been

deemed inadmissible.⁶⁸ In view of all of this, it is concluded that the obligations imposed upon non-State actors are moral, rather than legal, in character at the international level.

What is the value of moral obligations then? One could certainly argue that moral obligations have no value at all because it is doubtful that non-State actors such as organized criminal groups care much about the human rights of victims in conducting their business. Nevertheless, the moral obligations retain certain value for other non-State actors involved in the process. Take private companies, for example. As stressed throughout this book, they may become part of trafficking by employing child or cheap labor. While international human rights law does not impose obligations upon them, many companies have voluntarily agreed to be bound by code of conduct and other non-legally binding rules.⁶⁹ Such a trend has undoubtedly been influenced by the human rights movement and law at the national, regional and international levels. It is submitted, therefore, that moral obligations can play an important part in encouraging non-State actors to promote and protect the human rights of others.

All of this does not mean, however, that international human rights law is irrelevant in efforts to combat trafficking of human beings. The human rights norms and principles may be applied indirectly through national courts and tribunals, and the horizontal application of human rights law is possible at this level.⁷⁰ The benefit of horizontal application is that it empowers victims by providing them with a means to hold individual perpetrators legally accountable for human rights abuses.⁷¹ This can be achieved in two ways. The first is to bring criminal proceedings against perpetrators.⁷² In the context of trafficking, many States have already enacted specific laws and regulations to prohibit the act.⁷³ The victims can rely on these laws and regulations to see to it that traffickers are prosecuted and punished.

The second is to initiate civil actions against traffickers.⁷⁴ Such civil proceedings are more likely to be successful than criminal ones because “the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.”⁷⁵ Civil actions also have the effect of empowering victims more, because they can be initiated by victims, giving them a degree of control, whereas the decision to bring criminal prosecutions lies mainly with States.⁷⁶ A classic example of a civil proceeding is *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*⁷⁷ from the United States, in which the Court of Appeals applied the *Alien Tort Claims Act*⁷⁸ to adjudicate on the case of deliberate torture inflicted upon a plaintiff.⁷⁹ In the case of the United States, the *Torture Victim Protection Act*,⁸⁰ and more appropriately, the *Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act*⁸¹ can be invoked to initiate civil actions. Such laws which allow actions in tort also exist in States such as Belgium,⁸² the Netherlands,⁸³ and the United Kingdom.⁸⁴ To summarize, although international human rights law cannot be enforced directly against non-State actors, indirect enforcement is an option.

In order to indirectly enforce human rights standards and values at the international level, analogous to criminal proceedings at the national level, the principle of individual responsibility under international criminal law is applicable to human trafficking.⁸⁵ The principles of individual criminal culpability for breaking international law have long been established, and there are connections between transgressions of both international criminal law and human rights law.⁸⁶ The 1998 *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* reiterated this.⁸⁷ Human trafficking may be classified as a crime against humanity among the

other established categories of crimes. It is worth noting in this regard that in the case of *Kunarac*, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY held that enslavement, as a crime against humanity, included trafficking of human beings.⁸⁸

All of this warrants a careful analysis as it raises a possibility of trafficking being treated as an international crime. Under the *Rome Statute*, a crime against humanity is defined as: any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.⁸⁹

Of particular importance is Article 7(2)(c) which states: “Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.⁹⁰ The first point which needs to be addressed is the relationship between trafficking and enslavement. It is important to note that trafficking and enslavement are not necessarily the same acts. This means that an additional ground or grounds may be necessary in order to establish trafficking as a crime against humanity in cases where the practice does not amount to slavery. In analyzing Article 7 of the *Rome Statute*, it can be stated that trafficking can fall under some other acts. Forcible transfer of population under Article 7(1)(d) is one example. Together with deportation, the act is defined as “forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.”⁹¹ According to the Preparatory Commission for the ICC, the term “forcible”: is not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment.⁹²

The *Rome Statute* does not require proof of crossing an international border, but only that the civilian population was displaced.⁹³ In addition, unlike the enforced disappearance under Article (7)(1)(i), which must be committed with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization,⁹⁴ there is no such requirement for forcible transfer of people. This means that it can be committed by non-State actors such as traffickers. Applying these interpretations to the definition of trafficking, it may reasonably be sustained that trafficking can be regarded as forcible transfer within the meaning of Article (7)(1)(d). However, those being deported or transferred must be lawfully present in a given State, and therefore trafficking of illegal migrants in foreign States does not constitute forcible transfer under the same Article.

In addition, torture under Article 7(1)(f) of the Rome Statute may be invoked as noted above. Torture and related practices can be committed by non-State actors without any involvement of public officials.⁹⁵ Moreover, trafficking may be regarded as “other inhuman acts” under Article 7 (1)(k). The conditions which must be satisfied are that such acts must be similar to other acts stipulated under a crime against humanity, and that they must entail the intentional causing of great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. As stressed elsewhere, trafficking is coercive, and as such, may fall under this category. In sum, it is possible to apply other provisions when trafficking cannot be regarded as enslavement.

In addition to these specific acts stipulated in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, there are several other conditions which must be satisfied. A lack of jurisprudence under the ICC necessitates an analysis of the pre-existing jurisprudence established by the national and international tribunals to elaborate upon the meaning of a crime against humanity. In applying their interpretations to Article 7 of the Rome Statute, it becomes possible to hold that trafficking of human beings can be treated as a crime against humanity. To begin with, it stipulates that in order for conduct to constitute a crime against humanity, it must be “widespread or systematic.”⁹⁶ The term “widespread” has been interpreted to mean the large-scale nature of the attack against civilians and the number of its victims⁹⁷ and therefore isolated acts committed by perpetrators cannot be considered as such.⁹⁸ Further, “systematic” conduct requires “the organized nature of the acts of violence.”⁹⁹

Another key phrase is “with the knowledge of the attack.”¹⁰⁰ This suggests that criminal intent or *mens rea* is required. On this point, the ICTY held that the accused must have had the intent to commit the underlying offence or offences with which he is charged, and that he must have known “that there is an attack on the civilian population and that his acts comprise part of that attack, or at least that he took the risk that his acts were part of the attack.”¹⁰¹ This does not mean, however, that the accused must know the details of the act itself.¹⁰² Unlike genocide, which requires an intention to destroy a population on grounds of nationality, ethnicity, race or religion,¹⁰³ a discriminatory intent is not required under a crime against humanity.¹⁰⁴ It is worth noting further that while all perpetrators must have criminal intent, they may commit the act for a wide variety of reasons. On this point, it has been held that “the motives of the accused for taking part in the attack are irrelevant and a crime against humanity may be committed for purely personal reasons.”¹⁰⁵

A crime against humanity must also be committed in support of or in promotion of a State or organizational policy, as stated in Article 7(2)(a) of the *Rome Statute*.¹⁰⁶ This Article's wording is broad enough to cover actions taken by non-State actors, and both the national and international community have approved this view.¹⁰⁷ Although overtly promoting or encouraging an attack against a civilian population is a requirement for committing a crime against humanity,¹⁰⁸ a State or organization need not announce or explicitly endorse such behavior.¹⁰⁹ It might be sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a given act's widespread and systematic nature in and of itself to establish the existence of a policy.¹¹⁰

In looking at these elements, it may be reasonably argued that trafficking of human beings can be designated as a crime against humanity. Given the number of people trafficked each year and States affected, it can be stated that trafficking is widespread. The act is also systematic as

it requires organization. In addition, the definition of trafficking under the Trafficking Protocol suggests that traffickers must have knowledge of the attack on civilian populations. As noted above, a crime against humanity can be committed purely for personal reasons. Therefore, trafficking that is done for monetary or material benefit might likewise be considered to be such. Furthermore, although this could effectively exclude trafficking committed by people other than organized criminal organizations, the term "organizational policy" under Article 7(2)(a) of the *Rome Statute* can be understood to cover trafficking committed by entities like organized criminal groups. If such interpretations are upheld by the ICC in the future, human trafficking might be upgraded to the category of *delicta juris gentium*, the "most heinous crimes of concern to the international community as a whole," and traffickers could be called *hostes humani* (enemies of all mankind).¹¹¹

There are several important implications for the international legal system if trafficking of human beings is accepted as a crime against humanity. First and foremost, cases involving trafficking of human beings can be tried by the ICC. In other words, direct control of the crime of trafficking may become possible at the international level.¹¹² There are mainly two advantages in doing so. First, States may be able to avoid retaliation or corruption in the forms of violence, intimidation and bribery on the part of traffickers. National governments and courts are more vulnerable to threats and corruption, as it may be easy for traffickers, such as organized criminal groups, to influence them in order to advance their trafficking business. However, being an independent international judicial organ with judges who have no personal interests or opportunities for gain, it is arguable that the ICC can be immune from the influence of traffickers and therefore that it is better suited to try cases of trafficking.

The legal actions against traffickers might also include victims of trafficking. During the investigation phase, the prosecutor has access to information from intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, as well as from other trustworthy sources.¹¹³ In order for the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber to decide whether or not to grant an authorization of investigation, victims may also submit arguments.¹¹⁴ The International Criminal Court (ICC) can permit the presentation of the interests and viewpoints of the victims during the trial stage and can provide protection measures for the victims concerned, such as hearings in camera.¹¹⁵ Finally, the *Rome Statute* also provides for a trust fund for victims, whereby the Court may award compensation.¹¹⁶ In sum, the Rome Statute has the effect of empowering victims of trafficking by affording them access to international criminal justice.

Nevertheless, the role of the ICC is constrained by the limits imposed upon its exercise of jurisdiction. There are three ways in which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction. First, it can do so when a case is referred to the Prosecutor by States.¹¹⁷ In this case, the consent of States where offences take place or States of the accused's nationality is required.¹¹⁸ In addition, the Court would find a case inadmissible if it is being investigated and prosecuted at the national level.¹¹⁹ Second, the ICC has jurisdiction over cases referred by the Security Council of the United Nations acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.¹²⁰ This is unlikely to happen in the context of trafficking as the act may not be easily treated as a threat to international peace and security to merit the invocation of Chapter VII. Third, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction upon an independent investigation initiated by the Prosecutor.¹²¹ Similar to cases of referral by States, the consent of States is required.¹²² It can certainly be argued from these that bringing a

case of trafficking before the ICC is not practical, as the principle of national sovereignty and political interests of States may hinder it.

However, the possibility remains for the ICC to be involved. For instance, cases requiring the consent of States would be deemed admissible if it can be shown that they are either unwilling or unable to investigate, prosecute and punish perpetrators of the crime specified in the Rome Statute.¹²³ In the context of trafficking, such a situation can arise if States do not enact laws prohibiting trafficking, allow impunity of traffickers, or are not able to conduct independent and impartial proceedings due to corruption. In the case of referral by the Security Council, trafficking may reasonably be considered as a threat to international peace and security under certain circumstances which may include, but are not limited to, its link with terrorist activities¹²⁴ and instances of internal and international armed conflict.¹²⁵ Even when the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC is hindered, trafficking as a crime against humanity can serve as a basis for the establishment of universal jurisdiction by States. The ICC is not able to exercise universal jurisdiction because the basis of its jurisdiction is territoriality and/or nationality.¹²⁶ Universal jurisdiction may be invoked when a crime constitutes a “joint concern of all States” and is “of such a gravity and magnitude” that it “warrants their universal prosecution and repression.”¹²⁷ Simply put, “universal jurisdiction permits any State to apply its laws to punish an offence even when the State has no links of territory with the offence, or of nationality with the offender.”¹²⁸ Universal jurisdiction over such offences as piracy, slave trade, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity has been established as a matter of customary law.¹²⁹ Although the Organized Crime Convention, the parent instrument to the Trafficking Protocol, does not touch upon universal jurisdiction, its exercise in relation to trafficking of human beings is increasingly supported.¹³⁰ If it is accepted that trafficking constitutes a crime against humanity, this would not only send a message to traffickers that they would not be able to escape from the reach of the law, but also put more pressure on States to establish criminal jurisdiction, prosecute and punish traffickers.¹³¹

Further, trafficking as a crime against humanity has an important implication for immunities of those government officials and military personnel who become part of trafficking process. There are two types of immunity. The first type is known as personal immunity or immunity *ratione personae*, which is attached to a particular office and continues to be possessed by an official as long as he/she remains in the office.¹³² This type of immunity exempts high ranking or senior officials such as heads of States and governments, and foreign ministers from civil or criminal jurisdiction in other States. It was noted by the ICJ in *Arrest Warrant Case* that these high ranking officials are exempt from arrest and prosecution in foreign courts even when they are suspected of committing international crimes.¹³³ Such a principle has also been accepted at the national level.¹³⁴ The ICJ, however, went further to state that senior officials may be subject to criminal proceedings before international criminal courts where they have jurisdiction.¹³⁵ All of this suggests that if high ranking officials are implicated for committing trafficking directly or indirectly, the ICC can step in and try them, provided that all the jurisdictional hurdles noted above are cleared, and that States of the nationals being prosecuted are parties to the Rome Statute.¹³⁶

The next type is functional immunity or immunity *ratione materiae*. This applies to acts performed in official capacity.¹³⁷ Immunity of this type can be applied to acts not only of serving State officials, but also of former officials while they were in the office.¹³⁸ Unlike the immunity *ratione personae*, State officials are not immune from criminal jurisdiction in foreign courts when they commit international crimes under immunity *ratione materiae*.¹³⁹ This type of immunity may be more relevant to trafficking of human beings, because lower ranking officials working in the field, such as the police, are more likely be implicated for the practice as noted elsewhere. Trafficking as a crime against humanity, then, can make a strong case for bringing the representatives of the governments, who attempt to hide behind the veil of immunity, to justice.

In relation to immunities for UN officials and experts on mission, including UN peacekeeping forces, a starting point is Article 105 of the United Nations Charter which provides:

1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connexion with the Organization.¹⁴⁰

In accordance with Article 105(3) of the Charter, the General Assembly adopted, in 1946, the *Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations*.¹⁴¹ The relevant provisions in this Convention are Articles V and VI. Article V relates to UN officials, while Article VI touches upon the immunity of ‘experts on mission’ who include Special Rapporteurs appointed by the Commission on Human Rights,¹⁴² UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) and military observers.¹⁴³ Further, there is general understanding that the Convention also applies to those involved in UN peacekeeping operations and transitional authorities.¹⁴⁴ The immunity accorded to these people is functional immunity discussed above,¹⁴⁵ and therefore can be waived if they commit international crime such as trafficking of human beings. In this regard, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has the right and duty to waive the immunity if it “impedes the course of justice.”¹⁴⁶ In view of all of this, it seems reasonable to conclude that international human rights law, together with other legal principles, plays an important part in addressing the liability of non-State actors.

There are still two things to say. First, trafficking as a crime against humanity opens the door for other illegal conducts to be categorized as international crimes in the future. States and the international community must be able to recognize the evolving nature of various criminalities at the national, regional, and international levels in modern times and should be prepared to treat them as such if they believe that they warrant universal repression and prevention, despite the fact that they may still be reluctant to broaden the definition of international crime(s). Second, it is important to emphasize where people stand in relation to international criminal law. It can be concluded from an analysis of the jurisprudence in this area of law that the vast majority of defendants have been government agents or members of the military services. Reaffirming that trafficking is a crime against humanity shows that non-State actors can harm innocent civilians and that they are subject to the reach of international criminal law and justice.

Conclusion

Responses to human trafficking have dramatically changed during the past ten years on a national, regional, and worldwide level. Due to the transnational nature of the act, global intervention involving various actors is required. The UN's approval of the Trafficking Protocol was one of the key steps taken to address the problem. This tool is important because it provides a definition of trafficking that different parties can use to develop rules and laws at the national, regional, and global levels. It also seeks to promote collaboration in order to maximize the contributions made by different players.

The criminal justice system must undoubtedly deal with the issue of human trafficking. The practice jeopardizes a state's territorial integrity since it frequently facilitates border crossings that are against immigration laws and policies at the national level. It also presents a challenge to the rule of law and the political foundation of States because traffickers, particularly organized criminal gangs, use violence and corruption as instruments to further their unlawful enterprises. This paper explains how criminal and immigration control, which seeks to prosecute and penalize traffickers and halt the flow of trafficked individuals, has been the most common response. This criminal justice reaction is improved by the Trafficking Protocol, which essentially serves as a tool to help with the successful suppression and prevention of this behavior. The human rights implications of trafficking have, nevertheless, received increased attention in recent years. This demonstrates that a human rights perspective on trafficking is also necessary in order to handle the numerous issues raised by the phenomenon.

However, in recent years, the human rights aspects of trafficking have become more widely acknowledged. This shows that in order to address the complex problems posed by the phenomena, a human rights approach to trafficking is also required. This paper's major goal was to clarify this and create a human rights framework to comprehend and deal with the situation. This paper looked at questions of non-State actor accountability under international human rights law. The key finding was that, despite the fact that non-State actors are not subject to international human rights legislation, there are still means to remedy the violations of human rights they cause.

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND RE-DEMOCRATISATION: RETHINKING THE ROLE OF INDIGENOUS NON-STATE ACTORS IN COLONIAL IJEBULAND, WESTERN NIGERIA

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Abstract

The role of indigenous institutions in peace-building, conflict resolution and re-democratisation in colonial Ijebu province is yet to receive any serious attention from the academic community, particularly historians. Thus, this paper fills the gap in literature by examining the role of indigenous institutions in peace-building, conflict resolution and re-democratisation in Ijebu province of Western Nigeria from 1900 to 1960. Using primary and secondary sources of historical data including archival records, oral interviews and texts, the paper reveals that the structural delineation of Ijebu province into districts; the establishments of the Judicial Council and the Ijebu Native Administration (INA) from 1917 led to the proliferation of indigenous institutions in the province. The reforms also reconfigured the Ijebu traditional political system which enabled 'hyper-elevation' of the office of the *Awujale* against the initial tradition. The study argues that the colonial reforms consequently impacted the internal dynamics of Ijebu politics, while it created conflicts which the community associations including Egbe Ojuba and other progressive associations had to deal with by engaging on peace-building processes and re-democratizations of the indigenous institutions to address issues of inequalities, as processes to sustaining peace within the province.

Keywords: Indigenous institutions, colonial reforms, Peace-Building, Conflict Resolution and Re-democratisation

Introduction

From historical perspective, peace-building, conflict resolution and democratization have a long history in many African societies dating back to pre-colonial times. It is a verifiable historical fact that the phenomenon of conflict has been common denominator and recurring decimal in African societies from pre-colonial to post-independence times. In pre-colonial Africa, conflict assumed micro and macro imensions depending on its impact on the conflicting parties or the people around them. It involved rifts, misunderstanding, family and market

brawls, skirmishes and wars, public insurrections and assaults, chieftaincy and boundary disputes.

In lieu of the inevitability of conflicts and the understanding that peace was a *sin qua non* for community development, a kind of political culture evolved in pre-colonial African societies recognising certain indigenous institutions as agents of conflict resolution and peace-building. The idea of conflict resolution was essentially aimed at the restoration of peace and enhancement of harmony in African indigenous societies.¹⁸² The traditional strategies and mechanisms for conflict resolution and peace-building in pre-colonial Africa were mediation, negotiation, adjudication and reconciliation.¹⁸³ Indeed, in pre-colonial Africa communities, there were numerous indigenous institutions that played important roles in peace-building and conflict resolution.

The prominent indigenous institutions of peace-building and conflict resolution in pre-colonial Africa were the age-grade societies as well as secret societies. Of course, there were other agents and stakeholders in conflict resolution in pre-colonial African societies. The king, chiefs, elders and family heads all played crucial roles in peace-building and conflict resolution in pre-colonial African states. These indigenous institutions contributed in no small measure by channeling their positive energy into the peace-building and conflict resolution. These institutions were in the saddle of re-establishing the energy within individuals, families and communities so as to re-build social harmony and peace in pre-colonial Africa. For instance, the Poro society in Sierra Leone, the age-grade societies among the Igbo and the Ogboni cult among the Yoruba of south west Nigeria had long established the models of conflict resolution geared towards peace-building and peaceful co-existence of people in their environment.

However, the advent of colonial rule in Africa with its attendant administrative reforms brought significant changes to the roles of these indigenous institutions. Perhaps the most astonishing feature of colonial administrative policy in Africa was the squeezing out of a good number of these institutions from the newly imposed political arrangement or machinery of government. Although they still existed, they had lost their traditional constitutional rights and clout and had been reduced to purely social organizations. Indeed, during colonial period, these indigenous institutions had lost ground to the hereditary aristocracy and the educated parvenus in Africa. Nevertheless, while it is true that their political relevance dwindled during colonial period, they still constituted important agents and platforms of conflict resolution, peace-building and re-democratisation. In other words, in spite of the reduction in the political roles and relevance of these indigenous institutions; they still acted as agents of conflict resolution and peace-building in Africa.

The colonial Ijebu province of Western Nigeria offers a good example or case study of the historical dynamics of peace-building, conflict resolution and re-democratisation in colonial Africa, particularly in respect of the role of indigenous institutions. The Ijebu territory covers such towns but not limited to Ijebu-Ode, Ijebu-Igbo, Ago-Iwoye, Epe, Ala, Owu, Igbile, Ilese,

¹⁸² Lawal, R.O, Orunbon, N.O, Ibikunle, G.A. and Faduyile, G.A (2020), Resolving Conflict in African Traditional Society: An Imperative of Indigenous African System, *African Journal of History and Archaeology*, Vol 4. No. 1

¹⁸³ Oguntomisin, G. O. (2004). The processes of peacekeeping and Peace -Making in Pre-Colonial Nigeria. Ibadan: John Archers Ltd

Isonyin, Atiba, Jobore, Imodi-Mosan, Okun-Owa, Odogbolu, Omu, Itele, Ososa, Imushin, Oru, Ijebu-Ife, Odoyanta, Odorangunse, Ogbogbo, Odolewu, Idomila and so on. Just like other African societies, indigenous non-state actors evolved, grew and propelled peace-building, conflict resolution and re-democratisation efforts in colonial Ijebuland.

Thus, this paper explores the specific roles played by indigenous institutions such as *Egbe Ojuba*, patriotic and progressive unions and welfare associations in peace-building, conflict resolution and re-democratisation in Ijebuland during colonial period. For this purpose, the paper takes stock of the efforts and strategies deployed by these institutions in addressing issues of conflicts and decline in democratic structures as a result of British colonial reforms in the area. The paper is structured into five segments. The first section is the introduction which provides background history indigenous institutions in Africa. The second segment deals with conceptualisation of the key conceptual variables in this discourse—the concepts of peace-building, conflict resolution and re-democratisation. The third section examines indigenous institutions as agents of peace-building and conflict resolution in colonial Ijebuland. The fourth section examines indigenous institutions as agents of political reforms and re-democratisation in colonial Ijebuland. The fifth section is the conclusion.

Peace-Building, Conflict Resolution and Re-democratisation: Conceptual Clarification

The concepts of peace-building, conflict resolution and re-democratisation have become a domain of great interest to scholars of different disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, particularly those in the field of peace and conflict studies. Historians and scholars in other related disciplines have attempted conceptual analyses of these three terms that provide the conceptual variables for our historical analyses in this paper from different but related contexts. Considering the mix-up and misconceptions that surrounds the term ‘peace-building’, it is necessary to attempt proper clarifications. Peace-building is conceptualized as the mechanism and process necessary for transition or transformation toward peaceful relationships and governance structures.¹⁸⁴ The term denotes all interventions geared towards the management, mitigation, resolution and transformation of the fundamental aspects of conflicts.¹⁸⁵ The concept of peace-building is characterized by civil society peace processes, informal dialogues, negotiations, and mediations.¹⁸⁶ It involves the entire process of providing supportive structures that can entrench and strengthen peace in a particular society.¹⁸⁷ In theory and practice, peace-building emphasizes the sustenance of peace in which state and non-state actors collaborate to keep peace and make it endure.¹⁸⁸ In more broader sense, peace-building covers a wide range of determining factors such as equality, justice, fairness for potential conflict parties.

Literature on conflict resolution is vast and abundantly rich. Conflict resolution is described as situation in which different parties in a conflict come to an understanding that their central

¹⁸⁴ Waldman, T. (2009), Conflict Resolution, Peacebuilding, and Youth: An SPW Primer, Student Partnerships Worldwide Working Paper.

¹⁸⁵ Bright-Brock, U. (2001). Indigenous Conflict Resolution in Africa. Institute of Educational Research. University of Oslo.

¹⁸⁶ Waldman, T. (2009), Conflict Resolution, Peacebuilding, and Youth...

¹⁸⁷ Akpuru, A. (2007). Basic Concepts, Issues, and Strategies of Peace and Conflict Resolution (Nigerian African Conflict Case Studies). Enugu: Keny and Brother Enterprises.

¹⁸⁸ Maiese, M. (2003). The Conflict Management Toolkit: Approaches. The Conflict Management Program. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University.

incompatibilities must be addressed so as to ensure cessation of all kinds of hostilities against each other.¹⁸⁹ Conflict resolution is defined by peace-making initiatives directed towards handling conflicts between individuals, groups or society with a view to ensure the entrenchment of sustainable peace.¹⁹⁰ As a process, it focuses on the alleviation, elimination and removal of various trigger factors that necessitated conflict in the first instance.¹⁹¹ The concept covers various strategies, tools and mechanisms of putting an end to a conflict situation.¹⁹² Such strategies include negotiation, diplomacy, mediation, arbitration, facilitation, adjudication and conciliation.¹⁹³ Conflict resolution can be conceptualised from generic and specific points of view.¹⁹⁴ Waldman's generic conceptual interpretation encompasses all efforts and measures geared at ending issues of conflict. The specific notion of the concept of peace-building covers various mechanisms aimed at moving conflicting parties away from zero-sum positions towards positive outcomes. The concept of conflict resolution became popularized in the 1950s and 1960s, at the height of Cold War when the development of nuclear weapons and the conflict between the super powers seemed to threaten human survival.

Similarly, the concept of re-democratisation cannot be clinically clarified without recourse to the twin concepts of 'democratisation' and 'de-democratisation'. In other words, in order to understand the concept of re-democratisation, it is important to explain what is meant by the twin concepts of democratisation and de-democratisation as all are intimately connected. In simple terms, democratization means transition from non-democratic forms of government to a political system dependent on popular sovereignty, control, legitimacy and peoples will. Political scientists have interrogated democratization from minimalist and maximalist conceptual perspectives.¹⁹⁵ To some scholars, democratization has to do with introduction and extension of citizenship rights and the creation of a democratic state. To others, democratization goes beyond transformation of the political system from non-democracy towards accountable and representative government but also touches socio-economic reforms, cultural and social change and a transformation of gender relations. De-democratisation is the decline in democratic culture, tenets and ethos in a particular society. It is the backward transition from democracy to a non-democratic system of government a political space.

¹⁸⁹ Hilal, A.W. (2011), Understanding Conflict Resolution, *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Vol. 1 No. 2:104-111

¹⁹⁰ Adegami, A. (2020), Peacebuilding in a Disparate Federation: Nigeria's Experience, *Relationes Internationales* Vol. 13, no 1/2020, pp. 59-77

¹⁹¹ Pooja, K. (2007) "Conflict Resolution, Conflict: Forms, Causes and Methods of Resolution." Deep-Deep Publications, New Delhi pp.1-29

¹⁹² Aremu, N. S., Adeyemi, A. E., & Abogunrin, A. P. (2021). Workplace Conflict Management and Organizational Sustainability in Selected Manufacturing Organizations in Nigeria. *Covenant University Journal of Politics & International Affairs* (Special Edition), 9(1).

¹⁹³ Tamilarasu, S., Sabrinah, A., Batiah, M. (2023), Conflict Resolution Styles and Organisational Performance: The Mediating Role of Cultural Factor, *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences* Vol. 13, No. 1,

¹⁹⁴ Walderman, *Conflict Resolution*, p.33

¹⁹⁵ Grugel, J. (2002), *Democratisation: A critical Introduction*, New York: Palgrave

Flowing from the conceptual framings of democratisation and de-democratisation, re-democratisation in simple term refers to the reinstatement of democracy after some level of decline or degeneration. In the context of this paper, re-democratisation denotes efforts geared towards return to democratic ethos and principles including political equality, administrative transparency, accountability and inclusive governance. Given the historical dynamics in the traditional political system of colonial Ijebu province, re-democratisation covers all mechanisms, efforts, agitations and struggles to restore the 'old democratic political order' that the society was known for prior to the British political reforms. Indeed, our conception and usage of re-democratisation in this paper revolves around the struggles for the rebirth and resuscitation of democratic governance within the traditional political configuration of the Ijebu in the face of British reforms that crippled democratization.

Indigenous Institutions as Agents of Peace-Building and Conflict Resolution in Colonial Ijebuland.

Since communal peace was considered a *sin qua non* for development, these indigenous institutions enjoyed legitimacy in conflict resolution and peace-building in colonial Ijebuland just as they did prior to the advent of British administration in Nigeria. Some of the old community institutions and even newly established ones sustained their roles as agents of conflict management and resolution in colonial Ijebu province. They worked to ensure the de-escalation of conflicts, reduction of violence, facilitating peace building and working with their communities to prevent and contain violent conflicts and built peace initiatives. A good number of them facilitated dialogue and inter-group social cohesion in Ijebuland during our period of study. Indeed, in respect of this *sin qua non* of community development, the efforts of these indigenous institutions merit attention. The associations were actively involved in settling intra-group and inter-group rifts and imbroglio in their communities. Some of these associations intervened meaningfully in legitimacy crises in their domains of operation. *Egbe Ojugba* became a veritable instrument of conflict resolution and management in their communities. For instance, *Egbe Gbobaniyi* was said to have made series of conflict resolution efforts during the popular legitimacy crises that engulfed Ijebu ode between 1929 and 1945.

The period between 1929 and 1945 witnessed serious legitimacy crises on the political landscape of Ijebu Ode. This legitimacy crisis (Gbelegbuwa imbroglio) threatened the peace, unity and development of Ijebu Ode community in the 1930s. Accession to the throne of *Awujale* Gbelegbuwa II had created rifts between his allies and some eminent personalities in the local politics. Be that as it may, some Ethno-cultural associations (ECAs) saw it as a point of duty to quench the ember that surrounded *Awujaleship* through diplomacy. Indeed, the role of "patriotic" unions in the resolution of the Gbelegbuwa imbroglio was remarkable as they engineered compromise solutions that eventually contributed to the entrenchment of relative peace in the town. To this end, the Ijebu Igbo Patriotic Union, the Ijebu Union (IU), and Ago-Iwoye Progressive Union (APU) were actively involved in diplomatic engineering for peace in Ijebu Ode.

Furthermore, in the early part of the 20th century, a dispute between two Ijebu rulers, the *Elepe* of Epe in Ijebu Remo and the *Akarigbo* of Ijebu Remo would have degenerated if not for the efforts of some associations who used the instrument of dialogue to settle the rift. Of course, this rift was triggered by the decision of the *Elepe* of Epe (in Ijebu Remo) to assume the status of a crowned *Oba* in Remo country. The *Akarigbo* had protested the *Elepe's* wearing of a

beaded crown, which by tradition could be worn only by an *Oba* claiming direct descent from Oduduwa, who had been authorized to wear the crown by the *Ooni* of Ile-Ife. Some communal associations such as the Remo Union (RU) also intervened in *Elepe-Akarigbo* crises as peace was eventually brokered.

The Ijebu Ode Branch of the Epe Descendant Union (EDU) also intervened in the inter-group conflict that bedeviled the Epe community in the 1950s. The Ijebu-Epe/ Eko-Epe imbroglio which had attained a devastating dimension in the 1950s gained the attention of the leadership of the EDU in Ijebu Ode community. This was a product of a long-standing inter-group rivalry between the Ijebu people and the Eko elements in the community. However, while the efforts of the EDU was not sufficient to quench the troubles in Epe, the association made significant strides to ensure that peace was entrenched at home.

The effort of the Ijebu National Society (INS) in promoting peace, unity and solidarity in throughout the Ijebu nation also merits our attention. Without mincing words, in the 20th century, the INS was the first ECN to inspire and engineer pan-Ijebuism which placed emphasis on peace, solidarity and oneness of all Ijebu people.¹⁹⁶ Indeed, the ideological mantle of the INS remained peace and solidarity of Ijebu people, a concept that some of the so-called patriotic unions never preached in Ijebuland.¹⁹⁷ This ideological leaning was put to fore in 1940 when a delegation of the INS who had been concerned about the balkanization of the province appealed to Reverend Solomon Odutola to work towards the reconciliation of the Super-Ijebus and those in the districts.¹⁹⁸

Indigenous Institutions as Agents of Political Reforms and Re-democratisation in Colonial Ijebuland.

Abundant historical evidence attests to the crucial interventions on the political and democratic landscape of colonial Ijebu province. In the first case, the roles played by some of the ECAs included the struggle for the administrative autonomy of their communities, raising the political status of the leadership of the traditional aristocracy in their communities, engineering democratization and re-democratisation, building resistance against obnoxious, exploitative and harsh administrative policies as well as facilitating accountability and transparency in local governance. On the struggle for the administrative autonomy of their communities, some ECAs were significantly instrumental to the attainment of administrative autonomy of their communities in colonial period. The origin of the struggle for administrative autonomy championed by such ECAs in the district areas of Ijebu province had to do with the 'capital-district dichotomy' between two classes (educated parvenus and traditional aristocracy) in Ijebu Ode and the districts. Certainly, the constitution of Ijebu Native Administration (INA) coupled with the enforcement of the Sole Native system of indirect rule in early years of colonial administration in the province played a crucial role in the struggle for administrative autonomy of some districts particularly Remo and Ijebu Igbo.¹⁹⁹ Thus, in the atmosphere of sectionalism and sub-nationalism (that manifested in form of Remoism and Ijebu Igboism), some ECAs rose to prominence and became veritable instrument of political liberation and emancipation. The

¹⁹⁶ Odutola papers, Diary entry for 7June, 1940

¹⁹⁷ Odutola papers, Diary entry for 7June, 1940

¹⁹⁸ Odutola papers, Diary entry for 7June, 1940

¹⁹⁹ The point here is that the ideology of sub-nationalism and sectionalism demonstrated by the educated parvenus and traditional aristocracy in Remo and Ijebu Igbo was a reactionary product of series of administrative changes brought about by the colonial state in Ijebuland.

activities of the Remo Union (RU) and the IPU vis-à-vis Remo's and Ijebu Igbo's agitations for administrative independence merits mentioning here. The Remo Union offered a prominent example of ECAs role vis-à-vis politics in Remo. Of course, by 1916, the British government had merged Remo with Ijebu Ode for administrative expediency and by 1917, the Akarigbo of Remo had been made a Native Authority (N.A) subject to the Awujale. This development had created resentment; and hence the several petitions from the Remos to the government claiming the restoration of their absolute freedom from Ijebu Ode. This campaign for independence was championed by the the Remo Union which became the voice of the people of Remo.²⁰⁰

Thus, the RU under the leadership of Odun Ojunuloye (Ode Remo), S.M. Sowole (Sagamu), Ayodele Desalu (Iperu), J.O. Oshinbajo (Ikenne), G.S Afisunlu, S. Solanke Ogunlana (Ipara), J.A.S Osindeinde (Isara) and J.O. Sokoya (Ilisa) strategized vehemently for the administrative autonomy of the community.²⁰¹ This they argued was in the interest of community development. In September 1933, the RU wrote the Commissioner a strongly worded petition which read:

The officers and members of the Remo Union, Lagos humbly beg of the commissioner to submit this memorandum touching the claims of the Akarigbo, the Obas and Chiefs of Remo for administrative independence of the Awujale of Ijebu Ode as old... Our union associates itself with Obas and people at home in this legitimate claim and proffer our unstinted loyalty to the Akarigbo of Remo. We appeal to all that is Good and Honourable in British sense of justice is restore us to our erstwhile position.²⁰²

On democratisation and re-democratisation, as seen in available records, the ECAs in some cases were agents of democratization and re-democratisation. As noted previously, democratisation and re-democratisation in our context denotes the quest for inclusion in the political space of the communities in the province as well as improving transparency and accountability level of officials of the Ijebu Native Administration. Some of them had pressured the colonial government, their political mercenaries and even the Ijebu native Administrative to meet higher standards for transparency and accountability in the process of local administration. Some of these associations had required governments to produce clear budgets and timelines for the implementation of projects, and they had followed with insistent requests that the money be accounted for.

To this end, the ECAs were very active in the struggle for good governance in Ijebu province. They had been in the forefront of the struggle for accountability, transparency and the campaigns against funds mismanagement, corruption and financial recklessness in Ijebu Native Administration. Indeed, the ECAs agitated vigorously for openness and information on governmental affairs the community level. The organizations had sought dialogue on community governance issues and agitated for governance systems that would address the needs, aspirations and challenges of community members in colonial Ijebuland. The ECAs had

²⁰⁰ National Archives, Ibadan [NAI], Simple List on Remo (Exhibit L.19), Memorandum of the Remo Union in connection with the Commission of Enquiry to investigate Remo Claim for Administrative independence of Ijebu Ode

²⁰¹ NAI Simple List on Remo (Exhibit L.19)...

²⁰² NAI Simple List on Remo (Exhibit L.19)...

monitored governance issues and brought excesses of the INA to public scrutiny. In this way, they were also a major platform for oversight and checks and balances in the administrative set up of the province.

In the atmosphere of chronic corruption exhibited by some Ijebu traditional rulers and their chiefs, some ECAs became anti-corruption agencies. The level of corruption exhibited by some of these traditional rulers or district heads in colonial Ijebuland propelled a British political officer into issuing a statement in 1917 in which he said:

You chiefs...have done nothing but sit in your towns and made as much money as possible for your own selves. You never thought of the good of the country.²⁰³

Since the maximalist conception of re-democratisation views it as holistic covering not just democratic consideration but also socio-economic reforms, the anti-corruption role of these indigenous non-state actors in colonial Ijebuland should not go unnoticed. Indeed, officials of the Ijebu Native Administration were so corrupt. Between 1925 and 1929, corruption became the “motto” of governance under the leadership of *Awujale* Adenuga who was the head of the Ijebu Native Administration. *Awujale* Adenuga was corrupt to the extent that he was reprimanded in 1926 for collecting money improperly.²⁰⁴ In fact, Adenuga was responsible for the state of corruption in Ijebu Native Administration. However, some ECAs rose to the occasion by monitoring the *Awujale* and members of the INA. With the close monitoring, corrupt practices of some INA members and even the *Awujale* were brought to attention of colonial officers in the province. One of the ECAs renowned for its anti-corruption crusade against the INA was the Goodwill Society.²⁰⁵ In some cases, these associations would ask the Ijebu Native Administration to provide the advance copies of the estimates which they found the time to study in a bid to ensure that the interest of the community members were taken care of by the body and reduce corruption in local governance.

The role of ECAs in political and democratic reforms as well as good governance was also demonstrated by the Majeobaje Society in 1948. Indeed, the Majeobaje Society (MS) also known as *Egbe Omo Ibile* was equally at the forefront of the campaign for good governance in the colonial Ijebu community of Iperu in Remo area.²⁰⁶ The MS had complained bitterly about the obnoxious taxation policy of the Alaperu of Iperuland, Oba Olayinka Okupe.²⁰⁷ The MS had asked the Alaperu to review his taxation policy and account for taxes paid by the people of Iperu. To this end, the MS became an agent of good governance built on the democratic principle of transparency, accountability and quality representation in governance system.

The Ijebu-Igbo Progressive Union (IPU) offered another example of ethno-cultural association acting as agents of political and democratic reforms in colonial Ijebuland. The IPU advocated political and democratic reforms in the province by lobbying the colonial state and the ‘hegemons’ in Ijebu-Ode to grant administrative autonomy to the community and raised the status of the *Orimolusi* in Ijebu Native Administration. The struggle for the administrative independence of Ijebu Igbo from the traditional aristocratic ‘hegemons’ of Ijebu Ode was

²⁰³ National Archives, Ibadan [NAI], IjeProf 9/5 *Council Minutes Book*, 30 March, 1917

²⁰⁴ National Archives, Ibadan [NAI], IjeProf 7/2 Confidential Notes, 1926

²⁰⁵ National Archives, Ibadan [NAI], IjeProf 2443 The Goodwill Society to *Awujale*, 10 November, 1942

²⁰⁶ National Archives, Ibadan [NAI], IjeProf 3754 Majeobaje Society to the Alaperu of Iperu, 1948

²⁰⁷ National Archives, Ibadan [NAI], IjeProf 3754 Majeobaje Society to the Alaperu of Iperu, 1948

championed by the IPU in the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed, a feature of the diplomatic effort of the IPU to neutralize the influence of the super-Ijebus on the internal political affairs of Ijebu Igbo was the sending of series of petitions to the British administrators in charge of the province. The IPU monopolized the struggle for administrative autonomy and enhancement of the status of *Orimolusi* as this was considered a workable strategy for improving the level of development of Ijebu Igbo community.²⁰⁸

The leadership of the organization had felt that if the community must achieve social, economic and infrastructural development, it must liberate itself from the control, oppression and exploitation by the Awujale and the 'super subjects'. The organization also felt that the community must form an integral voice in Ijebu Native Administration through adequate representation.²⁰⁹ Lack of administrative autonomy was seen as a bane of development to the community because the Awujale and his aristocratic council members hijacked every development project that was meant for Ijebu province. This meant that a significant proportion of development projects meant for the whole province was situated and enjoyed by the residents in Ijebu Ode only.²¹⁰ The notion shared by the leadership of the IPS was that their community was marginalized as far as development projects for the province were concerned Part of the solution to this would be the attainment of administrative autonomy and enhancement of the status of the *Orimolusi*. It would be recalled that in 1929, the *Orimolusi* title, which had fallen into abeyance since 1905, was re-instituted with the appointment of Abraham Adesemowo. The *Orimolusi* became officially acknowledged as the titular head of Ijebu-Igbo and was appointed district head. The problem which subsequently emerged was that the *Orimolusi* title had no recognition as a crowned status, a phenomenon that was grossly unacceptable to the IPS. The truth of the matter is that the movement against the ruling traditional hegemony in Ijebu Ode organized by the IPU was one of the fiercest social movement, the first successful mobilization of patriotic fervor, against the hegemony of the metropole since Remo's attainment of independence in 1938. With the singular exception of the RU's revolt against the unpopular imposition of Awujale on Remo country, no ECA aroused so much popular interest in secession than the IPU.

The audacity and bravura exhibited by Ijebu Igbo traditional ruling council with regards to the clamour for political and democratic freedom was the handiwork of the IPU. Thus, the IPU became a veritable instrument of political reforms and re-democratisation through its interventionist strategy in community governance. The major approach of the IPU in its solidarity struggle for the democratic reforms and the granting of independence for the community was petitioning. Series of petitions were forwarded to the British government by the IPU in the thirties and fourties to support the *Orimolusi* in his for administrative autonomy. The role of the IPU in this regard could be vividly read in objections raised by the organization to the invitation extended to the *Orimolusi* by the Awujale in 1939. The Awujale had written to the *Orimolusi* saying:

²⁰⁸ Interview with Imam, Lateef Odeseye aged 91 on 17th June, 2017 at his residence at Okesopin, Ijebu Igbo

²⁰⁹ It should be noted that was the main centre of cocoa and palm Kernels which the Awujale and Ijebu Ode middlemen exploited to the detriment of Ijebu Igbo people. The hegemony in Ijebu Ode had lorded it over the community people since the community was under the rule of the Awujale.

²¹⁰ Interview with Imam, Lateef Odeseye aged 91 on 17th June, 2017 at his residence at Okesopin, Ijebu Igbo

...come to the Afin [palace], Ijebu-Ode, with the other Bales of Ijebu-Igbo, 12 representatives of Osugbo [an indigenous political society] and some members of the Patriotic Society on Monday the 27th February at 10 a.m.²¹¹

In reaction to the above invitation letter, the *Orimolusi* through the leadership of the IPS led by T.A. Odugbesan wrote:

With reference to your letter dated 20th February, and the more imperative sequel of 22nd February, 1939. I am to inform your Alaiyeluwa [Highness] that we do not desire to come to Ijebu-Ode.... We should be immensely grateful if your Alaiyeluwa, for your own sake, may not press the invitation....Awujale Ijebu-Ode imperatively request Oba...*Orimolusi* Ijebu-Igbo to proceed with his chiefs and Osugbo to Ijebu-Ode on Monday February 27th. There is consternation among Ijebu-Igbo natives feeling insulted by Awujale's letters. Action amounts deliberate travesty of sacred traditions. Unpleasant civil cataclysm follows immediately if Awujale is allowed by government to drag Ijebu-Igbo dignitaries to his Afin²¹²

The efforts of the IPU to transform Ijebu Igbo politically and democratically for better development results did yield positive outcome in the late 1930s and 1940s. By June 1939, Ijebu Igbo had been granted the concession of a sub-treasury status and by 1940, the community had been given Ijebu Igbo Council. By 1948, the community through the efforts of the IPU had asserted its existence as a separate entity, an achievement that produced positive impact on the democratic governance through improved inclusiveness. In fact, a good proportion of its revenue or tax could then be used to execute development projects for the benefit of Ijebu Igbo people. Of course, hitherto, the Ijebu Igbo tax payers had accused Ijebu Ode of hijacking all development projects despite the fact that they contributed the chunk of the money used to execute such projects by the Ijebu Native Administration. With the sub-treasury status granted the community, the leadership now had a level of financial autonomy that translate to community development.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, indigenous institutions particularly ethno-cultural associations were not just actively involved in settling intra-group and inter-group rifts and imbroglio in their communities, but also played pivotal role in the bringing trappings of political and democratic reforms through passive, active, overt and covert mechanisms. In the local politics of colonial Ijebu communities where they were active, some of these associations intervened meaningfully in legitimacy crises in their domains of operation. As discussed above, various strands of *Egbe Ojugba*, patriotic and welfare associational platforms *became* a veritable instrument of conflict resolution and management in their communities. Of course, certain dynamics operative in local politics of colonial Ijebu province acted as a kind of catalyst for the emergence, proliferation and development of these indigenous institutions. However, the political dynamics

²¹¹ National Archives, Ibadan [NAI], IjeProf 2, File no. C.54, vol. I, Awujale to Orimolusi, 20 Feb. 1939

²¹² National Archives, Ibadan [NAI], IjeProf C.54 vol. I, Orimolusi to Chief commissioner, 25 and 26 Feb. 1939.

that spurred their emergence and development also went a long way in determining and defining the impact of these indigenous institutions on the political and democratic landscapes of the province. The nexus or point of convergence between the political circumstances that precipitated the growth of these associations and the political role they played in colonial Ijebu province cannot be severed. This, therefore, suggests that the political roles of these associations can be understood within the context of administrative dynamics that propelled and compelled their proliferation. They were indeed monumental considering the quality of political and democratic transformations brought about in their communities during our period of study.

THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE 2023 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Right from the commencement of Nigeria's Fourth Republic in 1999, the political system is depicted to have been characterized by the predominance of the two major political parties- APC and PDP. These parties alternated the positions of the ruling and the opposition parties between themselves. Therefore, this research paper investigates the performances of the Labour Party in the 2023 general election in Nigeria. It further assesses the strategies that could transform the party into a formidable force in Nigeria. The study adopted an ethnographic research design to analytically and systematically describe the perception of individuals on the performances of the Labour Party during the February 2023 election in Nigeria. Data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. The study made use of 25 key informants who were selected through a purposive sampling technique. It was discovered that the Labour Party significantly influenced the political landscape in Nigeria by challenging the political parties that were hitherto considered invincible, especially in their respective strongholds. The study revealed that the Labour Party lacked a viable structure that ensured proper monitoring of votes at polls. The study concluded that the Labour Party has awakened youth consciousness and instituted a challenge to the dominance of the All-Progressive Congress and Peoples Democratic Party in the political arena. The study made some recommendations that if adopted by the policymakers will go a long way in restructuring the electoral practices in Nigeria in such a way that the masses' trust in democracy is regained.

Keywords: Labour Party, Election, APC, PDP, Political Party

Introduction

Regular free and fair elections signify one of the most important institutions of participatory and liberal democracy. Elections, which can take different forms based on what the polity in question deems appropriate for use, serve as an indispensable aspect of democracy (Robert & Obioha, 2005). However, Ujo (2008) observes a discrepancy between elections and voting. He opines that election is an all-encompassing word with wide coverage, that entails other activities before, during, and after voting. Nonetheless, voting is the actual procedure in which individual

choice is made from various alternatives. The extent to which elections contribute to the advancement and continuity of democracy, specifically in those that are nascent and developing, is largely dependent on factors that influence the electorates in determining their choice (Ujo, 2008).

Political parties under a liberal democratic system are expected to help deepen democracy and development by pursuing public policy measures and programs to advance public welfare in line with their manifestos and ideologies (Ibeanu, 2018). However, a political party is much more than an organization for seeking and controlling political power. More critically, it is an organization for expressing and harmonizing interests and that intermediates between the citizens and political society, government, and the state. Because of its diverse roles, a political party is a major source and a breeding ground of electoral conflicts as well as a major platform for expressing, reconciling, and managing electoral competition and contestation.

This particularly connotes the significance of political parties in a democracy. Hence, ‘without well-developed parties as a buffer, the State is constantly battered and endangered by societal demands’ (Perkins, 2000). Unarguably, in all democracies of the world, political parties serve as the engine house of politics as they (are expected to) perform certain vital democratic functions. The role of parties in established democracies is not in dispute. What is in question is their ability to perform their roles in contemporary times, and this questioning is not limited to any particular region but all over the world. For instance, in the United States, Dalton and Wattenberg (2001) observed that many American Political Scientists have criticized political parties in the country for becoming weak and unable to do what is expected.

Typically, Nigeria elections have been fraught with different forms of irregularities be it before, during, or after election exercise. (Campbell, 2010; Alli, 2015; Moshood, 2023). This however made scholars like Ikenna (2020); Emoghene & Okolie (2020) claim that religion assumed a central role in determining the fate of elections in Nigeria despite being a secular nation. However, Ikenna concluded that adherence to religious values and morals would facilitate national development. While relying on secondary data, Abdullahi (2021) lamented that the political parties have now become inconsequential and thus unable to aggregate and articulate the majority interest in promoting credibility and transparency in democratic practices. This indicates that studies have largely been carried out in different fields after elections in Nigeria to debate the level of compliance to democracy and to unmask the conduct of the political parties about democratic principles. However, despite the efforts of these scholars, less attention is paid to the impacts and influence of minority parties in elections.

Husaini (2023) who recently conducted research on democratic development and political fragmentation in the 2023 general election only captured the preparedness of the Independence National Electoral Commission (INEC) and analyzed the implications the insecurity predicaments had on the voting behavior. Furthermore, Mimiko (2007) trailed the blaze in his account of the performances of the Labour Party in the Ondo state 2007 gubernatorial election. He was motivated by the victory of the Labour Party in the election, which made Ondo state the only state won by the Party with a weak structure (Mimiko, 2007). Therefore, with a focus on the February 2023 General Election in Nigeria, this paper aims to investigate the performances of the Labour Party and suggest strategies that could transform the Party into a winning force in subsequent elections.

The current political stage is dominated by two major political parties in Nigeria called “All Progressive Congress (APC)” and “People’s Democratic Power (PDP)” (Africa Report, 2023). Nonetheless, the 2023 election in Nigeria witnessed a transformation in the political scene as a significant number of the Nigerian youths displayed their support and pledged allegiance to the Labour Party which had Peter Obi as its presidential flag bearer. However, as revealed by the outcome of the election, the Labour Party was adjudged to have come third by the INEC and, as a result, was perceived as just a touted party on social media.

Theoretical Framework

The study is anchored on primordial theory. The idea of the primordial soup was originally proposed by Alexander Oparin and John Haldane as a possible explanation for the creation of life on our planet. The theory states that if energy is added to the gases that made up Earth's early atmosphere, the building blocks of life would be created. Primordialism as a theory and ideology has been employed by many researchers to describe group loyalty and membership in an association (Kaufmann, 2012). Primordialism, in its original version, views ethnicity as an attributed or a natural phenomenon and comprehends ethnic groups in the biological sense and as intrinsically related to race. Mohammad (2021). The assumption that ethnicity is a natural primordial bond is premised on the notion that group identity is an uncompromising aspect of one’s identity. One proponent of this school of thought, the sociologist Edward Shils (1957, pp-154–170), for instance, argues that social life primarily cuts across various kinds of “primary group” relationships. As a result, he posits that the attachment that one feels to another member of one’s kinship group is not just a function of social interaction; instead, “it is because a certain ineffable significance is attributed to the tie of blood”. “The need for connections or relationships of a primordial character”, Shils continues, “will be endemic in human existence as long as biological existence has a value to the individual organism”.

Since the emergence of modern political government in Nigeria, the formation of political parties has been observed to be based on ethnic affiliation and differences, which puts the ethnic group that has the largest population at an advantage. However, this has left other minority ethnic groups in Nigeria to be politically sidelined. Some scholars (Omemma, 2019 & Chioke, 2022), for instance, believe that the Igbo ethnic group has been faced with political segregation because of constituting the low population in the country. However, the Igbo are one of the major ethnic groups of Nigeria, with the wherewithal: numerical strength, industry, education, wealth, ingenuity, etc, to secure a robust and extensive niche in Nigerian politics. Other scholars like (Onuoha, 2012; Ndiribe, & Aboh 2022), believed that the claims that the Igbo were marginalized require an explanation. However, the massive support given to the Labour Party candidate, Mr Peter Obi, as evident in the 2023 General Election results, captured the primordial tendency against the Igbos in Nigeria.

Methodology

The study adopted qualitative research methodologies which utilize ethnographic research design to analytically and systematically describe the perception of individuals on the performances of the Labour Party during the February 2023 election in Nigeria. Data for the study were collected through primary and secondary sources and a semi-structured interview with 25 key informants. The selection of the participants cut across Party agents including the Labour Party, party ward leaders, and some other notable members of the party were done

randomly. The study participants were selected purposively using convenient sampling techniques. The individuals who participated in the study were selected randomly across the 6 southwest states, particularly the areas where the researchers could reach the respondents and for confidentiality. The participants who were not available for a physical interview volunteered to share their opinions via WhatsApp conversation. However, their responses were audio-recorded and jotted down in papers in case of technical failure. The researcher chose to make the selection of participants across states, the reason being party supporters occupied all places to advocate for their political cause. Responses from the participants were collected, coded, and structured in a way that reflected the objectives of the research, while it employed thematic analysis in discussing the findings respectively. The researcher briefed the participants on their anonymity and confidentiality, considering the sensitivity of the information that would be disclosed henceforth.

The Candidature of Peter Obi and the Labour Party in the 2023 Election

The Labour Party, which had previously been in existence since 1970 via the linking together of four major central trade union organizations- the United Labour Congress, the Labour Unity Front, the Nigerian Workers' Council and the Nigeria Trade Union- was revamped in 2002 (Robin, 1970). Since then, the party has only won one gubernatorial election as well as the least of parliamentary positions. Even though the Labour Party was formed by the leaders of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), it has neither gained massive support among Nigerian trade unionists nor has it typically absorbed trade unionists as its candidates in elections (Husaini, 2023; Beckman & Salihu, 2010). However, the 2023 General Elections saw the rise to prominence of the Nigerian Labour Party, as one of the major political parties that participated in the elections. Before then, the Nigerian political space had been dominated by the All-Progressive Congress (APC) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). This made the presidency to be rotated among these two major political parties right from the commencement of Nigeria's Fourth Republic in 1999. Between 1999 and 2007, Olusegun Obasanjo contested and was elected the president under PDP for two consecutive terms. After the expiration of his tenure, President Umaru Musa Yaradua took over and became the President in 2007, contesting under PDP. He ruled the country from May 2007, until his demise in 2010. Then, his vice president, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, continued and also captured political power in 2011 under the same party.

In 2015, President Goodluck Jonathan contested for re-election and eventually lost the election to Muhammadu Buhari, who contested under APC. President Muhammadu Buhari assumed office as the president in 2015 and was re-elected for another four-year tenure – until 29 May 2023. During these periods, the PDP and the APC alternated the positions of the ruling and the opposition parties between themselves. It is, however, instructive to note that the APC did not exist until 2013, having been formed by ACN, CPC, ANPP and a faction of APGA. Although the Labour Party had been contesting elections, it was never close to capturing the Nigeria presidential seat except for the victory in the 2007 Ondo state gubernatorial election. However, the membership of the former Anambra state governor, Mr Peter Obi, into the Labor Party in 2023 brought the party to the fore. His membership led to the inclusion of new several members into the party, who were tired of the political stage occupied by only PDP and APC.

Mr Peter Obi had been the running mate of the former vice president to President Olusegun Obasanjo, Alhaji Abubakar Atiku when he contested in the 2019 election under PDP.

Unfortunately, PDP lost the election to APC in 2019 hence, the interest of Peter Obi to become the president of Nigeria became evident. Before joining the Labour Party in 2023, Peter Obi participated in the PDP presidential primary election and lost to Alhaji Abubakar Atiku. Consequently, Peter Obi came out on his social media handle and renounced his membership in the PDP while accusing PDP officials of corrupt practices. This made him defect to the Labour Party to contest the 2023 presidential election and afterward chose the former Kaduna state senator, Alhaji Yusuf Datti Baba-Ahmed, as his running mate (Husaini, 2023). In addition to his political ambitions, he employed the plights of the Nigerian youths during the EndSARS violent demonstrations to base his argument and political campaign.

Peter Obi was also perceived as the youngest presidential candidate who has a good track record and a worthwhile political experience while serving as the executive governor of Anambra state. As a result, this earned him the support of the Nigerian youths across various social media platforms, and through his political agenda of youth inclusiveness in politics. Peter Obi brought the Labor Party to prominence and, his major backing came from the eastern part of the country. Aside from being the most vibrant and youthful presidential candidate in the 2023 general election, Peter Obi was considered the rightful candidate that should emerge in the election by the Igbos in Nigeria. The Igbos have long condemned the Nigerian political system for political marginalization. It was believed that since the commencement of Nigeria's Fourth Republic, the presidency has never been rotated to their region.


In addition, there have been a series of controversies surrounding the selection of a Muslim-Muslim presidential ticket in APC. Before the election, people had come out to criticize the decision of Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu, who was contesting under the incumbent party. Being a Muslim, he also chose Alhaji Shettima as his presidential running mate, and this resulted in apathy among his supporters who are from Christian-dominated regions. Apart from Nigeria being a secular country, it was considered an affront to the eastern part of the country which is popularly Christian and has been aggrieved for their perception of being sidelined by the Nigerian government. This was the basis for the massive support of the Labor Party in the 2023 general election in Nigeria.

Findings and Discussion

As represented by the figures below, five major themes are reflected in the findings and each has subthemes that are justified by direct quotations from the participants as revealed in the network analysis. In addition, the themes are categorized under each objective of the study that forms the subheading. The five major themes are *Youth political participation*; *Systemic revolution*; *Changing the political landscape in Nigeria*; *Solid structure*; and *Proper coordination*.

The Performance of the Labour Party in the 2023 General Election

Youth Political Participation



Authors' Field Work (2023)

Before the emergence of the Labour Party in the presidential race in Nigeria, the majority of the citizens believed that the political activities in Nigeria had discouraged the active engagement of the youths. As is the case with the Vision and other Strategic Thrusts, the government has failed to meet expectations, and the extent of meaningful youth participation in political affairs has remained pathetically low. Writing about the very low level of youth participation in politics and decision-making, Ajodo-Adebanjoko (2019) says that although the signing into law of the "Not Too Young To Run Bill" in 2019 had reduced the age for running for elective offices (for instance, from 40 to 35 years for the Presidency; from 30 to 25 years for House of Representatives, etc), and as many as 67% of registered voters for the 2019 General Elections were youths: Less than 1% of youths were voted into office in the elections; there is no youth in the National Assembly; and no youth was appointed into President Buhari's Cabinet.

Ajodo-Adebanjoko (2019) identifies poor internal democracy among older political parties, an absence of a strategic political agenda, and money politics as some of the barriers to youth inclusion in politics in Nigeria. Showing how money politics constitutes a barrier to meaningful youth participation in political affairs, she concludes that “*while they are Not Too Young To Run, in practice, the youth find themselves Poor....*” However, the composition of the Labour Party with young and vibrant leaders assured the youths of securing better positions in the political space in Nigeria. This bolstered their involvement and the election eventually saw a massive turnout of voters among the youths. It can be argued that, for the first time in Nigeria, the youths across different regions of the country came united and engaged in political consciousness among the masses for them to see the need to vote and support a candidate in an election.


The impact of the Labour Party was interesting, it increased the awareness of the citizens about political implementation and performing their civil rights. The emergence of the Labour Party changed the narrative. The party has the freedom to vote for whomever, and they work for it. Virtually, the Labour Party gained nationwide influence through the youth and, also, through social media outlets. Innovation as the main focus, from everyone, makes everyone gain interest in the candidate. Labour Party proves to everyone that what seems to be unattainable can be achievable. For a new party to come out and challenge existing parties still standing firm is an achievement. It was the first of its kind in Nigeria. The impact was amazing. If you were to give it a score, it would be 100 if not for the anomaly that occurred during the elections. At least, people came out in huge numbers to cast their votes, a Labour Party leader said.

Consequently, the assumption of the Labour Party in the political stage in Nigeria has titillated the Nigerian youths to adopt a variety of innovative ways of political campaigns other than the primitive ways of wooing voters. Interestingly, the active political involvement of Nigeria as engineered by the Labour Party was, however, devoid of ethnic and religious sentiments among the youths who believed in a similar ideology. This was also confirmed by one of the respondents who opined that it was the political leaders who had created the ethnic and religious line that pitted them against each other and discouraged them from participating in elections.

Like me, I am a Yoruba, but I do not discriminate against the Igbo or other tribes, because I believe in equality and that is what the Labour Party stands for. Our Impact is very huge. At least, we did our best and we won. Yes, we won, he said.

This foregoing contradicts the work of Offiong (2018) who argues that Nigerian youths’ efforts at leadership are futile exercises because, generally, they are too divided along ethnic lines to clamor for national integration.

Systemic Revolution



Authors' Field Work (2023)


Sulaiman and Muhammad (2023) posited that political parties are important pillars of democracy. They are catalysts to the development of modern democracy. Through their numerous political and social activities, they serve as ladders and avenues for political mobilization and participation. Of the numerous functions of political parties, particularly, the ones that critically relate to the project of youth political participation are recruitment, mobilization, and participation as objective socio-political and economic reality. It can be argued that the Labour Party, in the 2023 general election, had served as a revolutionist movement that was designed to voice the interest and showed the displeasure of the Nigerian youths, including the masses over the repressive actions of the Nigerian government, especially during the incidents of Lekki massacre in Lagos. The grievances resulting from the 2020 EndSars nationwide violent protest made the citizens seek refuge in the Labour Party which hence would be used to uproot the incumbent government. Additionally, it can be contested that the common defection of political leaders between the APC and PDP had created disillusionment of voters and perceived the Labour Party as the only ordained party that had come to the rescue. From the inferences, it is noteworthy to point out that the massive

mobilization of citizens made those who contested under the auspices of the Labour Party in other capacities emerge winners which had never occurred before in Nigeria. Hence, this created representatives of ordinary citizens at both state and national assemblies in Nigeria because the electorates voted for the Labour Party irrespective of the candidates presented at polls. A party member told me:

The emergence of the Labour Party has changed the dimension of politics in Nigeria. That third force was what LP provided. Where we have several civil society organizations coming together. It was the first time in Nigeria that a party in less than a year gained tremendous ground in the election. Such as winning several seats in the National and state assemblies. As I said, all Nigerians are tired of APC and PDP, so, people are looking for an alternative, an incredible alternative, so when LP came up, it was a divine arrangement by God because nobody thought that any political party could challenge APC and PDP even APC and PDP are one political party. That is why most of their leaders will say APC, and PDP because they sometimes will defect to APC and they will defect to PDP, they are the same people.

It can be posited that the Labour Party was understood as strengthening the democratic practices in Nigeria by becoming a strong political opposition that can challenge the dominance of both APC and PDP in Nigeria ever since the commencement of the Nigerian Fourth Republic. This mode of government had been perceived by the masses as nothing other than autocratic rule because both parties were composed of the same people who only switched membership of political party when in defeat. The party was also said to have gained prominence despite coming out within the shortest time because of the assumption that, with the emergence of Labour Party presidential candidate, Peter Obi, it would create a balanced political representation across all regions in Nigeria.

Changing the Political Landscape in Nigeria



Authors' Field Work (2023)

As aided by the above network analysis, it can be deduced that the participation of the Labour Party in the 2023 general election altered the political landscape in Nigeria by defeating the invincible political forces, especially in their respective strongholds. Through their involvement in the 2023 election, the Labour Party questioned the age-long system of godfatherism in Nigeria by changing the perceptions of the citizens steeped in a strategic one-party system. In response to a question, a respondent shockingly expressed as follows:

Labour party performed very well in Lagos state and Nigeria as a whole, especially in Alimosho local government, where I came from. Ever since 1999, the opposition party has been the winning party in any election they used to tag Alimosho as Tinubu's area but as I speak now, they call it LP's constituency because we defeated APC with a big margin.

He further added:


It was tremendous. Lagos especially had phenomenon great result via LP which has never happened in 24 years. If you look at it, in a party of 9 months, even though the party has been there the movement that came into the party in 9 months has been able to do tremendously. It is a string game path. It changed the system of politics in Nigeria, he reiterated.

Accordingly, the study revealed that the massive participation of the citizens that resulted from the emergence of the Labour Party enlightened the citizens about how they could decide their future at the election polls. Most especially, as gathered from the study participants, the announcement of the election result in Lagos and the winning of some areas in Lagos by the Labour Party assured the citizens that their votes could count during elections in Nigeria. In corroboration, a respondent stated:

I can tell you authoritatively that with the push and everything we have done, one of the results is the governor of Edo state, Alex Otti who won under LP, this is what we want to push the affairs of government, but he has been denied the result of that election whose result the votes of the supporters of the LP had proven, we have nothing less than 14 national assembly representatives both in upper and lower chambers. Three years ago, we were not known, so, it is a plus for us now.

The Strategies that can Transform Labour Party into a Formidable National Political Party in Nigeria?

Solid Structure



Authors' Field Work (2023)

It was gathered that despite the performances of the Labour Party in the 2023 general election in Nigeria, the party could not emerge as the presidential race winner. Many of the respondents blamed their defeat on different factors and structural weakness assumed a centrality in their discussion. It was reported that the structure of the party should be rebuilt to reflect the objectives of a winning political party. While in the past, political engagement of youth was mainly channelled through activism in political parties (membership, voluntary work, door-door campaigning, attending meetings, etc.), the last decade has shown that political parties are facing difficulties in attracting new party members, and in particular young people (USAID, 2012). Similarly, the respondents answered that the party members should ensure effective integration of the grassroots, rather than touting the party through their online platforms. It was discovered that many of those who supported the Labour Party only did so without physically engaging their supporters. This marred the success of the political party at the polls. The study revealed that the Labour Party could only serve as a formidable political party in Nigeria if

there is a selfless commitment among the supporters of the party and sacrificing resources to enlighten the masses on the goals the party purports to achieve. In this regard, a respondent recounted that:

A membership drive should be done. Creating awareness among all members and also forming an ideology every member can act with. The loopholes include not identifying people working for and against the party, which is totally under control now. Ethnicity and religious issues which we tend to curb soon and fix the people's hearts in building a better Nigeria. The strategy is going back to the drawing board. Because the party came like a force or tsunami. There are a lot of people that came from different parties with several ideologies so it affected the party organization. However, after the election, we are getting to know each other and also identifying and removing people who don't have the party's interest at night. Additionally, in Nigeria, the first thing is to have a candidate in every state so that we can pass bills that can strengthen our elections. Also, we need to go to the grassroots to see why we did not win some parts even though we know we won it. Bringing a lot of people into the party and getting them involved in the activity of the party.

The inferences depict that the Labour Party would, from their current representatives, galvanize opportunities at their disposal to dislodge the moles within their political party who had earlier come to the party to sabotage their plans. It was accounted that the inadequacy of having committed members and representatives in every state of the federation posed a big challenge to the success of their emergence. Furthermore, they, regrettably, reported that their votes which were protected in some states because of a lack of representatives would be addressed to ensure that they would be fully represented in future elections.


Labour Party needs to have a stronghold in every state in Nigeria. Because LP is only present or popular in Lagos, Anambra, Abuja, and some other eastern parts of the country. For instance, now, LP is not prominent in states like Ekiti, Ondo, etc... in fact, they could not clinch a seat in the House of Assembly of these states. So, they need to build a stronghold... because you cannot compare them to the PDP or APC since those are established all over Nigeria. So, the Labour Party should take a leaf from these parties' books and follow the same pattern, he said.

However, other respondents claimed that the Labour Party should only continue with the current strategies adopted as the party was not founded to be corrupt; and the party was populated by law-abiding citizens, unlike APC and PDP who recruited miscreants to fight political cause. They further asserted that the party only needs to utilize legal means to claim any stolen mandate as this is the only method that could win them massive support. According to what a Labour Party leader said:

I do not think there is anything we should change. Because the other parties still made use of the old naughty, tricky, disgusting, and corrupt way of doing politics. For us, I think we are good. Membership drive. And LP needs to come up with a proper manifesto. I noticed that most political parties in Nigeria copy and paste. Unlike what you see in developed countries like the USA... Every party has proper manifestos... for instance, if you are a Republican, everybody knows where you stand on, for instance, gun control, homosexuality, and religion... We should also impact people's lives, such as doing some community projects so

that the people at the grassroots such as market women and men can feel the presence of the party and also see that it is a party that cares about human development.

Proper Coordination



Authors' Field Work (2023)

The study uncovered that the Labour Party would need to undergo a proper internal reconciliation before it could be a winning force in Nigeria's political system. It was also gathered that the unnecessary fracas that frequent the party members would not assist them in capturing the apex seat in Nigeria without finding a suitable means of placating aggrieved party members when such an occasion arises. Citing other vibrant political parties in Nigeria, a respondent opined that the party leaders would have found an amicable way of quenching any power tussle that may arise within their party without disclosing to the public, as this creates a sense of mistrust among their followers. According to a respondent, he stated as follows to corroborate the foregoing assertion:

Now, after the 2023 general election, Peter Obi and LP took Tinubu & Shetima to court to secure back their mandate as they believe the election was fraudulent...During that phase, several issues developed in the party from several individuals. For instance, the case of Lamidi from Agege as he is popularly called, took some members of the LP to court because he claimed he was the new Labour Party chairman in Lagos. That kind of loophole affected the party's

structure and organization. So, to stop such matters from coming up again, they need to have a leader that can call every member of the party to order, he stated.

The findings revealed that the lack of proper coordination and the adequate use of information and communication technology would have proven much more effective and hence contributed to the success of the Labour Party presidential race. According to the majority of the Labour Party who responded to similar questions, it can be posited that all this should be incorporated to prevent further failure in the election that will come up in 2027 in Nigeria. They further stated that they would ensure that their votes are strictly monitored at polls, while also exclaiming that the lack of their party agents in some areas had contributed to their defeats in the last election. Nevertheless, it was stated that the party would need to flush out those who had come from the opposing parties to spread ills among their supporters pretending to be their members.

We found out that most polling units do not have polling agents, as a result, some elections were manipulated. So, Nationwide monitoring is what the Labour Party should work on. Like I rightly said earlier, monitoring is one thing that they should focus on and the people should come together... especially the party leaders, there should be unity and make sure that whatever they are feeding to the party should be people who are ready to work... and Labour Party should come up with a kind of campaign that speaks to them coming up with a different thing, as that why most people supported them. I feel one thing they should do more is proper awareness, and unity among the party leaders because at a point most people started coming out as the party chairman and all that. It was one thing that became a problem at a point. In terms of coordination and structure... he recounted.

Conclusion & Recommendations

The Labour Party has transformed the political stage in Nigeria with its diverse composition of Nigerian youths who were tired of tyrannical rule and youth's political exclusion. Labour Party won massive support and validation from the citizens but, unfortunately, lost the election despite its remarkable performance owing to the lack of representatives across some states in Nigeria. The party must adopt methods to identify and flush out those who have joined the party to sabotage their plans if their major objective is to capture the apex seat in Nigeria.

- i. Political parties, INEC, and the Government should continue to improve their functional performance to increase the confidence and trust of citizens in their activities. This could be done through reforms for professional performance. Youth should be involved directly in the act of governance to represent their peers and directly address their challenges.
- ii. Political party management and activities related to internal democracy should be reformed in such a way that excessive use of money, for example for the purchase of forms for party primaries, and congresses is controlled. Similarly, political party constitutions should be reviewed in such a way that beyond the appointment of a Woman Leader and Youth Leader, certain key political offices in party structures and organs should be reserved for the youth. This will help to break the dominance of godfathers and ease the tension of control and gatekeeping of the political space.
- iii. Due largely to the nature of political violence affecting political participation, it is recommended that security agencies managing political activities should be adequately

trained. This will enhance their professional conduct and nip in the bud any potential for violence. Similarly, adequate security should always be provided during the conduct of any political activity, such as campaigns, party primaries and congresses, and general elections.

- iv. In this context, it is important that the primary focus on advocacy and sensitization be given to socio-political orientation on political participation. This would help to further liberalize the political space for the full participation of the citizens, including women's participation in key political activities. The advocacy should also be extended to political elites (godfathers) who strongly control the political space, often, outside the dictate of party constitutions.

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MILITARY WARFARE AND TACTICS IN NUPE CONQUEST OF OKUNLAND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

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Abstract

Early studies on Nupe conquest of Okunland focused on slave raiding and imposition of Ogba system of administration in which fiefs were appointed to administer and collect taxes and tributes on behalf of the Nupe imperial power. Of very important in the course of Nupe-Okun invasion were military warfare, tactics, and resistance, which has received less attention in the academic literature. It is against this background that the thrust of this paper is to provide insights into military warfare and tactics deployed during the Nupe-Okun war. The study adopted qualitative research method to contends that the Nupe demonstrated a superior military tactics during warfare, to overrun the Okunland and continued to control it until the British colonial military forces dislodged the Nupe suzerainty in the Okunland.

Keywords; Conquest, Military, Tactics, Warfare, and Resistance

Introduction

Most of the precolonial African kingdoms and states possessed formidable armies, not only to defend the territorial integrity of the states but also to prosecute wars when the need arose. Several reasons have been adduced as to why precolonial African states and kingdoms prosecuted wars. Aliyu Idrees pointed out that most of the precolonial African states and kingdoms prosecuted wars to consolidate power and establish central government, expand their territories, acquire slaves, and impose imperial rule, among others.²¹³ It is not surprising that large-scale wars and internal rebellion became rampant among African states and kingdoms in the precolonial period. In fact, some African states and kingdoms were known to be famous for their military prowess and strengths during wars. There is no denying that an elaborate military

²¹³ Aliyu A. Idrees "Precolonial Military Organisation and Strategies in Nigeria" in Gbor, J.W.T (ed.), *Military History of Nigeria from Pre-Colonial Era to the Present*, Ibadan: University Press, 1992. Pp14-15

system, such as an efficient military commander and well-trained troops, as well as effective weapons and good tactics, are determinant factors for success in military expeditions. In the nineties, Nupe Kingdom was one of the African states that prosecuted several wars to quell internal rebellion as well as obtaining slaves and levies from the conquered states. This was possible because of its elaborate and efficient military systems, akin to military organisation.

The Nupe kingdom launched a military expedition, conquered Okunland, and thereafter imposed imperial administration on the people, a situation similar to that of the Ajele system in Yorubaland. Though there were forms of resistance by the Okun people, the Nupe continued to exercise control over the Okun people and the Okunland. However, Nupe armies were dislodged by the British forces in 1897 to mark an end to the Nupe imperial rule in Okunland.²¹⁴ In this context, this study is set out to historicize the Nupe military warfare and tactics used to annihilate the Okun people as well as the resistance by the people, which have not received adequate academic attention. The study is organised into the following themes: introduction; Okunland and its people in the nineteenth century; relationship between Nupe and Okun people; motives for the Nupe invasion of Okunland; Nupe military system, warfare, and tactics; major battles and resistance; reasons for the Okun People's defeat; end of Nupe imperial rule; and conclusion.

Okunland and Its People in the Nineteenth Century

The word 'Okun' is a connotation generally used to describe sub-Yoruba communities found in Kogi State, North Central Nigeria. The Okun people and dialects consist of the Owe, Ijumu, Bunu, Yagba, Gbedde, and Oworo.²¹⁵ They are collectively called 'Okun', which in Yoruba means strength or vitality, and it is the word commonly used in greetings among the people. Although this form of greeting is also found among the Ekiti and Igbomina groups of Yoruba people, Okun as an identity was probably first suggested by Eva Kraft-Askari during the 1965 field expedition, and since then, it has gained wider acceptance among the indigenous Yoruba people and scholars.²¹⁶

A. Obayemi, while describing the Okun people, maintains that for convenience, the people, even with little dialectical variation, are lumped together as Okun-Yoruba.²¹⁷ In other words, Okun people are a confederation of different groups who lived independently of each

²¹⁴ Richard H. Dugate "Kabba: The British Invasion of 1897" in Olu Obafemi (ed) *Studies in Okun*, (Ibadan: Kraft Books Limited, 2014). Pp.321-328

²¹⁵ Ade H. Obayemi "States and People of the Niger-Benue Confluence Area" in Obaro Ikime (ed.) *Groundwork in Nigerian History* (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980), p.136

²¹⁶ Eva Krapf-Askari, "The Social Organization of the Owe," *African Notes* 2, No. 3 (1964-65), p.9. See also, Ade Obayemi, "The Sokoto Jihad and the 'O-kun' Yorùbá: A Review," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*. Vol. 9 (1978): p.61.

²¹⁷ Ade Obayemi "History Culture and Group Identity: The Case of North East or Okun-Yoruba." Unpublished Post-Graduate Seminar Paper Presented to the Department of History, A.B.U, Zaria 1976/77 session

other with their own organisation, though with bounding similarities. The individual sub-groups of Okun share some historical, cultural, and linguistic affinity but still maintain individual peculiarities.²¹⁸ Their dialects are distinguishable as individual dialects, but they are mutually intelligible to an extent. The dialects are generally classified as part of the North-East Yoruba language grouping.²¹⁹

According to oral tradition, individual Okun sub-groups laid claim to migration from Ile Ife,²²⁰ the cradle of Yoruba, and to a greater extent, this is very popular and highly accepted among the people because of the similar cultural traits Okun share with the other Yoruba groups like the Egba, Ijebu, Akoko, Ijesha, and Ekiti. One of the huge gaps created by oral tradition linking their origin to Ile Ife is the unavailability of the epoch or period of migration and arrival to their present location, and this has made the identity of the Okun people as a Yoruba sub-group contestable. Contrary to the Ile-Ifẹ migration, Ade Obayemi and Ijagbemi are of the view that the Okun people are aboriginals in the Niger-Benue confluence and may not have migrated to their present location from Ile-Ifẹ.²²¹ The controversies surrounding the origin and identity of the Okun people prompted scholars like Ann O'Hear to call attention to the need for further research on the Okun people and their history.²²² Historical research has been able to establish over the years that Okun people have socio-cultural and linguistic affinity with other Yoruba subgroups. The people lived in nucleated settlements made up of villages and towns.²²³ The geographical entity of Okunland has an area of about 28,032 square kilometres of land.²²⁴ It bordered Ebiraland in the south, Akokoland, Ekiti, and the Igbomina in the west, Lokoja in the southeast, and the River Niger in the north. Okunland is situated very close to the Confluence Rivers of Niger and Benue; thus, the people are often classified among the Niger-Benue

²¹⁸ John. Otitoju, *The Okun People of Nigeria*. (Lagos: WEPCOM Publishers Limited.2002), Pp6-7

²¹⁹ Bayo Ijagbemi "O-Okun Yoruba in Yoruba Art Historiography: History, Problems and Prospects". PhD Thesis.

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²²⁰ Clement O. Bakinde "Oral Narrations on the Origin and Settlement Patterns of the Okun People of Central Niger"

Journal of Tourism and Heritage Studies, Vol. 2, No.2 (2013). Pp53-63

²²¹ Ade H. Obayemi "States and People of the People of the Niger-Benue Confluence Area" ... Pp163-165. See also,

Bayo Ijagbemi "O-Okun Yoruba in Yoruba Art Historiography: Problems and Prospects." An Unpublished PhD

Thesis, submitted to the Department of History, University of Arizona USA 1996.

²²² Ann O'Hear "The History of the Okun Yorùbá: Research Direction" in Toyin Falola and Genova (eds) *Yoruba*

Identity Power and Politics (New York: University of Rochester Press, (2006) Pp111-126

²²³ Clement O. Bakinde "Oral Narrations on the Origin and Settlement Patterns of the Okun People of Central Niger"

...p.56

²²⁴ Ekundayo Aduke "Women in Pre-Colonial Economic Development in North East Yoruba Land of Nigeria"

Science Arena Publications Specialty *Journal of Humanities and Cultural* Vol.4 (3) Pp.60-64. ISSN: 2520-3274

Available online at www.sciarena.com

confluence people.²²⁵ According to O. Akinwumi, the proximity of Okunland to the Confluence Rivers of Niger and Benue has largely enabled Okun inter-group relations with the people around the confluence area up to the early part of the nineteenth century. The major Niger-Benue confluence people who established inter-group relations with Okun people include the Nupe, the Ebira, the Kakanda, and the Igala on the east of Niger.²²⁶

According to Apata, Okun people's political institutions lacked central administration or authority, which is why it was classified as a "stateless" society.²²⁷ This was also corroborated by Obayemi and Akinwumi. One of the basic essential features of a stateless society is the absence of centralization of authority or the welding of political power by an individual, or where such exists, his role affects a rather limited population. That is not to mean that the people did not have a political structure, but it was non-centralised in nature and limited to a village or sub-group of Okun, as each community was autonomous and self-governing.²²⁸

Sources reveal that Okun people engaged in diverse economic activities such as farming, trading, craftwork, mostly cloth weaving, etc. Thus, family land holdings coupled with fertile land and adequate rainfall made farming possible. Common farm produce in Okunland includes yam, cassava, pepper, okra, sorghum, maize, millet, cotton, etc. The women engaged in domestic trade within Okunland and long-distance trade with their neighbours (mostly Ebira, Igarra, Akoko, Ekiti, Igbomina, Afemai, Kakanda, and Nupe) on specific periodic market days.²²⁹ Articles of trade include textile materials, pot, cotton, pepper, and livestock. Long-distance trade provided avenues for intergroup relations with their neighbours, either in the markets or at the banks of the Niger.²³⁰ Sources reveal that the Bunu women and their Owe neighbours, were known for weaving in textile materials, particularly a red textile used in the burial of the wealthy and making masquerade dresses. The textile materials were said to be the major object of trade of the Bunu and Owe women with their Ebira neighbours and others.²³¹

Relationship between Nupe and Okun People

²²⁵ Ade H. Obayemi "States and People of the People of the Niger-Benue Confluence Area" ...163-176

²²⁶ Olayemi Akinwumi "A Socio-Political Survey of Okun Yoruba History in the 19th and 20th Centuries" in

Zacchaeus O. Apata and Yemi Akinwumi (eds.) *The Groundwork of Niger-Benue Confluence History* (Ibadan:

Crest Hill Publishers Ltd, 2011). Pp74-75

²²⁷ Zacchaeus O. Apata "Administrative Integration and Conflict in Nigeria, 1840-1940: The Case of North-East

Yorubaland." *Transafrican Journal of History*, vol. 24, 1995, pp.106-122. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/24328657. Accessed on 1st March, 2021

²²⁸ Ade H. Obayemi "States and People of the People of the Niger-Benue Confluence Area" ...167

²²⁹ Ekundayo Aduke "Women in Pre-Colonial Economic Development in North East Yoruba Land of Nigeria" ...p.64

²³⁰ Jerome O. O. Sumanu, "The History of the Relation of the Yoruba Speaking People of Kabba Division with Nupe

up to the 1920s". B. A. (Hons) Long Essay, Department of History, Bayero University, Kano. 1976

²³¹ Ekundayo Aduke "Women in Pre-Colonial Economic Development in North East Yorubaland of Nigeria" ...p.63

See also, Ann O'Hear "The History of the Okun Yorùbá: Research Direction" ...p.116

Geographically, a part of Okunland was separated from the Nupe Kingdom by the River Niger. In other words, there is geographical proximity between Okunland and the Nupe Kingdom. Akinwumi states that Okun and Nupe people were interacting peacefully through economic activities before 1840, but the peaceful interaction later gave way to hostility and eventually the invasion of Okunland by the Nupe. For instance, there were evidences of trade relations between Nupe and the people of the Niger-Benue confluence area, of which Owe, Abinu, Yagba, and Gbedde are among. Nupe and Okun traded in commodities not only on the market days but at the bank of the River Niger. Nadel noted that some commodities were exchanged in trade transactions between the Nupe and Okun people, which include weaving cloths, beads, fish, livestock, hides and skins, and blacksmithing products.²³²

Besides economic interaction, the intergroup relationship enabled aspects of culture from the Nupe kingdom to penetrate into Okunland. Sources maintains Nupe masquerade (Egungun), known as Igunnu, entered Okunland through the Bunu area sometimes in the eighteenth century.²³³ Today, the Egungun festival is a rich culture that is widely celebrated among the Okun people.

Motives for the Nupe Military Invasion and Conquest of Okunland

Scholars have adduced several reasons for the Nupe military invasion and conquest of Okunland in the nineteenth century. To Michael Mason, the Nupe invasion of the south of the River Niger was an extension of the Islamic revolution started by Usman Dan Fodio in the first half of the nineteenth century.²³⁴ Mason reinforced his argument that several of the returned Okun slaves had become Muslims in the first and second decades of the twentieth century.²³⁵ Renne asserts that there was a spread of Islam in Okunland during the nineteenth century, when Nupe hegemony prevailed. He cited some Bunu chiefs who became Muslims, although the majority of the people retained traditional beliefs.²³⁶

Mason's assertion appeared to have come from the background of the involvement of Islamic jihadists in the nineteenth-century Nupe Wars beyond Nupeland. His assertion may have also come from the growing numbers of Muslims among the Okun people in the early twentieth century. But scholars like S. F. Nadel and A. Obayemi have refuted the religious claim of the Nupe invasion of Okunland. In the assertion of S. F. Nadel, the impetus of religious zeal that drove the Fulani armies across Northern Nigeria lost its substance when the movement crossed

²³² Siegfried F Nadel, *A Black Byzantium. The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria...*p.78

²³³ Bayo Ijagbemi "O-Okun Yoruba in Yoruba Art Historiography: History, Problems and Prospects". PhD Thesis.

The University of Arizona.1996.

²³⁴ Michael Mason," The Jihad in the South: An outline of the 19th century Nupe Hegemony in North-Eastern

Yoruba and Afemai" *Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. No. 2, (June 1970). Pp195-198

²³⁵ Michael Mason," The Jihad in the South: An outline of the 19th century Nupe Hegemony in North-Eastern

Yoruba and Afemai"

²³⁶ Elisha P. Renne "Aso Ipo, Red Cloth from Bunu." *African Arts*, vol. 25, no. 3, 1992, Pp 64–102. JSTOR,

www.jstor.org/stable/3337002. Accessed 1 Mar. 2021.

the southward River Niger.²³⁷ This view was also shared by Ade Obayemi, who denied any connection between the invasion and religion. In his own view, the Islamic revolution was a factor in the Nupe wars, but by the time the warriors invaded the south of Niger, it had lost its religious touch.²³⁸ The inability of the Nupe-Fulani to raise a flag, preach, and convert Okun people as it was done in Hausaland negates the assertion of Mason. The fundamentals of the Nadel and Obayemi argument are that the majority of the people should have been Islamized if Islamic or Jihadist movements were a factor in the Nupe conquest of Okunland. Obayemi concludes that no part of Okunland was Islamized as a result of Nupe rule; rather, people were left to practice their traditional religion without any interference after the conquest of the territory. Agreeing with the above, many Okun settlements still remained traditional worshippers up until the second decade of the twentieth century. Also, Egbe, which was used as a base from which Masaba's forces attacked neighbouring communities in Yagbaland, had very few indigenous Moslems. Similarly, Kabba, one of the important towns in Okunland that was used as a Nupe base, was not Islamized.

Mason noted that the history of the Nupe Kingdom in the first half of the 19th century was characterised by constant intrigues, fights, wars, and rebellion.²³⁹ What can be construed from studies of the Nupe Kingdom in the nineteenth century is that the kingdom was largely characterised by political and religious transformation, as there were Fulani Jihadist wars and internal intrigues among the princes for Etsuship. These events culminated in the dynasty building and the unification of Nupe central authority with its administrative headquarters in Bida. Explaining the political and economic transformation, F. J. Kolapo described the nineteenth-century Nupe Wars in at least nine more or less clear phases, mostly between 1810 and 1857.²⁴⁰ According to him, the war began as a civil war among members of the Nupe royal family; however, foreign Muslim clerical immigrants and revolutionary jihadists from Sokoto to the northwest soon intruded into the fray, immediately giving the war an altogether new and complex character. There were many military camps and factions in the wars, which revolved around a number of contenders to the Nupe throne of Etsuship, particularly between particular jihadist factions and the local indigenous royal contenders.²⁴¹ Kolapo, while quoting other sources, maintained that the Nupe against non-Nupe wars have been variously described in the literature as raids, razzias, expansionist wars, jihad, and slave raids.²⁴²

Based on his analysis, the power contenders sought resources to prosecute the war; therefore, the slave raiding and tribute collection were perpetrated against weak and defenceless Okun

²³⁷ Siegfried F Nadel, *A Black Byzantium. The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria*. (London: Oxford University, Press, 1942)

²³⁸ Ade Obayemi, "The Sokoto Jihad and Okun-Yoruba", *Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria*. A Review, Vol. IX No 2. (1978).

²³⁹ Michael Mason, "The Nupe Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century: A Political History". PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, (1970) Pp.56-77

²⁴⁰ Femi J. Kolapo "The Dynamics of Early 19th Century Nupe Wars" *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*. Vol, 31 (2), (2003), Pp16-18

²⁴¹ Femi J. Kolapo "The Dynamics of Early 19th Century Nupe Wars" ...p.16

²⁴² Femi J. Kolapo "The Dynamics of Early 19th Century Nupe Wars" ...p.18

communities that bordered Nupe in the southern region. Several studies, like the works of Nadel Mason and Kolapo, reveal the complexity of the succession to the throne, which involved Fulani jihadists, and the need for consolidation among the power contenders. The complexity, however, made the wars prolonged, brutal, and more expensive to prosecute. Therefore, there was a need to source resources not only to boost the depleted Nupe economy but also to prosecute the war.

Z.O. Apata and O.T. Oshadare, in different studies, substantiated the assertion that the invasion and conquest of Okunland were largely prompted by the internal conflicts in Nupeland. In their summation, the major cause of the conflict was the power struggle and rivalry between the Nupe princes over the Etsuship of Nupe. The two princes were Usman Zaki Ibn Dendo, whose mother was Fulani, and his younger brother, Muhammed Saba Ibn Dendo (better known as Masaba) whose mother was Nupe. Earlier, Usman Zaki had declared himself the Etsu of Nupe. He was, however, challenged by his younger brother Masaba, who believed that he had a better claim to the throne.²⁴³ Hence, the need for slaves and tributes became a central factor in prosecuting the internal war. This prevailing hostile situation forced Masaba to seek political asylum at Egbe in Yagbaland.²⁴⁴

In 1834, Usman Zaki and Masaba established their capitals at Rabah and Lade, respectively. Two factors made the invasion of Okunland by the Nupe a matter of time: one was their proximity to Okunland and the other was the wealth of Okunland, while the second factor was that the area was rich in human and material resources, which the warring parties needed to prosecute the war and consolidate their positions. For instance, slaves were needed to replenish their soldiers, and proceeds from the sale of slaves were also needed to purchase war ammunition.²⁴⁵

Slaves were also needed to produce food for the fighting forces in Nupeland because farming had been neglected since internal wrangling started, a situation that resulted in a food shortage in the areas.²⁴⁶ In these circumstances, the conquest and occupation of Okunland became part of the strategy of the warring parties.

Nupe Military Dexterity, Warfare, and Tactics

As mentioned earlier, the Nupe Kingdom evolved an elaborate command structure akin to a modern military organization. Large-scale wars were usually organised by the central authorities, with headquarters in Bida. According to A. Idrees, the Nupe army possessed a unit

²⁴³ Zacchaeus O. Apata “Administrative Integration and Conflict in Nigeria, 1840-1940: The Case of North-East Yorubaland.” See also, Timothy O. Oshadare, *Trends in Social and Political History of Okunland North – Central Nigeria, 1840-1960* (Lap Lambert Academic Publishing, 2019) ISBN-13. 978-6200085177. www.books.ng

²⁴⁴ Zacchaeus O. Apata, “British Administrative Changes and Re-Organisation in Northern Nigeria 1897-1939 with Specific Reference to North-East Yorubaland...” p.46

²⁴⁵ Siegfried F Nadel, *A Black Byzantium. The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria...* p.82

²⁴⁶ Zacchaeus O. Apata, “British Administrative Changes and Re-Organisation in Northern Nigeria 1897-1939 with Specific Reference to North-East Yorubaland...” p49

of regular soldiers who were experienced and well-trained and served as the Etsu's body guard.²⁴⁷ The army

was organised under two broad divisions, Dokochizhi (calvary) and Dakari. For each division, a number of commanders were appointed to form the official corps.²⁴⁸

One of the features of Nupe military warfare against Okun people in the nineteenth century was its numerical strength, superiority of weapons, tactics, and organisation; these, however, gave Nupe an excessive advantage over Okun people during the invasion. In 1823/24, Nupe forces numbered about 10,000 were used to invade Ilorin.²⁴⁹ Besides, there were about 4000 horsemen that were involved in the Masaba struggle for the throne between 1856 and 1857.²⁵⁰ Kolapo, while quoting R. A. C. Oldfield in 1833, reported that Usman Zaki's cavalry and infantry numbered about 5,000 and 20,000, respectively.²⁵¹ The Nupe army was composed of different classes, namely, mercenaries, volunteers, and slaves conscripted into the military.²⁵² These components of the Nupe forces demonstrated skills, bravery, and discipline at different wars prosecuted within and outside the kingdom. Based on these figures, Nupe princes in the struggle for Etsuship deployed sizeable numbers of forces to overrun Okunland.

Besides, Nupe maintained a valuable and important trade in horses with Bornu and Kano, where horses were mostly purchased.²⁵³ The horses were, no doubt, largely used in what is known as cavalry warfare. With horses, muskets, bows and arrows, spears, swords, and bludgeons, the vulnerable communities could easily be overrun. The use of horses by Nupe forces in Okunland was made possible because of nucleated settlements in flat terrain and less tse-tse flying. The possession of guns and muskets as weapons for the Nupe army provided more of a tactical function

of frightening the people in sudden raids when loud and repeated gunshots created terror and facilitated the seizure of captives.²⁵⁴

The Nupe warriors used a diverse range of tactics in Okunland, which varied from one community to another. Such tactical operations include scorched earth, laying sieges or attacks at night, and divide and rule tactics. Mason described the scorched earth as "smash and grab operations." Nupe forces expropriated the people's crops during their raiding exercises.²⁵⁵

²⁴⁷ Aliyu A. Idrees "Precolonial Military Organisation and Strategies in Nigeria" in Gbor, J.W.T (ed.), *Military History of Nigeria from Pre-Colonial Era to the Present*, Ibadan: University Press, 1992. Pp.14-15

²⁴⁸ Aliyu A. Idrees "Precolonial Military Organisation and Strategies in Nigeria" in Gbor, J.W.T (ed.), *Military History of Nigeria from Pre-Colonial Era to the Present*, ... p.15

²⁴⁹ Femi J. Kolapo "The Dynamics of Early 19th Century Nupe Wars" ...p.19

²⁵⁰ Siegfried F. Nadel, *A Black Byzantium. The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria*, p. 78

²⁵¹ Siegfried F. Nadel, *A Black Byzantium. The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria*, p. 78

²⁵² Femi J. Kolapo "The Dynamics of Early 19th Century Nupe Wars" ...p.19

²⁵³ Femi J. Kolapo "The Dynamics of Early 19th Century Nupe Wars" ...p.24

²⁵⁴ Femi J. Kolapo "The Dynamics of Early 19th Century Nupe Wars" ...p.26

²⁵⁵ Aliyu A. Idrees "Precolonial Military Organisation and Strategies in Nigeria" in Gbor, J.W.T (ed.), *Military History of Nigeria from Pre-Colonial Era to the Present*, Ibadan: University Press, 1992. Pp.14-15

Sometimes villages, shrines, vegetation, barns, pens, and sacred places were set ablaze by the invaders to cause confusion for their victims, and through this means, men and women were captured.

Since Okun people were invaded at different times, the 'divide and rule tactic' became effective when most Okun communities had fallen due to the ruthlessness of Nupe forces. Sources also disclosed that upon entrance to a settlement by the Nupe forces, their first assignment was to look for some collaborators who would divulge vital information about the tactics of the unprepared people. All these tactics were maximally utilised, and they gave the Nupe forces swift victory over the Okun people in the early invasion.

Major Battles and Okun Resistance

The organised and well-trained Nupe army deployed to Okunland maximised their weapons as most of the communities were conquered with ease. It should be noted that the entire Okunland was attacked at different times between 1840 and 1882. Following the death of Usman Dendo in 1840, the contenders for political power in Nupeland, Usman Zaki and Masaba, set up their capitals at Rabah and Lade, respectively, and from these capitals, Okunland was invaded.²⁵⁶

Usman Zaki was responsible for the defeat of Bunu and Oweland, while Masaba and his successors, Umaru Majigi, were responsible for the defeat of Oworoland, West and East Yagba, Gbedde, and Southern Ijumu communities like Ekinrin-Adde, Iyamoye, Iffe, Egbede-Egga, and Ikoyi.²⁵⁷ To this end, Okunland was invaded by three Nupe rulers who ruled in succession between 1840 and 1882.²⁵⁸ The Kirri communities of Abinu were the first victims of the attacks between 1840 and 1850. Masaba attacked and conquered Kirri, which was described as a "large and prosperous town" in Bunuland.²⁵⁹ As a way of protection, many Kirri people fled to Oke Kirri (Kirri Mountain) to seek refuge, where large rocks were rolled down on Nupe warriors. This could not permanently check the Nupe's advance. Kirri was subsequently conquered, and many able-bodied men were carried away as slaves, and a tribute of 6,000 cowries was imposed.²⁶⁰

There were places in Okunland where pockets of fierce battles or resistance took place against the Nupe invaders. Kabba, an important town in Oweland, had a massive Odi (mud wall) that surrounded the town. The Odi has two main gates, namely, the Asuta gate located in the northern section and the Aiyeteju gate located in the south.²⁶¹ When the news of Nupe invaders reached Kabba, a unit of Owe soldiers swiftly advanced to stop the advance of the Nupes. The first open battle took place at a place called Agura near the northern gate. It was a

²⁵⁶ Zacchaeus O. Apata, "British Administrative Changes and Re-Organisation in Northern Nigeria 1897- 1939 with

Specific Reference to North-East Yorubaland..." p.51

²⁵⁷ N. A. K. SNP 10: 12 P/1914, Bunu District. Assessment Report by H. B. James ADO

²⁵⁸ The three Nupe Kingdom rulers who ruled in succession were Usman Zaki, Masaba and Umoru Majigi

²⁵⁹ N. A. K. SNP 10: 12 P/1914, Bunu District. Assessment Report by H. B. James ADO

²⁶⁰ N. A. K. SNP 10

²⁶¹ Zacchaeus O. Apata "British Administrative Changes and Re-Organisation in Northern Nigeria 1897-1939 with

Specific Reference to North-East Yorubaland" ...p.36

very fierce battle in which Kabba lost many men. The persistence of the Nupe cavalry caused the remaining defending forces to withdraw inside the Odi. The Nupe forces were unable to gain entrance, but they devised another means of devastating the countryside with the objective of starving the people to death. According to Oshadare, this hurried the Kabba people into submission, and a tribute of 72,000 cowries was levied on them as part of the peace deal.²⁶²

Also, there was a fierce resistance put up by Owe people who lived in settlements outside the Odi; they assembled their forces on the hilltop and hill basement of Igberi, from where they rained spears and stones on Nupe forces and their horses in the popular Ogun Igberi.²⁶³ The invaders recorded casualties, fled, and never returned to the area. The resistance also took a similar form among the Bunu people at Olle; the Nupe forces met stiff resistance but had to order reinforcement from Kabba and after a protracted battle, the town capitulated.²⁶⁴

In the Yagba area, Nupe forces met lesser resistance. Masaba's military campaigns intensified between 1865 and 1868. For instance, Egbe, an important town in Yagbaland, was made the Nupe camp, from which attacks were launched against the outlying territories. Muhmud Ibn Shaba (also known as Yerima Muhmud) led a large army from Egbe to Ejuku in East Yagba. According to a source, Ejuku town had earlier been invaded during the reign of Usman Zaki, but soon after his death, the people asserted their independence from Nupe domination. Muhmud's expedition was, therefore, aimed at forcing the Ejuku people into tributary status. On the approach of Nupe forces, the Ejuku people took cover in the rock cavity provided by Oke Yeu in Ejuku. The Nupe warriors discovered the rock with the assistance of captives and thereafter fumigated it. The people were suffocated to death.²⁶⁵ With the fall of Ejuku, fear gripped its immediate neighbours, Jege, Ponyan, and Ife-Olukotun. The villages were conquered with little or no exertion. Other villages conquered in quick succession included Isanlu-Mopo, Isanlu-Makutu, Mopa, Oka-Agi, and Amuro. Before the death of Masaba in 1873, large areas of Yagba, Gbedde, Bunu, and Oworo had been conquered.²⁶⁶ These areas constituted about three-quarters of Okunland. Umaru Majigi, who ruled as Etsu

²⁶² Olabode T. Oshadare Indigenous Colonialism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Nupe Over-Rule in Okun-Yorubaland:

North Central Nigeria, c.a.1840-1897. *Port-Harcourt Journal of History &Diplomatic Studies*, Vol.7, No 1, March 2020. p.237

²⁶³ Usman, Aribidesi, and Toyin Falola. "The Nineteenth Century: Wars and Transformations." *The Yoruba from*

Prehistory to the Present. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2019. Pp.159-240.

²⁶⁴ Usman, Aribidesi, and Toyin Falola. "The Nineteenth Century: Wars and Transformations." *The Yoruba from*

Prehistory to the Present. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2019. Pp.159-240.

²⁶⁵ Detail of Nupe invasion and conquest of Yagbaland is contained in M. Ogidan "Changing Pattern of Settlement

and Institutions in Yagbaland 1859-1967" PhD Thesis submitted to Department of History, University of Ilorin, 2003. Pp76-80

²⁶⁶ Zacchaeus O. Apata "British Administrative Changes and Re-Organisation in Northern Nigeria 1897-1939 with Specific Reference to North-East Yorubaland" ...p.38

Nupe between 1873 and 1882, brought the entire Okunland under Nupe domination before his death.²⁶⁷

Reasons for Okun People's Defeat

Quite a number of factors had been given to explain the defeat of the Okun people by the Nupe invaders. One of the reasons that accounted for the defeat of the Okun people was the superiority of the Nupe military system and tactics. As mentioned earlier, the Nupe Kingdom was a centralised state with an elaborate military system and experienced troops. Nupe forces possessed superior firearms and tactics with which they attacked their enemies on horseback always. The firearms were probably the ones Mason described as “cheap muskets” the Bida people purchased from the European merchants on the Niger coast.²⁶⁸

Okun could be described as a non-centralised state with no experience of wars. Where there were resistances, they were hurriedly put up by the hunters and volunteers. The Okun people also relied on locally made items such as guns, bows and arrows, spears, clubs, cutlasses, and knives, largely produced by the indigenous blacksmithing industry. In fact, the locally made gun was a muzzle-loader that required a minimum of four minutes to reload. Such traditional or local weapons were no match for the Nupe firearms.

There was also the role of individual collaborators. The Nupe forces played a lot of deceit. Divide and rule tactics were used among Okun people by setting one community against another. Upon Nupe forces entrance into a settlement, their first assignment was to look for some collaborators who would divulge vital information about other settlements in terms of direction, strategy, and strength. It was alleged that Owe people in Kabba played the role of collaborators with the invaders against their Ijumu neighbours.²⁶⁹ To a greater extent, the Nupe forces capitalised on the information obtained from the collaborators. Also, Nupe forces were said to have invaded Okun communities at night in a surprise attack. In most cases, armed horsemen were usually stationed at the periphery of any settlement they intended to raid. As the people woke up to start the day's work, they would be captured, thus causing a lot of confusion among the people.²⁷⁰

The End of Nupe Imperial Power in Okunland

The Nupe imperial rule, popularly called the Ogba system, reached a climax in 1894 when some Okun communities, namely Ogidi, Ayere, Ogale, Aduge, Ekinrin-Adde, Egbeda-Egga, Iffe, Iyamoye, and some communities in Akokoland, formed the popular Ogidi Grand Alliance

²⁶⁷ Zacchaeus O. Apata “British Administrative Changes and Re-Organisation in Northern Nigeria 1897-1939 with

Specific Reference to North-East Yorubaland” ...p.36

²⁶⁸ Michael Mason, “The Nupe Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century: A Political History” ...p.89

²⁶⁹ Zacchaeus O. Apata “British Administrative Changes and Re-Organisation in Northern Nigeria 1897- 1939 with

Specific Reference to North-East Yorubaland...

²⁷⁰ Zacchaeus O. Apata “British Administrative Changes and Re-Organisation in Northern Nigeria 1897- 1939 with

Specific Reference to North-East Yorubaland...p.37

against the Nupe overrule.²⁷¹ No doubt, it was a conspirative coalition and resistance against Nupe imperial rule. The alliance got its inspiration from Nupe's inability to conquer Ebira Okene and Oka-Akoko in many of their fierce battles; thus, this exposed the invincibility of the Nupe warriors. The alliance was also similar to the one formed by some Yoruba groups called Ekitiparapo in 1879 to end Ibadan suzerainty.²⁷²

The Ogidi Grand Alliance forces were well organised under a war veteran who became the General Commander, Agauhun of Akoko settlement in Esuku, coupled with Olumodeji of Ayere, Ajakaye of Ogidi, and Ajamba of Oji, who were appointed as unit commanders.²⁷³ In addition, the services of seasoned Ebira archers, who are vast in the use of poison arrows, were employed. All these arrangements further strengthened and improved the striking capability of the forces. Some men were also recruited as spies who were placed under the command of Elesu.²⁷⁴ These spies were stationed at vantage points to monitor the movements of the Nupe forces, thus preventing any sudden attack from the enemies. The allied forces also acquired European firearms from the Ekiti countryside; some of these firearms were used during the Ekitiparapo war with Ibadan. Additional weapons were said to have been obtained by influential Ekiti and Ijesha people resident in Lagos. The Ogidi alliance itself was able to get supplies of weapons from Lagos.²⁷⁵

This time around, the Ogidi forces were well prepared and organised to a greater extent. The determination of Etsu Abubakar, who succeeded Emir Maliki in attacking Ogidi Alliance forces, made him dispatch Makun Momadu in 1896 with a strong force numbering over 6,000. Makun forces camped for 3 months near Udi, a few miles from Kabba, planning to attack Ogidi.²⁷⁶

Towards the end of 1896, Bida forces advanced and launched an attack against the allied forces who camped on Ayinoro hill in the Ogidi area, thus signaling the beginning of the Ogidi war. While the hilly nature of the Ogidi area was advantageous to the allied forces, like it was during the *Ogun Igberi*, on the other hand, it was disadvantageous to the Bida forces.²⁷⁷ The

²⁷¹ Zacchaeus. O. Apata; "The Nupe Imperialism and the Ogidi Grand Alliance, 1894 –1897: Reflections of Ekitiparapo War", in Akinjogbin A (ed.), *War and Peace in Yorubaland, 1793 –1893*, (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1998). p.435

²⁷² Adebajji Akintoye *Revolution and Power Politics in Yorubaland, 1840-1893, Ibadan Expansion and the Rise of Ekiti-Parapo*. (London: Longman Limited, 1971). Pp60-70

²⁷³ Z. O. Apata, "British Administrative... p. 44

²⁷⁴ Jerome O. O. Sumanu, "The History of the Relation of the Yoruba Speaking People of Kabba Division with Nupe up to the 1920s" ...p.50

²⁷⁵ Jerome O. O. Sumanu, "The History of the Relation of the Yoruba Speaking People of Kabba Division with Nupe up to the 1920s" ...p.65

²⁷⁶ Jerome O. O. Sumanu, "The History of the Relation of the Yoruba Speaking People of Kabba Division with Nupe up to the 1920s" ... p.142

²⁷⁷ Jerome O. O. Sumanu, "The History of the Relation of the Yoruba Speaking People of Kabba Division with Nupe up to the 1920s" ... p.143. See also, Zacchaeus. O. Apata; "The Nupe Imperialism and the Ogidi Grand Alliance, 1894 –1897: Reflections of Ekitiparapo War" ...p.439

allied forces rained poison arrows from the hilltop on the Bida forces. Thus, as the war lingered for days, Makun forces could not dislodge the allied forces because they met formidable and organised forces. Neither the Nupe forces nor their horses were able to climb the hill. The allied forces used the hill and the caves as shields. The Ogidi war ended abruptly without victory for either the allied forces or Makun's Nupe forces. This was because the Nupe forces vacated their camp in January 1897, a few days before the arrival of George Taubman Goldie and his Royal Niger Company (RNC) troops to Kabba.²⁷⁸

The period of the Ogidi War coincided with when the British intensified their imperialistic ambitions in Nigeria. The last decade of the nineteenth century was a period when the constabulary forces were to carry out effective occupation of the territories still under the control of African traditional rulers. Thus, Goldie and his troop's mission in Ogidi were to dislodge Makun's Nupe forces and remove their hegemony in the entire Okunland. When Nupe forces under Makun got wind of the Goldie's RNC military expedition in Okunland, they vacated their camp swiftly and headed for Bida in January 1897.²⁷⁹ On their arrival, Goldie and his troop met an empty camp of the Nupe force at Ogidi, which they burned down. The summation is that there was no battle between Goldie's forces and the Nupe warriors in Okunland, but the presence of Goldie and his troops ended Nupe imperial rule in Okunland.

Conclusion

The paper reminisces on the Nupe invasion and conquest of Okunland in the nineteenth century, with a focus on military warfare, tactics, and resistance. Nupe and Okun people have been neighbours, only separated by the river Niger. Geographical proximity and river Niger-related activities have facilitated a great deal of their inter-group relations. But a great deal of their inter-group relations changed in the first half of the nineteenth century, due to political and religious transformations within the Nupe Kingdom. These two developments led to protracted conflicts within the Nupe Kingdom; therefore, Okunland became a fertile ground where economic resources were sourced to prosecute and sustain the war. Nupe was able to achieve this successfully because its administration was highly centralised, coupled with an elaborate military system akin to the modern military. Nupe warriors were not only well-trained but also highly experienced in warfare. The forces employed tactics such as scorched earth, starvation, laying siege or attacks at night, and divide and rule tactics, among others. Even though the Okun had no elaborate or formidable forces to withstand Nupe warriors, they put up fierce resistance before their defeats. As a form of resistance, many Okun communities moved to hilltops or hill basements, which were impregnable to calvary and difficult to scale on foot. It was the Ogidi grand alliance forces that changed tactics against the Nupe warriors in a war that ended in a stalemate. Nupe imperial rule in Okunland finally ended following the arrival of George Goldie and his Royal Niger Company troops in 1897.

²⁷⁸ Richard H. Dugate "Kabba: The British Invasion of 1897" in Olu Obafemi (ed) *Studies in Okun*, (Ibadan: Kraft Books Limited, 2014). Pp.321-328

²⁷⁹ Richard H. Dugate "Kabba: The British Invasion of 1897" ...p.328

THE EFFECTS OF EMPLOYEE RELOCATION ON THE WELFARE OF FAMILY MEMBERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES IN ONDO AND OSUN STATES OF NIGERIA

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Abstract

Owing to rapid industrialisation, global competition and the development of high technology, employee relocation transfer has become common practice for corporations and organisations worldwide. This study explores the effects of employee transfer on family well-being because employee relocation is a significant life event that impacts the employee as well as their family members. The study employed a cross-sectional survey research approach, distributing structured questionnaires to 291 local government employees from four local government areas of Osun and Ondo States that were purposefully selected. Likert scale was used to quantitatively measure work transfer (relocation) as the independent variable, and family well-being as the dependent variable. The resulting regression analysis reveals that employee transfer/relocation has a positive association with family well-being of the local government employees. The study, therefore, concludes that local government employees view job relocation as an opportunity for new job challenges and future career enhancement, and thus recommends that dialogue between various government departments and transferees should be promoted to facilitate effective transition for all parties involved.

Keywords: Employee relocation, Family well-being, Local Government Employees, Osun, Ondo

Introduction

Due to rapid industrialisation, increased global competition, and sophisticated technology, many enterprises and organisations worldwide move and relocate

individuals¹. Nigerian public service job transfer policy began during British colonial rule. The Federal Military Government did not implement the 1976 local government reforms, which gave the third tier of government authority to transfer local government workers, until the mid-1970s². Additionally, the changes unified the nation's varied local government administrative systems.

¹D. M. Ntseane. (2004). Personnel transfers: Experiences of Batswana teachers, Pula: Botswana. *Journal of African Studies*, 18(1), 65–76.

²K. Ajayi. (2000) “Justification and Theories of Local Government” in Ajayi .K. (Ed) *Theory and Practice of Local Government*. Ado Ekiti, Department of Political Science, University of Ado-Ekiti.

The new structure standardised local government management nationwide.³ This standardisation included functions, structures, personnel systems, and funding sources. The assumption that many local governments have too many non-professional staff and not enough qualified staff to effectively perform their duties may influence the decision to grant the Local Government Service Commission (LGSC), which is established by each state government, the authority to transfer local government employees between LGAs. The LGSC assigns LGAs to recruit, hire, assign, train, promote, and discipline grade I-6 workers. The LGSC still manages senior personnel due to the 'unified staff system' implemented as part of the reforms. Local governments (LGAs) benefit from the unified staff system by ensuring employment stability, facilitating career development, and addressing the challenge of recruiting qualified staff in undesirable or unattractive locations⁴.

However, employee transfer, often known as relocation, is a major life event that affects the employee and their family.^{5&6} All family members of the of transferred local government employees must participate for a smooth transition⁷. Thus, local government administrators must understand the effects of relocation on the individual and their family, the employee's adaptation, and the organization's ripple effects⁸. It is against this background that this study attempts to investigate the impact of work transfer/relocation on matrimonial/family well-being of local government personnel in some selected local government areas in Nigeria.

Statement of the Problem

Employee transfer is a strategic human resources management strategy used in Nigerian local government administration. Officially appointed employees must move to a different local administrative jurisdiction within the state. A poorly managed transfer can have negative impact on an organisation and its employees. Reduced production may occur as a result of poor employee transfer policy. Corruption and a lack of dedication afflict the Nigerian local government system⁹. These factors hinder effective and efficient service delivery, which is crucial to national development. The Nigerian local government's mandatory employee relocation programme may have caused the problems.

An improperly conducted employee relocation can lead to dysfunctional marriages and families, as the family unit is the basic social group where people learn familial and national values. Absent spouses and parents are common in Nigeria nowadays. The collective dysfunctionality of a family or marriage can contribute to a dysfunctional society or nation, which can hinder national progress. There is a dearth of studies on the impact of employee relocation (transfer) in Nigeria, and this study intends to fill this gap. Thus, this study examines how employment relocation affects family ties and marriages in Osun and Ondo states, Nigeria.

- ³D. Arowolo. (2010) "Local Government Administration and the Challenges of Rural Development in Nigeria" in Agagu .A. Afinotan .L. Arowolo .D. Lawal .T. (Eds) *Public Administration in Nigeria*, Akure Alabi-Eyo & Co. Ltd.
- ⁴ O. E. Atakpa, and C. S. Akpan. (2023). Corruption in Public Administration and National Development in Nigeria. *Open Journal of Social Sciences*, 11(6), 120-134.
- ⁵ L. Luo., and C. L. Cooper.(1990). Stress of job relocation: Progress and prospect. *Work & Stress*, 4(2), 121-128
- ⁶O. Lundy. (1994). From personnel management to strategic human resource management. *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 5(3), 687-720.
- ⁷ J. Y. Benjamin, and L. Eagles. (1991). Support services to relocated families increase employee job performance. *Journal of Career Development*, 17(4), 259-264.
- ⁸ A. G. Munton, and M. A. West. (1995). Innovations and personal change: Patterns of adjustment to relocation. *Journal of Organizational behavior*, 16(4), 363-375.
- ⁹M. O Ananti and U. Umeifekwem. (2012). Work ethics and productivity in local government system in Nigeria, Problems and Prospects. *African Research Review*, 6(1), 380-392.

Conceptual Review on Employee Transfer/Relocation

Employee relocation is the horizontal transfer of employees inside an organisation, either to the same job function or to a new one. This relocation involves people changing locations.¹⁰ According to the 2008 Public Service Rules, employee transfer is the permanent discharge of an officer from one scheduled service to another or from one class to another within the same service. This study will use the two names interchangeably because their definitions seem to be mutually reinforcing.

Recent studies have demonstrated some effects of employee relocation on individuals and their families¹¹. These effects include divorce,¹² self-image alteration,¹⁴ unemployment¹³ etc." As a result, Relocation represents a particularly useful way to understand changes in the self-concept with respect to relocation as (i) a transition; (ii) loss and continuity; and, (iii) material and symbolic aspects of possessions.¹¹

Relocation as Transition

Framework for life transitions includes three phases: separation from one's previous social position or status, transition, and incorporation, which involves integrating the new identity into one's sense of self.¹⁴ An employee that relocates displays transitional traits. Status insecurity, identification difficulties, social invisibility, and status ambiguity are these traits. There are cases of relocated people feeling invisible because locals ignored them.

Relocation as Loss and Continuity

Due to the nature of relocation, people may suffer divestment to varied degrees. Losing a house means losing its powerful symbols of refuge and security. Most relocations result in the loss of valuable items due to space constraints or damage during transport¹⁵.

Material and Symbolic Aspects of Possessions in Relocation

Moving forces people to examine the symbolic and material value of their belongings. The dining table, once a family meeting spot, is now inconvenient and fragile. Practical necessities can deconsecrate artefacts, turning them profane. Conceptually, therefore, employee relocation appears to be useful for understanding employee's life transitions, identity issues and socialization¹⁵.

Theoretical Perspectives on Employee relocation

The relationship between couples and work have been examined using several social science theoretical frameworks. These frameworks are relevant to this paper's topic. Three models—economic, gender-role, and marital quality—will guide this study on employee relocation

¹⁰Shihadeh, E. S. (1991). The prevalence of husband-centred migration: employment consequences for married mothers. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 53, 432-444.

¹¹Alexandrovas. S, Reichert .A, and Robinson, S. (2022). An empirical case study of housing mobility in corporate relocations; equity constraints and corporate incentives. *Journal of real estate practice and education* 24 [1],17-31

¹²Amato, P.R and Beatties, B, (2011). Does the Unemployment Rate Affect the Divorce Rate? *Social Science Research*, 40, 705-715.

¹³Cuneyt .K, Mesut .Y and Halil .O, (2019). Relationship Between Migration and Unemployment: Panel Data Analysis for Selected OECD Countries. *Montenegrin Journal of Economics*. Vol. 15, No. 3, 101-111

¹⁴Brett, J. M., & Reily, A. H. (1988). On the road again: Predicting job transfer decision. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 73(4), 614–620.

¹⁵Brett, J.M, Stroh,L.K, and Reilly,A.H. [1993]. Pulling up roots in the 1990s; Who's willing to relocate? *Journal of organizational behaviour*, 14 [1],49-60

The economic approach

Neoclassical family migration decisions are driven by the desire to maximise family advantages.¹⁶ Each partner prioritises family welfare over their own well-being and hobbies. This theory suggests that a family will relocate if one partner's offer to go outweighs the other's financial losses, and *vice versa*. Thus, some households may move in spite of personal inconvenience to one member, while others may stay put despite the potential gain to one partner. ^{18,17} found that spouse pay and career prospects will discourage relocation.

Neoclassical theory holds that spouse income drives migration decisions. Previous researches have shown that the spouse's salary's contribution to family income is essential.^{19, 20} The employee's readiness to accept a relocation offer reduces as the spouse's financial contribution to the home grows.

Gender role

Gender roles are societal standards that define appropriate actions, tasks, and responsibilities. According to gender roles, socialisation shapes women and men's roles. Gender roles range from traditional to modern²¹. Men are traditionally given power and decision-making authority. According to the description, women put family over personal goals. Modern society's gender roles include negotiation of parental authority and decision-making²². Gender-role theory is supported by various researches, including²³ and ²⁴. These studies show that women, despite having human capital and labour force attachment, are more likely to abandon their careers for their husbands.

Marital quality

In the context of relocating, maintaining a positive connection with one's partner may be as important as personal objectives. The ²⁵ perspective introduced marital quality into relocation decision-making. Marital quality—the way a family structure meets a couple's personal, relational, and societal needs—is considered crucial to collecting the resources needed to negotiate geographical shift. Study findings contradict the proposed notion.

¹⁶Becker, G. S. (1981). *A treatise on the family*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

¹⁷Mincer, J. (1978). Family migration decisions. *Journal of Political Economy*, 86, 749-73.

¹⁸Bielby, W. T., & Bielby, D. D. (1992). I will follow him: family, ties, gender-role beliefs, and reluctance to relocate for a better job. *American Journal of Sociology*, 97, 1241-1267.

¹⁹Rives, J. M., & West, J. M. (1993). Wife's employment and worker relocation behavior. *Journal of socio-economics*, 22, 13-22.

²⁰Wheeler, K. G., & Miller, J. G. (1990). The relation of career and family factors to the expressed minimum percentage pay increase required for relocation. *Journal of Management*, 16, 825-834.

²¹Scanzoni, J. (1979). A historical perspective on husband-wife bargaining power and marital G. Levinger, & O. Moles (Eds.), *Divorce and separation* (pp. 20-36). New York: Basic Books

²²Peyton, R. M., Pitts, S., & Kamery, R. H. (2003). A review of significant consumer satisfaction/ models: the family decision-making process. In *Proceedings of the Academy of Family Business*, 1 (2), 3-8.

²³Becker, P. E., & Moen, P. (1999). Scaling back: dual-earner couples' work-family strategies, *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 61, 995-1007.

²⁴Bielby, W. T., & Bielby, D. D. (1992). I will follow him: family, ties, gender-role beliefs, and reluctance to relocate for a better job. *American Journal of Sociology*, 97, 1241-1267.

²⁵Brett, J. M., & Stroh, L. K. (1995). Willingness to relocate internationally. *Human Resource Management*, 34, 405-424.

A thorough investigation is needed to determine whether dissatisfied couples see relocation as a chance to start over or as a source of strain.²⁵ This study found a favourable association between marital quality and an employee's willingness to consult their spouse while deciding to migrate.

Methods

Research Design

The study employed a cross-sectional survey design to examine the effects of work transfer (relocation) on the matrimonial/family well-being of local government employees.

Study Area

The study was conducted among a sample of local government personnel who had experienced job transfer or relocation for at least once since they were confirmed as employees of four (two from each state) LGAs from Ondo and Osun. These local government areas are; Akoko Northeast and Owo in Ondo State and; Ife Central and Ayedaade in Osun state.

Sample Size Determination

The sample size for the study was determined using Taro Yamane formula. Yamane (1967:886) provides a simplified formula to calculate sample sizes. This formula was used to calculate the sample size for this study. Given that the estimated employees from the four LGAs combined was 2880. The formula is given as: $n = N / (1 + N(e)^2)$

Where: n signifies the sample size, N signifies the population under study, and, e signifies the margin error, which is 0.05.

$$n = 2880 / (1 + 2880(e^2))$$

$$n = 351 \text{ (to nearest whole number)}$$

Thus, 351 structured questionnaires were administered and 291 were deemed usable for the analysis. This represents a response rate of 82.9%, which is well over and above the expected 50% threshold for response rate.

Sampling Technique

The selection of respondents for the investigation was based on non-probability sampling technique of convenience sampling. Convenience sampling was an appropriate sampling method because workers selection occurred during any period of the working hours, and was dependent on each respondent's consent. *Data Collection*

Using a structured questionnaire, which was self-developed based on the variables identified in the reviewed literature and subsequently perfected through pilot test survey involving 60 local government employees that have experienced relocation/transfer (at least once) before, primary data were collected from 291 transferred local government employees across four LGAs (two from each state of Ondo and Osun) for the study. The respondents were spread across all the departments in the local governments. In addition

to obtaining demographic information, the questionnaires asked respondents to indicate whether work transfer affected their matrimonial/family well-being. Throughout the data collection process ethical standards of anonymity, voluntary participation and confidentiality were adhered to.

Data Analysis

Data from the survey were analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Univariate statistics were used to provide the general description of the sample. Frequency tables provided useful percent summaries of respondents in each variable category. Bivariate statistics was used to test for the existence of a relationship between each independent variable and dependent variable.

Results and Discussion of Sample Description

As stated earlier, a total of 291 transferred local government employees participated in this cross sectional study. Of these, a little over half (50.5 %) were male and the rest (49.5 %) were female as depicted in Table 1. This implies that there are nearly as many male as female workers in modern local government employment, leaning credence to the fact that traditional home of women is not the kitchen anymore.

The age distribution revealed that 6.5% of participants were between 20 and 30 years, 25.4% were 31 and 40 years, 53.6% were 41 and 50 years, while 14.4% were age 51 years and above. Considering the marital status of the respondents, more than 90 percent (91.4%) of local government employees that participated in the survey are married, while only 6.2 percent were single, and a meagre 2.4 of the respondents were either separated or divorced.

Table 1: Socio-demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Characteristics	Number of Samples
Gender	
Male	147 (50.5)
Female	144 (49.5)
Age Group	
20-30	19 (6.5)
31-40	74 (25.4)
41-50	156 (53.6)
51 and Above	42 (14.4)
Marital status	
Single	18 (6.2)
Married	266 (91.4)
Separated/Divorce	7 (2.4)

Source: Computed by the author based on the data from the questionnaires

With respect to departmental distribution, Table reveals that Community & Social Development department recorded the highest number of respondents (22.7%), closely followed by Administration department with 19.9%. Others include Agriculture (10.3%), Works (9.3%), Budget and planning (8.9%), Primary healthcare (7.9%), and, Water and Sanitation (4.5%). Also, number of years spent in service by the participants was depicted in Table 2, and about 28.5% of the respondents have spent between 16 to 20 years in service, while about 21.6% of them have spent between 11 to 15 and 21 to 25 years in service. While 15.4% of the respondents (12% + 3.4%) has spent more than 25 years in service, only 12.7 of the participants has spent less than 11 in years.

Table 2: Departments and Number of Years in Service of the Respondents

Number of Samples		(
%)		
Local Government Area (9.3)	Administration (19.9)	58
	Finance & Supply (16.5)	48
	Than (22.7)	66
	Works	27
	Departments (8.9)	
	Budget and Planning	26
	Agriculture (10.3)	30
	Water and Sanitation (4.5)	13
	Health (Primary Healthcare) (7.9)	23
	6-10 (12.7)	37
Number of Years in Service (28.5)	11-15 (21.6)	63
	16-20	83
	21-25 (21.6)	63
	26-30 (12.0)	35
	More than 30yrs (3.4)	10

Source: Computed by the author based on the data from the questionnaires

In Educational qualification distribution in Table 3, 32.6% were NCE/HND holder, 52.6% had Bachelor's degree, while those with Master's and Doctor of philosophy degree 9.6% and 1.4% respectively. 3.8% of the participants had other qualifications not mention in the administered questionnaire. Table 3 also presented the rank/level of the participants, and those in level 10 to 12 accounted for 38.1 percent of the respondents, closely followed

by those in level 6-9 (34.4%), and participants in level 13 to 15 accounted for 27.5 percent of the total respondents.

Table 3: Education/Professional Qualification and Rank/Level of Participants

Samples		Number of (%)
Education/Professional Qualification	ND/HND	95 (32.6)
	Bachelor's Degree	153(52.6)
	Master's Degree	28 (9.6)
	Doctorate Degree	4 (1.4)
	Others	11 (3.8)
Rank/Level	Level 6-9	100(34.4)
	Level 10-12	111(38.1)
	Level 13-15	80 (27.5)

Source: Computed by the author based on the data from the questionnaires

Finally, Table 4 shows the distribution of the number of local government employees that relocated with their family members. Almost all the participated (99%) did not relocate with their spouses (and children). Only 1 percent of the respondents relocated to their new place of work with their family members. Also in Table 4, more than half of the respondents (61.5%) had spent more than a year at their new place of relocation, while 19.6 percent and 18.9 percent of the participants had spent between 1 to 6 months and 7 to 12 months in their new place of work, respectively

Table 4: Relocation with (or without) Family Members and Number of Months spent in New LGA

		Number of Samples(%)
Did you relocate with Family Members	No	288
	(99.0)	
	Yes	3
	(1.0)	
Number of Months spent in		
	1-6 months	55
	(18.9)	

New LGA	7-12 months	57
(19.6)	More than 12 months	179
	(61.5)	

Source: *Computed by the author based on the data from the questionnaires*

Thus, it can be argued based on proportionally high number of employees that relocated to their new place of work without moving with their family members that work transfer (relocation) is stressful, especially for couples with working spouses and children of school-going ages.

Impact of work transfer (relocation) on matrimonial/family well-being

In other to assess the impact of work transfer on family well-being, the author regressed the questionnaire items under 'Transfer' on 'Family/Matrimony' items on the questionnaire. The output report is presented in Table 5.

Table 5: The Estimated Impact of Work Transfer on Family/Matrimony

Variable	Coefficient	t-statistic	p-value
constant	14.007	11.381	0.000
Transfer	0.043	0.868	0.386
	<i>F-statistic</i>	0.753	
	<i>Prob</i>	0.386	
	<i>Durbin-Watson R-</i>	1.799	
	<i>Square</i>	0.003	

The output in Table 5 indicates that work transfer has a positive impact on individual family and matrimonial home. However, this relationship is not statistically significant given that the p- value for the estimated coefficient of work transfer is greater than the threshold 5 percent critical value (0.386). This is supported by the fact that the reported p-value of F-statistic (0.386) is not significant as well. While the coefficient of determination (R) also revealed that work transfer could only explain less than 1% in total changes in family/matrimony well-being of the transferred worker. However, the model does not suffer from serial correlation since the reported value of the Durbin-Watson statistic (1.799) is close to 2.

Although there is a positive correlation between work transfer and matrimonial/family well- being of the transferred local government personnel, this relationship is, however, not statistically significant. While not statistically significant, the positive association between employee relocation and family well-being of local government workers in

Nigeria may not be unconnected with the fact that transferees view job relocation as an opportunity for new job challenges and future career enhancement.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In this study, an attempt was made to investigate, empirically, the impact of work transfer/relocation on the family well-being or matrimonial homes of local government workers in some selected local government areas in Ondo and Osun states. Questionnaire items measured on 5 Likert scales were used to capture the dependent variable (matrimonial/ family well-being) and the explanatory/independent variable (work transfer). Prior to the estimation of the linear regression model, descriptive tables involving percentage and frequency distributions of the respondents' socio-demographic characteristics such as age, marital status, educational qualification, departments, and the number of years in service, were first presented. Concerning the impact of work transfer/relocation on family/matrimony well-being, the study established a positive association between work transfer/relocation and family well-being of the selected local government employees for this study. This finding is in consonance with prior studies like ^{26, 27} who concluded in their studies that employees viewed job relocation as an opportunity for new job challenges and future career enhancement, hence the positive association with family well-being. On the other hand, however, the findings from this study is in contrast to those carried out by some prior studies ²⁸ and, ²⁹ that show that most employees now view relocation as stressful, especially for couples with working spouses.

Owing to the findings reported above, the following are recommended by this study. First, given that most of the participants are married, potential transferees should be given at least 3 months to prepare for relocation. And, where possible, couples should be separated only as a last resort. Again, the transferring agencies should, to the extent possible, ensure that couples are located within a radius of not more than 80 km to ease transporting to and fro since most of the workers do not relocate with their family. Also, Transparency should prevail in the transfer decision making process. Dialogue between various government departments and transferees should be promoted to facilitate effective transition for all parties involved. Lastly, transfer policy guidelines should be documented outlining succinctly, the objectives of the policy and the implementation machinery.

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THE NEXUS OF CORRUPTION, INSURGENCY, BANDITRY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

The Nigerian state is currently bedeviled with a high rate of corruption both in private and public institutions after the military handed over power affairs to civilians. With the upsurge of corruption in the country, there have been high increase in insurgency and banditry operation in the country. Therefore, this paper will examine the nexus of corruption, insurgency, banditry and sustainable development in Nigeria. Using the qualitative research design, this paper will interrogate or fashion out issues from journals, articles, government publications, international materials, and internet sources. The increase in inflation and socio-economic degradation in Nigeria has reflected the pandemic ravaging the country, creating a high debt rate and low development. The paper identified that the pandemic of corruption started from the household and community at large as a result of the inequality in the distribution of resources among the citizens. Strong institutions and full implementation of policy to improve the livelihood and development of the nation must be a top agenda of the government. The paper concluded that corruption must be dealt with, and sustainable development must be the government's order without leaving any sector of the country behind.

Keywords: Corruption, Insurgency, Banditry, Sustainable Development, Nigeria

Introduction

Corruption is an anti-social attitude awarding flawed privileges contrary to criminal and ethical norms and impairs the authorities' capacity to relax the welfare of all citizens. Corruption in Nigeria is a steady phenomenon. In 2012, Nigeria became envisioned to have misplaced over \$400 billion to corruption considering its independence (Okoye, 2012, & Ijewereme, 2015). In 2021, the nation ranked 154th in the one hundred eighty nations listed in Transparency

International's Corruption Index (with South Sudan, at 180th, being the maximum corrupt, and Denmark the least) (Transparency International, 2021).

Nigerian politicians locate themselves in a sturdy position of power and wealth due to their network with Nigeria's oil and fuel industries. These fuel industries are beneath the nation-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) management. Oil and gasoline exports account for over 90% of all Nigerian export sales (Varrella, 2021). While many politicians personal or have shares in those industries, tax revenues from the power region dwindled, and the blessings of Nigeria's energy wealth are not lightly disbursed throughout the united states, with Lagos State benefitting disproportionately. Oil and gas revenues consequently account for the enormous majority of the federal price range and the salaries of government officials. Vote rigging by political events in elections is considerable, and corruption is endemic inside authorities. Business arrangements and circles of relatives' loyalties dominate governmental appointments paving the manner for politicians, officials, and their commercial enterprise associates who together make up the ruling elite to ensure that all of them turn out to be wealthy thru behind-the-scenes agreements and the awarding of worthwhile contracts to favoured supporters (Ralby, 2017). In 2018 many authorities' employees obtained annual salaries of over \$1 million. Corruption runs through every stage of the Nigerian government. From full-size settlement fraud at the pinnacle through petty bribery, cash laundering schemes, embezzlement, and seizing salaries from fake workers, it's estimated that corruption within the kingdom apparatus costs the nation billions of money every year (Campbell & John, 2018).

In addition to highlighting the devastating blows of corruption at the military operation campaign in opposition to Boko Haram, mention should additionally be made of the complacencies of the likes of Alhaji Buji Foi, an alleged sponsor of the Boko Haram insurgents, performed 24 hours after Mohammad Yusuf, the founder, and leader of the sect. A two-time chairman of neighborhood government and Commissioner in the price of non secular affairs below former Governor Ali Modu Sheriff (Borno state), who succeeded in using his position to provide a safe haven and guide for Boko Haram insurgents. Perhaps extra startling turned into the implication in someday 2012 of General Azubuike Ihejirika (Rtd), former chief of Army Staff, Senator Ali Modi Sheriff, in addition to a senior officer of the Central Bank of Nigeria. These revelations had been made through Dr. Stephen Davis, an independent negotiator who claimed that the lead sponsors of the sect were politicians who channeled their funds via the state's Apex Bank to make their transactions look legitimate. Although those allegations had been brushed off with the aid of the Goodluck administration, seeing that they have been aimed toward tarnishing its image. The reality remains that there may be no smoke without a hearth. There have been additional allegations from several quarters, and the story of Colonel Sambo Dasuki (Rtd) is fresh in many Nigerians' minds (Shimawua, 2020).

The presidency of Muhammadu Buhari has observed major action against corruption in Nigeria. In 2016, the Senate ad hoc committee on "pailing humanitarian crisis in the North East" coordinated by Senator Shehu Sani fingered the then secretary to the Government of the Federation choosen by Muhammadu Buhari, Mr. Babachir Lawal in an N200 million contract corruption for the clearing of "invasive object species" in Yobe State by Rholavision Nigeria Limited; a company he owns (Adebayo and Ojo, 2017). On October 30, 2017, President Buhari removed Lawal based on the report of a three-person panel coordinated by Vice-President Yemi Osinbajo that investigated him and one other (Abayomi & Adetayo, 2017). Corruption remains a major concern for the government and the people of Nigeria. Corruption affects all

aspects of public life, continues to undermine the country's social, economic, and political development, and is a major obstacle to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (UNODC, 2022). Therefore this research will examine the nexus of corruption, insurgency, banditry, and sustainable development in Nigeria.

Conceptual Discourse

Corruption: Nigeria's continuing war with insurgency and bandits and government corruption threatens the country's stability and political growth. President Muhammadu Buhari's 2015 election promises included curbing endemic corruption and ending an insurgency that has taken over 20,000 lives and displaced millions. However, Nigeria's defense institutions face significant corruption hazards, with exceedingly lax controls in procurement and operations. While tools to ensure checks and balances are in place, they often lack the materials, expertise, administration, and understanding to fully execute their functions (Mbara, Gopal, and Zvaita, 2021). The international Bank and the IMF posit that it's miles "the abuse of public workplace for non-public profits". Soachs (2007) defines this is a phenomenon that has extensively appeared as one of the largest demanding situations of the current human society. Ademihe (2013) believes "corruption has no uniform definition. This is so because what is appeared as corruption relies upon the actors, the pro *corruption* as "endemic in addition to an enemy within". According to Osunyinkanmi (2009), the term corruption is synonymous with fraud, bribery, settlement, etc. Even transparency international defines corruption as "the misuse of entrusted electricity for private advantage".

Table: Arms and Ammunition Funds Shared by Former NSA

S/N	Name	Amount	Purpose	Remark
1	Attahiru Bafarawa	N4.6 billion	Spiritual purposes	Arrested by the EFCC
2	Chief Raymond Dokpesi	N2.1 billion	Publicity and Media	Arrested by the EFCC
3	Alh. Aminu Babakusa	N2.2 billion	Shared to politicians	Promise to refund part
4	Waripamowei Dudafa	N10 billion	Shared to PDP delegates	-
5	Chief Olisa Metu	N1.4 billion	Shared to politicians	Arrested by the EFCC
6	Bala James Ngillari	N450 million	-	Arrested by the EFCC
7	Mrs Esther Nenat Usman	N2.5 billion	Shared to party officials	Arrested by the EFCC
8	Air Marshal Adesola Amosu (Rtd)	Returned N2.3 billion	-	Returned 2.3 billion
9	Air Chief Marshal Alex Badeh (Rtd)	\$930,500 and \$690.000	Questionable contracts	Arrested by the EFCC
10	Femi Fani-Kayode	N840 million	Campaign publicity	Arrested by the EFCC

11	Chief Olu Falae	N100 million	Received from Mrs Usman	
12	Rashidi Ladoja	N100 million	Received from Mrs Usman	
13	Prof. Rufai Alkali	N320 million	Support Group	
14	Bashir Yuguda	N1.5 billion, N1.2 trillion, And N775 million	Suspicious payments	

Source: Adopted from Jimoh, 2016

Insurgency:

Nigeria's ongoing struggle with rebel groups and ongoing government corruption threatens the stability and political integrity of Africa's most populous nation. Since 2011, Boko Haram, one of Africa's largest Islamist militant groups, has carried out terrorist attacks against religious and political groups, local police, and military and indiscriminately attacked civilians in crowded markets and villages. The kidnapping of more than 200 school girls from their learning center in April 2014 drew international attention to the ongoing Boko Haram threat and the government's inability to contain it. Following talks between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government, mediated by the International Committee of the Red Cross, 103 girls have now been released (Center for Preventive Action, 2022).

President Muhammadu Buhari, the previous military dictator who defeated sitting Goodluck Jonathan, was elected to the anti-terrorism platform in 2015. However, economic and political challenges in Nigeria have complicated the fight against Boko Haram. In addition to military conflicts, the unequal distribution of oil revenues, high levels of corruption, and violence in the Middle Belt region pose major security challenges for Nigeria (Center for Preventive Action, 2022).

Relations between Boko Haram and other Islamist groups could further exacerbate regional security problems. After the group swore allegiance to Islamic State in March 2015, the United States stepped up its military assistance, sending 300 troops to Nigeria to help fight Boko Haram. As Africa's largest oil producer, Nigeria's stability is important to regional security and US economic interests.

The potential impacts on victims of terrorism can be devastating and numerous; it can be experienced on many interconnected levels – individual, collective and social. From a victimological perspective, there are three rounds of 'personal victimization', defined according to proximity to the immediate victim: loss or death; Secondary or secondary victimization experienced by family members, relatives, or friends of the primary victim; and third or third-degree victimization experienced by those who observe victimization being exposed through television or radio coverage of victimization or victim support and care” (Erez, 2006, p. 20).

Boko Haram: Boko Haram, officially known as Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād 'Group of the People of Sunnah for Dawah and Jihad', is a terrorist organization based in northeastern Nigeria, which is also active in Chad, Niger, and northern Cameroon (BBC, 2015). In 2016, the group divided, resulting in the emergence of a hostile part known as the Islamic

State's West Africa Province. Established by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002, the group was coordinated by Abubakar Shekau from 2009 until his dismissal in 2021. Also it splintered into another team after Yusuf's death and in 2015. When the group was first formed, its main goal was to "purify"[clarification needed] Islam in northern Nigeria, believing jihad should be delayed until the group was strong sufficient to overthrow the Nigerian government (Zenna, and Pierib, 2017). The group formerly aligned itself with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The group has been known for its wickedness, and since the insurgency started in 2009, Boko Haram has killed tens of thousands of people in regular attacks against the police, armed forces, and people. It has resulted in the deaths of more than 300,000 children, displaced 2.3 million from their homes, and was the world's deadliest terror group reigning part of the mid-2010s, according to the Global Terrorism Index 2015. Boko Haram has contributed to regional food problem and famines (Matfess, 2017).

After its establishing in 2002, Boko Haram's increasing radicalization led to the suppression activities by the country's military and the killing of its leader Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009 (Cook, 2011). Its unexpected resurgence, following a huge prison break in September 2010 in Bauchi, was accompanied by increasingly sophisticated attacks, initially against weak points, but increased in 2011 to suicide bombings of police buildings and the United Nations office in FCT Abuja. The government's ministry of a period of emergency at the beginning of 2012 moved in the coming year to cover the entire northeast region of Nigeria, leading to a growth in both security force abuses and militant attacks.

Banditry: According to Egwu (2015), in his work, *The Political Economy of Rural Banditry in Modern Nigeria*, considers armed bandits as the practice of stealing livestock and animals from herders or robbing livestock from farms. Although in his view, these activities are usually driven by some means and other factors, in general they can be seen as an economically justified form of crime supported by informal networks. As a problem with economic roots, Egwu (2015) further states that armed bandits thrive as a means of "primitive" cattle accumulation in the context of subsistence and commercial husbandry. Momale (2015), on the other hand, conceptualizes armed bandits as a broader spectrum of widespread cattle rustling encompassing various forms of crime; These include robbers and robberies by gangsters to confiscate assets and property (Cheserek et al. 2012), cited in Momale (2015). He (Momale) further postulated that these activities are usually associated with communities suffering from social and economic disasters and are also resilient when the structures and functions of leadership and management have been damaged or have been slightly weakened. He also stressed that these heinous acts are more common in rural and marginalized communities.

On the other hand, Mohammed and Alimbi (2015) opined that armed banditry is both a symptom and a cause of rural underdevelopment. They also argued that Bandits are usually seen in two perspectives. They were seen, in most cases, as outlaws by the State authorities. At the same time, in the second perspective, they were often viewed by peasants as those who were able to defy a malfunctioning system and right the wrongs in society.

Sustainable Development: Sustainable Development Goals and Nigeria is about how Nigeria implements the Sustainable Development Goals in 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) consist of seventeen global goals defined as "plans for achieving a better and more sustainable future for all". Each of the 17

goals must be achieved in every country worldwide by 2030. On the other hand, sustainable human development is an organizing principle to achieve human development goals while preserving the ability of natural operations to provide the natural materials and ecosystem services on which economies and societies depend (Abdullahi, 2021).

Effect of the misappropriation and diversion of funds on the war against insurgency and Banditry Operations in Nigeria

Corruption is related to various factors that will prevail even if the rules try to build a regime to combat it. Mitrevska (2019) identifies two common forms of corruption, institutional and non-institutional personal corruption. Corruption of non-institutional people is the corruption of people outside the institutional environment. Such corruption is related to people's moral character and destroys their morals.

Institutional corruption implies the idea of institutions and institutional authorities exercising institutional discretion and social power (Miller, 2017). It tends to explain how individuals in state institutions can intentionally manipulate administrative structures to control corruption or engage in corrupt behavior on behalf of institutions for their gain.

According to Lessig (2013), "corruption is when there are systemic and strategic, legitimate or even ethical influences at the moment, which weaken the institution's effectiveness, distract it from its objectives, or weaken public trust in the institution. Although Lessig's definition of institutional corruption tends to include the types of corruption that occur in public institutions designed to ensure the public good and societal values, he underestimates the elements of corruption, such as bribery and embezzlement, are most frequently defined as corruption.

Smith-Crow and Warren (2014) characterize institutional corruption as a common collective disorder among those responsible for running the state security sector. In contrast to non-institutional personal corruption, institutional corruption weakens the effective function of institutions in carrying out their duties. Fotaki (2020) revealed that this weakens the institution's effective functioning due to the significant discretion that members of the institution have regarding the governance of the institution and the extent of their involvement in corrupt practices within the institution.

Based on the consensus among normative institutionalism in explaining institutional corruption, normative theorists have developed a tripartite concept known as the elements of institutional corruption. These include institutional advantages, institutional disadvantages, and the relationship between the two (Thompson, 2018). They tend to incite corruption through established and legitimate institutional processes such as payroll systems, institutional budgets, recruitment, training funds, research and development, capacity-building training, and conferences. They manipulate these procedures in cooperation with each other or regulators through excessive billing, lack of existing payroll staff, ghost worker systems, inappropriate conferences, and distribution of fake contracts among themselves. The conclusion is that hybrid forms of corruption are on the rise in the long term, ultimately undermining the effective functioning of institutions and threatening the long-term viability of fighting against bandits and insurgency in Nigeria (Page and Wando, 2022).

On the other hand, corruption has affected national security, where internal politics has softened through recruitment, placement, and promotion to security organizations, thereby weakening the work of security agencies in ensuring adequate security. Similarly, senior

security officials have been accused of mismanaging the funds allocated to purchase the equipment needed to ensure security in the country. This is also one of the factors that cause poverty, and unemployment, which forces some people to engage in certain criminal activities (such as political banditry, armed robbery, terrorism, etc.) that pose a threat to national security. It also limits access to abundant opportunities there and diverts the energy of some young people towards crime, disorder, and violence that threatens the existing peace of a country (Amali, Sarki, & Usman, 2016). Another reflection of the corruption of national security is its ability to generate political, ethnic-religious, and societal conflicts to control and maintain state power as a driver for the accumulation of illicit wealth through the diversion of state resources (Muhammed, 2013). However, it is said that militancy, which is considered a major problem in our modern society, is associated with corruption, especially in the public sector (Ulu, 2009). He also claims that the extremists/rebels act based on the deprived benefit of the resources taken from their country, where a few are positioned.

Challenges facing in Achieving Sustainable Development in Nigeria

1. Corruption

In Nigeria, corruption happens in many aspects, but the most common is the corruption of government officials. News reports citing the EFCC cited large figures for the amount allegedly stolen from former government officials (Sanni, 2022). Ministries, directorates, and government agencies have two employees who will disrupt the smooth running of extortion schemes or accept bribes from the public for free services.

Many foreign investors are far from Nigeria, and some have put their investments on hold to get them to safety. Nigeria has been known to be home to the world's second deadliest terrorist group since ISIS. Nigeria is accused of Boko Haram, which uses suicide bombers to kill and maim innocent civilians in the northeast. This condition of uncertainty scares foreign investors in the country. To stop the flight of capital, the government must destroy Boko Haram to allow the regional economy to return to normal and restore confidence in our security apparatus and its ability to keep the country safe.

2. Excessive dependence on imports

Some Nigerians see the use of imported products as a status symbol. They believed that eating imported beef, Uncle Bence's rice, roasted beans, and exotic drinking wine marked them as high-class citizens. Due to this unusual taste and dependence on imported consumer goods, Nigeria imports basic goods such as buttons, dental floss, matches, torches, and toothpicks. Second, the lack of a constant supply of electricity makes imports cheaper for companies like Michelin and Dunlop, which now import tires than they produce domestically.

3. Lack of Visionary Leaders

Visionary leaders are builders of a new dawn, working with imagination, insight, and courage. They are challenges that bring out the best in people and unite them around a common goal. Visionary leaders are agents of change. Nigeria has few change agents and needs more infrastructures to develop the nation (Gbadebo & Olalusi, 2014).

4. Poor infrastructure

Poor infrastructure, such as the lack of an uninterruptible power supply and transportation system, prevents Nigerian businesses from thriving. Poor infrastructure doubles the cost of producing and selling finished goods in Nigeria. Roads need to be repaired because of the damage caused by transporting goods by road rather than by rail by rail.

The cost of electricity is a huge production cost that all businesses in Nigeria bear. For example, all GSM phone service providers use solar to power their cellular sites with telecommunication towers spread across the country (Usifo, 2017).

Conclusion

More than every other issue, corruption has contributed immensely to the lack of ability of the Government to end insurgency and banditry operations in the country. The phenomenon incapacitated the military in phrases of adequate and required weaponry, the sagging morale of the troops at the frontline, and the indiscipline among the rank and file in the navy. The method of the government first of all, was inadequate and lacked every element of seriousness. The need to implement and support the fight against corruption in the country is inevitable.

Recommendation

The factors affecting Nigeria's economic growth are social and economic issues, including corruption, poor infrastructure, inflation, and the value of the naira.

Therefore, to ensure sustainable economic growth, the government must monitor and manage these factors, creating price stability and a favorable environment for the private sector, which is the engine of wealth growth.

The youths are the future of any country. Thus, a country that fails to empower its people through education has no future. Established political pressure groups should do more to mobilize the electorate to ensure their votes count.

The government also ignored suggestions from some quarters to hold dialogue earlier, to grant amnesty, and to compensate some rebels for their losses.

Anti-corruption agencies like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the independent corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) should work independently without any interference from the government or influential politicians. This will address the victimizing of political opponents, which affects national security, thereby increasing political conflicts.

The government should vigorously promote national policies on reorientation and departures through the education sector and information ministries at the federal and state levels.

Military discipline must be strengthened to prevent the kind of indiscipline that almost led to unrest among the Nigerian army. This can only be achieved by solving the problem.

Finally, the current fight against corruption must continue, and more efforts must be made to recover the spoils of corrupt officials, especially regarding money laundering abroad.

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FROM FRIENDS TO FOES: FULBE/MAMBILLA RELATIONS SINCE THE CONFLICT OF 2002

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Abstract

This paper examined the causative agents and the aftermath of the 2002 Mambilla riot, which led to the killing of many people, destruction of properties and cracks into the Fulbe/Mambilla relations, which raised the question of identity and origin. Both written and oral sources are used to analyze the phenomena of social strife and violence. Fulbe/Mambilla relations had been smooth and cordial since the 19th century which was beatified with the ethos of religious tolerance as their relationship was defined by their differences. Through this process, other ethnic groups inhabiting the Mambilla Plateau like Kaka, Fanzo and Kambo knew the vitality of maintaining peaceful co-existence in the area which carries with it sobriety, intermarriage, trading, and interdependence. However, this type of peaceful relations between them began to take a new dimension prelude to the 1999 democratic transition in Nigeria the peak of which is the riot of 2002. The paper found out that Fulbe/Mambilla relations began to degenerate after the 2002 riot from friendliness to enmity immersed in the ocean of suspicion and slander.

Keywords: Conflicts, Fulbe, Farmers. Mambilla

Introduction

Various factors lead to conflict, or violence, which is always born out of the clash of interest among societies and nations be it social, economic, political, strategic, or even psychological. The Mambilla plateau with its complex ethno-religious and geographical composition is a classic example of a race between bourgeoisies and the proletariats over the control and distribution of resources. It was this class struggle that led to the Fulbe/Mambilla conflict of 2002 which further raised the question of origin, identity and suspicion. Therefore, this chapter examines the nurture, nature and complexities of intergroup relations between the Fulbe and the Mambilla speaking peoples of the Mambilla plateau.

Theories of Conflict

Conflict is lucidly defined as a social system involving actors with incompatibility between their goals and aspirations which served as a major threat to societal survival, which involves life and property in so many parts of the world¹. To this end, scholars have made bold steps to examine the nature, types and dimensions of conflict through various perceptual lenses. Typologies and dimensions are the two facets of any social strife. As the former classifies conflicts into types, the latter becomes the variable through which all conflicts, regardless of type are analyzed². Scholars have put forward various theories of conflict ranging from Marxism, which deals with class struggle over scarce resources, Personian theory which deals exclusively with relations of authority, Elite theory that stresses on the inter-play of authoritative structure that negates both the class struggle of the Marxists and Pluralism, to Darwinian concept of the ‘survival of the fittest’³.

However, being a historical analysis over conflict which defines the Fulbe/Mambilla relations, this chapter applies the Marxian theory to examine the phenomenon under study. The theory deals with class struggle between the bourgeoisies and the proletariats over scarce resources in which the former is persistently willing to monopolize the control and distribution of resources, while the latter is tirelessly rebelling against any exploitative system that tends to delimit their progress within the social strata. This development brings the issue of either revolt, or revolution depending on the circumstances on the ground. Therefore, one would argue that the Fulbe being the richest and the privileged few in control of land and resources, and the Mambilla who are predominantly poor despite the fact that they were the first settlers on the plateau saw it as a direct economic onslaught of the bourgeoisies over them.

The Mambilla Plateau

Located in the present day Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State, Mambilla, a scenic mountain with an altitude of 1800 metres (6000ft) above the sea level with its ceaseless temperate climate is a home to many ethnic groups like the Mambilla, Fulbe, Kambu, Kaka,

Fanso, etc⁴. This plateau falls largely between Tikar and Adamawa plains in Cameroon⁵. According to N.A. Nasidi:

The plateau is located between latitude 5° 30' to 7° 18' North and longitude 10° 8' to 11° 37' East with a total landmarks of 3765.2km forming the southernmost tip of the northeastern parts of Nigeria. Mambilla plateau is ever-green and the soil is rich, a condition which allowed the cultivation of different fruits like; banana, pine apple, plantain and pea. Other products include; potatoes and maize though, produced in small quantity due to the problems associated with the highland⁶.

Mambilla was initially a virgin plateau before the settlement of the Mambilla people in the 16th century who were said to have migrated from the east. According to legend as N.A. Nasidi argues:

...the Mambilla people originated from Egypt. They then migrated to the southern part of the present day Sudan. As some of them settled permanently, other groups of common ancestry moved through Chad and then settled in Bankin (in the present day Cameroon). In search of a greener pasture, some of them were able to discover the virgin land now called the Mambilla Plateau. With that development, they quickly went and informed their brethren who were then at Bankin about the fertility of the soil which they loved so dearly. Thus, they began to settle clan by clan. As moved to the newly discovered land, the only things available and visible on the hill were; wild animals⁷.

The Mambilla plateau therefore got its name from the Mambilla speaking peoples. Thus, it is the name of a plateau, an ethnic group and a language. However, the Mambilla language being a branch of the Bantu group of languages is an indication that they must have migrated from the Central and South Central African sub-region. Pointer to the migration of the Mambilla from there is the presence of the name 'Mambilla' though with some modifications to different geographical locations in the region as mentioned. For example, Mambillima (a name of a town and a waterfall in Zambia/Congolese border), Mambili (name of a river in Congo Brazzaville), Mambere (name of rivers in Central African Republic and the Cameroon), to mention, but a few⁸.

Mambilla plateau is also a perfect example of the Mazruinian theory of Africa's 'Triple Heritage' due to the Presence of Traditional religion, Islam and Christianity. The settlement of the Fulbe in 1880 led to the spread of Islam among the people of the area⁹. Among the early Fulbe migrant clans to the area include Jafunu and Rahaji¹⁰. From that time onwards, all other ethnic groups like the Kaka, Kambu and Fanso began to settle on the plateau especially in the early 20th century. The presence of these groups of people led to intergroup marriages especially between the Fulbe and the Mambilla. Christianity was introduced into the area in the first half of the 20th century. The missionaries were from the North American Baptist Convention originally from the Cameroon. The first team included Dr. Geypower, Dr. Dunga and Mamachu (an African evangelist). It was under the supervision of these medical missionaries that the area was evangelized. They first settled at what is now War-War town. Mr. Joseph Gindal, John Donwan and Mr Tafi were the first converts, and they confronted a lot of challenges from their brethren who saw the new religion as a negation of their traditional totemic beliefs¹¹.

After the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference, the Cameroon in which the Mambilla was part of fell under the German colony. However, with the defeat of the axis aggression in World War I (1914-1918), the Allied forces took over all German territories in Africa and Asia to be administered as 'Mandates' on behalf of the League of Nations. This agreement was sealed in the famous Treaty of Versailles. Talking on the same vein, B. Walsh argues that:

Germany's overseas empire was taken away. It has been one of the causes of bad relations between Britain and Germany before the War. For German colonies became MANDATES controlled by the League of Nations, effectively meant that France and Britain controlled them¹².

In this regard, the Cameroon which was a German territory was given a dual mandate by the British and the French. Taylor while commenting on the impact of the mandate as a system believes that: the mandate system fostered the development of sub-regional national entities which became increasingly distinct from each other because of differing administrative influences¹³.

It should be noted that with the attainment of independence by both Nigeria and the Cameroon, there emerged the question of where did the Mambilla plateau belong to? British Nigeria, or the French Cameroon? Due to the growing nature of tension between Ahmadu Bello, the Nigerian Premier of the Northern region and Ahmad Ahijo, the then president of the Republic of Cameroon, the United Nations interfered between the two countries in its effort to reconcile border disputes to which plebiscite was the only answer.

The Plebiscite of 1961 and the Question of Identity

The UN mission as regards the conduction of a plebiscite and the future of the Mambilla plateau maintains that:

On the basis of the facts and opinions known to it which include the consideration of historical and political development which it had set forth in the first part of this report...there is no difference of opinion on the principal question of the future of the northern Cameroon which would require or justify the holding of a formal consultation on the subject. It believes it to be manifestly the opinion of the northern population as a whole as far as it can be expressed at present and in the foreseeable future; that they would become permanently a part of the northern region of the Federation of Nigeria when the latter attains independence. The mission accordingly recommends that, if the General Assembly accepts such a union as the basis for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement on further consultation need be held¹⁴.

Therefore, on the 16th of October, 1959, the UN passed resolution 1350 ending the conduction of a plebiscite not later than March, 1961. The UN also mandated the inclusion of the following questions on the plebiscite pact popularly known as the 'two alternatives'¹⁵.

1. Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria?
2. Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroons?

Fortunately for Nigeria, majority of the people of the Mambilla plateau voted to join the independent Federation of Nigeria. From that time, the area became part and parcel of the country. While showcasing his gratitude and happiness to the people of the plateau, Ahmadu Bello of Nigeria said:

I wish to express on behalf of this house our sincere thanks to the people of the Northern Cameroons. They have given overwhelming support to our cherished ideal of 'One North, One People and One Destiny'. It is this ideal which holds together the different people of this great region irrespective of tribe, or religion...members are, however, aware that in the past certain people usually not living in this region, have attempted to destroy this ideal. They have said that non-Fulanis and non-Muslims would vote for the Cameroon Republic in the plebiscite. This, I am glad to say has been proved totally untrue. We won the plebiscite by a resounding majority¹⁶.

With this development, the question of identity and will to power came into the limelight as much as other ethnic groups inhabiting the Mambilla plateau are concerned. Therefore, the only yardstick used by the people to determine the citizenship of a particular group of people was the plebiscite of 1961. According to this law, any ethnic group that settled on the plateau before the plebiscite of 1961 is considered to be indigenous and any ethnic group that came to the area after the plebiscite is no more than a settler.

Land Act, Fulbe-Herdsmen and the Mambilla Farmers

Before 1978, land was directly placed under the emirates as in the case of Northern Nigeria. The members of the royalty could access any unoccupied land at their disposal. However, any farmer who wanted a land must pay in cash to the emir¹⁷. Later, a land act was introduced to achieve the following objectives:

1. There were land racketeering and unending litigations in land transaction due greater demand for land.
2. Traditional land ownership has constituted a barrier to national development.
3. On the death of a land owner, inheritance problems arose in the form of excessive sub-division of holdings.
4. Need for sustained security of rights to land in matters of duration, compensation and alienation of rights in land.
5. Government could not be different to a system in which only the rich, powerful and influential own land.

This decree therefore, was promulgated on the basis of the concept of collective ownership of all lands in Nigeria by the citizens. This would help unify land tenure in the country. However, despite the promulgation of the act, many traditional rulers in Nigeria continued the distribution and allocation of lands when need be.

As the Fulbe are herders, the Mambilla people are predominantly farmers. Each one of them is in dire need of enough land either for transhumance, or farming. Therefore, the continuous growth of population not only of humans but that of cattle increases serious demand for land. This brought a sort of friction between the Fulbe and the Mambilla¹⁸. To solve this problem, the Native Authority (N.A) allocated lands for transhumance and crop production¹⁹. According to this scheme, the Fulbe were to occupy the highlands, while the Mambilla were to make use of the valleys for their agricultural purposes. The idea was that the high level of precipitation on the plateau washes away the soil nutrients from the hilly part into the valley and thereby making it more fertile. The available grasses on the hilltops are enough for the cattle to feed.

For many years, both the Fulbe and the Mambilla were independent of each other as far as land was concerned. The Fulbe is the richest ethnic group on the plateau and this gave them the chance to buy greater part of the unused lands for their economic activities. They also became like feudal lords employing the services of the predominantly poor Mambilla to work for them in order to earn a living. Even the major business enterprises like filling stations, transport, schools, etc. especially in Gembu, the plateau's capital, are owned by the Fulbe. The Mambilla who considered themselves original owners of the entire plateau saw the Fulbe as no more than colonialists. With this development they began to hatch violent plans so as to send the Fulbe away²⁰.

According to the Mambilla people, the Fulbe were not only using the hilltops as agreed, but extended to the valleys with their cattle destroying their crops. In a counter narrative, the Fulbe argued that they never did that and raised an accusing finger at the Mambilla who were said to have hoisted red flags on the Fulbe allocated areas. However, the growth of population may warrant the need for more land by both sides which may be the causative agent of social strife there. Similarly, the chauvinistic Mambilla politicians like Salihu Dogo had the intention of fighting the economic strength of the Fulbe through the confiscation of their lands, bought and allocated²¹.

It was this discord that in 1999 led to a deadly clash between a Pullo (Fulani man) and a Mambilla, mining in the land of the former²². This incidence further jeopardized Fulbe/Mambilla relations the peak of which was the conflict of Nenge village between the Fulbe and the Mambilla. Many people lost their lives. As a result of this feud, the Mambilla people began to organize series of meetings on how to attack the Fulbe. The Fulbe on their side knowing fully well that the Mambilla are greater than them in terms of population, employed the services of some wodābe (a Fulbe clan) mercenaries situated at the foot of the plateau along the Barua axis of Gashaka Local Government Area. The Fulbe with large herds of cattle migrated to the neighboring Cameroon. On the 1st of January, 2002, a serious conflict broke not only in the countryside, but even in the major cities of Gembu, Maisamari, Mayo Daga, Likitaba, Mbu, and Kakara²³. The Mambilla were carrying heavy guns like AK47 while the Fulbe were ill prepared. Though there was no statistical evidence as regards the number of people killed, or maimed, it was obvious that hundreds of people on both sides lost their lives though the Fulbe were predominantly the victims. Many Fulbe, their houses and wealth were all set ablaze.

The Fulbe who made it, migrated to the Cameroon, while others came down the plateau to Gashaka, Bali, Ardo-Kola and Jalingo. It was said that this conflict was planned by the Mambilla leaders and executed by the commoners in an attempt to free 'their fatherland' from

‘foreign domination’. Part of the aftermath of this crisis was the impoverishment of the Mambilla who are completely dependent on the Fulbe for imported food stuff, clothes, electronics, accessories, building materials, and above all, the transport network linking the secluded plateau with the outside world.

Similarly, the conflict reshaped Fulbe/Mambilla relations from friendliness to animosity. It also promoted tension and suspicion between them as regards who controls what? Despite the fact that each one of them pretends that nothing happened.

Challenges and Prospects

One of the major challenges affecting the Fulbe/ Mambilla relations was the disintegration of central authority. During the reign of Muhammadu Mansur even though a Fulani *Lamdo* (king) both the Mambilla and the Fulbe were answerable to him. Through this process, peace and unity was maintained. However, with his demise, the traditional leadership was factionalized into two with the erection of an independent Mambilla royal house under the leadership of Audu Shehu Bajau. Though there was agreement that the kingship should be rotational between the Fulbe and the Mambilla, the issue of unity remains a mystery.

Poverty and squalor are also major causative agents of societal decay and frustration the peak of which is violence. The General Strain theory emphasized that the individual’s affective responses to unpromising life experiences promotes deviant behaviour²⁴. Frustration is a critical condition in which an individual is challenged by socio-political, and economic forces making him to develop negative character as much as his personality is concerned²⁵. As most Psychologists argue, frustration is one of the effective emotional response to opposition²⁶. Therefore, the bulk of the Mambilla population is uneducated and unemployed youth. For this reason, they are easily manipulated by the politicians to start a violence.

Thirdly, there is the threat of re-armament on both sides. This no doubt spells doom to the peaceful-coexistence of the people of the area. It was this reason that led to Mambilla/Kaka violence after the Fulbe conflict of 2002. It also created tensions among the politically weak ethnic groups of Fanzo, Kaka and Kambu.

There is the problem of indigene/settler tussle. The Fanzo who settled on the plateau after the plebiscite of 1961 are treated as foreigners. They are not given the chance to contest democratically despite their reasonable population. Though they are predominantly non-Muslims, they prefer to support the Fulbe so as to maintain a sort of independence with the support of the latter.

The Mambilla politicians who are deeply rooted in Mambilla chauvinism keep on putting the cats among the pigeons by supporting their people with guns and bullets to fight a ‘liberation war’. The recent Fulbe genocide on the plateau in 2017 was a classic example of the inter-play of politics in igniting chaos and insecurity. Hundreds of Fulbe women, old people, children and even fetus were massacred in cold blood.

However, there is still hope at the end of the tunnel. To properly arrest the situation, the constituted authorities must put their hands on deck to promote peace, law and order in the area. It was its presence in the past that led to peace and tranquility and today, its absence makes the atmosphere chaotic and rebellious. There is also the need for a sound security system to

maintain law and order and to quickly halt an emerging violence without much damage. With the exception of Gembu, and Ngroje, Police stations are totally absent in the countryside. That is why whenever there is a violence, it must be fatal to the people of the area.

The Taraba state and the Federal governments should cooperate in promoting massive private investment on the plateau. This will no doubt open the gate of opportunities for the people. The investment should cut across all spheres of life. There is also the need to subsidize farming and food preservation for export. The plateau is blessed with huge amount of fruits and cattle. However, distance and the secluded nature of the area made it almost impossible to transport their perishable goods to the Nigerian major cities. Poverty and lack of modern equipment for preservation are also contributing factors.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the nature and transformation of Fulbe/Mambilla relations from friendliness to animosity. It argued that the major factor promoting discord between the Fulbe and the Mambilla was a class struggle between the bourgeoisies and the proletariats over the control and distribution of resources. Whenever the latter felt oppressed, the ending result will be chaos and violence. Besides, poverty, squalor, unemployment and the inter-play of politics further endangered the presence of peaceful co-existence among the major ethnic groups inhabiting the plateau. It also highlighted the chemistry of the challenges and prospects.

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Oral Interview:

S.N	NAME	AGE	OCCUPATION	PLACE OF INTERVIEW	DATE OF INTERVIEW
1.	Don Williams	49	Teacher	Gembu	01/06/2017
2.	Muhammad Bello	77	Herdsman	Ngroje	01/04/2014
3.	Paul Abba	78	Pastor	Gembu	04/06/2014
4.	Abdullahi Baworo	54	Herdsman	Kwara-Kwara	07/06/2017
5.	Jonathan C. Yep	81	Reverend	Gembu	17/06/2017
6.	Ahmad Tukur	63	Imam	Tamya	29/06/2017